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The Global Financial Crisis caused upheaval to the world economy, triggered many corpo-
rate failures, and inflicted significant social distress with long lasting ramifications. This the-
sis applies DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) New Institutional Theory and Clegg’s (1989) Theory 
of Power to analyse contributing factors to the collapse of the investment bank Lehman 
Brothers.  This is achieved by employing a case study approach which examines reasons for 
the failure. It is of interest because Lehman Brothers was the only major US investment 
bank allowed to fail by regulators at this time. Isomorphic influences and interplays of pow-
er associated with the US investment banking industry are contextualised in the study.  
This thesis finds contributing factors to Lehman Brothers’ collapse included the risks of a 
‘light touch’ approach to investment banking regulation; deficiencies in the capital adequacy 
rules; and, consequences of a lack of oversight over innovative practices. It is found that 
regulators were subjected to regulatory capture by the investment banking industry, and 
deviated from their role as stewards of the public interest. Similarly, the thesis finds risks to 
asset markets were heightened by a prolonged neo-liberal approach to economic policy. 
The investment banking industry’s influence over politicians and regulators through lobby-
ing, political contributions, and the use of the ‘revolving door’ was a way of influencing legis-
lative and economic policy outcomes to their benefit.  
Further, the business and political connections of the US investment banking industry which, 
when combined with specialised knowhow and an ability to innovate, generated powerful 
commercial advantage. The influence exerted by the investment banking industry extended 




potential profitability of the industry. The investment banking industry was able to encour-
age the issuing of inflated credit ratings for their securitisation vehicles and clients. Addi-
tionally, the industry was instrumental in the design of an accounting standard applying to 
repurchase agreements which was open to ambiguous interpretation, allowing Lehman 
Brothers to conceal significant amounts of debt from stakeholders. 
The Lehman Brothers case study revealed that unbridled power, especially when motivated 
by self-interest, generated a dysfunctional organisational culture. Individuals’ behaviours 
were driven by a ‘survive at all costs’ mentality. This setting led to poor management deci-
sions within a weak corporate governance system causing the firm’s ultimate demise. It re-
veals the limitation of regulations to control behavior, and signals a need for regulators who 
routinely deal with firm and systemic risk to focus more attention towards corporate cul-
ture. The systemic risk was compounded by an institutional isomorphism which engendered 
common business models amongst the industry peer group. This resulted in similar financial 
structures typified by excessive leverage, which were tested during the global financial crisis 
and found to be inadequate, requiring urgent government intervention.  The findings of this 
thesis could help prevent future costs to taxpayers, investors, and society. 
Key words: GFC, investment banking, power, institutional theory, Repo 105, corporate gov-





 INTRODUCTION CHAPTER 1
The Global Financial Crisis (GFC) which peaked during 2008, significantly impacted the global 
financial system with dire consequences for the world economy. The resulting social effects 
touched many individuals and its impact has been long lasting. The GFC also triggered the 
failure of several large financial institutions including banks and investment banks, including 
Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc (LB), the subject of the case study in this thesis. The economic 
cost of the GFC has been difficult to estimate due to the far reaching nature of its impact. 
However, according to Porter (2014), based on a model developed by the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Dallas, it was noted that: 
… The [US] economy would return to its previous path by 2023 and concluded that the total 
loss would amount to 40 per cent to 90 per cent of a year’s worth of economic output. That’s 
about $US6 trillion to $US14 trillion in today’s money – or $US19,000 to $US45,000 per per-
son (Porter 2014). 
Using a broader measure, which takes into account the cost to the US government and the 
impact to US workers in general, the cost of the GFC approximated USD 180,000 per person 
in the US (Porter 2014). Therefore given the magnitude of the crisis, a study relating to the 
GFC is considered a worthwhile contribution to the literature at a time when the world is 
still suffering from its impacts. This thesis is motivated by a desire to better understand the 
causes of the GFC by examining the largest corporate failure in US history up to that time in 
2008. Rather than limiting the analysis to economic or technical factors, the thesis peels 
back the layers of the causes of LB’s failure to reveal a story involving human and organisa-
tional interactions within a socially constructed environment. There is a relative dearth of 
qualitative research on the investment banking industry which this thesis addresses. There 
are various contributing factors that led to the GFC which are either technical or qualitative 
in nature. This thesis analyses certain qualitative factors and explains an often ignored cause 
of the GFC which relates to organisations’ cultural and persons’ behavioural characteristics, 
which played a profound role in the years leading to its manifestation.  
 
The primary contribution of this thesis is its use of two theoretical frameworks in explaining 
the downfall of LB and providing a rich insight into the investment banking industry and the 
role of the financial network in the lead up to the GFC. The application of the two theoreti-
cal frameweworks is unique and was necessary as the use of a single theory would have 
been insufficient to explain both internal and external influences on LB’s failure. This use of 
two theories uses a methodology assuming a non-realist ontological stance (Chua 1986, 
Hopwood 1987, Hines 1988), that sees the culture of investment banking as socially con-




unique in the context of explaining a financial crisis. A case study offers two important op-
portunities: firstly it allows an analysis of practice; and secondly, it permits an evaluation of 
the theory.  
The scope of this thesis is limited to an investigation of the failure of LB which was selected 
for the case study as it was the only US investment bank officially allowed to fail by entering 
bankruptcy. The case study extends to 15 September 2008, when LB declared bankruptcy. 
The commencement of the timeline is driven by the historical context which is detailed in 
CHAPTER 4 and CHAPTER 5 with the history of the investment banking industry and LB re-
spectively. Therefore as the history of the US investment banking industry can be traced to 
the beginning of the American Revolutionary War in 1775 (the Revolution), this date has 
been used as the starting point.  
A major limitation of this thesis is the timeline used with respect to the regulatory, commer-
cial, social and political responses post-GFC. Similarly this study is conducted using the US as 
its subject field and a detailed discussion of the effective failure of other international in-
vestment banks and other economies is beyond the scope of this study and is recommend-
ed for future research. A final limitation of this study involves a significant reliance on sec-
ondary data from third parties such as journalists, and books authored by ex-employees 
who provide accounts of industry participants. The use of primary sources such as inter-
views of participants directly involved in the crisis would provide a deeper insight. The re-
mainder of this chapter outlines the research question and the structure of the thesis.  
1.1 Research Problem and Question 
The causes of the GFC have been well canvassed in academic literature (Acemoglu 2009; 
Arup 2010; Brunnermeier 2009; Calomiris 2009a; Diamond & Rajan 2009; Fahlenbrach & 
Stulz 2011; Grant & Wilson 2012; Masood 2009; Mian et al. 2013; Obstfeld & Rogoff 2009; 
Paulson 2011; Pol 2012; Reinhart & Rogoff 2009; Sinclair 2010; Swedberg 2010; Tarr 2010; 
Taylor 2009a). The qualitative issues underlying the material decisions of the key players in 
positioning the economy, the profitability and financial structure of various organisations 
and the performance of the financial and other asset markets, however, are relatively un-
der-researched. The research problem is therefore related to the relative lack of qualitative 
research relating to the causes of the GFC. In particular a search for the human and institu-
tional influences which steered decision-making that led to the failure of financial markets 
and institutions and resultant economic and social turmoil. The case study approach featur-
ing the largest corporate failure in the US at the time, which happened to be one of the 




calamity that followed. The research question posed by this study relates to the cultural as-
pects of the failure of LB and is articulated as follows: 
To what extent did the cultural and behavioural influences through the context of an 
institutional framework and interplays of power within the investment banking in-
dustry contribute to the failure of LB?  
The research question is answered through the lens of two theoretical frameworks. Firstly,  
DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) New Institutional Theory, which explains the institutional in-
fluences upon LB and a financial network consisting of the investment banking industry; 
other financial institutions (such as hedge funds, commercial banks, money market corpora-
tions and other financial institutions); the regulators; the government (including individual 
politicians); credit rating agencies (CRAs); and lobby groups representing the investment 
banking industry. Secondly, Clegg’s (1989) Theory of Power is applied to reveal power rela-
tionships which enabled individuals to pursue organisational strategies consistent with ful-
filling a personal agenda dominated by self-interest. 
1.2 Plan of the Thesis 
This introductory chapter outlines the purpose of the research as providing a rich insight 
into the culture and behavioural practices of LB and other participants in the investment 
banking industry in the US. CHAPTER 2 sets the economic, regulatory and political context 
over the time period immediately prior to the GFC. This includes a period of a neo-liberal 
political environment, a burgeoning economy and a ‘light touch’ to investment banking reg-
ulation. CHAPTER 3 outlines the theoretical lens used in this thesis which incorporates Di-
Maggio and Powell’s (1983) New Institutional Theory, augmented by Clegg’s (1989) Theory 
of Power. CHAPTER 3 also explains the methodology and method used in the research.  
An understanding of the evolving culture and practice of the investment banking industry is 
assisted by the historical context described in CHAPTER 4. Profiles and behavioural charac-
terisitics of a sample of historical personalities are provided to describe practices within the 
investment banking industry which are found to persist up to the pre-GFC period. Certain 
historical events such as economic crises and trends such as the pressure to change corpo-
rate structures are also highlighted. These factors offer an understanding of the influences 
exerted on the evolution of the regulatory field and the opportunities and challenges con-
fronting the investment banking industry throughout this period. Ultimately the historical 
influences help explain the industry’s modern day modus operandi.  
CHAPTER 5 follows with a history of LB, which tracks the development of the firm’s culture 




brothers who established the business in 1850 to the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Richard 
Fuld who presided over the firm during its demise in 2008. The chapter is divided between 
periods covering the pre-Fuld era and the post-Fuld era, in order to isolate specific cultural 
traits impacting the firm from the time Richard Fuld, LB’s last Chairman and CEO, ascended 
to power. The pre-Fuld era respresents LB’s history prior to Richard Fuld’s appointment as 
CEO and Chairman, whilst the post-Fuld era refers to the period following this appointment. 
Certain parallels are found to exist between behaviours and practices of the industry out-
lined in CHAPTER 4 and those found in LB. These parallels support the argument that com-
mon institutional influences affected various participants within LB throughout its history. 
The last days of LB warrant a dedicated discussion in CHAPTER 6 given the important deci-
sions made by senior management which directly led to the firm’s downfall. An explanation 
of some of the important innovations and practices of the industry which were also adopted 
by LB, and the lack of transparency exhibited by the firm shed light on some of the cultural 
causes of the GFC. The decisions leading to the financial pressures on LB and which ulti-
matelty caused LB’s liquidity crisis reveal the dysfunctional exertion of power by senior 
leadership within the firm. As the firm experienced a deterioration in performance, the reg-
ulators and public authorities, who were once subjected to powerful influences from indus-
try, ultimately declined to rescue the firm. 
CHAPTER 7 discusses the common business models and financial structures adopted by ma-
jor US investment banks. As investment banks operate in a competitive and ambiguous en-
vironment where economic cycles, evolving technology and innovation are constant fea-
tures and challenges, the mimetic pressures as explained by New Institutional Theory led 
divisional units of the peer group to undertake lines of business similar to each other. Fur-
ther, the profitability benefits of the leverage effect were uniformly exploited by the major 
investment banks, despite the resultant dangers it conferred by way of an over-extended 
debt profile. 
The value of connections developed by the investment banking community within the finan-
cial network is analysed in CHAPTER 8. A coercive influence as described by DiMaggio and 
Powell (1983) was exerted by the industry on these connections and led to a regulatory cap-
ture by the investment banking industry which influenced the regulatory process to produce 
an environment conducive to generating stronger financial performance. The same influ-
ence was exerted over the Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) which published favourable and 
flawed credit ratings for customers of the investment banks and the firm sponsored securiti-
sation vehicles. Further, the accounting standard setters who through a consultation pro-
cess involving the investment banking industry issued an accounting standard – FAS 140 
which allowed LB the flexibility to avoid the accounting of Repurchase Agreements (Repos) 
as debt, thereby ‘window dressing’ its financial statements by an understating of its lever-




LB’s senior management in ensuring the accounting for this financial instrument achieved 
the desired effect of concealing significant levels of debt from its stakeholders.   
CHAPTER 10 concludes by adding to the suggestion that Fuld exercised power for motives of 
self-interest. His exercise of power involved an influence over the firms’s corporate govern-
ance system which was underpinned by his duality of role. This influence was exerted over 
board composition and involved supporting the appointment of ageing directors. These 
were mostly retired from their previous executive roles, and were lacking in the currency of 
modern investment banking innovations. The same directors lacked relevant expertise and 
experience, which was necessary to make informed decisions in their area of responsibility. 
Additionally there were attractive board compensation arrangements which enticed board 
members to remain on the board and perpetuate their longstanding friendly relationships 
with the Chairman and senior management. The board sub-committees met periodically 
and the frequency with which each sub-committee met signals the importance of the re-
spective committees. For example the compensation committee met more frequently than 
the finance and risk committee implying a prioritisation of compensation over finance and 
risk matters. This combination of board attributes led to a less than optimal monitoring role 
and level of engagement from the board. A further insight into LB’s corporate culture is 
shown by Fuld’s relationship with employees, where he routinely exercised power, for ex-
ample ensuring a lucrative employee compensation structure (refer section 10.5), to ensure 
the pursuit of his strategy of generating growth at all costs. This culture is highlighted by a 
rhetorical analysis of a corporate presentation and certain communications between senior 
executives of the firm. Finally, LB’s stated commitment to ethical values is shown to diverge 
from the firm’s practice. CHAPTER 11 summarises the thesis, presents a conclusion which 
reinforces the contribution of the thesis, and suggests areas for further research. 
The following chapter establishes an appropriate background to the thesis by identifying the 
various causes of the GFC as covered by the literature. It also introduces two important 
themes which recur throughout the thesis, that is, the problem of insufficient capital regula-
tion over the investment banking industry and the related problem of a neo-liberal ap-
proach to financial market legislation generally. The following chapter concludes with a jus-
tification for selecting LB as the subject of the case study used in the thesis. The case study 





 BACKGROUND TO THE GFC CHAPTER 2
This chapter provides a brief background to the GFC to set the economic, social and political 
context of the thesis. The chapter addresses the problem of insufficient capital regulation 
for the investment banking industry, the neo-liberal approach to financial market regulation 
and concludes with the selection of LB as the subject of the case study in this thesis.  
The GFC was sparked in July 2007 with the failure of two highly leveraged hedge funds man-
aged by Bear Stearns due to their investments in subprime mortgages1. The crisis that en-
sued was termed the subprime crisis and effectively came to notice in early 2007 when 
lenders to the subrime borrower market began to experience a rising level of defaults. 
Housing  construction companies were suffering from a deteriorating housing market. This 
affected banks’ balance sheet structures, causing a liquidity crisis. The follow-on effects of 
this liquidity crisis universally affected the global banking system, culminating in devalua-
tions of numerous asset classes, predominantly in the equity, debt and real-estate seg-
ments. LB failed on 15 September 2008 – the subject of the case study in this thesis. 
Lucas highlighted the significance of the LB bankruptcy as a milestone in the crisis: 
… until the Lehman failure the recession was pretty typical of the modest downturns of the 
post-war period. After Lehman collapsed and the potential for crisis had become a reality, 
the situation was completely altered (Lucas 2009, p. 67).  
Similarly, Blinder noted: 
…everything fell apart after Lehman went over the cliff, no financial institution seemed safe. 
So lending froze, and the economy sank like a stone. It was a colossal error, and many people 
said so at the time (Blinder 2009, p. 2).  




 A subprime mortgage is a home loan made to borrowers with who would under normal circumstances nnot 
qualify for a regular home loan. These loans are often associated with simple documentation (low-doc) and 
made available with no deposit requirements and/or little evidence of loan serviceability such as income tax 




Henry Paulson, the prevailing US Treasury Secretary, confirmed the magnitude of the prob-
lem which affected the financial system and the market confidence upon which it relies:  
We had a system crisis. Credit markets froze and banks substantially reduced interbank lend-
ing. Confidence was seriously compromised throughout our financial system. Our system was 
on the verge of collapse, a collapse that would have significantly worsened and prolonged 
the economic downturn that was already under way (Paulson 2008) 
In addition to the depth of the crisis was the complexity associated with the various causes 
and their interrelationships. According to Brunnermeier (2009, p. 77) “The financial market 
turmoil in 2007 and 2008 has led to the most severe financial crisis since the Great Depres-
sion and threatens to have large repercussions on the real economy”. Literature to date has 
explored and surmised the GFC as having multiple contributory factors.(Acemoglu 2009; 
Arup 2010; Brunnermeier 2009; Calomiris 2009a; Diamond & Rajan 2009; Fahlenbrach & 
Stulz 2011; Grant & Wilson 2012; Masood 2009; Mian et al. 2013; Obstfeld & Rogoff 2009; 
Paulson 2011; Pol 2012; Reinhart & Rogoff 2009; Sinclair 2010; Swedberg 2010; Tarr 2010; 
Taylor 2009a). The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission which was appointed by the US Con-
gress in January 2011 summarised these contributory factors as follows:   
widespread failures in financial regulation and supervision; dramatic failures of corporate 
governance and risk management at many systemically important financial institutions; a 
combination of excessive borrowing, risky investments and a lack of transparency; govern-
ments and regulators which were ill-prepared and inconsistent with each other in their ap-
proach to regulation; a systemic breakdown in accountability and ethics; the collapsing of 
mortgage lending standards and mortgage securitisation; over the counter (OTC) derivatives; 
and a failure of credit rating agencies (Financial Crisis Enquiry Commission 2011, pp. xv-
xxviii). 
Although there is continuing discussion about the causes of the GFC, we are offered some 
insights by the Leaders of the Group of 202, who concluded the following: 




 The Group of Twenty (G20) is an assembly of the leaders of approximately 20 countries which meets regular-
ly to discuss issues related to global economic governance. As at 2016 “The Group of 20 comprised 19 coun-
tries (Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Re-
public of Korea, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, United Kingdom, US and the European Union)” 




During a period of strong global growth, growing capital flows, and prolonged stability earli-
er this decade, market participants sought higher yields without an adequate appreciation of 
the risks and failed to exercise proper due diligence. At the same time, weak underwriting 
standards, unsound risk management practices, increasingly complex and opaque financial 
products, and consequent excessive leverage combined to create vulnerabilities in the sys-
tem. Policy-makers, regulators and supervisors, in some advanced countries, did not ade-
quately appreciate and address the risks building up in financial markets, keep pace with fi-
nancial innovation, or take into account the systemic ramifications of domestic regulatory 
actions (Leaders of The G20 2008). 
These sentiments were not inconsistent with those of the prevailing chairman of the US 
Federal Reserve, Ben Bernanke3  who offered the following explanation:  
The proximate cause of the crisis was the turn of the housing cycle in the US and the associ-
ated rise in delinquencies on subprime mortgages, which imposed substantial losses on many 
financial institutions and shook investor confidence in credit markets. (Bernanke 2009, p. 1).  
Bernanke also attributed the crisis to aspects of the credit boom including: 
 … widespread declines in underwriting standards, breakdowns in lending oversight by inves-
tors and rating agencies, increased reliance on complex and opaque credit instruments that 
proved fragile under stress, and unusually low compensation for risk taking (Bernanke 
2009, p. 1).  
McSweeney (2009) agrees that the GFC was sparked by the collapse of the housing market, 
principally in the US. Reddy (2010) goes further suggesting that the “main proximate 
sources of the crisis were 15 or 20 financial conglomerates” (Reddy 2010, p. 131). These 
global financial institutions which fuelled the credit boom were complicit in the “unsound 
risk management practices” (Bernanke 2009, p. 1). McSweeney (2009) also directs blame 
towards the financial institutions sector and claims that with adequate financial reserves 
these institutions would have been able to withstand the shocks from the GFC: 




 Ben Bernanke, whose background is in economics, was a Chairman of the US Federal Reserve between 2006 
and 2014. Prior to his role with the Federal Reserve, Bernanke was the Federal Governor and Chairman of the 




But too many were over-exposed not only because of their careless acquisition of ‘toxic as-
sets’ – often knowingly or unwittingly created by sellers from their risky and even distressed 
liabilities – but also as a result of unwise and speculative activities (McSweeney 2009, p. 
836).  
Figure 1 shows the escalation of the housing bubble until its collapse in 2007. 
Figure 1 - US House Price Index 1991 to 2008 
 
Data Source: Data fro the graph was extracted from the Federal Housing Finance Agency 
database (Federal Housing Finance Agency 2010). 
Other literature, for example, focuses on specific causes such as the inherent conflicts of 
interest between CRAs and financial institutions which led to problematic credit ratings 
which is well covered by Barth et al. (2009), Brunnermeier (2009), Calomiris (2009b), and 
Caprio et al. (2008). Section 8.3 has a detailed discussion on the CRAs. Taylor (2009b) how-
ever, claims the Federal Reserve’s accommodative monetary policy produced an environ-
ment conducive to the formation of the asset bubbles which preceded the crisis, arguing it 
to be more than a liquidity crisis. Wallison (2009) tends to focus on the US government’s 
inept attempts to regulate Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs) and the role played by 
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response to the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA Act) which is discussed later in this 
chapter. Holcombe and Powell (2009) similarly support the view that as many government 
agencies were focused on increasing home ownership, they concurrently influenced banks 
to lower underwriting and credit risk standards. The loosening of credit risk standards sup-
plied the impetus for an increasing supply of credit, particularly to the housing market – re-
fer Figure 2 for a graph of home lending volumes in the US from 1998 to 2008. 
Figure 2 - US Home Loan Volumes for Period 1998 to 2008 
 
Source: The data fro the graph was extracted from the Federal Reserve database (Federal 
Reserve Bank of St Louis 2015b). 
As lenders searched for more lending opportunities in the early 2000s, they lowered their 
credit risk standards and began to accumulate subprime mortgages. Mayer et al. (2009) 
found there was a significant growth of subprime loans comprising loans mostly with no de-
posit or documentation between 2001 and 2006. Mian and Sufi (2009) also found significant 
growth in subprime lending and related it to higher default rates and the use of securitisa-
tion as a vehicle in creating greater capacity for the industry to expand lending in this seg-
ment of the market. As higher volumes of subprime loans were written, those banks which 



















































































































problem loans. Dell’Ariccia et al. (2012) confirmed this trend and associated delinquency 
rates with areas in which credit risk criteria were lowered by home lenders.   
Yeoh (2010) and Aluchna (2013) argue that governance practices within both government 
and industry are largely to blame for the GFC. Yeoh (2010) relies on observations of relevant 
banking practices common within the industry to support this contention. Taylor (2009a) 
claims that inconsistent government intervention worsened the crisis, citing government 
support of some financial institutions such as the American International Group Inc (AIG) 
and their creditors, but not others, for example LB, which was allowed to fail. The govern-
ment’s inconsistent treatment of troubled organisations during the crisis was handled with-
out a clear framework. 
Jaffee (2009) argued that the government should regulate investment banks quickly to avoid 
the moral hazard which was exacerbated following the bailout of US investment bank Bear 
Stearns. At this time regulators orchestrated a rescue through a merger with JP Morgan 
Chase. Jaffee (2009) conceded that further regulation was required given the urgency and 
potential major impact on the US economy.  
On the other hand, Rosenberg (2009) raises the moral hazard problem to argue against a 
government interventionist approach. He claims that the real “systemic risks are due to the 
moral hazard engendered from market expectations of a LB bailout following the govern-
ment bailout of Bear Stearns” (Rosenberg 2009, p. 78). He therefore argues against the risk 
of government intervention as a response to the GFC and claims the market response during 
the period immediately prior to the LB default was unpredictable due to previous govern-
ment interventions. The differing stance taken by Rosenberg (2009) compared to Jaffee 
(2009) highlights the inconclusive views in academic literature on whether more or less reg-
ulation is the answer to avoiding a repeat of the GFC.  
Although the depth and nature of regulation is important, of equal importance are the per-
ception and characteristics of the relationship between regulators and industry participants 
(Sinclair 2010). The importance of a transparent and distinct separation between industry 
participants and their regulators is identified as an area which is under-researched. This the-
sis asks the question: could it be possible that the inconsistent approach to supporting or-
ganisations as espoused by Taylor (2009a) was partly based on the influence of the actors or 
their varying uses of power within and between the respective organisations and regula-
tors? The answer to this question, not addressed specifically by Taylor, constitutes a contri-
bution to the understanding of this era of financial history. 
A deeper understanding of the various causes of a financial crisis will assist in identifying the 
underlying protagonists. Sinclair (2010) notes it is helpful to contrast two main ideologies of 
understanding crises, exogenous and endogenous perceptions. Firstly Sinclair (2010) argues 




such as Adam Smith, Friedrich von Hayek and Milton Friedman. The overriding principle is 
that markets, when unimpeded, are efficient allocators of resources and any deviation from 
a normal state of the market would explain a crisis. Given the assumption of efficient mar-
kets, this approach blamed external causes, such as government intervention, as the instiga-
tor of a crisis.  
Secondly Sinclair (2010) notes the contrast endogenous approach, which claims that finan-
cial crises begin primarily within the financial markets community:  
Central to the endogenous perspective is the idea that market traders do not merely inte-
grate information coming from outside the markets in the wider, real economy, but are fo-
cused on what other traders are doing, in an effort to anticipate their buy/sell activities, and 
thus make money from them (or at least avoid losing more money than the average)… On 
this account, finance is subject to the pathologies of social life (Sinclair 2010, p. 95). 
Thus, this alternative perception of how the financial markets function and produce crises 
features aspects of social interaction such as rumours, norms, and practices, and is subject 
to social phenomena such as interplays of power and influence. This thesis adopts the en-
dogenous approach as a way of understanding and illustrating the underlying causes of the 
GFC. This approach goes beyond much of the existing literature on technical causes which 
ignore the cultural and behavioural explanations.  
The preceding section outlined various approaches identified in the literature that are used 
to understand the causes of the GFC. The remaining part of this chapter uses Sinclair’s 
(2010) framework to focus on the endogenous approach and deals with two key background 
themes which set the context for this thesis. That is, insufficient capital regulation prevailing 
at the time, and the neo-liberal approach to financial market legislation which led to the 
former. This contextual background allows for a fuller understanding of the external envi-
ronmental conditions within which the social interactions of financial market participants 
occurred.  
2.1 Insufficient Capital Regulation 
An important aspect of the GFC was the relatively high leverage, or expressed in terms of 
capital, an insufficient level of capitalisation of financial institutions in general and in par-
ticular, the US investment banking industry. A requirement for minimum capital levels has 
traditionally been the principle prudential tool used by regulators to manage risk profiles of 
banks, pursuant to the Basel regulations as described below. The regulatory framework for 
investment banks in the US however, did not employ the same focus on minimum levels of 




in the minimum levels of capital required but the types and extent of risks that were to be 
covered by such capital. This problem of insufficient capital in the investment banking indus-
try was created by two factors: firstly the push for higher leverage by investment banks so 
they could take advantage of the increased profitability from the ‘leverage effect’ (refer sec-
tion 7.3.1 for a detailed discussion on the leverage effect); and secondly, the lax require-
ments relating to the capital adequacy of investment banks prior to the GFC. See section 
4.4.8 for a detailed discussion on the voluntary nature of compliance to capital regulations 
by the large US investment banks.  
Financial institution failures can generally be classified into two main categories: Banks, and 
Non-Bank Financial Intermediaries (NBFIs). The number of US financial institution failures 
between 2007 and 2014 is set out in Figure 3. 
Figure 3 - US Financial Institution Failures 2007 - 2014 
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
           
Number of Financial 
Institution Failures 
3 24 140 157 92 51 24 18 
Source: (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 2016). 
Figure 3 shows a steep escalation in the number of failures following the GFC period of 
2007/2008, peaking in 2010 with 157 failures. These failures occurred despite the prevailing 
regulatory framework which suggests an inherent weakness in the ability of regulations to 
protect financial institutions from bankruptcy. Licenced banks (as opposed to investment 
banks) in the US are a highly regulated group whose risk management frameworks and prac-
tices are largely influenced by various regulators4. The key regulator for US banks is the Fed-
eral Reserve System, which at the time of the LB collapse adopted the prudential guidelines 
stipulated by the Bank of International Settlements known as Basel II5.  




 Bank regulators in the USA consist of Federal Reserve System, Comptroller of the Currency, Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation, Department of Justice, Securities and Exchange Commission and State Boards or Com-
missions. 
5
 Basel II refers to a set of prudential guidelines issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, an ad-







A major sub-group within the NBFI sector comprises the investment banking industry. The 
activities of the US investment banks were however subject to a less stringent regulatory 
environment as they did not fall under the same regulatory umbrella as banks as illustrated 
by Figure 4. Instead they were officially supervised by the US Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (SEC) and this supervision was largely voluntary (Sirri 2008). See section 4.4.8 for a 
detailed discussion of the voluntary nature of regulation impacting the large US investment 
banks. Investment bank activities conform to a generally common business model.  The 
framework driving investment banks’ business activities is created and managed by an or-
ganisation’s leadership through conscious decision-making, ranging from high level strategic 
to tactical operational decisions within a regulatory environment which during the pre-GFC 
period was shown to be deficient (McSweeney 2009). 
  
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
 
forms the basis of formal rules for adoption by prudential supervisors around the world. The US Federal Re-










The differences in the regulatory framework between the banking and investment banking 
industries, and the degree of the regulatory strictures were to be tested during the GFC. In 
the timeline of the GFC, it was at the approximate point of LB’s bankruptcy when the pendu-
Global Financial Crisis 
Investment Banks Commercial Banks 








lum had swung from the neo-liberalist6 approach to a more interventionist7 approach as the 
government attempted to stave off an even deeper crisis. Examples of government inter-
vention were the arrangements to rescue failing institutions such as AIG, the large govern-
ment sponsored mortgage institutions - Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, Morgan Stanley, Bear 
Stearns, Washington Mutual, Wachovia Corporation, and Citigroup. The US government also 
provided its guarantee to enhance liquidity of financial institutions’ money market accounts 
with Federal Reserve programs to purchase commercial paper issued by financial institu-
tions. A more significant assistance package was established through The Emergency Eco-
nomic Stabilization Act, which implemented the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), en-
acted on October 3, 2008. This government intervention reintroduced a degree of liquidity 
to the market which assisted in the short term funding needs of US banks, possibly prevent-
ing a complete loss of confidence in the financial markets and an even deeper crisis. The in-
terventionist approach was an admission that the laissez-faire approach had serious short-
comings, especially in times of crises. 
Ultimately the remaining investment banks were taken under the Federal Reserve System’s 
supervisory control by either being classified as bank holding companies or being merged 
with other bank holding companies. This move achieved a reprieve for both Morgan Stanley 
and Goldman Sachs from the liquidity crisis which affected all investment banks. The status 
of a bank holding company qualified both these investment banks for official protection and 
emergency funding by the Federal Reserve, as well as the associated market confidence that 
comes with the status and the capital regulations which applied to all banks. These and oth-
er subsequent financial aid programs represented a reversal from the neo-liberalist ap-
proach to financial regulation which permeated through the government and regulatory 
sectors prior to 2008. 




 Neoliberalism is an ideology that supports a laissez faire approach to the management of an economy. The 
reliance of this ideology is on allowing markets to be subject to unobstructed market competition. The notion 
is backed by a belief that the markets are best able to allocate limited resources within an economy and there-
fore are able to maximise economic growth. In order to facilitate free market operation, government interven-
tion is discouraged (Smith 2016). 
 
7
 An interventionist approach involves a government intervening in the market process by employing economic 
and regulatory policies which attempt avoid market failure and produce positive economic and social out-
comes. This government intervention is at odds with the neoliberal approach which supports a free market 




2.2 Neo-Liberal Approach to Financial Market 
Legislation  
The US executive government has for decades been pre-occupied with the affordability of 
housing for the underprivileged classes. In 1977, the Carter administration introduced the 
CRA Act which was intended to support the borrowing needs of low income individuals and 
families residing in underprivileged communities. The CRA Act effectively designated geo-
graphic areas as zones of extreme poverty, a process called ‘redlining’ and required banks to 
establish branches in these zones and allocate a proportion of their loan portfolios targeted 
to home mortgages in these zones. The CRA Act provided for penalties including bans on the 
establishment of additional branches in wealthier regions if banks failed to meet the re-
quired portfolio allocations (Hylton & Rougeau 1999, pp. 164-6). The pressure on banks 
from government was profound: “banks were told to use innovative or flexible methods in 
lending to meet the goals of the CRA Legislation” (Hossain & Rezaul 2004, p. 57). Given 
these directives, banks were lending to customers that would otherwise not meet their 
credit criteria and consequently the quality of the home lending portfolios decreased. Dur-
ing this period, the Federal Reserve’s accommodative monetary policy kept interest rates 
relatively low. Homeowners took advantage of this to either purchase new homes or up-
grade. As demand for home loans increased so did the balance sheets of banks:  
Riskier mortgage standards by banks were not the consequence of deregulation; rather the 
banks were compelled to change the standards by new regulations at the behest of commu-
nity groups. Again, this was a political failure as the Administration sacrificed the greater so-
cial good to appeal to narrow constituencies (Tarr 2010, p. 2). 
In 1982, the Reagan administration, often cited as one of the most neo-liberal governments 
in the past several decades, introduced an act known as the Alternative Mortgage Transac-
tions Parity Act (AMTPA), which effectively permitted non-bank financial institutions to offer 
adjustable rate mortgages (ARM). These mortgages were influential in spurring home loan 
growth, as the key feature of the product involved an interest rate which was heavily dis-
counted in the initial period – usually 12 to 18 months, thereafter increasing substantially to 
a variable rate often many percentage points higher than the initial rate. This amendment 
offered the banking industry greater marketing power and flexibility for borrowers in their 
product choice. Combined, these enhancements provided greater access to home loan fi-
nancing to borrowers. 
The accommodating attitude towards the underprivileged segment of the community con-
tinued under the Clinton administration which in 1995 passed an amendment to the CRA 
Act commonly referred to as the CRA Expansion Act (CRA Expansion). Barr (2005) notes the 




group households, and resulted in an increase in the proportion of the US banks’ loan port-
folios related to distressed inner city areas. Naturally as this segment of the banks’ lending 
business grew, so did the credit risk of their portfolios. 
George W. Bush was US President from 2001 to 2009 - an important period prior to the GFC 
in which neo-liberal principles towards the investment banking industry prevailed. Bush’s 
presidency was characterised by extreme advocacy of free market principles: “This admin-
istration made decisions that allowed the free market to operate as a bar room brawl in-
stead of a prize fight” (Becker et al. 2008).  
During the Bush administration, US house prices increased significantly – refer to Figure 5 
for a graph showing the escalation of US house prices. Bush had established an ambitious 
goal to create housing for a large proprition of minority groups. According to Becker et al. 
(2008) “he had a plan to increase home ownership by US minority group families to 5.5 mil-
lion by the end of the decade [2000s]”. His strategy was to use the financial institution sec-
tor to carrying out his policy:  
Through his homeownership challenge, the President called on the private sector to help in 
this effort. More than two dozen companies and organizations have made commitments to 
increase minority homeownership - including pledges to provide more than $1.1 trillion in 
mortgage purchases for minority homebuyers this decade (United States White House 2004). 
Low income families however were still confronted with the challenge of meeting the initial 
deposit for a home loan. Bush solved this problem by establishing the American Dream 
Down Payment Act which would provide USD 200 million per annum to assist approximately 
400,000 low income families meet their deposit requirements (United States White House 
2004).  
According to Becker et al. (2008), Lawrence Lindsay, Director of the National Economic 
Council, and assistant to President Bush on economic policy, acknowledged that the White 
House was aware of the growing housing bubble, however had ignored it given any action to 
deal with it would have affected the President’s home ownership policy targets.    
The passing of new legislation to accommodate narrow constituencies and enable a deterio-
ration of loan portfolio quality had as much a detrimental effect in the lead up to the GFC as 
did deregulation. Political influence is therefore considered a contributory cause of the GFC 
even though indirect. Tarr (2010) goes further to associate the root cause of the GFC to a 
political malfunction:  
Politicians, however, often prefer to mandate a regulation on firms to achieve a political ob-
jective, since this allows them to avoid exposure of the costs of their programs while obtain-
ing support from narrow constituencies. In this further sense, the financial crisis is, at its root, 




The repeal of another piece of legislation created an environment which amongst the ‘too 
big to fail’8 syndrome encouraged riskier behaviour amongst the investment banking and 
banking industries. For the first time since the enactment of The Glass-Steagall Act (GSA) 
following the Great Depression of the 1930s, commercial banks, investment banks, securi-
ties firms and insurance companies were allowed to merge. The enabling act, commonly re-
ferred to as The Gramm Leach Bliley Act (GLBA), also known as the Financial Services Mod-
ernization Act of 1999 effectively repealed, in part, the GSA. The combining of operations of 
banks with other non-bank financial institutions is often cited as a cause of the Great De-
pression. A major reason for the non-consolidation of investment banks and licenced banks 
was the concern that the relatively high risk activities of an investment bank could adversely 
impact on the operations of a licenced bank (potentially in the form of a bankruptcy) and 
this in turn would harm the entity’s depositors. The GBLA for example, ratified the Citigroup 
consolidation of Citibank (Commercial Bank), Smith Barney (securities firm), Primerica (In-
surance and loans) and Travellers (Insurance). Furthermore, the GBLA failed to provide any 
meaningful regulatory oversight of the investment banking industry either through the SEC 
or any other governmental agency leading to the voluntary regulatory regime mentioned 
above. 
One of the most accommodative pieces of legislation, favourable to the investment banking 
industry was The Commodity Futures Modernization Act 2000 (CFMA). This Act exempted 
financial institutions from regulation in relation to their derivatives activities and important-
ly precluded risks associated with derivative positions from capital adequacy requirements. 
Without restriction, the investment banks were able to expand their derivatives trading 
businesses exponentially and thereby radically escalate their risk profiles without supervi-
sion. Further examples of the deregulation of the investment banking industry are outlined 
in Appendix A. 
A depiction of the combined impact of the enactment of a selection of the accommodative 
legislation is represented in Figure 5. It is argued that this legislation fuelled an increasing 
house price cycle which culminated in the commonly referred to ‘housing bubble.’ The 




 The "too big to fail" concept mainatains that large corporations, which are systemicly important to the econ-
omy should not be allowed to fail as their failure would have dire economic and social consequences. The ex-




graph below is merely intended to reveal the impact of some key pieces of legislation for 
illustrative purposes only and is not intended to represent a comprehensive compilation of 
legislation. Moreover the timeline extends over the latter period covered by this thesis 
which ends with the bankruptcy of LB on 15 September 2008.  
Figure 5 - US House Prices and selected US legislation 1975 to 2011 
 
Source: The data fro the graph was extracted from the Federal Reserve database (Federal 
Reserve Bank of St Louis 2015a). 
2.3 LB – Subject of the Case Study 
It is ironic that the financial institutions which contributed significantly to the credit boom 
were themselves counted amongst the casualties of the credit crunch that consumed many 
institutions. For example, Bear Stearns was forced to merge with JP Morgan Chase via an 
acquisition on 30 May 2008 (Waggoner & Lynch 2008); LB filed for bankruptcy on 15 Sep-



























































































ernment acquired an effective 79.9% ownership interest on 16 September 2008 (Webel 
2013); and Wachovia Bank was taken over by Wells Fargo on 31 December 2008 (Wells 
Fargo & Co 2009).  
This thesis uses a case study method using LB as its subject to elucidate the dysfunctional 
behavioural and institutional influences that prevailed from three perspectives: within LB 
itself; between LB and its stakeholders; and between the investment banking industry and 
external organisations including regulators, legislators, accounting standard setters and 
CRAs. The case study extends to 15 September 2008, when LB declared bankruptcy. When it 
begins is driven by the historical context which is detailed in CHAPTER 4 and CHAPTER 5 with 
the history of the investment banking industry and LB respectively. Therefore as the history 
of the US investment banking industry can be traced to the beginning of the American Revo-
lutionary War in 1775 (the Revolution), this date has been used as the starting point. 
LB was selected for the case study as it was the only US investment bank officially allowed 
to fail by entering bankruptcy. It is differentiated from other failing investment banks which 
avoided bankruptcy such as Bear Stearns, which was forced to merge with JP Morgan Chase, 
and Merrill Lynch & Co. which was sold to Bank of America Corp. Regarding the remaining 
two major US investment banks, Morgan Stanley shut down part of its trading desk as a 
consequence of the GFC whilst Goldman Sachs retained all its operating divisions and on 
September 22, 2008 together with Morgan Stanley, announced that they would become 
traditional bank holding companies, which as mentioned above in this section, are regulated 
by the Federal Reserve (Gandel 2009). Therefore Goldman Sachs was the only investment 
bank of its peer group which survived the GFC in its original form whilst the other invest-
ment banks were either merged with other entities or restructured their operations in order 
to continue operating.   
Chapters 4 and 5 explore the personal characteristics and behaviours found in US invest-
ment bankers since the formation of the industry and likens certain traits to those found in 
the senior management eschelons of LB. LB was a full service investment bank and carried 
out investment bank activities similar to those of its peer group which included Goldman 
Sachs Group, Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch and Bear Stearns. JP Morgan Chase carried out 
investment banking activities and could therefore be considered as part of the peer group, 
however it was a fully licensed bank at the time and is generally excluded from peer group 
comparisons. See section 7.2  for a full description of LB’s business activities. Figure 6 sets 
out the relative size of each investment bank based on market capitalisation and number of 
employees as at 2007, in order to provide an overview of the relative position of each in-





Figure 6 - Major US Investment Banks 2007 by Market Value and Number of Employees 
Investment Bank Highest  
market value 2007 
USD Billions 
Average  
number of employees 2007 
     
Merrill Lynch  150.89 64,200 
Goldman Sachs  107.05 30,522 
Morgan Stanley  83.34 56,000 
Lehman Bothers 59.38 28,556 
Bear Stearns 20.47 13,700 
      
Source: (Arslan 2009). 
This chapter provided a background to the GFC outlining the various causes, from the burst-
ing of the housing bubble to the resulting liquidity crisis in the financial markets. Underpin-
ning these adverse developments were two important regulatory related problems: insuffi-
cient capital regulation and a neo-liberal approach to financial market legislation.  The fol-
lowing chapter outlines the theoretical framework, methodology and method used in this 
study. The theoretical framework provides the lens through which this study is interpreted, 
and describes the broad philosophical underpinning of the case study method which is sup-





 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK, CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY AND METHOD 
This chapter introduces New Institutional Theory and Clegg’s (1989) Theory of Power, to 
better understand the historical context, events, personalities, and culture which prevailed 
prior to and during LB’s collapse. This case study using this framework enables recurrent 
themes of the interplay of power and institutional pressures to explain the behaviours driv-
ing important managerial decisions. This thesis augments New Institutional Theory with a 
Theory of Power, to unravel the pertinent influences from key sources, to provide a com-
prehensive view of LB’s downfall. 
The chapter commences with an outline of the theoretical framework used in this thesis. 
Firstly Di Maggio & Powell’s (1983) New Institutional Theory is introduced and its relevance 
to the case study is discussed. This is followed by an outline of Clegg’s concept of three cir-
cuits of power, which is considered important as it fills a deficiency found in New Institu-
tional Theory by explaining the power relations between individual actors and between ac-
tors and organisations. The chapter then describes the methodology and method used in 
this study. It is argued that a case study approach emphasises the importance of acknowl-
edging the social, political and economic contexts of LB’s downfall (Burrell & Morgan 1979; 
Chua 1986; Gioia & Pitre 1990; Hassard 1991; Hopwood 1987).  
3.1 Theoretical Framework 
This section outlines institutional influences on the investment banking industry and more 
specifically on LB prior to its collapse. New Institutional Theory is a derivation of the broader 
institutional theory which has attracted various interpretations since the first version devel-
oped by Weber (1905).  As well as a discussion on New Institutional Theory this chapter in-
cludes a discussion on Clegg’s (1989) Theory of Power which is used to augment New Insti-
tutional Theory to better explain the abovementioned dynamic influences at work within 
the investment banking industry.  
3.1.1 Institutional Theory and Theory of Power  
Institutional theory, which asks “provocative questions about the world of organizations” 
(Scott 1995, p. xiii), is capable of providing insights about organisational behaviour, whilst 




ing a comprehensive understanding of the interplay of power which is exposed through inci-
sive analysis of various forms of data and historical accounts (Clegg 2010; Leca & Naccache 
2006).  
The development of an appropriate theoretical framework for this study encompasses fea-
tures of both New Institutional Theory and Clegg’s (1989) Theory of Power. Clegg (2010) 
identifies an omission in the literature covering institutional theory: “Issue is taken with the 
relative absence of the analysis of power from many leading institutional theory accounts of 
organisations” (Clegg 2010, p. 4). The role of actors9 in institutional theory is at best fuzzy 
but can be addressed by considering a framework augmenting New Institutional Theory 
with a Theory of Power.  
The organisational culture of LB was shaped not only by external institutional forces but by 
the interplay of internal power relations. New Institutional Theory has been criticised as it 
does not adequately deal with power. This notion is supported by (Brint & Karabel 1991) 
who argue that the role of power in institutional processes is neglected in favour of cultural 
domination. Additionally, (Perrow 1986) suggests that institutional theory has downplayed 
the role of self-interest. This concept is important in the case of LB’s downfall as the domi-
nation of self-interest, particularly by the CEO was an important factor in the misguided de-
cision making prior to the firm’s downfall. Self-interest is however adequately dealt with by 
Clegg’s (1989) Theory of Power. This theory enables the linking of the CEO’s own self-
interest to that of the organisation’s and is able to highlight it as an object of his pursuit of 
power.  
Another shortcoming in the use of institutional theory to describe influences on organisa-
tions is in its definition of the organisational field. The organisation field is defined by insti-
tutional theory as “those organisations that, in the aggregate, constitute a recognised area 
of institutional life: key suppliers, resource and product customers, regulatory agencies, and 
other organisations that produce similar services or products” (DiMaggio & Powell 1983, p. 
148). However Clegg (2010, p. 5) argues that the “non-action or absence from a field is a 
significant form of presence and this element of power has largely been absent from en-








gagement with DiMaggio and Powell’s work”. This inclusion of ‘non-action or absence from 
a field’ to the definition is incorporated in this thesis. 
Clegg’s (1989) Theory of Power complements New Institutional Theory as it is able to ex-
plain the behaviours of individual actors within LB who were able to exercise power to 
shape the organisations culture and decision making processes. New Institutional Theory on 
the other hand is primarily concerned with the application of external institutional forces 
and therefore doesn’t adequaltely address the internal power relationships. Whilst Clegg’s 
(1989) Theory of Power can be effectively applied to the internal relationships within LB, 
specifically those between the poweful CEO and his fellow board members and employees, 
New Institutional Theory can help explain the various outside forces at play which influ-
enced the organisational culture, business model and financial structure of LB. Therefore 
the application of both theoretical frameworks in this thesis enables coverage of both inter-
nal and external forces at play which led to LB’s downfall. 
Other theoretical framweworks were considered for this thesis, including agency theory, 
stewardship theory, stakeholder theory, and resource dependency theory. A discussion of 
these theories is provided in section 10.2.1 including their limitations.  The use of both New 
Institutional Theory and Clegg’s (1989) Theory of Power overcomes the various limitations 
of the alternative theories in addressing the corporate governance failure of LB. A key dis-
tinction between the abovementioned group of theories and the two applied in this thesis is 
that the former theories are generally premised on agency where the focus is on traditional 
accounting concepts of shareholder wealth. They largely ignore the role of organisational 
culture and individual power relationships in effective corporate governance which is ac-
commodated by the latter theories respectively.  
Regulatory capture theory was also considered. Regulatory capture involves winning a regu-
latory agency’s support by influential and often large commercial or political interest groups 
whose industry or activities the agency is charged to regulate. The support is usually at the 
expense of the public in whose interests the regulatory agency is supposed to act, and may 
take the form of regulations which are advantageous to the interest group. This process 
leads to the notion that the regulatory agency is being ‘captured’ or allowing itself to be in-
fluenced by the interest group and therefore represents a failure of the regulatory agency 
(Chalmers et al. 2012; Cortese & Irvine 2010; Königsgruber 2010; Stigler 1971). 
In their study of the process by which the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) 
developed IFRS 6, ‘Exploration for and Evaluation of Mineral Resources’, Cortese and Irvine 
(2010) showed how participants in the extractive industries and other interested parties in-
fluenced the IASB to produce an accounting standard which accommodated their own pref-
erences. In this case the industry was able to maintain flexibility in its application of the ac-
counting standard by changing the IASB’s recommendation contained in their earlier pub-




the accounting standards setters to achieve their own ends. Similarly, Konigsgruber’s (2010) 
study found that companies were able to influence the US and European accounting stand-
ard setting process by making use of personal  relationships with political  decision-makers  
in  order  to  gain  leverage  over  the  standard  setter. The study found that companies 
have incentives to lobby political decision makers and the accounting standard setters in-
stead of participating in the due process normally associated with the establishment of ac-
counting standards.  
Regulatory capture theory therefore has merits in providing a framework for explaining the 
power that the investment banking industry had over regulators and is referred to in section 
8.2, in particular as it applies to the system of lobbying and use of political contributions in 
the US. However the theory ignores the influential forces that apply between non-
regulatory agencies and individuals. 
The following section discusses the evolution of Institutional Theory and is followed by a de-
scription of a branch of this theory known as New Institutional Theory which is applied in 
this thesis. 
3.1.2 Institutional Theory– Precursor to New Institutional 
Theory 
Weber, often considered the father of institutional theory, was interested in the overriding 
influences that organisations exerted on societies. The impact on society from a modern ra-
tionalisation process as exhibited by organisations is likened to a “polar night of icy dark-
ness” (Weber 2013, p. 128). The loss of an individual’s freedom to practice their own values 
is captured well by Weber: “The increasing rationalisation of human life traps individuals in 
an iron cage of rule-based rational control” (Weber 1905, p. 181). The ‘iron cage’ metaphor, 
a translation by Talcott Parsons of the German “stahlhartes Gehäuse” Baehr (2001, p. 154) 
is an attempt to conjure an image of the human subject under bureaucratic capitalism as 
within a ‘shell as hard as steel’.  
What Weber feared was not private capitalism per se but its rentier parasite, not individual-
ism but the accustomed Gehäuse of bureaucratic regimentation, not democracy but rule-
governed conformity, not administration in its place but the bureaucratic stultification of all 
sectors and spaces of life (Baehr 2001, p. 167). 
A further development of Weber’ descriptions involves institutionalisation being viewed as a 
process that should be viewed in the context of an organisation’s history and constituting an 
interdependence between the organisation and the actors within it (Jackson 2010; Selznick 
1957).  




It (institutionalisation) is something that happens to an organisation over time, reflecting the 
organisation’s own distinctive history, the people who have been in it, the groups it embodies 
and the vested interests they have created, and the way it has adapted to its environment.  
Given that institutionalisation is an important aspect of an organisations history two chap-
ters of this thesis consider the institutional forces at play during the history of the invest-
ment banking industry and LB. Institutional theory is useful in understanding organisational 
relationships. Garud et al. (2007) summarise academic literature on the influences on insti-
tutions from three perspectives: the economic; cognitive; and sociological. Within the insti-
tutional economics field, for instance, uncertainties relating to outcomes resulting in trans-
action costs which may prejudice an organisation are minimised. These transaction costs 
could arise from contractual arrangements between organisations. The repetition of the 
contractual process resulting from an institutionalisation of behaviour tends to reduce vari-
ability in contractual practice and any potential for opportunistic behaviour (Coase 1937; 
Williamson 1985). Literature on the cognitive perspective focuses on the way in which ac-
tors interpret otherwise ambiguous symbols in a common perspective. The individuals 
therefore construct a common meaning which leads to consistent cognitive activities 
(Geertz 1973). Actors interact “in a consensually validated grammar for reducing equivocali-
ty by means of sensible interlocked behaviour…[and therefore convert]…ongoing interde-
pendent actions into sensible sequences that generate sensible outcomes” (Weick 1979, p. 
3). Therefore the cognitive perspective allows an institution to interpret ambiguous symbols 
and information to construct a common meaning (Gioia & Chittipeddi 1991, pp. 434-5). This 
perspective on institutional theory explains the powerful hidden influences of conformity 
between organisations, “moreover, the shared nature of these cognitive frames makes it 
difficult to stray far from them in either thought or deed” (Garud et al. 2007, p. 159). 
Institutional theory can also be viewed from a sociological perspective whereby institutions 
are considered to be able to influence groups to conform to an accepted view of the world 
and such conformity attracts validation of behaviour. It is “a generalized perception or as-
sumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper or appropriate within some so-
cially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman 1995, p. 574). 
The resultant influence causes tension that constrains an actor’s activity to conform within 
an institutional field. “Some actions…come to be seen as legitimate and may even be pre-
scribed, making it difficult for actors to deviate from them” (Garud et al. 2007, p. 959). One 
of the influences of the sociological perception of institutional theory is the development of 
New Institutional Theory used in this thesis.  
A simple diagrammatical representation of where New Institutional Theory fits under the 




Figure 7 – Garud et al.’s (2007) positioning of New Institutional Theory 
 
Section 3.1.3 introduces New Institutional Theory, which was originally developed by Meyer 
and Rowan (1977), followed by an outline of Clegg’s (1989) Theory of Power which was de-
veloped through several iterations (Clegg 1975, 1979; Clegg & Dunkerley 1980). The chapter 
concludes by augmenting New Institutional Theory with Clegg’s Theory of Power to create a 
theoretical framework which accounts for institutional pressures, the role of key actors as 
well as the power interplays between various actors and between actors and organisations 
which seek to shape and influence their environments. 
3.1.3 New Institutional Theory 
The abovementioned sociological perspectives of institutional theory were developed in the 
1960s and 1970s with key literature by Luckmann and Berger (1966), Meyer and Rowan 
(1977), and Zucker (1977). This strand of the theory known as New Institutional Theory, 
proposes that new “institutional rules function as powerful myths” which “often conflict 
sharply with efficiency criteria” (Meyer & Rowan 1977, pp. 340-1). It is concerned with social 
structures such as schemas, rules, norms and belief systems. 
Meyer and Rowan (1977) developed Weber’s themes by describing organisational struc-
tures as “reflections of rationalised institutional rules” (Meyer & Rowan 1977, p. 340). Ac-
cording to Scott (1995, p. 13) these structures contained “shared knowledge and belief sys-
tems” which are “built into society as reciprocated typification or interpretations” (Meyer & 
Rowan 1977, p. 341). New Institutional Theory argues that institutions are social structures 














us what we should do), and are regulated, that is they are enforced. These social structures 
are communicated in the field through symbols, relationships, routines and artefacts. They 
provide stability for organisations, and operate at both the global and organisational levels. 
These social structures are buffered or protected by a decoupling process which is described 
by Meyer and Rowan (1977) as the formation and safeguarding of divergences between or-
ganisational structure including policies, on the one hand and practices on the other.  
Because attempts to control and coordinate activities in institutionalized organizations lead 
to conflicts and loss of legitimacy, elements of structure are decoupled from activities and 
from each other (Meyer & Rowan 1977, p. 357). 
Decoupling conflict from social institutions is necessary to cope with institutional inconsist-
encies that arise, allowing such pressures to appear to be dealt with rationally. Decoupling 
allows unresolved matters to avoid scrutiny, allowing ceremonial compliance, and thus giv-
ing the perception of commitment and maintaining legitimacy. 
New Institutional Theory offers a theoretical perspective through which we can analyse how 
the typical investment bank model evolved, and understand investment banker behaviour 
during the boom times of pre-GFC. New Institutional Theory helps us understand and ex-
plain how the social structures of the investment banking industry at the global level, and LB 
at the organisational level, are created, adopted, adapted and in time fail or change. Weick 
(1996, p. 567) notes that organisations such as investment banks can be “externally con-
trolled by their social contexts”, which are constructed by “what people take for granted 
and consider legitimate and are willing to pay as the price of being included”. The invest-
ment banking culture had developed a commonality which is demonstrated throughout this 
thesis. This culture established a structure of internal morality for behaviours and practices 
that were evident prior to the GFC. The behaviours and practices were socially justified in 
view of their common usage within the industry and in the shared motivations of individuals 
which was dominated by the maximisation of profits and bonuses. Institutions can therefore 
constitute vehicles which offer “stable designs for chronically repeated activity sequences” 
(Jepperson 2012, p. 145). New Institutional Theory can assist in understanding not only how 
the investment bank model evolved but why the major US investment banks shared the 
same model and their employees a common culture. 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) expanded New Institutional Theory by arguing that the uni-
verse of organisations is heavily influenced by institutionalised isomorphism. That is, organi-
sations incorporate operational structures, policies and practices which are similar within a 
particular field. This type of conformity appeals to the perception that ‘normal’ practice is 
risk averse and accrues legitimacy in the eyes of stakeholders, and not related to whether or 
not such conformity maximises profits. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) identify three means by 
which institutional norms permeate an organisational field. These institutional forces are 




pand on this concept by proposing the notion of “reverse legitimization” (Riaz 2009, p. 28). 
That is, if organisations are successful, the institutions, such as regulatory authorities which 
legitimised them are endorsed for supporting this success. He further argues that the mutu-
al legitimisation between an organisation and its regulator gives rise to a “contagion of legit-
imacy” (Riaz 2009, p. 27). However, when an organisation is revealed to be  unsuccessful, as 
for example, the publication of a bankrupt investment bank, the legitimacy of all investment 
banks becomes suspect. Riaz (2009) uses New Institutional Theory to help explain the caus-
es of the GFC. He argues that the the association between regulators and industry partici-
pants is fundamental to understanding the environment prior to the GFC. This complex in-
terplay, he argues, “provides perceptions of legitimacy to both parties” (Riaz 2009, p. 33). 
Riaz (2009, p. 28) also maintains that certain institutions may not endure “without the ac-
tive support and sanction of organisations”. This implies that organisations possess latent 
power which is used to influence the institutions that oversee them. However, Riaz (2009) 
fails to explain this type of power and how it is used. This thesis therfore fills a gap in the 
literature by using New Institutional Theory, supplemented by a theory of power to eluci-
date the use of this power and how it related to the contagion effect which paralysed most 
US investment banks during the height of the GFC and which led to the ultimate downfall of 
LB. 
Further research into organisational fields identifies that not all fields represent a complete 
universe and are often divided into sub-fields. Furthermore some fields are subjected to var-
ious  institutional influences (Powell 2008, p. 4). Edelman (1992), Dobbin and Sutton (1998), 
and Edelman et al. (1999) noted that individuals working within an organisation have influ-
ence over the regulatory process and therefore are able to establish what is considered  
‘best’ practice in their particular field. Powell (2008, p. 5) purports “that institutionalisation 
is a political process, and the success of the process and the form it takes depends on the 
relative power of the actors who strive to steer it”. Consistent with this concept, this thesis 
relates the way the investment banking industry sought to influence the accounting stand-
ards on repurchase agreements10 known as (Repos) for their own benefit - refer to CHAPTER 
9 for a detailed discussion on the influence over the accounting standard setting process. 




 A Repo is an abbreviation for repurchase agreement. Repos facilitate short term, (most often from overnight 







There is also a suggestion by Sahlin-Andersson and Engwall (2002) that political forces play a 
major role in the exertion of institutional influence.  Their research reveals that professional 
bodies such as consultants, accounting standard setters, and even the media are active in 
conveying  best practice to a particular field (Powell 2008, p. 5). Tsamenyi et al. (2006) dis-
covered that New Institutional Theory was relevant in their case study that examined varia-
tions in the accounting and financial information system of Sevillana, a large electricity 
company operating in Spain. Similar to the investment banking industry’s efforts to influ-
ence accounting standards relating to Repos (explained in section 8.4) Tsamenyi et al. (2006, 
p. 409) discovered that “the institutional environment interacted with market forces and 
intra-organisational power relations to influence the changes in the corporation’s account-
ing and financial information system”.  
Similarly, Major (2008) used a case study approach in his study of Marconi, a telecommuni-
cations corporation operating in Portugal. Marconi was pressured by the pervasive econom-
ic and institutional influences to change its management accounting system in response to 
the liberalisation of the European telecommunications industry.  
This thesis uses DiMaggio & Powell’s (1983) coercive, mimetic and normative classifications 
of institutional forces to explain key drivers impacting on decision-making at the firm, indus-
try and regulatory levels of investment banking. Coercive factors involve governmental 
power and political influence to generate outcomes consistent with the will of the state and 
political pressure groups. Normative factors emanate from the influence of the profession 
to conform to the best practice for its field and through the education system used to train 
the professionals.Mimetic forces act on agents when they succumb to the safety of long ac-
cepted practices and choose to mimic others when  dealing with decisions in times of uncer-
tainty. The DiMaggio and Powell (1983) framework is explained in greater detail in the fol-
lowing section. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
 
deemed a sale with a concurrent commitment to repurchase the securities by the borrower at an agreed fu-




Figure 8 - New Institutional Theory Framework 
 
Normative Pressures 
Normative pressure is an influence to conform to a social practice or norm. Social practice 
or norms are validated by their common application within a society. They can therefore 
“refer to what is commonly done - that is, what is normal or to what is commonly approved 
- that is, what is socially sanctioned" (Zanna 1991, p. 202). Social norms are like social guide-
lines of behaviour that are followed by a group (Schacter et al. 2011). Normative pressure 
can therefore exist in a group of members of the same profession. DiMaggio and Powell 
(1983) define professionalism as an accepted way for members of a profession to behave. 
Professionalism is considered to be one of those pressures widely considered in determining 
a proper course of action or moral duty (Boxenbaum & Jonsson 2008; Deephouse & 
Suchman 2008; Suchman 1995). According to this definition, a profession will have expecta-
tions that its members will follow certain behaviours and norms. Therefore, given these ex-
pectations, to appear legitimate, the professionals are inclined to demonstrate the same 
characteristics and traits. 
Educational institutions are a source of normative pressure that is transmitted to individu-
als. The norms are established through education, either through formal courses, profes-
sional training, workshops, seminars and through professional trade magazines. Professional 
networks where ideas are routinely exchanged are also influential in establishing norms 
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Galaskiewicz and Wasserman (1989) suggest that professionals typically work autonomously 
or in small teams, and are often insulated from coercive pressures. They agree with 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) that information relevant to the production of accepted norms 
is effectively disseminated through professional networks.  
Galaskiewicz (1985) proposes that individuals occupying uncertain positions would tend to 
seek direction about the best course of action from their professional network, and be in-
clined to create even closer links within their networks. Notwithstanding an individual’s 
unique personality characteristics, as an employee takes similar professional roles with dif-
ferent employers throughout their careers, they carry with them the same skills and  world 
view from one organisation to another (Galaskiewicz & Wasserman 1989). The assimilation 
of the same view of the world within the organisation may  usurp existing traditions and in-
ternal rules, hence subjecting the organisation to isomorphic change (DiMaggio & Powell 
1983). Conformity can also be compounded by similar human resource departments, com-
mon promotion practices and skills level requirements, which all lead to professionals be-
coming virtually indistinguishable (DiMaggio & Powell 1983). 
Normative pressures have an operational impact on organisations. The legitimacy of an or-
ganisation is dependent on the credentials and the personal characteristics and experience 
of its employees who have the ability to move an organisation closer to conforming to an 
industry or field where standards and conventional wisdom assist in creating clear bounda-
ries and providing standardised conditions that are associated with a particular profession 
(Milstein et al. 2002).  
Mimetic Pressure 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) define mimetic pressure as the pressure on one organisation to 
mimic another that is deemed to be successful and legitimate. Mimicking behaviour is found 
when an organisation is faced with a situation where managmenet is uncertain about a par-
ticular decision. (Boxenbaum & Jonsson 2008; DiMaggio & Powell 1983; Greenwood et al. 
2008; Milstein et al. 2002; Mizruchi & Fein 1999; Slack & Hinings 1994). Not only does this 
type of isomorphism generate a sense of security for management, it also brings comfort to 
investors as it creates the perception of a legitimate survival tactic. This organisational imi-
tation is enabled by the examination of the practices employed by associated organisations 
within the field (Hasse & Krücken 2008).  
An advantage of mimicking another organisation is the low cost on human capital (DiMaggio 
& Powell 1983). Additionally the act of mimicking can bestow respect amongst other indus-
try participants and stakeholders which are critical elements for a successful investment 
bank (Galaskiewicz & Wasserman 1989). Organisations seek to mimic other organisations of 




interactions between organizations tend to be localized along a size gradient, because sub-
stantial changes in organizational size are accompanied by structural change, shifts in organ-
izational form, and because organizations with different forms require different resources 
(Haveman 1993, p. 597). 
In a fast moving environment where technology and the process of production is quickly su-
perseded, such as in the highly innovative field of investment banking and the future of the 
business environment is uncertain, organisations are more likely to submit to mimetic pres-
sure. The decade preceding LB’s bankruptcy was characterised by many new financial prod-
ucts as investment banks sought new revenue streams by either fulfilling clients’ complex 
needs or generating opportunities for trading profits. Examples of innovative products de-
veloped during this period include collateralised debt obligations (CDOs)11; credit default 
swaps (CDSs)12 and new structures of securitisation including the securitisation of new asset 
classes. According to DiMaggio and Powell (1983) submission to mimetic pressure would be 
greater in times of uncertainty.  
Uncertainty is also found when an organisation undertakes a drastic change in strategy. Un-
der these circumstances an organisation may find safety in mimicking the practices of an-
other organisation with a similar strategy (Haveman 1993). Aspects of diversification which 
may be mimicked may include changing the range of customers, products or services, and 
the technology employed. Any new direction associated with a diversification strategy in-
volves a degree of uncertainty such as that experienced in a new business and therefore 
modelling actions on the behaviours and policies of another organisation which is perceived 




 CDOs are financial instruments like bonds which are collateralised by a pool of assets which generate the 
income stream necessary to service the interest and principal repayments. A common pooled assets include 
home mortgages or bonds issued by other entities (International Monetary Fund 2003). 
 
12
 A credit default swap is a financial instrument that transfers the credit risk of an asset from one party to an-
other without transferring legal ownership of that asset. The transferor of the credit risk pays the transferee 
either a periodic and/or an up-front fee in exchange for protection against possible loss suffered if a credit 









as successful and legitimate in the same strategic area, reduces perceived risks and increas-
es perceptions of success.  
Mimetic pressure can also be found between social groups within different organisations in 
the same industry. Their interactions in either professional or social environments can con-
stitute the conduit for the pressure to be applied. Communication between individuals can 
result in the transference of a behaviour, idea or style. “The assumption is that actors will 
first exchange information and then one will persuade the other to give it a try” 
(Galaskiewicz & Wasserman 1989, p. 456).  
Coercive Pressure 
Coercive isomorphism occurs when an organisation is subjected to institutional pressure 
from another organisation or entity on which there is a reliance or dependence to act in a 
particular way (DiMaggio & Powell 1983; Slack & Hinings 1994). Coercive pressures appear 
when a more dominant organisation is able to exert force on a more submissive organisa-
tion to comply with its wishes in return for legitimacy. The benefits of legitimacy are com-
monly financial or continued survival. Submission to coercive pressure is described as “con-
scious obedience to the incorporation of values, norms or institutional requirements” 
(Oliver 1990, p. 152). It is mostly evident as a consequence of the compliance towards 
standards, mandates and rules established by professional associations and governments 
(Hasse & Krücken 2008; Milstein et al. 2002). Whilst government and regulatory authorities 
are often cited as organisations which exert coercive pressure, any organisation which has 
the power to impose sanctions for non-compliance to their requests are also able to exert 
similar pressure (Boxenbaum & Jonsson 2008). 
As well as constituting  a direct pressure to comply, coercive isomorphism  may manifest as 
a more imperceptible force to those outside the field  (DiMaggio & Powell 1983). Compli-
ance is imposed either directly or implicitly and is a means of attracting and retaining re-
sources. An example of subtle coercive isomorphisim in action could include the efforts of a 
bank in encouraging a debtor to restructure a financial position or balance sheet structure in 
exchange for continuing availability of debt facilities. In summary, coercive pressures can 
manifest in a variety of modes both directly and indirectly, from laws and regulations, politi-
cal pressures, and from a variety of institutions (DiMaggio & Powell 1983; Slack & Hinings 
1994).  
Although mimetic, normative and coercive pressures of New Institutional Theory are helpful 
in identifying influences on LB, members of the peer group, the regulators, standard setters, 
and credit rating agencies, it is inadequate to explain some of the culture within LB and the 
behaviours of certain individuals within the organisation. This thesis finds that some deci-
sion-making within the firm was driven internally by an organisational culture shaped by 




Power to provide a more robust analysis. The following section outlines Clegg’s (1989) Theo-
ry of Power used throughout this thesis. 
3.1.4 A Theory of Power 
This thesis incorporates an institutional perspective on the investment banking industry to 
explain institutional pressures on LB, and the industry. This theoretical lens is supplemented 
with Clegg’s (1989) Theory of Power which examines power within relationships between 
actors and is helpful in explaining a convergence of influences precipitating the downfall of 
LB, and the subsequent investment banking crisis. This thesis explores the use of power to 
influence LB’s key management to make certain questionable decisions during the period 
prior to the firm’s collapse. There appeared to be a ‘survive at all costs’ mentality which was 
nourished by the values embedded in the organisation. 
Power has been analysed from diverse perspectives as befits its divergent nature. The early 
theories of power were developed by Hobbes (1651) and Machiavelli (1532). Rather than 
associating power with individuals, Karl Marx located power in social classes and social sys-
tems. His tenet was that power is evidenced in relation to a social class’s relative station 
(Marx 1964). Weber’s (1993) definition of power differed slightly viewing it as a means of 
controlling individuals, resources or affairs to ensure an outcome is achieved despite any 
resistance or obstruction. “Power is a thing that is held, coveted, seized, taken away, lost, or 
stolen, and it is used in what are essentially, adversarial relationships involving conflict be-
tween those with power and those without” (Schoja 2016, p. 4). The focus of overcoming 
resistance is a cornerstone of Weber’s notion of power as he states that: “Power is the 
chance of a man or a number of men to realize their own will in a social action even against 
the resistance of others who are participating in the action'' (Weber 1978, p. 926). In the 
following decades the concept of power developed further focusing on the political and so-
cial perspectives. Omitting an action or avoiding a decision was similarly considered an exer-
cise of power (Bachrach & Baratz 1963).  Subsequently Lukes (1978) expanded this theory 
by developing a three dimensions model of power. In addition to the first dimension which 
dealt with actual decision-making and the second dimension which addressed non-decision-
making, he introduced a third dimension where institutional power is exercised to socially 
construct reality. This means that “those who are able to control meaning are thus in a posi-
tion to render the others powerless, but also that people are not usually aware of this con-
struction of reality” (Vaara et al. 2005, p. 6). This augmentation of the notion of power ex-
panded the concept to include practices, customs, common principles and social structures. 
Another strand of literature on power has focused on the discursive elements which give 
rise to the existence of power in inter-organisational relationships (Ball & Wilson 2000; 
Brocklehurst 2001; Carter & Jackson 2004; Deetz 1992; Ezzamel et al. 2001; Gowler 1981; 




has been influential in his descriptions of disciplinary practices as well as in his concepts of 
subjugation and subjectification. Clegg (1989) synthesized different conceptions and views 
of power and presented a ‘circuits of power’ theory.  
This thesis applies New Institutional Theory  with the three circuits of power model devel-
oped by Clegg (Clegg 1975, 1979; Clegg et al. 1986; Clegg & Dunkerley 1980). The title ‘three 
circuits of power’ implies that each circuit is inter-related to produce structures of power 
and power relationships between actors. Clegg (1989, p. 158) uses his framework to explain 
“how relations of agency and structure have been constituted discursively, how agency is 
denied to some and given to others”. He also emphasises that power can occur in everyday 
events and practices: “Power is the apparent order of taken for granted categories of exist-
ence as they are fixed and represented in a myriad of discursive forms and practices” (Clegg 
1989, pp. 183-4). 
A revised approach by Clegg (1989, p. 20) views power as “more or less complex organized 
agents engaged in more or less organized games”. An analysis of power is “neither ethical 
nor micro-political; above all it is textual, semiotic, and inherent in the very possibility of 
textuality, meaning and signification in the social world” (Clegg 1994, p. 149). These con-
cepts are consolidated in Clegg’s (1989) three circuits of power model where power can be 
analysed at different levels: the episodic, dispositional; and facilitative (Clegg 1989). The 
three circuits include: the episodic circuit which at the micro level deals with communica-
tions, feelings and conflict; the dispositional circuit which at the macro level deals with so-
cially contructed meanings that inform relations between members; and the facilitative cir-
cuit, which also deals at the macro level, but with technology, environmental contingencies, 
job design and networks. Each circuit operates through conduits known as ‘obligatory pas-
sage points’ which are likened to conduits which allow the conveyance of empowerment or 
disempowerment (Clegg 1989). These circuits are further explained in the following sec-
tions. 
Clegg’s (1989) framework of power was selected among several theories of power for this 
thesis given its effectiveness in other similar studies (Cashmore et al. 2014; Lawrence et al. 
2011; Lawrence et al. 2012; Lee et al. 2014). Other theories of power which could have been 
applied include: Lukes 1978; Foucault 1977, 1978; Foucault & Gordon 1980; Foucault et al. 
1988.  These studies encompass case studies which explore power relationships between 
actors and explains the processes that occurred to enable change. Clegg’s circuits are struc-
tures where power is either generated or expunged and the process by which this power or 
disempowerment is transmitted through ‘obligatory passage points’ is a key to understand-
ing the process of change. Clegg’s (1989) framework of power deals with this transmission 
process better and more clearly than the other theoretical frameworks dealing with power 
and is the reason it was selected over the other frameworks for this thesis. Clegg’s (1989) 




conducted a critical post-modern analysis of the 150 year empowerment-disempowerment 
debate. They find that Clegg offers a deeper sociological understanding of systematic dis-
empowerment and domination than other theories. This aspect of empowerment and dis-
empowerment is particularly relevant for this thesis given the fluctuations of power be-
tween industry participants and regulators which occurred prior to, and during the GFC.  
A study of power by Cashmore et al. (2014) is useful as it adopts a case study approach to 
reveal how the interaction between parties was able to influence the environmental prac-
tice in Bangladesh through the use of new knowledge. In the process, the actors’ approach 
to the environment and ways of thinking was affected. Clegg’s (1989) circuits of power was 
used to reveal a “will to power among the international development community, realised 
through the construction of knowledge”(Cashmore et al. 2014, p. 1). 
Lawrence et al. (2012) explore the function of power in achieving strategic change in direc-
tion for traditional businesses. The case study uses Clegg’s (1989) three circuits of power to 
explain how three professional service partnerships managed a transition into a contempo-
rary business through an extrememly complex transformation process.  
Lee et al. (2014) investigate how power facilitates inter-organisational system integration. In 
particular the authors’ focus on Clegg’s (1989) episodic circuit and the obligatory passage 
points were used to differentiate the affects of latent power and that which is exercised on 
fostering process driven changes. These examples are not meant to represent a comprehen-
sive list of the literature using Clegg (1989), however, they are effective demonstrations of 
how Clegg’s (1989) three circuits of power have been used to explain the process of power 
and to justify the use of his framework in the thesis. 
3.1.5 Clegg's Circuits of Power 
In Clegg’s (1989) framework, power is transmitted through the three interrelated circuits 
before  generating an outcome. The framework consists of two macro circuits and one mi-
cro. The circuits represent a valuable framework to analyse the use of power internally and 
externally by both the investment banking industry generally and LB. The analysis reveals 
practices involving discipline and process which result in imbuing power, or alternatively, 
disempowering at the macro level of the model. Whilst at the micro level, power is exer-
cised in the everyday exercise of a working routine. 
The Episodic Circuit 
At the micro level, the episodic circuit is “where  power is exercised intermittently" (Clegg 
1989, p. 187). Power in this circuit resembles the more traditional notion where power de-
pends on resources, whether they are represented by time, wealth, position, commodities, 




individuals may attempt to resolve issues emanating from their feelings which may instigate 
an exercise of power over another. Secondly, individuals may address communication 
whether as a recipient or conveyor. The forms of communication may range from assertive 
to submissive or technical in nature to simplistic and in each case they define a skew in the 
power relations. Thirdly, individuals may address conflict, whether overt or covert. Finally, 
power may be expressed as resistance in the everyday  interpersonal relationships inherent 
within an organisational operating environment (Clegg 1989).  
The outcomes between individuals at this level can be both negative and positive and will 
depend on the social relations, and the resources and means available to the agencies.  
Since "power always involves power over another and thus at least two agencies, episodic 
power will usually call forth resistance because of the power/knowledge nature of agency" 
(Clegg 1989, p. 208).  
The Dispositional circuit 
The dispositional circuit is constituted of rules of practice (at the macro level) and socially 
constructed meanings that inform relations between members. This circuit is primarily con-
cerned with the formation and continuation of a member’s standing within the organisation 
and the relevant rules to which they are subjected. The relative standing of a member is a 
function of positon within the organisational hierarchy and their access to resources. The 
capacity of a member will also depend on the rules and policies which give rise to their 
standing and which require organisational compliance. Meaning is therefore provided to an 
organisation through these rules and policies which can undergo a process of constant 
change thereby potentially altering the balance of power within social relations. The social 
integration such as the communications within an organisation necessary for these rules to 
be established and changed is highlighted by Clegg as follows: “Rules are fixed and re-fixed, 
and meanings are stabilized, through social integration” (Clegg 1989, p. 233).  
This circuit involves adversarial undercurrents where authority is legitimised. "Rules of prac-
tice are at the centre of any stabilization or change of the circuitry. Through them, all traffic 
must pass" (Clegg 1989, p. 215). Clegg (1989) notes that these rules should not be likened to 
the static rules of a game instead they are:  
far more fragile, ambiguous, unclear, dependent upon interpretation, and subject either to 
reproduction or transformation depending on the outcome of struggles to keep them the 
same or to change them this way or that (Clegg 1989, p. 209).  
Within this circuit rules of membership and meaning are interpreted and the interpretations 
themselves are able to be changed (Clegg 1989, p. 215). The power emanating from these 
rules are transmitted via the obligatory passage points to affect and inform the social rela-




Therefore the episodic circuit shares a dependency on the dispositional circuit in the for-
mation, interpretation and provision of the rules of meaning and membership. These rules 
flow into the episodic circuit influencing social relations where power is exercised or con-
tested. The resultant impact on the rules is cycled back through the obligatory passage point 
where they are refixed to re-order the relations of meaning.  
The Facilitative Circuit 
Finally, the facilitative circuit, also at the macro level, determines an agency’s capacity for 
power through a process of empowerment and disempowerment. This process uses “a sys-
tem of rewards and punishment constituted through technology, environmental contingen-
cies, job design, and networks, which empower and disempower” (Clegg 1989, p. 233).  
Within the facilitative circuit, Clegg (1989) notes two concepts which can alter the balance 
of power. These include the ‘techniques of production’ and the ‘modes of discipline’ em-
ployed by an organisation. Both processes have the capacity to transform existing rules of 
practice and in turn transfer power between agencies. The facilitative circuit is "a major 
conduit of variation in the circuits of power" (Clegg 1989, p. 233). An example to describe 
how innovation can affect power could be the automation of certain manufacturing pro-
cesses which were previously carried out by skilled workers. The obviated skills disempower 
those affected employees whilst the employees responsible for the ongoing maintenance of 
the automated systems become empowered.  
The use of job design and networks are useful in applying power both at the regulatory level 
and through internal relationships within the investment bank. This level of power has the 
potential to reconstrue organisational morality and transform previously deemed unac-
ceptable behaviour into acceptable behaviour. Apart from investment banking we saw this 
level of power exerted by Enron during the Californian blackout scandal (McLean & Elkind 
2003).  
All three circuits of power intersect through a network linked by obligatory passage points. 
A diagrammatical representation of the three circutis of power is provided in Figure 9. Clegg 
(1989) uses an example of medical doctors and shop assistants to describe the effect of con-
trolling existing obligatory passage points:  
Control of extant obligatory passage points, as by doctors in hospitals, will serve to repro-
duce institutionally system-transforming change in empowering rather than disempowering 
ways. For shop assistants, however, who are merely traffic through conduits controlled else-



















Source: (Clegg 1989, p. 214). 
Another example of how the model operates, is located in a study  conducted by  Crozier 
(1964). He analysed a tobacco factory which relied on machines maintained by maintenance 
workers. These machines were controlled by production staff whose bonuses were depend-
ent on the success of the maintenance workers keeping the machines operational. Without 
the co-operation of the maintenance workers, the ability of the production staff to succeed 
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in their roles and hence generate bonuses was limited. The highly bureaucratic state-owned 
tobacco factory’s operations were centred on the production staff whose formal standing in 
the organisational hierarchy was much higher than the maintenance workers. However, the 
power of the maintenance workers over other staff was superior in view of their control 
over the production outcomes on which the production staff performance was measured. 
Management, including the production staff, attempted to resist this power by instituting a 
program of preventative maintenance. In response, maintenance workers destroyed work 
manuals and machines were occasionally decommissioned by them regardless of their op-
erational functioning. This example shows how technical knowledge and skill empowered 
workers who were otherwise low in the formal structural hierarchy of an organisation. Their 
knowledge of the production process empowered the maintenance workers to  overcome 
the formal power held by others in the organisation (Clegg 1989, p. 236). The maintenance 
workers effectively possessed a degree of power by way of technical knowledge and skill 
depicted as the ‘technology of production’ located in the facilitative circuit of Clegg’s (1989) 
model. The resultant power was transmitted through an obligatory passage point - the pro-
cess being represented by the destruction of the operational manuals which were instru-
ments vital in management’s attempts at diffusing the relative control of the maintenance 
workers.  The resultant effect in the dispositional circuit was to change the significance and 
meaning of maintenance work. The workers’ power in the episodic circuit was also en-
hanced as their everyday actions involved more control over production resources, pay 
rates and bonuses. Conversely changes in ‘technology of production’ can render certain 
skills redundant, thus disempowering the affected individuals.  
This thesis examines similar power relationships evident through the written and non-
written interactions of and between the CEO, employees, boards, regulators and key gov-
ernment appointees to help explain their actions as well as inactions in the lead up to the 
GFC. It will focus on the interactions which had impacted on the failure of LB. It is also a re-
sponse to Arup (2010, p. 363) who argues the need to “locate power and responsibility in 
the GFC”. While Arup (2010) identifies the potential use of power between state and corpo-
rations and suggests that corporate and state power were concentrated together, he con-
tributes little analysis of the mode of power nor the actors’ motivations in their use of pow-
er. 
Therefore with the aid of an analytical lens incorporating New Institutional Theory and 
Clegg’s (1989) three circuits of power model, this thesis explores the individual and institu-
tional machinations, influences, power relationships and pressures which helped shape LB 
and lead to its final demise. Figure 10 illustrates diagrammatically the combination of the 
institutional pressures and the internal and external power relationships which influenced 





Figure 10 - An Institutional View of Lehman Brothers Impacted by Three Circuits of Power 
and Institutional Influences 
 
































































A research methodology is informed by philosophical assumptions relating to ontology “the 
nature of reality” Dillard (1991, p. 11), epistemology (the means or process of knowing: 
Dillard (1991, p. 11), human nature (the effect that environment has on human beings: 
Dillard (1991, p. 11), methodology (the way in which investigation is carried out: Dillard 
(1991, p. 12) and societal orientation (the inclination of the dynamic forces in society: 
Dillard (1991, p. 12), (Burrell & Morgan 1979; Chua 1986; Dillard 1991). This study assumes a 
non-realist ontological stance, that is the culture of investment banking is socially construct-
ed and socially constructing (Chua 1986, Hopwood 1987, Hines 1988). This is contrasted to 
functionalist approaches. It is argued that regulations covering financial institutions, such as 
accounting standards, are a socially constructed phenomenon, dependent on people for 
their existence and use, interpretation and perpetuation. Additionally investment banks that 
operate within their regulatory framework are reliant on individuals’ decision-making which 
occurs within a business model that is bound by a set of internal rules and policies which are 
shaped by an organisational hierarchy and influenced by the regulatory environment and 
individuals’ capacities. This study emphasises the importance of recognising the social, polit-
ical and economic contexts to explain the how, why and who of the event (Burrell and Mor-
gan 1979, Chua 1986, Hopwood 1987, Gioia and Pitre 1990, Hassard 1991). This research 
methodology acknowledges that awareness of the contextual nature of the inquiry is fun-
damental to this approach (Dillard 1991, Hassard 1991). The methodology applied is con-
sistent with a constructionist case study approach which is a valid research tool used in or-
ganisational studies and which is appropriate when using archival data as well as regulatory 
factors(Baxter & Jack 2008; Yin 2014). Baxter & Jack (2008) argue that methodology which 
uses a constructivist case study approach provides the means for researchers to investigate 
‘complex phenomena’ within their historical context. Yin (2014) supports the view that it is 
possible to offer analytical generalisations from applying a methodology using a single case 
study. This can be achieved by a careful application of theory. Consistent with the approach 
supported by Yin (2014) this study  applies a single case study that extracts the presences, as 
well as the silences, and absences of power, its uses, and institutional influences in and be-
tween the various organisations. It also identifies who were the power holders, those sub-
jected to power and how power was exerted. 
3.3 Method  
The seminal case of LB reflects a particular social phenomenon. LB was a member of a peer 




and financial structure as explored in CHAPTER 7. Therefore its selection for the case study 
can inform the behaviours, culture and practices within this sector at this time. Further as LB 
represented the largest failure amongst US investment banks up to 2008, a case study ap-
proach using LB as the subject is considered appropriate. This qualitative study also incorpo-
rates some empirical analysis which is helpful in analysing the prevailing business practices 
and associated communication used by LB and the regulators and in the regulatory docu-
mentation itself.  Eisenhardt (1989, p. 532) suggests that case studies are useful in informing 
theoretical development “from specifying research questions to reaching closure”.  
A case study approach in the banking field adds to the diversity of the body of literature on 
the subject. A mixed methods approach was used by Hofstede et al. (1990) for organisations 
across a variety of industries in measuring organisational cultures. Additionally, similar ap-
proaches were conducted to expose the underlying practices and institutions in the ac-
counting profession (Cortese et al. 2010; Mitchell et al. 1994; Mitchell & Sikka 1993; 
Mitchell et al. 2001). Cortese et al. (2010) analysed comment letters issued by various inter-
est groups to identify otherwise concealed associations amongst powerful agents. (Cortese 
et al. 2010, p. 76). In this field, interpretive studies are acceptable to analyse the status of 
the profession, political involvement in the accounting standard setting process, and the re-
lationship between the profession and other government and corporate institutions (Arnold 
& Sikka 2001; Cousins & Sikka 1993; Mitchell et al. 1998; Sikka & Willmott 1995).  
This study analyses the behaviour of participants in the industry, and in particular executives 
of LB and those parties involved in the political and regulatory environment that are of in-
terest. An organisational case study can offer a deep insight into aspects including the or-
ganisation’s history, structure, personnel, personalities, goals, relationships, interactions, 
resources, context, situation, culture, mission and practices (Atkinson 1995). 
This case study includes an examination of certain events, organisations, legislation, regula-
tions and individuals in the history of the industry and the firm to extract recurrent themes 
to assist in the understanding of some institutionalised behaviours displayed within LB and 
the investment banking industry in general.  
The analysis of certain events, organisations, legislation, regulations and individuals within 
the case study is overlayed with the applicable theoretical framework, that is, New Institu-
tional Theory and Clegg’s (1989) Theory of Power. This approach draws out structures un-
derpinning the recurring themes. The application of a theoretical lens over historical events, 
documents and characters is aimed at generating a rich understanding of the cultural and 
behavioural aspects that led to LB’s failure rather than a mere technical analysis which has 
permeated the literature relating to the GFC. This method explains rather than predicts 
events, behaviours and actions of actors which offers insights  within the historical and so-




This thesis uses history not as an ontological realist historian would translate historical evi-
dence to establish a causal relationship. Rather it incorporates history to consider the 
broader social implications of the events that occurred prior to the GFC. This approach 
which is supported by Gaffikin (2011), is done with the application of a theoretical lens to 
provide a rich picture, explanation and point of view in a social and cultural context of the 
events leading to the resulting social and economic devastation. This thesis adopts the posi-
tion that “history  should  be  engaged  in  sustained,  mutually  questioning  and  self-
questioning  interchange  with  critical  theory  and  historians  should  read  demanding,  
often  difficult theoretical texts and enquire into their bearing for historical enquiry and the 
very under-standing of historiography and historicity” (La Capra 2007, p.161). 
Specific data used is described in the table below: 
Figure 11 - Data Sources 
Data Source Description 
The report of the bankruptcy examiner on 
the failure of LB. 
This report consists of 9 lengthy volumes (re-
fer Figure 12 below) and covers various sub-
jects including, business and risk manage-
ment, valuations, survival and the discharge 
of fiduciary duty, Repurchase Agreements 
105 (Repo 105) - an accounting ‘window 
dressing’ technique used by LB, interactions 
with secured lenders, and LB’s interactions 
with government agencies. It also contains 
information from interviews conducted with 
250 subjects many of whom were LB em-
ployees. 
  
Annual reports, proxy statements and quar-
terly reports of Lehman Brothers Holdings 
Inc. from 1999 to 2007. 
Financial statements enable analysis of fi-
nancial data and commentary made by LB 
executives and directors. 
  
Various financial statements, Proxy state-
ments and official SEC lodged corporate 
documents  published by LB’s investment 
bank peer group. 
These statements contain relevant financial 
information and commentary to enable in-
dustry comparisons between peer group 
members.  
  
Internal emails and various other LB docu-
ments such as a Strategy Presentation, Ethics 
Statements and Board Committee Charters. 
Emails authored by LB executives and the 
Strategy Presentation were sourced from the 
Bankruptcy Examiners Report. 
  
US Financial Accounting Standards. Standards specifically covering repurchase 
agreements including Statement of Financial 




Data Source Description 
Statement of Financial Accounting Standard 
No. 125 (FAS 125). 
  
Comment letters submitted to the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board. 
Specifically submissions from the banking 
and finance industry regarding the creation 
of FAS 125 and FAS 140. 
  
Commercial books and transcripts. Commercial books some of which have been 
authored by participants in the investment 
banking industry, employees of LB and oth-
ers by regulators. 
  
Media including press articles. Press articles prior to and after the failure of 
LB. 
  
Various datasets. Dataset sources include: Baker Library Leh-
man Brothers Dealbook Collection, Centre 
for Responsible Politics, World Bank, Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York, Federal Reserve 
Bank of St Louis, Bankscope, Osiris, Compen-
sation Force, Federal Deposit Insurance Cor-
poration, Federal Housing Finance Agency, 
Council on Foreign Relations, Investorpoint 
Inverstor Information, United States 
Whitehouse Archives, Securities Industry 
and Financial Markets Association, US Sen-
ate Office of Public Records, 
 
 
Figure 12 – Contents of the Bankruptcy Examiner’s Report on the failure of Lehman Brothers 
Holdings Inc. dated 2010  
Volume No. Pages Content 
1 1-193 Introduction, Executive Summary and Pro-
cedural Background. 
2 203-718 Valuation of portfolios, Survival Strategies 
and Efforts. 
3 732-1053 Repo 105. 
4 1066-1535 Potential Claims Against Secured Lenders, 
Interaction Between Lehman and the Gov-
ernment.  
5 1544-2208 Avoidance Actions, Barclays Transactions. 




Volume No. Pages Content 
7 Tab 2 – Tab 7 Glossary, Key Individuals, Witness Interview 
List, Document Collection and Review, Leh-
man Systems, Bibliography. 
8 Tab 8 – Tab 22 Risk Management Organisation and Control, 
Risk Appetite and Value at Risk (VaR) Usage 
Versus Limits Chart, Calculation of Certain 
Increases in Risk Appetite Limits, Compensa-
tion, Valuation – Archstone, Survival Strate-
gies Supplement, Valuation – CDOs, Narra-
tive of 4/9/2008 to 15/9/2008, Valuation – 
Residential Home Loans, Repo 105, Sum-
mary of Lehman Collateral at JP Morgan, 
Lehman’s Dealings with Bank of America, 
Knowledge of Senior Lehman Executives Re-
garding The Inclusion of Clearing Bank Col-
lateral in the Liquidity Pool, Lehman Broth-
ers Holdings International (LBHI) Solvency 
Analysis, Preferences Against LBHI and Other 
Lehman Entities. 
9 Tab 23 – Tab 34 Journal Entry, Cash Disbursement, and JP 
Morgan Collateral, Foreign Exchange Trans-
actions, Intercompany Transactions Occur-
ring within 30 days before Bankruptcy, 
CUSIPs13 with Blank Legal Entity Identifiers, 
CUSIPs Not Associated with an LBHI Affiliate, 
CUSIPs Associated Solely with an LBHI Affili-
ate, CUSIPs Associated with Both Lehman 
Brothers International (Europe) (LBI) and 
LBHI Affiliates, CUSIPs Associated with Sub-
ordinated Entities, CUSIPs Associated with 
LBHI Affiliates Not Delivered to LBI in a Fi-
nancing Trade, Summary Balance Sheets of 
LBHI Affiliates, Tangible Asset Balance Sheet 
Variations. 




 Committee on Uniform Security Identification Procedures is a code used to identify financial securities is-




Source: (Valukas 2010). 
The benefit of using historical events and documents in this case study is to extract themes 
in the business environment which recur thereby providing insights into management deci-
sion-making. This approach is useful in studies based on the experience of the firm (Davis 
1971). The compilation of individual historical studies of businesses within an industry has 
the potential to produce an insightful portrait of the whole industry’s history (Davis 1971; 
Miller & O'Leary 1987).  Hidy’s (1949) examination of the UK firm Baring Brothers offered an 
understanding of the investment banking industry; Johnson & Supple’s (1967) study of 
wealthy Bostonians provided insights into the the social and economic world of regional 
capitalists; and Williamson & Smalley’s (1957) case study of Northwestern Life, provided an 
understanding of the insurance industry.  
Instead of focusing on an individual firm, Carosso (1970) used an historical account of the 
growth of the investment banking industry to gain an understanding of historical economic 
developments. Although he included a discussion of some practices of the investment bank-
ing industry and regulatory developments, a gap in the literature still exists as he failed to 
explore the consequences or drivers of that regulation, and how it was influenced by out-
side stakeholders, which is a focus of this thesis. 
Carnegie and Napier (2002, p. 711) when discussing studies in accounting development, 
support the view that “interpretive and critical research, set firmly in the archive as broadly 
construed and appropriately elucidated by existing or refined theory, may … present insights 
into both the present and the future”. The historical approach taken generates an alterna-
tive attempt as described by Cooper and Puxty (1996, p. 287) as a “political and cultural un-
derstanding” of the investment banking industry. The underlying themes of interplay of 
power, common personal characteristics between actors in the industry and common indus-
try practices explain a cultural identity within LB and is consistent with Gaffakin’s (2011, p. 
239) contention that historians “… are obliged to consider the broader social implications…”. 
Gaffikin (2011) supports an historical approach that encompasses a political and cultural 
understanding. He claims it considers important factors such as “objectivity, fact, evidence 
(sources), fictive elements, truth, relativity, language, narrative, text, rhetoric, causality, his-
torical laws and many other considerations obviously important to the … historian. They en-
able and shape history” (Gaffikin 2011, p. 238). It is the illumination of some of the afore-
mentioned matters that this thesis highlights with a broader theoretical framework which 
takes into account institutional pressures and the interplay of power relationships.  
A case study offers two important opportunities: firstly it allows an analysis of practice; and 
secondly, it permits an evaluation of the theory used. As mentioned above, this thesis ex-
plains the practice within the investment banking industry using the theoretical frameworks 




ries were found to be complementary and useful in offering a critique of the underlying as-
sumptions of agency by  examining the existence and processes of power and exertion of 
influences from internal and external sources to the organisation rather than an uncritical 
shareholder view of events.  
An important role for the methodology used in this thesis is to afford a means of applying a 
theoretical framework to provide structure to events and behaviours within the industry 
over a sufficiently long period. The theories have been applied in this thesis in an historical 
context over a 230 year timeline of the US investment banking industry. They were found 
useful in explaining the cultural and behavioural influences on the investment banking in-
dustry which contributed to the failure of LB. 
New Institutional Theory offers limited scope for explaining the impact of personal charac-
teristics found in the investment banking industry. However, Clegg’s (1989) Theory of Power 
is useful in this respect and helps to uncover the pattern of certain behaviours by individuals 
which are identified in the history chapters 4 and 5. Whereas New Institutional Theory as-
sists in understanding the institutional influences which came to bare on firms from various 
sources including the the industry’s own peer group, regulators, legislators, credit rating 
agencies and the investment community, Clegg’s (1989) Theory of Power deals adequately 
with the power relations between individual actors. 
In summary, this chapter outlined the two theoretical frameworks applied in the thesis. It 
argued that other theories were inadequate in explaining all the forces at play in the in-
vestment banking industry up to 2008 and claims that by augmenting New Institutional 
Theory with Clegg’s (1989) Theory of Power a richer understanding of the causes of LB’s 
failure is achieved. The constructivist methodology using a case study approach is intro-
duced as an appropriate tool in answering the research question which in turn offers in-
sights into the causes of the GFC. The following chapter, provides an understanding of the 
cultural evolution of the investment banking industry by presenting various key personali-
ties and events throughout its history in the US. The analysis of the practices within the in-
vestment banking industry in and around certain historical events such as economic crises 
offer an understanding of the influences exerted on the regulatory field and the opportuni-
ties and challenges confronting the investment banking industry throughout this period. Ul-
timately the historical influences help explain the behaviour of industry participants to the 





 HISTORICAL INFLUENCES ON THE CHAPTER 4
US INVESTMENT BANKING INDUSTRY 
According to Morrison and Wilhelm (2007) the evolution of the US investment banking in-
dustry is better understood through a chronological analysis of the key events occurring in 
the US which may have affected the industry. In the process it is possible to understand the 
industry in its societal context. This chapter will outline the history of the investment bank-
ing industry through an analysis of the critical events which occurred in the US since the in-
dustry’s early beginnings and through the personalities who pioneered and imparted their 
influence within their own firms to the industry and to the wider financial community. The 
chapter draws together some important themes repeated throughout the history of the in-
dustry in relation to behavioural characteristics of the players and the organisational culture 
within the industry which had been influenced by DiMaggio & Powell’s (1983) institutional 
pressures and in which the exercise of power as described by Clegg (1989) was evident. The 
history section also provides context for the later chapter dealing with LB’s own history (re-
fer CHAPTER 5) and enables a comparison between the pervasive organisational culture ex-
isting within the industry and the culture which evolved within LB. The chapter illustrates 
that LB’s culture and behavioural practices were shaped by similar influences acting upon 
the industry at large. 
The historical tracing of investment bank activity in the US is not only a search for formally 
structured business entities whose operations we associate with modern investment banks, 
but also includes the commercial undertakings of individuals usually relating to commercial 
fund raising or advisory services. The US investment banking industry had humble begin-
nings and emerged parallel with the formation of the US, following the American War of In-
dependence 1775 - 1783. Most commercial funding up until this point was carried out by 
small private banks or merchants, primarily for funding trade and other commerce. Many of 
these private banks developed into investment banks in the period following the American 
War of Independence (Bass & Moulton 1921). The transformation of entities into invest-
ment banks progressed along two major routes. One involved the transformation of curren-
cy broking firms such as Prime, Ward and King and, John E. Thayer and Brother, which car-
ried out private banking as well as some investment banking activities. The other route in-
volved merchants expanding their business to incorporate lending activities, followed by 
trading in commodities such as cotton. These firms included Lehman Brothers, Thomas Bid-
dle and Co. and Alexander Brothers (Werner & Smith 1991). 
Currency exchange dealers were necessary in the colonies as there were numerous curren-




offshore currency imported from Britain, Spain, France, Portugal, and notes issued by a vari-
ety of entities such as state and municipal governments, and private businesses. Valuation 
of these currencies was carried out by the various brokers and since communication was 
inefficient, exchange rates varied widely between brokers and regions. The publication of 
exchange rates in the 1790s improved the consistency of currency quotations (Weiss 1970). 
This money was used by merchants in their domestic and international trade and for settling 
other transactions between citizens and government authorities. The exchange value for 
each currency was a difficult task to ascertain given the different values ascribed to a cur-
rency by different states and the expertise offered by the currency exchange dealers was 
important (Weiss 1970). 
The expansion of the financial sector in the 1800s provided opportunities for entrepreneurs 
to raise the necessary finance to undertake projects which accompanied the significant US 
industrial expansion of the period. The early private and commercial bankers often relied on 
their personal relationships with established entrepreneurs to facilitate their credit assess-
ment process. Consequently their inside information on projects enabled the industry to 
maintain relatively low levels of problem loans and the period was characterised by very few 
bank failures (Moulton 1921). The exploitation of personal relationships is noted by 
Moulton (1921) as a means to improve an understanding of credit risk and expand business 
activities and becomes a consistent theme within the US investment banking industry 
throughout its history. This common practice of exploiting personal relationships relates el-
ements of DiMaggio & Powell’s (1983) normative and mimetic pressures. The normative 
pressure established the practice as an acceptable way for a banker to behave and there-
fore established a social norm amongst the investment banking community. After-all the 
practice indirectly led to protecting the firms against loss by providing deeper insights into 
the credit risk of borrows or to share the related risks amongst a peer group known as a 
syndicate, on the one hand, and potentially increasing revenues by the generation of addi-
tional business from either existing or new clients on the other. As the primary goal of in-
vestment banks is to maximise profits for its partners and stockholders, both tactics would 
assist this objective. The mimetic pressure applies as bankers feared that by not imitating 
successful strategies adopted by other industry participants to maximise profits, they would 
suffer a competitive disadvantage, and would risk losing market share and consequently po-
tential profits to other banks.  
Mercantile firms largely dealt with international trading transactions, facilitating payments 
for goods by providing short term credit to shippers. US mercantile firms often undertook 
their activities by using agents in the overseas country where the trade had been carried 
out. This contrasted to the British practice of using a network of branches. Not only was the 
mercantile firm a precursor to the US investment bank but it was from these firms that 




The following sections reveal how certain characteristics and business strategies of a mod-
ern day investment banks found their origin as far back in history as the American Revolu-
tion. The selected historical analysis will be chronological for ease of understanding the evo-
lutionary influences. The recurring overriding theme of power and its role in the interactions 
between investment bankers and government authorities and with other organisations and 
institutions will also be developed in this historical analysis. Three subsidiary themes which 
are related to the theme of power and influence are developed: 
1) Relationships with government authorities and officials; 
2) Influence through networks; and 
3) Personal characteristics and culture. 
4.1 Timeline of Events Shaping the Investment 
Banking Industry 
The timeline below highlights periods in the history of the US investment banking industry 
which are shown to be formative and influential. An effective way of illustrating the themes 
in some of the periods is through an understanding of the background, business activities 
and modus operandi of individuals involved in the industry. This method, for example, is 
particularly relevant for the period covering the Revolution and subsequent years in the ear-
ly history of the US when investment banking activities were starting and were predomi-




Figure 13 - Evolution of the US Investment Banking Industry 
 
 
Amercian War of Independence (1775 - 1783) 
 
US Constitution as an Economic Document (1789) 
 
The Formation of a National Bank (1811) 
 
War of 1812 (1812 - 1815) 
 
American Railroads Expansion (1830 - 1850) 
 
American Civil War (1861 - 1865) 
 
The Panic of 1907 and the Pujo Committee (1907 - 1913) 
 
The Great Depression and New Regulation 
Post WW2 Transformation  
 
Transformation from Partnership to Corporation 
Corporate Scandals - Sarbannes Oxley Act 2002 




The timeline above is characterised by major events or periods of time which prompted 
changes or highlighted features of the US investment banking industry. Periods not covered 
by the timeline are generally characterised by stable economic growth following the birth of 
the industrial revolution circa 1780 (Reinhart & Rogoff 2009). During this era, the invest-
ment banking industry generally prospered with the exception of times of banking crises. It 
was natural for investment banks to experience similar difficulties as commercial banks dur-
ing the banking crises.  As an emerging economy, the US was susceptible to volatile econom-
ic cycles and financial market disruptions. A disproportionally high number of financial crises 
occurred in the 1800s during which the US experienced eight major panics whilst from 1900 
to 2008, the US experienced three major crises. Financial crises can be identified in the fol-
lowing years: 1814 1819, 1837, 1839, 1857, 1873, 1884, 1893, 1896, 1907, 1929, 1987 and 
2008. Financial crises most often precede a banking crisis typified by a systemic failure of 
banks. From the financial crises the major banking crises14 occurred in 1857, 1873, 1893, 
1907, 1929 and 2008  (Reinhart & Rogoff 2013).  
The evolution of the investment banking industry was punctuated by the US banking crises 
during the 19th and 20th centuries. Most banking crises naturally coincide with the troughs 
of economic cycles. The GFC was similar to many of the previous crises. Like other crises it 
was preceded by speculative bubbles in certain asset classes which culminated in a crash, 
often involving the stock market and ultimately resulting in a recession (Reinhart & Rogoff 
2009). As most investment banks are traditionally active in the capital markets, both debt 
and equity, stock market crashes inevitably negatively affected their operations. This can be 
seen in the table below which sets out significant US banking crises during this period. 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) cite inadequate regulation as a customary contributor to a fi-
nancial crisis. Whether or not inadequate regulation contributed to the GFC will be exam-
ined in this thesis. When the US was not in crisis, economic growth and industrialisation 
kept investment banking firms occupied and profitable, thereby removing incentive for 
change. As a result, successful practices and behaviours which prevailed in the late 1700s 
continued through to the modern day. Apart from financial crises and periodic regulatory 
reform the evolutionary timeline was punctuated in the post WW2 era by the search for 




 A major banking crisis here is defined as one where economic growth has declined by over 10% in a peak to 
trough of an economic cycle. This differs from other definitions of a banking crisis which often cite a number of 




capital which carried far reaching implications for the investment banking business model 
and financial structure, discussed in detail in section 4.4. The following table is a reconsti-
tuted excerpt from Reinhart and Rogoff (2013) and outlines a brief history of banking crises 
in the US: 
Figure 14 - US Banking Crises: Historical Summary 
Year Brief Summary Reference 
1814 Johnson Matthey Bankers failure. Conant 1915; 
Reinhart & 
Rogoff 2013  
1817-1819 46 banks rendered insolvent due to demands for specie 




1825 Preceded England’s crisis; Bank of the United States and 




1837-1838 Three banks failed (March 1837); Bank of England gave 
generous advances to other banks to prevent panic; fail-
ures began in New Orleans and New York City and 




1841 Second Bank of the United States liquidated; lenders re-





1857 Discovery of Australian and Californian gold fields led to 
massive speculation on various commodities and proper-
ty and then collapse; paralysed finances throughout the 
world (spread from US to Europe, South America and Far 
East). Many banks suspended; The Bank of England the 




1861 Government suspended specie payments – lasted until 
1879; drove up price of gold (peaked in 1864) and all 




1864 US panic due to Civil War. Conant 1915; 
Reinhart & 
Rogoff 2013 
1873 Philadelphian banking firm, Jay Cooke & Co. failed, trig-




1884 Weak commodity prices and a series of brokerage firm 
failures led to bank runs and suspended payments, most-
ly in the New York region. The output effects were mild. 
Bordo & Eichen-








Year Brief Summary Reference 
bank runs. Political action to ameliorate the crisis; severe 
decline in output but the economy recovered quickly. 




1907 Global credit restrictions and domestic financial excess-
es, increasing number of state banks, and a rising ratio of 
deposits to cash reserves set the stage for a crisis. Real 
estate and stock market speculation burst; crisis spread 
from New York nationwide. Growth rate fell by 9% per 
annum. JP Morgan, the Bank of Montreal and the Treas-
ury of New York replenished liquidity. 
Bordo & Eichen-




1914 New York Stock Exchange closed until December in re-
sponse to World War 1; however a banking crisis was 
avoided by flooding the country with emergency curren-
cy to prevent hasty withdrawals. 
 
1929-1923 Great Depression: thousands of banks closed; Bank of 
USA failed in December 1930; between August 1931 and 
January 1932, 1,860 banks failed. 
Bernanke & 
James 1991; 
Bordo et al. 
2001; Reinhart & 
Rogoff 2013 
1984-1991 1,400 savings and loans institutions and 1,300 banks 
failed. 
Bordo et al. 
2001; Reinhart & 
Rogoff 2013 





4.2 Selected Personalities and Events Influenc-
ing the Industry 
4.2.1 American War of Independence (1775 to 1783)  
The American War of Independence, also known as ‘the Revolution’, ‘the American Revolu-
tion’ and ‘the American Revolutionary War’ is used as a starting point for this thesis in trac-
ing the beginnings of the US investment banking industry. It is deemed appropriate on two 
fronts. Firstly it symbolises the birth of a modern nation which was to become the United 
States of America; and secondly it symbolises a struggle for independence from Great Brit-
ain both politically and economically. This war resulted in funding needs which gave rise to a 
class of financier that would morph into the investment bank with which we are now famil-
iar.  
The Revolution began when thirteen British colonies in North America sought independence 
from Great Britain. It concluded with the Treaty of Paris, which recognised the sovereignty 
of the US. The Americans entered the war with many disadvantages compared to the Brit-
ish. They had no national government; no national army or navy; no financial system; no 
domestic banks; no established credit; and no functioning government departments such as 
a treasury department (Shy 1976). It is against this background that the seeds of the modern 
investment banking industry were laid. 
The Revolution was costly on several fronts for the Americans. Not only did it cost the lives 
of over 25,000 American Revolutionaries (Shy 1976), but it had cost the new nation, the 
equivalent in USD terms at the time, USD 37 million at the national level plus USD 114 mil-
lion by the states (Jensen 2004). This cost was mostly covered by loans from France and the 
Netherlands, who had participated in the war in support of the Americans. Also they, to-
gether with Spain, provided supplies such as guns, ammunition, clothes and blankets. Much 
of the funding for this equipment was sourced domestically within the US by loans from the 
American public and through the issuance of paper money known as ‘specie’ including both 




The British attempted to sabotage the economy of the American colonies and thus weaken 
the Continental Congress15 by counterfeiting the Continental dollar and flooding the local 
market with the currency. The resultant increase in money supply impacted on the inflation 
rate, and a depreciation of the currency leading to an increase in costs for everyday goods 
including supplies for the continental army. This event gave rise to the  saying of ‘not worth 
a Continental’ (Baack 2001, pp. 643-4). By the end of 1777 inflation had depreciated the 
value of the Continental dollar by over 70%. This rapid devaluation of the Continental dollar 
posed significant financing issues for the Continental Congress, since up to 1777, currency 
emissions accounted for almost 90% of Congress revenue which had by then declined to 
19% (Baack 2001, p. 643). It was clear that for the Continental Congress to continue to fight 
the war it needed to secure alternative sources of finance other than printing currency. This 
allowed some entrepreneurial individuals with the opportunity to enter into relationships 
with the Continental Congress and its officials to support the required financing effort. An 
assessment of the role played by financier, Haym Salomon in the following section provides 
an example of how key relationships were used for financial gain. This is a recurrent theme 
appearing throughout this chapter and will be analysed further with other examples of key 
historical figures.   
4.2.2 Haym Salomon (1740-1785) Financier to Government 
Figure 15 - Portrait of Haym Salomon 
 
Source: (Historic.us 2015). 




 The Continental Congress comprised a convention of delegates selected as representatives from the thirteen 
Amercican Colonies which were under British rule. The Continental Congress replaced the British as the gov-




Haym Salomon was one of the earliest individuals whose activities typically resembled that 
of an investment banker given his role in assisting the financing of the Revolution (Feldberg 
2001). Salomon, born into a Jewish family in 1740, emigrated from Poland to New York city 
in 1772. Salomon, who through his travels around Europe learned several languages includ-
ing German, was operating as a merchant, foreign securities dealer and financial broker in 
New York City. After becoming friends with Alexander MacDougall, leader of the New York 
Sons of Liberty, he was attracted to the colonial cause for independence. His patriot activi-
ties became known to the British and in 1776 he was arrested as a spy. The British released 
him on the basis that he co-operated as an interpreter assisting the British with their Ger-
man allies (Feldberg 2001). Salomon’s loyalty remained with the patriots and he continued 
to offer support by assisting patriot prisoners to escape British imprisonment and German 
soldiers to desert. He was again arrested in 1778, however escaped and finally settled in 
Philadelphia, where he resumed his investment banking activities. He continued to assist 
the patriots by serving their French allies as paymaster and as a financial consultant to the 
French consul (Blythe 2008). 
Whilst Salomon was in Philadelphia, the Continental Congress had been relatively unsuc-
cessful in raising the necessary funds to finance the war effort. Most funding was met by the 
issuing of currency with small amounts coming from the states which were similarly strug-
gling. Without a formal federation in place, the Continental Congress did not have a man-
date to raise funds from taxation and therefore decided to augment its finances by borrow-
ing from the French and Dutch governments. By 1781, Congress was struggling to manage 
its financial commitments and assigned Robert Morris a member of the Second Congress, to 
the position of Superintendent of Finances (Blythe 2008).  
Figure 16 – Portrait of Robert Morris – A Superintendent of Finance with Good Connections 
 




Morris established the First Bank of North America also known as the Bank of North America 
and provided much needed finance for the patriots’ war effort (Blythe 2008). Salomon con-
tinued to support the patriots’ war effort by acting as a broker for bills of exchange, which 
were instruments drawn to raise funds for Congress.  He also provided personal loans to 
members of Congress, on an interest free basis. One of the recipients of these favourably 
termed loans included James Madison, who later became the fourth president of the US 
(Blythe 2008). This is one of the earliest examples of a private financier providing assistance 
to members of government whilst also providing assistance to the government itself. One of 
the principal roles of Salomon as the official broker to the Continental Congress was to ex-
change the foreign currencies arriving from Europe, representing the proceeds from the 
French and Dutch loans, into Continental dollars. The most common type of currency con-
version emanated from the remittance of bills from the French government in French cur-
rency.  
Figure 17 - Bill drawn by French Government in 1781 to Bearer or Shaym Salomon 
 




Figure 17, above shows an example of a typical bill remitted by the French government and 
payable to the bearer who was Haym Salomon. The fact that the bills included Salomon as a 
payee reflected Salomon’s high degree of integrity which was recognised by Robert Morris 
who oversaw the funding effort and Congress in general. Salomon earned the trust of the 
Continental Congress which was the ultimate debtor in these transactions and he was also 
trusted by the French and Dutch governments, the signatories upon which the various bills 
were drawn and which were shipped to Salomon in the US as the broker of the bills. A par-
tial translation of the face of the bill in Figure 17, reads that the amount of 3000 livre16 is to 
be paid to Haym Salomon or to his order, within 30 days of presentation of the bill. 
The transactions simply operated as borrowings by the Continental Congress, with the funds 
sourced from financial instruments issued by France and Holland. These European countries 
would ship bills drawn by their governments to Salomon who acted as broker. Salomon 
would sell the bills to the public, usually wealthy merchants, in exchange for Continental 
dollars and passed on the currency proceeds to the Continental Congress to be used for the 
war effort. Upon maturity, the bills were redeemed by the bearers (the public) who would 
be reimbursed for their original investment directly by Salomon as the representative of the 
French and Dutch governments. The proceeds used by Salomon to reimburse investors 
would be simultaneously paid to Salomon by the Continental Congress as a repayment of 
their original loan. To attract investors in the bills, Salomon advertised his service as a bro-
ker through newspapers. In return for the sales of bills, mostly to merchants, Salomon re-
ceived a commission of 0.25% on the bills’ face value (Peters 1911, p. 16). 








Figure 18 - Advertisement in ‘The Pennsylvania Journal and Weekly Advertiser’ 1782 
 
Source: (The Pennsylvania Journal and Weekly Advertiser 1782). 
Salomon’s Power  
The advertisement above Figure 18 describes Haym Salomon as a well-connected broker 
and financier. Apart from espousing his role as broker to eminent offices in The US and 
France he assures customers that they “may depend on having their business transacted 
with as much fidelity and expedition as if they were themselves present” (The Pennsylvania 
Journal and Weekly Advertiser 1783). Further, his advertisement noted that “he flatters 
himself his assiduity, punctuality, and extensive connections in his business, as a Broker, is 
well established in various parts of Europe and in the US in particular” (The Pennsylvania 
Journal and Weekly Advertiser 1783). This self-promotion of the individual combined with a 
self-confidence intended to assure potential customers is characteristic of similar invest-
ment banking advertisements appearing in newspapers and magazines in the 20th and 21st 




beneficial to customers and his business - the business of investment banking. It could 
therefore be argued that the important feature of being well connected has been a common 
attribute necessary to succeed in investment banking from as early as the 1780s. Salomon’s 
view of himself was also shared by Alexander Hamilton, a former Secretary of the Treasury:  
Haym Salomon brought not only all his wealth to the aid of his adopted country, but a finan-
cial insight which, for clearness and depth, was not surpassed by Alexander Hamilton nor 
equalled by Robert Morris. America found in Haym Salomon a champion equalled by few, his 
fertility in resource and soundness of financial views made him, through Robert Morris, Su-
perintendent of Finance, the real financier of the Revolution and judged by Alexander Hamil-
ton's standard of patriotism, surpassed by none… (Peters 1911, p. 16). 
What was expected in return for Salomon’s generous assistance to the Continental Congress 
and selected congressmen is subject to conjecture however it is not unreasonable to as-
sume that the generally accommodating nature of the relationships with those in positions 
of power and authority could have been intentionally developed to secure commercial fa-
vour. In any event, Salomon exercised a power sourced from what Clegg (1989) described as 
facilitative and dispositional circuits. Given his relatively unique knowledge of finance, as 
attested by Alexander Hamilton and advantageous distribution network for the sale of bills 
of exchange, Salomon possessed a competitive advantage over other financiers in the US at 
the time. The unique ‘technology of production’, that is, an ability to use his skills and know-
how to broker bills of exchange necessary to secure the required finance for the Continental 
Congress, rendered Salomon almost indispensable for the war funding effort. Without the 
prevailing exogenous environment of the Revolution, Salomon’s position of influence may 
not have materialised. An exogenous environment provides the context and stimulus for the 
empowerment in a facilitative circuit (Clegg 1989). The finances of the Continental Congress 
were in chaos in 1781, and innovative and urgent solutions were required. Salomon was 
able to fulfil this requirement and his financial techniques, generous financial support of the 
patriot cause and role in transacting bills of exchange issued by the French government and 
their subsequent currency conversions, were all actions that facilitated the transmission of 
power to the episodic circuit where agencies with external parties such as Morris intervened 
to assist in generating the desired outcome. The resultant social relations developed by Sa-
lomon with Morris and other congressmen enabled his appointment as the official financier 
of the government which led to two outcomes: firstly, a financial solution for Congress and 
secondly, further business transactions which were commercially favourable to Salomon. 
The relative control over the fundraising activities of Congress provided Salomon a special 
standing within government, which was ratified and perpetuated by Morris in his official ca-
pacity as Superintendent of Finances. This special status within government, formed within 
the dispositional circuit, reinforced Salomon’s power which he continued to exercise in his 




The Early Formation of Mimetic Influence 
The development of Salomon’s power described in the previous section originated from a 
combination of his unique skills and know-how, superior ability to distribute financial in-
struments and special relations developed with key individuals who could offer new and ad-
ditional business for commercial benefit. These attributes, sanctioned by the leading author-
ity in the land, the Continental Congress, represented acceptable professional skills in the 
wider financial markets industry. Given the industry’s technical sophistication, many outside 
groups such as politicians, other professionals and the public at large were relatively unfa-
miliar with the prevailing modus operandi of the industry. Therefore due to this widespread 
unfamiliarity with investment banking skills, the practices and behaviours of individual in-
vestment bankers remained unchallenged and were considered to be acceptable within a 
social context.  
One of the key practices emulated by others was the tactic of soliciting relationships with 
politicians in exchange for favours. These favours would inevitably include privileged treat-
ment in selection for government fundraising. Often these financings would be transacted 
on favourable terms to the investment banker. Salomon’s other business activities and prac-
tices were also emulated by other firms as they represented profitable enterprise and were 
accepted by the general commercial, political and public communities. This replication of 
business practice is a form of DiMaggio & Powell’s (1983) mimetic isomorphism as described 
in section 3.1. Other investment bankers soon entered the business of broking financial in-
struments such as bills of exchange and foreign exchange trading until these lines of busi-
ness became commonplace. The business of broking contributed significant profits to many 
investment banks as it does in the modern era and constituted a major source of revenue 
for LB. Moreover the practice of developing special relationships with parties that could of-
fer commercial benefit became accepted, even if it involved personal favours for govern-
ment officials. This public acquiescence to the behaviour of the investment banking industry 
was to last until the early 20th century when the investigations of the Pujo Committee com-
menced. See section 4.2.19 for a discussion on the Pujo Committee.  
As is shown in the remainder of this chapter, the acceptability and even admiration of Salo-
mon’s behaviour and practice, including that of other prominent investment banking figures 
who followed, defined a professional custom within the field and was acknowledged by the 
wider community. The mimetic influence established a practice which was to be adopted by 
the industry in future years as a formula for continuing success in business.  
4.2.3 The War of 1812 
Similar to the Revolution, the War of 1812, presented opportunities for some firms and in-




to the US funding requirements and solutions is presented in this section. Firstly, a brief 
overview of the war and its costs highlights the dire situation of the government. This is fol-
lowed by an examination of how Albert Gallatin, the Secretary of the Treasury resorted to a 
group of innovative investment bankers to solve the problematic funding of the US govern-
ment deficit.  
In 1812 the US government declared war on Britain due to a number of factors relating to 
oppressive behaviour by Britain over the US. Britain had forcefully recruited US citizens into 
its navy to help in the war against France. The French war had also caused a restriction on 
trade with the US which had detrimental effects on the US economy. These factors in addi-
tion to the British support for American indigenous tribes in their resistance against the 
American territorial encroachment had brought the US to the point of war (Hickey 1989). 
Following the conclusion of the French war, Britain resumed trade with the US and ceased 
its forceful recruitment of US sailors (Black 2002). This development had appeased the US 
government, resulting in the end of the war of 1812, which was sealed with the signing of 
the  Treaty of Ghent on December 24, 1814. An unintended consequence of the war was a 
new nationalistic pride in the north American continent which “concluded almost a quarter 
of a century of troubled diplomacy and partisan politics and ushered in the era of good feel-
ings” (Black 2002, p. 3). The period following the war of 1812, was also characterised by a 
productive and peaceable relationship between Britain and the US (Heidler & Heidler 2004 ). 
Cost of the War 
Estimates of the cost to Britain of the war of 1812 are unavailable however British govern-
ment debts had increased by GBP 25 million during the war (Hickey 1989). In the US, the 
cost of the war totalled “USD 158 million which included USD 93 million in army and navy 
expenditures, USD 16 million in interest on war loans, and USD 49 million in war veterens 
benefits” (Hickey 1989, p. 306). This resulted in  the national debt increasing from USD 
45 million in 1812 to USD 127 million by the end of 1815, implying a net borrowing of USD 
82 million by the end of the war (Hickey 1989, p. 233). The following graph of public debt as 
a percentage of GDP from 1790 to 1865 sourced from data from the Congressional Budget 
Office shows debt to GDP for the US increasing significantly from 1810 to 1815 encompass-






Figure 19 - US Public Debt as % of GDP - 1790 to 1865 
 
Source: (Phillips 2012). 
Sources of income for the government were scarce. The government had not yet instituted 
an income tax regime, and other taxes were inadequate. Apart from selling bonds, which 
will be described later in this section, the government resorted to raising funds through lot-
teries.  A number of private organisations and institutions participated in the selling of lot-
tery tickets including S & M Allen & Co. which was established in 1808 to sell the new lottery 
tickets (Geisst 2001, p. 11). S & M Allen & Co. was typical of businesses that developed skills 
tangential to those required for an investment bank. Selling lottery tickets from their net-
work of twenty offices generated only meagre profits however. The firm quickly realised 
that greater profits could be earned from selling securities through the same network. There 
was little difference between the two activities and by 1820 the firm switched from selling 
lottery tickets to exclusively selling securities. Unfortunately after twenty eight years of suc-
cessful operations, S & M Allen & Co. was forced to close its doors in 1836, not from a fail-
ure of their business model but following a series of losses following the collapse of the Sec-
ond Bank of the United States which contributed to the financial crisis of 1837(Geisst 2001, 
p. 12). 
Replication of Distribution Networks – A Mimetic Influence 
The key asset of S & M Allen & Co was the vital twenty strong office distribution network 




enabled settlement of transactions. To this day distribution power is considered one of the 
most important attributes of a successful modern day investment bank. The benefits of a 
alrge and effective distribution network in selling financial instruments, whether lottery 
tickets or other forms of securities accrue through the ability to reach a higher number of 
ultimate investors and thereby increase sales and profits. As other firms realised these ben-
efits they too organised themselves with similar distribution networks and an effective busi-
ness model dealing with selling securities was given new impetus and remains a strong 
business segment for investment banks to the present day. The imitation of this business 
model is an example of DiMaggio & Powell’s (1983) mimetic pressure where firms copy oth-
er firms which they consider successful. 
The overriding driver for mimicry lay in the desire by other firms to sell higher volumes of 
securities. To achieve this, they needed a wider spread of customers as local markets ulti-
mately became saturated. The natural limitation of a local geographical market restricted a 
firm’s ability to reach a broad client constituency. Therefore after observing the improve-
ment in sales by S & M Allen & Co. other firms decided to imitate their successful geograph-
ical distribution strategy. 
Albert Gallatin, the Secretary of the Treasury had to deal with the funding shortfalls of the 
government during the war of 1812. The following section discusses the sequence of events 
which led Gallatin to seek the assistance of a group of investment bankers who together de-
veloped an innovative technique to provide certainty of funds for the government. This was 
generically to be known as an underwritten securities issue which is still used today. 
4.2.4 Albert Gallatin - Secretary of the Treasury 
Figure 20 - Portrait of Albert Gallatin 
 




The Secretary of the Treasury in 1812, Albert Gallatin, encountered difficulties in attempting 
to source the necessary funding for the War of 1812 from the private sector. In 1809, three 
years earlier, Gallatin had warned Congress of the dangers of not renewing the charter of 
the First Bank of the United States as the bank was a possible source of finance for the 
Treasury in the event of an emergency. At that time the federal government had been gen-
erally free of routine bank debt for approximately 10 years but Congress was not swayed by 
Gallatin’s precautionary warnings (Heidler & Heidler 2004 ). 
Following a realisation that the sale of lottery tickets was not going to raise sufficient funds 
for an impending war, Congress ultimately authorised the issuance of USD 11 million in new 
bonds at 6% interest in March 1812, three months before it declared war. Congress consid-
ered the amount and relatively low interest rate proposed for the new issue was within the 
appetite of the private sector given the perception that the US represented a solid risk. At 
that time the US had a sound international reputation with over 50% of its bonds held by 
foreign investors and was one of the few nations that had followed a consistent policy of 
paying down substantial amounts of its national debt for over a decade; less debt reduced 
the interest drain on budgets and lowered the risk of default. However uncertainties sur-
rounding the war altered the investment climate (Heidler & Heidler 2004 ). 
The Treasury Department had become accustomed to managing its bond sale programmes 
without assistance of private underwriters. The Treasury began accepting subscriptions in 
May 1812, but only USD 6.2 million of the initial offering was taken - USD 4.2 million by 
banks for their long term loan portfolios and USD 2 million by individuals (Heidler & Heidler 
2004 p. 182). Meanwhile requests for military expenditures were accumulating. Gallatin 
might have considered offering the bonds at a discount price or increasing the interest cou-
pon above 6% to attract more investors but these options were rejected by the then Presi-
dent, James Madison and his closest advisors. When it became clear that the terms offered 
to investors were insufficiently remunerative to raise the entire USD 11 million, Madison 
instructed Gallatin to seek permission from Congress to pursue an alternative strategy 
which had last been used in 1780 during the American War of Independence: the issuance 
of fiat paper money. Gallatin was aware of the inflationary problems related to the emis-
sions of the Continental dollar during the American War of Independence. He considered as 
an alternative to fiat money, the issuance of short term debt instruments similar to the one 
and two year treasury notes issued by the colony of Massachusetts in 1751. The plan in-
volved the issuance of negotiable treasury bills that were legal tender in public dealings but 
not in private transactions. These bills would have maturities of one year or less and carry 
an interest rate of 5.4%, slightly below the yields on the longer term US bonds (Heidler & 




In June 1812, Congress authorised USD 5 million in treasury bills to cover the shortfall from 
the earlier bond sale. Over the course of the war the Treasury issued a total of USD 36.7 mil-
lion in treasury bills, although no more than USD 17.6 million were outstanding at any given 
time (Heidler & Heidler 2004 p. 183). Most treasury bills were issued in denominations of 
USD 20, USD 100 and USD 1,000 which ensured they catered to most wealth classes of in-
vestors. In 1815, the Treasury issued approximately USD 2.75 million in bills in even smaller 
denominations of USD 3, USD 5 and USD 10 and bearing no interest. These small bills, tan-
tamount to fiat money similar to the Continental dollar of the 1770s, immediately entered 
the money supply with the risk of fuelling inflation. These small bills constituted less than 
4% of the Treasury’s total indebtedness and their overall impact was fairly modest (Heidler 
& Heidler 2004 p. 183). Unlike the Continental dollar, the purchasing power of these small 
bills remained relatively stable since holders had the option of converting the bills at face 
value into long term government bonds paying 7% interest thereby creating a secondary 
demand for the bonds. 
Meanwhile Gallatin tried to float another issue of long term bonds in early 1813. Congress 
authorised an issue of USD 16 million and given the shortfall experienced in the 1812 issue, 
military indecisiveness, and the opposition of many wealthy New England investors to the 
war, Treasury was allowed to pay a commission of 0.25% to private agents who solicited 
bond sales (Heidler & Heidler 2004 p. 183). This is another of the earliest examples of the 
acknowledgement that the Treasury could not fulfil the government’s fundraising on its own 
and that it could turn to the investment banks for the much needed assistance. Whilst the 
Treasury was solely responsible for the routine government debt offerings, it was lacking 
the aggressive marketing expertise that these investment bankers could provide.  
In response to its appeal for funds - the traditionally passive system of merely announcing a 
subscription date – the Treasury had received applications for only about one third of the 
sum required up to March 1813 which left approximately USD 10 million of bonds unsold. 
Gallatin was now prepared to consider any debt structures including higher interest rates, 
discounts on purchase prices, call rights and other features (Heidler & Heidler 2004 p. 183). 
During the first week of April 1813, Gallatin engaged in negotiations with representatives of 
a syndicate of underwriters and investors. The three principals who could be considered as 
sophisticated investment bankers were Stephen Girard of Philadelphia, John Jacob Astor of 
New York and David Parish, the agent of an international banking house who had resided in 
Philadelphia since 1806. Refer sections 4.2.5, 4.2.10, and 4.2.6 for a more detailed back-
ground of David Parish, John Jacob Astor and Stephen Girard respectively. Parish, who was 
the lead arranger of the syndicate, was the son of the senior partner of Parish & Co., a firm 
headquartered in Hamburg, Germany. He was familiar with the techniques of forming syn-




skills to the US capital markets. The syndicate agreed to underwrite the remaining USD 10.1 
million of 6% bonds at a discount price of 88% of par which produced a current yield to in-
vestors of 6.8%. Between them, Girard, Astor and Parish took up a total of approximately 
USD 7.7 million on terms which they considered acceptable and earned USD 11,510 in 
commissions after costs for their services. The remaining underwriting amount was filled by 
independent firms in New York and Philadelphia which acted as junior members of the syn-
dicate. These new syndicate members sold an additional amount of USD 2.4 million in bonds 
to various investors. The underwriting process provided the Treasury with the assurance 
that the funds were committed. It was then the responsibility of the syndicate members to 
place those bonds which they had underwritten to other investors (Heidler & Heidler 2004 ) 
otherwise the underwriters would be left holding any unplaced bonds in their own proprie-
tary portfolios. With the co-operation of the private syndicate of investment bankers, Gal-
latin was able to avoid the embarrassment of a second unsuccessful or unduly prolonged 
fund raising campaign. Moreover, with total commissions representing a fraction of 1% of 
the total face value of the amount underwritten, the government was well satisfied (Heidler 
& Heidler 2004 ). 
This underwriting process has remained unchanged ever since and is the cornerstone of the 
global debt and equity markets providing assurance to borrowers and users of capital that 
funding in whichever form would be provided by the underwriters of any particular issue. 
This precedent setting fund raising exercise in April 1813 is considered the first official US 
government involvement with financiers performing essentially investment banking func-
tions. This association between government and underwriters was a singular event in the 
financing of the War of 1812. Despite the success of the public offering, the participation of 
underwriters was not repeated during the war. During the ensuing two years the Treasury 
stuck to the former practice of managing the distribution of new securities without the as-
sistance of outside financiers (Heidler & Heidler 2004 ). 
Gallatin resigned from the posiiton of Treasury Secretary in May 1813, soon after the con-
clusion of negotiations with the syndicate. He was succeeded first by Secretary of the Navy, 
William Jones, (later president of the Second Bank of the United States), who served as act-
ing Treasury Secretary until February 1814, then by George Campbell until October 1814, 
and subsequently by Alexander Dallas. William Jones managed to sell USD 8.5 million of 6% 
bonds at a discount of USD 88 in August 1813, on the same terms established for the suc-
cessful bond issue by the syndicate three months earlier. Thereafter treasury secretaries 
had difficulty raising sufficient funds in the capital markets to cover military expenditures on 
equally favourable terms. They resorted to a mix of short-term treasury notes plus occa-







4.2.5 David Parish - Underwriter and Social Networker 
Figure 21 - Portrait of David Parish 
 
Source: (Immigrant Entrepeneurship n.d.). 
David Parish was a financier, property investor and trader from an English family which had 
important and influential connections throughout Europe. Parish spent time in Hamburg 
and began his fortune when he founded a commercial house in Antwerp. As mentioned in 
the previous section, he was later to play a major role in financing the US military effort in 
the War of 1812 and in chartering the Second Bank of the United States (Walters & Walters 
1944, pp. 149-50). 
Following his move to the US in 1806, Parish commenced his property investment activities 
by purchasing vast tracks of land in Philadelphia, to onsell to new American settlers (Walters 
& Walters 1944, p. 157). Sympathetic to the anti-war Federalist Party, he nevertheless was 
instrumental in arranging the abovementioned USD 10.1 million underwriting syndicate for 
the US Treasury in 1813 to continue prosecuting the war. For that support, Parish gained the 
political leverage to insist on neutrality for the St. Lawrence Valley on the border between 
the State of New York and Quebec and on peace negotiations with the British in view of his 
business interests in the region (Taylor 2010).  
Parish’s efforts for peace contributed to a continuing commercial relationship between the 
US and Britain within a peaceful environment. He was able to use his social networks to be-
come one of the most influential players in the international financial community  (Taylor 
2010). According to Schnurmann (2011) apart from his business and finance skills, his suc-




confront and overcome many challenges. Parish’s fortunes changed due to commercial fail-
ures following the banking crisis of 1826. His excessive pride and self-confidence affected his 
personal decision-making, as with some modern day executives of financial institutions that 
failed following the GFC, such as those of LB. As identified by Schnurman (2011), when hu-
bris is combined with a banking crisis, a significant financial loss is likely. This pattern of a 
successful career based on attainment of power, hubris, leverage through social networks, 
courage and personal abilities parallels that of Richard Fuld whose successful career also 
came to an untimely end through a combination of hubris, miscalculations, and general 
problems connected with a financial crisis. 
4.2.6 Stephen Girard - Financier, Patriot and Philanthropist 
Figure 22 - Portrait of Stephen Girard 
 
Source: (Brown 1832). 
Stephen Girard was born in 1750 in France, the son of a sea captain and merchant. In his 
youth, Girard trained as a seaman undertaking voyages between France the US and the 
West Indies.  His sailing skills proved useful when in 1776, he immigrated to the US where 
he established his own shipping business in Philadelphia. Like many financiers of his era, 
Gerard started his commercial career in a traditional and ordinary shipping business and 
used social networks and innovative practices to expand and exploit opportunities. An ex-
ample of Gerard’s innovative operating style is that he would warehouse goods imported 
from overseas until market prices reached optimal levels. This trading skill and market 
awareness may be viewed as a hallmark skill of any modern day investment banker where 
prior to the GFC, investment banks and in particular LB would warehouse mortgage securi-
ties for onselling once market conditions became favourable. Girard’s shipping business ex-
panded into trade routes encompassing China, Europe, the Caribbean and South America 




becoming a majority investor in the First Bank of the United States immediately following 
the expiration of its charter. His investment also involved the purchase of the bank’s head-
quarters on Philadelphia’s South Third Street (Schroeder 2011). The bank was instrumental 
in assisting the US government in its financing of the War of 1812, therefore making the US 
government its major customer. As detailed in the previous section, Girard, was also a major 
participant together with Astor and Parish in the USD 10.1 million syndicated government 
fundraising. As with the other major participants, this involvement provided Girard with 
special access to the government executive and authorities. Girard used his role in the USD 
10.1 million funding by simultaneously negotiating that in return the US government sold to 
him the majority of its shares in the First Bank of the United States (Cowen 2010). At the 
time of his death in 1831, Stephen Girard was the richest man in the United States 
(Schroeder 2011).   
Girard – Saint or Sinner, Subjected to Normative Pressure 
Girard is most famously recognised in the US as a generous philanthropist. He supported a 
wide variety of civic associations in his adopted hometown of Philadelphia. He contributed 
to a number of charities and social institutions such as to “the Pennsylvania Hospital, the 
Society for Relief of Distressed Masters of Ships and Their Widows, the Société de Bien-
faisançe Francaise, the Public School Fund of Philadelphia, the Pennsylvania Institution for 
the Deaf and Dumb, the Fuel Saving Society, and the Orphan Society, among many other 
groups” (Klem 2016). 
Although Girard is well known for his philanthropic activities throughout his life, he was also 
prepared to undertake devious business practices. According to Henry (1918, p. 284) 
“Gerard was a smuggler himself and a deviser of ways that are dark and tricks that in one 
notable instance …… were vain”. Examples of Girard’s dishonest activities included “lying, 
official declarations which were quite different of the cargo carried by his ships, gratifica-
tions for the customs inspectors, counterfeit passports and camouflaged ship ownership 
and consignees” (Henry 1918, p. 284). This acknowledgement that a successful merchant 
like Gerard was prepared to behave in such a manner is an indication of the times. Henry 




isation of antisocial and dishonest behaviour was also evident in the lead up to the GFC 
when for example investment banks were selling almost worthless mortgage backed se-
cruities to unsuspecting investors17. In support of the acceptance of these practices is the 
fact that there is no record of Girard ever being convicted of any criminal or civil indiscre-
tion. At worst legal authorities cast a blind eye, which as Zanna (1991, p. 202) explains is 
tantamount to “what is commonly approved – that is, what is socially sanctioned”. At best 
this behaviour was never discovered by the legal authorities, in which case the prevailing 
social norms, allowed for an under-resourcing of law enforcement agencies whether in per-
sonnel, training or motivation to detect and prosecute such misdemeanours.  
The normative influences existing during this era regularised certain dishonest practices as a 
means of doing business as explained in the previous section. Further justification for these 
practices is found later in this thesis by way of similar questionable behaviours being nor-
malised in the modern investment banking industry. A common feature of these practices 
within the field of finance and trading is the complexity of transactions. Large merchant 
businesses dealing with more complex international trade transactions encountered many 
obstacles and challenges in concluding the deals.  These circumstances mirror the challeng-
es which presented themselves to investment bankers in completing complex financial 
transactions in the pre-GFC period. Therefore given their complexity and relative remote-
ness from the purview of the legal and regulatory authorities, the indiscretions were suc-
cessfully concealed, or at worst, ignored by the same authorities. A significant contribution 
of this section to the thesis is the recurrent theme of similar behaviours exhibited by traders 
and financiers over the centuries in the US. 
4.2.7  American Railroads Expansion (1830 - 1850) 
Much has been written about the economic and social development which was accelerated 
by the US railroad expansion during the period 1830 to 1850, so it will not be addressed in 
this section. Instead this section analyses the favourable impact this expansion had on the 
investment banking industry given the scarcity of long term capital. The dearth of capital 




 On 16 January 2017 Deutsche Bank settled a claim of USD 7.2 billion with the US Department of Justice for 
its misleading and dishonest behaviour in selling toxic mortgage backed securities to investors prior to the GFC 




drove promoters to seek funding through the bond and equity markets with a predisposi-
tion for the bond markets in Europe. 
The funding of railroads underwent cycles of success and failure during the abovementioned 
period. Initially funding was relatively easily accessible, however once the economic impact 
on direct and indirect competitors to the railroads became apparent, funding for new rail-
roads dissipated. Competitors which had a meaningful influence on new funding included 
stagecoach companies, canal operators, and turnpike companies (Kansas Historical Society 
2011 ). Railroads were seen as an efficient and economical way of transporting people and 
goods between established cities and towns. In 1827, given the size of Baltimore, the pro-
ject economics for a railroad, known as the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, connecting Balti-
more with other towns were deemed feasible. The railroad was initially envisaged to com-
pete with the Erie Canal, which accommodated New York passengers, however through a 
number of extensions, it continued until it reached Parkersburg, West Virginia (Kansas 
Historical Society 2011 ).  
Other railroads soon followed such as those based in Charlestown, South Carolina, and Al-
bany, New York.  As settlements across the US expanded, the federal government wanted to 
develop a trans-continental railroad connecting New York and San-Francisco. This railroad 
was constructed between 1863 and 1869 and became known as the Pacific Railroad (Linda 
Hall Library 2012). As the project economics of the trans-continental railroad were not ap-
parent, the federal government granted public land to railroad companies via the Pacific 
Railroad Act, as an incentive to construct sections of track in selected areas. The govern-
ment anticipated that the land grants would increase in value as the new settlements along 
the track expanded and demand for adjacent land increased. This would contribute to the 
profits or net worth of the railroad companies and therefore improve the project econom-
ics. Moreover, as railroads usually operated as monopolies between destinations, an ulti-
mate profit was expected by the railroad companies. The Pacific Railway Act, also commit-
ted  government financing by way of issuance of government bonds, which contributed USD 
32,000 per mile of track laid to the two sponsoring companies, the Central Pacific Railroad 
and the Union Pacific Railroad. The balance of the financing was sourced from private inves-
tors (Linda Hall Library 2012). By 1860, US railroad mileage had more than tripled from a 
decade earlier. An indication of the expansion rate of railroads between 1830 and 1890 is 




Figure 23 - US Railroad Active Mileage by Region between 1830 and 1890 
Source: (Porter 1892). 
The support provided by government by way of land grants combined with the monopolistic 
nature of the railroad business in the early period of the industry, made financing this mod-
ern infrastructure an attractive and relatively low risk proposition for investment bankers 
(Porter 1892). As this was a capital intensive industry, which required large amounts of debt 
and equity from a country with a short supply, it was ripe territory for strong growth of the 
investment banking industry. The following section outlines some of the pioneers who initi-
ated the required railroad financing. 
4.2.8 Nicholas Biddle – Politician, Bank President and Fi-
nancier to US Railroads 
Figure 24 - Portrait of Nicholas Biddle 
 
Source: (Longacre c. 1830). 
Region 1830 1840 1850 1860 1870 1880 1890
New England 30            513             2,596         3,644            43,273         5,888            6,718              
East 1,484         3,740         11,927         18,292         28,155         40,826            
South 10            737             2,082         7,908            10,610         14,458         27,833            
Midwest 46               4,951            11,031         22,213         35,580            
South Central 21               107             250               331               1,621            5,154              
West 239               4,578            15,466         47,451            




Nicholas Biddle was born in Philadelphia in 1786. He was the son of Charles Biddle, who was 
a strong supporter of American independence and ultimately served as Vice President of the 
Supreme Executive Council of Pennsylvania under President Benjamin Franklin. Nicholas’ 
uncle was regarded as a hero and died in the American War of Independence, whilst anoth-
er uncle was a member of the first Continental Congress of 1774. This ancestry provided 
Nicholas Biddle an unusually valuable network of political and business connections 
(Hammond 1957, pp. 287-8).  
Nicholas Biddle graduated with a degree at Princeton University at the age of 15. He fol-
lowed his degree with further studies in law.  Following his studies, Biddle began writing for 
a prestigious journal, Joseph Dennies’ Port Folio and in 1804 became secretary to General 
John Armstrong, the American Minister in Paris. This job enabled Biddle to tour Europe and 
in 1806, he served the future US President, James Monroe, who was at that time, the Minis-
ter to the Court of St James in England (Hammond 1947). During this period, Biddle estab-
lished many connections which would become useful in his later finance career, especially in 
the distribution of bonds to European investors. Hammond (1957, p. 287) describes Biddle 
as having “a superfluity of social and economic advantages”. His network permeated both 
the US and Europe.  
In 1807, Biddle returned to the US and began writing journal articles and books. In 1810, 
Biddle was elected to the Pennsylvania House of Representatives whilst his father was a 
member of the State Senate. Nicholas Biddle later also became a Senator of Pennsylvania 
and during this time sought a new charter for the Second Bank of the United States, follow-
ing the expiration and non-renewal of the federal charter of the First Bank of the United 
States in 1811. The Second Bank of the United States was chartered in 1816 with the same 
responsibilities and powers as the First Bank. Biddle was initially appointed as a federal gov-
ernment director by the then US President Monroe and in 1823 succeeded Langdon Cheves 
as the bank’s president. Under Biddle’s leadership the bank assumed the role of a central 
bank and his interest in the welfare of the US economy inspired him to implement monetary 
policy to aid the government’s attempts to expand economic activity. Biddle remained in 
this role until the bank’s charter expired in 1836 (Hammond 1947).  
Biddle was a major contributor in elevating Philadelphia to its primary role in railroad financ-
ing during the 1830s. He helped market the securities of the Reading, the Virginia, and some 
of the local Pennsylvania railroads (Chandler 1954). The Second Bank of the United States 
acted as the fiscal agent for the Reading and other coal railroads and was of prime im-
portance in financing the Philadelphia, Wilmington and Baltimore railroads. His involvement 
with railroad financing earned Biddle the informal title of America's pioneer investment 
banker (Chandler 1954). He also used the Second Bank of the United States,  “to funnel 
American securities into the London market directly and efficiently through its agent, Mr. 




In April 1836, the national charter granted to the bank by the Federal government  expired, 
however Biddle was instrumental in ensuring the bank continued operating under a state 
charter to guarantee its status. In 1839, Biddle resigned as the bank’s president, and in 
1841, following the impact of the bank panic of 1837, the bank failed. Biddle was subse-
quently arrested on fraud charges but was later acquitted and died soon after (Hammond 
1947). When the Second Bank of the United States failed, it had large holdings in nearly all 
the important privately financed railroads south of New York. 
Biddle’s Power from Knowhow and Networks 
Biddle’s network of contacts enabled him to assume important political and commercial po-
sitions, leading to his ascension to the top position in one of the largest banks in the US at 
the time. His influence and capacity to organise finance for the burgeoning railroad infra-
structure in the US was vital for the development of the US economy. It is not surprising 
therefore that his knowhow, network, and credibility attracted favour from key individuals 
in the government executive and other prominent businessmen. The principal power exhib-
ited by Biddle is identified by Clegg (1989) as that emanating from networks and knowhow 
which is transmitted from the facilitative circuit.  
Biddle’s networks enabled his progression as mentioned above, through political positions 
in government which in turn led to the influential position as the head of the Second Bank of 
the United States with the ongoing support of President Monroe. Biddle used this power to 
support the development of the US railroads and economy. In the process he ingratiated 
himself to the country’s elite leaders which in turn served to increase Biddle’s commercial 
success and influence even further.  
The facilitative circuit is also where power is generated by techniques of production which is 
translated as the knowhow of arranging difficult financings. In this instance, Biddle’s 
knowhow and skills in arranging large financings by using Europe as a distribution centre for 
the issuance of railroad bonds is representative of a relatively unique technique which em-
powered Biddle to reach the positions he eventually attained. In accordance with Clegg’s 
(1989) framework, the resultant power favourably impacted Biddle’s social relations in the 
episodic circuit with politicians and leaders of industry to facilitate his leadership position in 







4.2.9 Clark Dodge – Investment Bank Financier to the Early 
Railroads 
Figure 25 - Portrait of Enoch Clark (founding partner of Clark Dodge) 
 
Source: (Scharf & Wescott 1884). 
Enoch Clarke, born in 1802, was another eminent financier instrumental in supporting the 
financing of the US railroad system. Clarke established his name as a prominent financier 
whilst a partner in the merchant bank S. & M. Allen and Co. which eventually failed follow-
ing the panic of 1837 (Geisst 2006). S. & M. Allen and Co. was a founding member of the 
New York Stock exchange and during his time in the firm, Clarke gained a reputation as a 
stock trader and speculator (Geisst 2001).  
Clarke subsequently began his own firm with his brother in law, Edward Dodge as partner. 
The firm was known as Clarke Dodge and Co. and specialised in trading banknotes and gold 
bullion. Clark Dodge & Co. soon established a sound reputation by guaranteeing the firm’s 
notes with their own stock of  gold and silver (Geisst 2001). The firm’s reputation grew 
when it participated as a co-underwriter alongside merchant bank, Corcoran & Riggs in a 
bond issue for the federal government to assist in the financing of  the Mexican War which 
began in 1846 (Geisst 2001). 
As the firm expanded, it introduced new partners, including Jay Cooke, who was admitted in 
1849. Prior to the Civil War, the firm participated in the underwriting of a number of bond 
issues on behalf of some of the earlier railroads such as The Pennsylvania railroad (founded 
in 1846), Rocks Island Line (founded in 1854), Northern Central (founded in 1858) and the 
Philadelphia and Erie (founded in 1861). These successful transactions generated significant 
esteem and earned the participating firms generous fees (Chandler 1954; Geisst 2001). 
Clark died in 1856, a year before the panic of 1857. As with all panics, the viability of mer-
chant banks generally becomes strained. Clarke Dodge closed its operations temporarily fol-




one of the most successful partners in the merchant bank, departed to open his own firm 
(Geisst 2006). Clark Dodge continued operating until 24 June 1974 when it was acquired by 
Kidder Peabody (Geisst 2006). Like many other investment banks, Clarke Dodge had been 
incurring losses in the early 1970s, and Kidder Peabody, recognising the valuable distribu-
tion capability of the firm was able to justify the acquisition (New York Times 1974).   
Distribution Capability as Technology of Production 
Clark Dodge & Co. was typical of the various investment banks of its era which often relied 
on effective distribution networks for the sale of bonds. The ability to reach investors with 
appetite for bond investments is considered a crucial skill of any firm. The wider distribution 
network the larger the potential volume of bonds that can be underwritten. It therefore fol-
lows that the higher the value of bonds underwritten the greater the potential profits for 
the firm.  
This distribution capability was equally important for the financing of the US railroad expan-
sion as it is today for any corporate bond issue. A cornerstone of the development of valua-
ble distribution capability is a network of social relations amongst other investment banks 
and wealthy investors. The power of individuals within a firm is facilitated by the possession 
of superior knowhow and technology. This knowhow extends to the ability to develop effec-
tive distribution networks. In creating these networks a reputation for reliable delivery of 
credit information on issuers and structuring and pricing of suitable capital market transac-
tions is essential in order to generate sufficient investor appetite for a successful issue. 
Therefore the knowhow required to deliver arrange securities issues and ensure their effec-
tive distribution is an important factor for an investment banking firm intent on participat-
ing in this sector of the market.    
4.2.10 John Jacob Astor Benefits from US Legislation 
Figure 26 - Portrait of John Jacob Astor 
 
Source: (Jarvis 1825). 
John Jacob Astor was born in 1763 in Germany and migrated to the US in 1784 at the age of 




ness interests in the US, Astor became one of the wealthiest men in the US and its first mul-
ti-millionaire (Bernstein & Swan 2007). Astor first developed his sales skills and business ac-
umen whilst working as a salesman in his father’s dairy business in Germany at a very young 
age. Destined for a career in commerce, he further refined his business skills at the age of 16 
once he moved to London to work for his brother, George Astor, manufacturing musical in-
struments. This provided Astor the opportunity to learn English (Klepper & Gunther 1996). 
Following his emigration to the US, Astor practiced his business skills by entering the fur 
trading sector and by the late 1780s established a fur goods retail outlet in New York. He 
also became the New York agent of his brother's musical instrument business (Klepper & 
Gunther 1996).  
He soon started exporting furs to Europe and expanded his business to China where he ex-
ported furs, sandalwood, tea and furs. In the process Astor began accumulating a significant 
amount of wealth. His trading business was temporarily affected by The US Embargo Act in 
1807, which prevented trade with France and Britain however this restriction was relaxed in 
1809  (Encyclopedia Brittanica 2015). Astor’s importance to US trade was recognised by 
Thomas Jefferson, and Astor used his influence to gain Presidential approval to establish the 
American Fur Company on April 6, 1808. Through his group corporate structure, Astor soon 
controlled trading in the Columbia River and Great Lakes areas (Klepper & Gunther 1996). 
Jefferson welcomed Astor’s entrepeneurship and acknowledge its importance to US eco-
nomic development. The letter below (Figure 27) quotes Jefferson as stating “I learn with 
great satisfaction the disposition of our merchants to form into companies for understand-




Figure 27 - Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Jacob Astor, 13 April  1808 
 
Source: (Jefferson 1808a). 
In the letter below to Meriwether Lewis Figure 28, Jefferson expressed his opinion of  Astor 




Figure 28 - Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Meriwether Lewis, 17 July 1808 
 
Source: (Jefferson 1808b). 
Figure 29 demonstrates Astor’s continuous contact with the President regarding his group’s 




Figure 29 - Letter from John Jacob Astor to Thomas Jefferson, 14 March 1812 
 
Source: (Astor 1812). 
Further evidence of Astor’s desire to court the interest of the most powerful leader in the 




learn with great pleasure the progress you have made towards an establishment on the Co-
lumbia River”(Jefferson 1813). 
Figure 30 - Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Jacob Astor, 9 November 1813 
 




The examples of correspondence above provide an insight to the strong relationship Astor 
was able to develop with the President of the US. Jefferson naturally was interested in fos-
tering economic trade for the ongoing prosperity of the new nation and Astor, knowing this 
priority within Jefferson’s agenda, ensured he kept himself and the developments surround-
ing his companies, front of mind with Jefferson and the government. It is therefore not un-
expected that as Astor required certain dispensations from the government that they were 
granted without challenge or bureaucracy. 
During the War of 1812, Astor’s fur trading hub, which was structured as a fort and located 
on the US west coast, was ceded by the British. This action by the British reaffirmed Astor’s 
belief of the repressive nature of the British and reinforced his loyal convictions towards the 
US Congress. Aside from the capture of his trading fort, Astor did not escape the War of 
1812 without a substantial profit. Like many financiers described in this section, Astor was 
able to use an influential network of connections, especially in government to secure con-
cessions allowing him, in effect, to continue the fur trade in Canada throughout the war 
(Klepper & Gunther 1996). 
Together with Stephen Girard and David Parish, Astor was able to assist the US government 
in the USD 10.1 million syndicated  funraising described in section 4.2.4. The income gener-
ated by this financing together with an expanded property portfolio in New York, enabled 
Astor to accumulate significant wealth. Astor became “immensely wealthy and ready to take 
over virtually the whole of the American fur trade” (Stokesbury 1997). 
Astor’s Preferential Treatment – An Exercise of Power and a Normative Influ-
ence 
Given the US government’s precarious financial position towards the end of the War of 
1812, and Astor’s immediate financial assistance, a sense of obligation was created between 
a grateful US government and the syndicate members of the USD 10.1 million financing 
transaction, including Astor. In 1816 Astor capitalised on this sense of obligation and at-
tempted to influence the US government to prevent Canadians trading in furs unless em-
ployed by a US firm. The US government consented to Astor’s request by enacting legisla-
tion on 29 April 1816: 
John Jacob Astor, already a power in the Wisconsin trade, saw his opportunity. Having se-
cured the passage by congress of an act April 29, 1816, by which foreigners were excluded 
from any participation in the fur trade within the United States except in subordinate capaci-
ties under American traders, he cleverly began through his agents to enlist the distressed 




This enlarged Astor’s business empire and granted his group control over all fur trade with 
the Great Lakes region of the US (Stokesbury 1997). Equally in 1816, through Astor’s hubris 
generated by the US government’ s sense of obligation, he illegally directed his American 
Fur Company to purchase 10 tons of Turkish opium, which was exported  to China on the 
ship ‘Macedonian’ (Frontline 2011). When he ceased his business with China, he instead ex-
ported opium to Britain (Frontline 2011). None of these illegal actions attracted the scrutiny 
of US law enforcement agencies. Whether this inaction was due to incompetence, a sense of 
obligation and awe of Astor’s power or carefully negotiated arrangements with US authori-
ties, Astor, had effectively enriched himself at the expense of the legal system under the 
government’s authority. It was during this time that Astor agreed to jointly underwrite the 
abovementioned US government USD 10.1 million bond issue, whilst concurrently receiving 
concessions from the US government for his fur trading. Astor’s influence with powerful 
government individuals also extended to property transactions. In 1804, Aaron Burr was 
serving as Vice President under then President Thomas Jefferson. Burr was in dire need of 
cash and needed to sell what remained of a 99-year lease he owned on a property located in 
New York. Astor was sought out by Burr, who knew Astor well through his dealings with 
government. Knowing of Astor’s vast wealth, Burr solicited Astor to buy the lease which ex-
pired in 1866 for USD 62,500 (Bernstein & Swan 2007). Astor negotiated the transaction 
based on it not being brought to the market for competitive bidding. Not only did Astor 
once again prove useful to a US government official by executing a much needed property 
transaction, he also generated considerable wealth by subleasing parcels of the property to 
private investors (Bernstein & Swan 2007). Bernstein and Swan (2007) signal this transaction 
as instrumental in Astor’s business career and journey to become one of the richest men in 
the US. 
In the above examples Astor exercised power through his influence on the government to 
pass legislation to limit Canadian competition in his fur trade; avoid prosecution  for his opi-
um trading; and build on his wealth through the acquisition of Burr’s property lease. In each 
case, Astor was able to influence some if not all of these outcomes through the use of his 
government relations facilitated by his financial support. Astor’s activities were set within 
the historical context of the War of 1812 where the government was in need of Astor’s fi-
nancial assistance. This provided the exogenous environment required as the setting for the 
transmission of power in Clegg’s (1989) dispositional circuit. In this circuit, rules of practice 
and socially constructed meanings inform social relations. Although this circuit is where so-
cially constructed meanings in the work environment are often found, in Astor’s case, the 
impact on social relations were created through a social obligation. Through the obligations 
created with the US government, and his frequent correspondence with the President which 
contributed to the positive impression formed of him by the President himself, he was able 
to establish an expectation that favours would be offered in return. This notion of obligation 




cial context of the relationships Astor formed. The empowerment was exercised through 
the episodic circuit where Astor’s desired outcomes were achieved. Within these social rela-
tions, Astor was able to assert influence in the enactment of legislation, the turning of a 
‘blind eye’ to criminal activity and being the ‘go to man’ when funding was required.    
As well as representing an exercise of power, Astor’s situation also indicates normative and 
mimetic influences. The normative influence is revealed through relationships between law 
enforcement authorities and contemporary key individuals also involved in investment 
banking activities. For example, illegal activities by Stephen Girard were also ignored by law 
enforcement authorities (see below). In both Girard’s and Astor’s cases, the authorities 
chose to ignore the illegalities or indiscretions. This lack of action represents a type of social 
influence where an acceptance of common practices is seen as, justifying the behaviour. 
Normative pressure is commonly found within a social group where actions can be defined 
by moral duty and standards. In accepting Astor’s actions, the groups in which he socialised 
comprising other businessmen, government officers and authorities tolerated a level of ille-
gal behaviour as a cultural norm. The mimetic influence is however located between the in-
vestment bankers themselves. As one investment banker noted that another was able to 
escape conviction on illegal practices, the other copied the same behaviours in the expecta-
tion of escaping legal scrutiny and generating abnormally high profits.  
Therefore Astor was able to achieve his desired objectives without sanction through a com-
bination of: the power generated through the sense of obligation; the normative pressures 
permeating the social relationships between the institutions and Astor; and the mimetic 
pressure between members within the industry to copy certain behaviours in anticipation of 
greater benefits.  
4.2.11 The Role of Bonds in Funding Railroads 
As mentioned in the previous sections of this chapter, investment banks became an im-
portant conduit for the issuance of bonds for the financing of railroads. In the 1830s US rail-
road companies either chose local investment banks such as Clark Dodge & Co. and Thomas 
Biddle, or London-based investment banks to undertake the role of underwriter and distrib-
utor of bonds. The importance of the size and quality of social and commercial networks in 
the distribution of bonds is well demonstrated in the period between 1840 and 1850. During 
this period, the US investment banking industry was converging on New York, which, as the 
new major financial centre, was the destination for most railroad and canal companies in 
their fundraising efforts. The New York-based investment banks had the capability to dis-
tribute bonds in the Eastern regions of the US as well as to Europe. These vast regions relied 
on strong commercial and social networks to reach the ultimate investor. However, given 
the remoteness from the investor base, particularly in Europe, it was difficult for the New 




Instead, investors preferred to invest in the less risky bond instrument. Since the equity is-
sued by railroad corporations was generally considered a riskier form of investment, the 
performance, operations and risks associated with the railroad project generally required a 
greater level of monitoring. Alternatively, bonds paying a fixed amount of interest, a condi-
tion preferred by European investors, represented a less risky form of investment, and 
therefore required a lower level of risk monitoring.  
However, in contrast with European investors, New England investors expressed a greater 
preference for equity as opposed to debt instruments. The social and commercial networks 
in New England were considered more closely knit than elsewhere in the US. The manufac-
turing and mercantile community of New England and specifically, Boston, where most 
wealthy investors resided, represented one of the country’s primary investment markets. 
Given the strength of relationships throughout this community, railroad promoters had en-
hanced access to the ultimate investor which often obviated the need for an investment 
bank as a conduit for bond issues. Railroad companies could often issue directly to the in-
vestor and given the relational closeness and physical proximity between the parties, the 
risk monitoring by the investor was less problematic. This led investors in the region to be 
more amenable to equity issues in preference to bond issues. This preference for equity 
capital soon changed by the 1850s, as the amounts required for railroad expansion exceed-
ed the available equity capital in the region (Chandler 1954). 
By the beginning of the 1840s, various states were acknowledging the economic benefits of 
railroads. However in this early phase of railroad expansion, private capital willing to invest 
in railroads was relatively scarce. The states stepped in by arranging large state guaranteed 
public bond issues. These included issues by the states of  Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Vir-
ginia, South Carolina, Georgia and several of the new states of the West. Given the scale and 
cost of the railroad projects, combined with the risk related to the uncertain prospects of a 
sustainable profitable business, willing private investors during this period were relatively 
difficult to find. Consequently public issues became the norm (Chandler 1954, p. 249). 
Critical to arranging much needed financing were the personal and business networks of the 
investment bankers in the Eastern States. This aspect of investment banking is similar to the 
traditional role of the investment banker in raising capital for specific projects or companies 
from sources usually well known to the firm. Toward the end of the 1840s, the firms of John 
E. Thayer and Brother and Henshaw and Ward began creating a liquid market for railroad 
securities and fostered relationships within their personal networks to sustain the develop-
ment of the secondary market in these securities. The importance of personal networks in 
raising finance is exemplified by the capital raising for Michigan Central, Boston's largest 
single railroad venture in the West. In this fund raising, John E. Thayer and Brother and John 
Murray Forbes sold securities for the project to stockholders such as –“Perkins, Cushing, 




of mercantile and manufacturing capitalists who dominated New England's economy” 
(Chandler 1954, p. 259).  
Figure 31 - Obituary of Nathaniel Thayer 
 












Source: (Ellis 1885). 
In his obituary above, Nathaniel Thayer was reported as receiving large profits from the fi-
nancing of the railroad expansion. New York Times (1883) attributed his success with the 
railroads to his “far-sightedness, courage and ability” a trait which is common amongst 
some investment bankers to this day. 
By the end of 1847, the railroad industry realised that traditional vanilla bond issues could 
no longer meet the full financing requirement of additional large Western railroads. The de-
pression of 1847 resulted in a reduction in available capital and forced investment bankers 
to complement the traditional source of funding with alternative and innovative ways to 
raise the necessary railroad financing. Consequently, the Michigan Central railroad issued 
USD 1,000,000 of 8% convertible mortgage bonds which were successfully sold to the pub-
lic. The convertible mortgage bond became the preferred instrument of financing for rail-
road projects. The mortgage was typically over the assets of the railroad including land to 
provide security to the investor. The convertible nature of the bond however was an option 
to convert the bond into a dividend paying equity instrument intended to reward the inves-
tor once the railroad was generating significant income and provided for capital growth. This 
style of financial product is often used by investment bankers today for various financing 
opportunities and represents the creative and innovative skills developed by US investment 






Figure 33 - Map from 1850 of the Michigan Southern and connecting railroads 
 
Source:  (Jervis 1850) 
4.2.12 James Gore King – ‘Merchant Prince’ and the ‘Al-
mighty of Wall Street’ 
Figure 34 – Portrait of James Gore King 
 
Source: (Mott 1899, p. 32). 
Born in 1791 in New York City, James Gore King was another individual who led a successful 
career as a politician and investment banker. King was well educated having studied law at 
Harvard University and graduated in 1810. Whilst in Paris, he also studied languages.  
In 1813 King married Sarah Rogers Gracie, whose father Thomas Fitch was a colonial Gover-




the New York Militia in the War of 1812.  His commercial career began as a Mercantile agent 
in New York City in 1815 (King 1854). His commercial experience led King to establish a 
banking firm in 1818 known as King & Gracie, in Liverpool, England with his brother-in-law, 
Archibald Gracie Jr (Weygant 2016). He returned to New York City in 1824 and engaged in 
banking as a partner in the firm of Prime & Ward (later known as Prime, Ward & King) be-
fore leaving this firm to form James G. King & Son. King had an estate in Weehawken, New 
Jersey named Highwood and became known as “the ‘Merchant Prince’ and the ‘Almighty of 
Wall Street’" (Litchfield Historical Society 2010). In 1835, King accepted another prominent 
position as the President of the New York and Erie Railroad (Markham 2002). According to 
his obituary King was involved in “one of the wealthiest banking firms in the country” (Times 
1853). His political career as a member of the US House of Representatives over the period 
1849 to 1851 was short lived in view of his preference for commercial pursuits (Weygant 
2016).   
King’s ability to combine leadership roles in politics, industry and his domestic and European 
networks facilitated his business of securities dealing. These networks assisted in providing 
much of the necessary funding for the US railroad expansion. Again the associations with 
both government and the elite in business circles proved useful in generating his substantial 
wealth.   
4.2.13 New York needs the help of Europe and Britain 
In the 1850s as the railroad expansion escalated, and the demand for capital from other 
non-railroad corporations increased, the ability of New York to absorb numerous bond is-
sues became increasingly difficult. As railroads accounted for the major share of bonds out-
standing in the 1850s, investors became overexposed to this industry, which had the effect 
of raising risk levels within portfolios.  Fortunately, the funding gap was met by European 
investors.  As the centre for international merchant transactions and the associated trade 
finance with Europe, New York was the conduit for sourcing most of the funds emanating 
from this region. The key players in New York comprised investment banks which possessed 
links with those based in Europe, and most of these connections originated from US individ-




the US. Merchants with trading relationships in Europe also participated in the distribution 
of US bonds to European investors (Chandler 1954, p. 263). 
Baring Brothers, a British merchant bank which was heavily involved in the securities used 
to finance the War of 1812, became the agent for many American businesses in London. It 
also used Prime, Ward and King as its agent in New York. The interest in US securities in-
creased from 1922 when the “Navy Five Percents”18 were being refinanced with 4% bonds. 
London investors became disaffected with the lower return and thus appetite grew for al-
ternative higher yielding bonds. The timing was ripe for the US issuer market as it constitut-
ed a high volume source  for higher yielding bonds and securities. Brokers began to capital-
ise on this increasing appetite and established marketing agents in London. Charles Deveaux 
was one such broker who established a capability to sell American securities in London and 
bonds were even sold on consignment through English brokers or correspondents. During 
this time the business of Baring Brothers and Co. continued to grow. Barings had two part-
ners in the US before the Civil War, Joshua Bates and Russel Sturgess and a special agent in 
Boston, Thomas Wren Ward (Markham 2002, p. 166). During the 1850s investments in rail-
roads totalled approximately USD 1 billion (Markham 2002, p. 165). The mortgage bond be-
came the issue of choice for New York based investment banks who raised the bulk of the 
financing for the railroad expansion during from the 1860s onwards, surplanting the role of 
Boston during the 1840s and Philadelphia in the 1830s (Markham 2002). 
Baring Brothers had noted the expanding need for capital in the US and attempted to clev-
erly use its US political contacts, in particular with the then US Secretary of State Daniel 
Webster, to position itself as a key player in the bond distribution process. Webster was ap-
pointed as a consultant to Barings and thus was able to profit also from this relationship. 
Barings’ involvement with the US government extended to encouraging a former head of 
Barings to assist Webster negotiate a treaty (known as the Webster-Ashburton Treaty)  
which ended the Aroostook War19 between the US and British North American colonies and 




 The Navy Five Percents referred to British bonds paying coupons of 5%. These bonds were used to finance 
the purchase of goods and services by the British navy. 
19
 The Webster–Ashburton Treaty, signed August 9, 1842, was a treaty resolving several border issues between 
the US and the British North American colonies. It resolved the Aroostook War, a nonviolent dispute over the 
location of the Maine–New Brunswick border. The treaty was signed by US Secretary of State Daniel Webster 




settled disagreements over border claims in the Maine - New Brunswick area. Barings in-
volvement in the negotiations was a pre-condition to it marketing further US bonds in Eu-
rope (Wilson 2007, p. 149). This was not surprising given the close relationship Barings had 
with the US Secretary of State as a paid consultant, which involved a conflict of interest on 
both sides. Firstly concerning Daniel Webster, who whilst being on Barings’ payroll, encour-
aged the appointment of Barings in the marketing role for US bonds. Secondly, on the part 
of Barings since it was an advantage for them to help settle disputes over the Maine-Canada 
border as this allowed the credit markets to flourish. This was essential for trade within the 
region, including that in which Barings had an interest.  
Barings was never able to fully capitalise over its privileged position with the US government 
in view of the US government’s financial difficulties following the panic of 1837 (Sexton 
2003, p. 26). The panic resulted in the default of eight US states and given that British banks 
held large quantities of US debt, they used their influence to encourage the US states to pri-
oritise repayments to British creditors. According to Sexton (2003, pp. 27-8) “London bank-
ers responded, by mounting behind-the-scenes public-relations campaigns in the US. By dis-
tributing campaign contributions and commissioning an anti-repudiation magazine and 
newspaper articles, the London bankers helped to convince several states to resume pay-
ments on their debt”.  
This example of the exertion of power directly benefitted British bankers as interest and 
principal payments continued. The influence exerted by these bankers was only made pos-
sible by their considerable resources and the leverage they had as one of the few providers 
of capital open to the US states at the time. In the late 1840s and 1850s, British bankers 
continued to support US relations, in the hope that the support would translate to continu-
ing business and as a mechanism to encourage reciprocal support in times of US difficulties 
(Sexton 2003). The influence exerted by a regional cohort such as the British bankers, is lik-
ened to a cohort brought together by ethnicity and religion such as the Jewish connections 
known as ‘Our Crowd’ who played a significant role in the development of the US invest-
ment banking industry.  
4.2.14 ‘Our Crowd’ and the ‘Yankee Houses’ – Subjects of 
Mimetic Pressure 
As discussed in CHAPTER 4, an understanding of the history of investment bank partnerships 
also allows an appreciation of the history of the influence some participants carried in cor-
porate and government circles. Many firms in the US were Jewish by origin, for example: J & 
W Seligman, Goldman Sachs, August Belmont & Co., Kuhn Loeb & Co., Lazard Freres, Salo-
mon Brothers and Dillon Read(Geisst 2001, p. 4). This Jewish group was known as ‘Our 
Crowd’. Although many conspiracy theories evolved over the years ranging from the clan-




power base, there is no evidence that their influence was any greater than that of their non-
Jewish counterparts, the ‘Yankee Houses’, such as Brown Brothers, J.P. Morgan & Co., Kid-
der Peabody and Clarke Dodge & Co. (Geisst 2001, p. 4).  
US firms lacked connections to generate sufficient volumes of business in Europe where 
banking was considered more sophisticated and where demands for credit up until the 19th 
century was greater (Geisst 2001). This drove a degree of insularity amongst the industry in 
the US and a need to form informal communities domestically in order to share ideas, expe-
riences and opportunities. For example, the second generation of the Lehman Brothers fam-
ily formed strategic friendships with their counterparts at other Jewish-American firms. Phil-
ip Lehman in particular was closely associated with Henry Goldman, the son of Goldman 
Sachs’ founder. Goldman and LB participated together in many investment banking transac-
tions. The two firms agreed not to compete with each other for new business and this 
agreement and alliance was a critical reason for LB’s achievements in the late 19th and early 
20th centuries (Geisst 2001).  
As discussed in detail in section 5.1.3, the use of syndicates to underwrite new securities 
issues had become a popular technique in the early 1900s and as transactions grew in size it 
became difficult for an investment bank to solely underwrite any single issue, primarily giv-
en the firms’ own capital constraints. The desire to share underwriting risks so a firm’s capi-
tal would not be overly exposed to an unsuccessful securities issue was equally as important 
to a firm’s desire to share opportunities to participate in one another’s transactions. The 
very nature of syndication requires firms to co-operate, preferably within a friendly ‘com-
munity’ (whether in the ‘Our Crowd’ or ‘Yankee Houses’ community), as repeated sharing of 
opportunities promoted continued survival (Geisst 2001). This necessitated firms with simi-
lar outlooks on risk and market conditions working together. Section 5.1.3 argued that the 
conformity of using similar financing techniques such as syndications is a result of normative 
pressures. These normative pressures allowed the practice of syndication to survive until 
the modern era as it is accepted as a safe and legitimate way to process securities transac-
tions. 
The repetitive behaviour of sharing in transactions for large and prestigious borrowers 
spread throughout the industry from a common desire to survive and grow and therefore 
emanated from DiMaggio & Powell’s (1983) mimetic pressure. The strategy of pursuing rela-
tionships with larger organisations and especially government was mimicked within the in-
vestment banking industry for two reasons. Firstly, it was hoped such clients would provide 
a continued stream of large and lucrative transactions. Secondly, these relationships with 
influential organisations would foster an expansion of their networks and create an impres-
sion to the market that the firm was a preferred option, given the importance of its clientele 
and track record. Networks were useful for future business and as an instrument in pushing 




The majority of the perceived influence that investment banks possessed stems from the 
relationships some had with government. As discussed in CHAPTER 4, almost since the be-
ginning of the Industrial Revolution, the US government had relied on the investment bank-
ing industry. This led to relationships which can be described on a continuum from institu-
tional in nature to personal. For example, the Seligmans had a close relationship with Ulys-
ses S. Grant, a leader of the Union army during the Civil War and the 18th President of the 
US between 1869 and 1877. As already discussed in this chapter,Jay Cooke of Clarke Dodge 
& Co and later founder of Jay Cooke & Co had a personal relationship with the US Senator 
and Governor Salmon Chase as US Treasury Secretary under President Abraham Lincoln and 
as the sixth Chief Justice of the US Supreme Court. It was as Treasury Secretary during the 
Civil War that Salmon Chase enabled Jay Cooke to win the mandate for selling the very large 
bond issues needed to finance the Union’s war effort during the Civil War. Bankers from 
Kuhn Loeb & Co. and LB were instrumental in advising the government on the establishment 
of the Federal Reserve between 1908 and 1912. As discussed in section 4.2.19, the percep-
tions of influence with government which disenchanted the public in the early part of 20th 
century largely instigated the Pujo Hearings of 1912 and the Pecora Commission of 1932. 
The behaviour of exerting influence is a hallmark of the investment banking industry 
throughout its history.  
4.2.15 Anthony Joseph Drexel – Railroad Bond Dealer and  
Global Banker 
Figure 35 – Picture of Anthony Joseph Drexel 
 
Source: (Drexel University c. 1880). 
Another prominent investment banker of the era was Anthony Drexel who, born in 1826, 
began his career in his father’s, Francis Drexel’s firm, Drexel & Co., which was based in Phil-
adelphia. Anthony Drexel was appointed a full partner in the firm in 1847 alongside his 
brother Frank. Under Francis Drexel the firm gained an early reputation as a currency broker 
which he established in 1838, the year after the financial panic. Once the Second Bank of 
the United States passed the role of distributing currency to the many state-chartered 




to flourish. The lack of liquidity in bank notes and the recovering US economy allowed 
Drexel to expand into railroad financing and convert his brokerage into a private bank. Un-
der the guidance of their father, Anthony and his brother gained much experience in busi-
ness affairs, and also developed an appreciation of the arts (Rottenberg 2001).  
Within a decade, Anthony assumed the leadership role of the firm. Drexel concentrated on 
government bonds and railroad issues. As the demand for railroad financing increased, 
Drexel and Co. established an office in Chicago and New York. In 1871 the firm merged with 
the London based firm of George Peabody forming Drexel, Morgan & Co. (later J.P. Morgan 
& Co.). Drexel admitted John Pierpont Morgan as a junior partner at the urging of JP Mor-
gan’s father, Junius Morgan, whose own career had centred on bonds and stocks 
(Schweikart & Doti 1999, p. 102). The partnership with JP Morgan which was based in New 
York operated initially as an agent for European investors, gaining a large share of the trans-
atlantic trade in railroad securities. The firm is also acknowledged as influential in develop-
ing a national market for the securities issues of industrial companies, other than railroad 
and canal companies (Rottenberg 2001). Drexel Morgan & Co. also assisted the US govern-
ment through underwriting the wages of the US Army when the US government was unable 
to meet its obligations in 1877; again rescuing the US government during the Panic of 1895; 
and rescuing the New York Stock Exchange during the Panic of 1907 (Rottenberg 2001). 
These actions empowered Drexel, creating an enviable reputation in the business communi-
ty and amongst fellow investment bankers.  
Drexel’s Power Found in the Facilitative Circuit 
Drexel’s power originated from his superior skill in arranging difficult financings, especially 
for government which created an image of Drexel as the ‘go to man’ in times of crisis. The 
assistance to government in difficult circumstances also created a sense of obligation 
amongst the government executive. Drexel’s sense of self-importance and and example of 
his exercise of power is documented by an incident with President Ulysses S. Grant:   
In a telling incident … President Ulysses S. Grant once called on Drexel - and because Grant 
was five minutes late, Drexel made the President wait an entire hour before seeing him. Pres-
ident Grant, needing Drexel’s bond selling expertise, was not insulted by the delay (Wooster 
2002, p. 1).  
This power exhibited by Drexel is found in Clegg’s (1989) facilitative circuit. The exogenous 
environment of the financial crises of 1895 and 1907, combined with Drexel’s technical skills 
differentiated Drexel from many of his compatriots. His technical skills enabled him to foster 
a bond market in the emerging corporate sector. In the process, given the substantial size of 
the issues, Drexel had to accurately assess the credit risk of the corporate borrowers, whose 
profiles were different to those of the railroads and canals. These differences required an 




monopolistic nature of the industries were considered. Additionally the type of credit analy-
sis required, focused on financial statements which reflected operational businesses relying 
on manufacturing and marketing to generate profits differing significantly to those of a 
transport concession. Drexel was also able to create a national bond market for industrial 
companies which required a network of like-minded investment banks and brokers capable 
of selling corporate bonds issued by a riskier class of borrower.  
The knowledge Drexel developed led to the innovative solutions required to bailout the 
government from its abovementioned predicaments. His unique ability empowered Drexel 
in his social relations with key leaders in government and industry alike. These favourable 
key relations translated to a repeat of these successful transactions and therefore contrib-
ute to his and his firm’s success. Drexel used his fortune and influence to establish the 
Drexel University in 1891 and was the first President of the Fairmount Park Art Association 
(now the Association for Public Art), the country’s first private association dedicated to inte-
grating public art and urban planning (Rottenberg 2001). 
Apart from the influence Drexel acquired, he was also an innovator of practices which are 
routinely used today. “These include, trading of national currencies, guaranteeing credit for 
travellers abroad, rewarding workers based on individual initiative, and offering sweat equi-
ty to deserving employees who could not ordinarily buy shares” (Wooster 2002, p. 1). Two 
years after Drexel’s death in 1893, Drexel Morgan & Co. was renamed J.P. Morgan & Co. 
4.2.16 John Pierpont Morgan – ‘The Most Powerful Private 
Citizen In The World’ 
Figure 36 - Portrait of John Pierpont Morgan 
 
Source: (Lamb 1913). 
John Pierpont Morgan (JP Morgan) was born in 1837 in Hartford, Connecticut, where he 
spent his formative years. He became one of the most influential investment bankers of his 




ed corporate finance and industrial consolidation during the period 1871 until 1913 follow-
ing the end of the Pujo Committee hearings (refer section 4.2.19 for a discussion on the Pujo 
Committee hearings). 
His father, Junius Morgan worked as a partner in J. M. Beebe, Morgan & Co., a Boston, Mas-
sachussets dry goods wholesaler, and in that role transferred to London as the company’s 
representative. Junius Morgan encountered George Peabody in 1854 in London soon after 
arriving in London. Peabody also started his career as a dry goods merchant in Massachu-
setts and later became a financier. Peabody originally moved to London to develop his in-
vestment firm George Peabody & Co to support the funding of a railroad company he had 
previously incorporated in 1836, known as the Eastern Railroad, and to trade in bonds. Fol-
lowing his meeting with Peabody, Junius Morgan joined George Peabody & Co as a partner 
in 1854 and the name of the firm was changed to Peabody, Morgan & Co. 10 years later, in 
1864. Upon the retirement of George Peabody, Junius Morgan succeeded Peabody as the 
head of the London operation and changed its name to J.S. Morgan &Co. (Schweikart & Doti 
1999). The principal activities of the firm were the distribution of bonds, and during the Civil 
War, the firm increasingly focused on the sale of US war bonds (Chernow 1990). 
In 1857, Junius employed his son, JP Morgan as a secretary in the count house and as the 
operator of the telegraph system to send out telegraphs to US War Bond investors of the 
outcomes of battles of the Civil War before it became general knowledge in England. Know-
ing the outcome of the battles before the investors, Junius was able to profit by trading the 
bonds whose value would fluctuate according to this important information (Schweikart & 
Doti 1999). In 1858, JP Morgan returned to New York to join Duncan, Sherman & Co. which 
was the US representative firm of the British merchant bank, George Peabody & Co.  
From 1864 to 1871, JP Morgan worked in the firm of Dabney, Morgan, and Company along-
side the Drexel brothers, he established the firm of Drexel, Morgan & Company in 1871. 
Apart from the significant influence of his father, JP Morgan was also mentored by Anthony 
J. Drexel at the request of Junius Morgan (Rottenberg 2001). This mentorship equipped JP 
Morgan with valuable skills relating to corporate restructuring which augured well for his 
corporate mergers and acquisition activities in the latter part of the 19th century 
(Rottenberg 2001). 
After the death of Anthony Drexel in 1895, Drexel, Morgan & Company was renamed J.P. 
Morgan & Co. JP Morgan realised that in order to sustain business it was crucial to maintain 
and develop important relationships. He therefore continued to associate his firm with a 
sister firm, Drexel & Company of Philadelphia; and Morgan, Harjes & Company of Paris; and 
J.S. Morgan & Company (which in 1910 became known as Morgan, Grenfell & Company) of 
London. By the end of the 19th century, J.P. Morgan & Co. was considered one of the most 
influential investment banks globally, with focus on mergers and acquisitions, corporate re-




er of choice within the investment banking industry and was therefore able to draw many 
influential partners to the firm (Morris 2015). 
JP Morgan’s power and influence was recognised by contemporary commentators. Exam-
ples of perceptions of JP Morgan can be found in the newspaper articles of the time. Mallios 
(2013, p. 1) recounts the words  of a contemporary journalist who describes JP Morgan as as 
“The most powerful private citizen in the world to-day, so far as financial affairs are con-
cerned …” (New York Tribune 1910). JP Morgan was also described as “the personification of 
a banking system: the most powerful private banking system in the US” (New York Tribune 
1910). The Pujo Committee20, which was mandated by the government to investigate the 
behaviour of the investment banks during the 1907 crisis, found that a small number of fi-
nancial leaders, including JP Morgan, exercised considerable control over many industries 
(Brandeis 1932). 
JP Morgan uses Power to Save the US Government 
An example of JP Morgan’s power occurred in 1895 when the US Federal Treasury had al-
most exhausted its gold reserves following the Panic of 189321. JP Morgan had recommend-
ed that the federal government supplement its gold reserves through purchases from vari-
ous banks in Europe as well as from his own firm, J.P. Morgan & Co. The federal government 
declined the plan and preferred instead to raise the necessary government funding to sur-
vive the crisis from a direct sale of bonds. Believing that the federal government was on the 
cusp of default, JP Morgan sought a meeting with US President Grover Cleveland, to express 
his concerns. JP Morgan came up with a plan to use an old Civil War statute that permitted 
the US Secretary of the Treasury to issue bonds without Congressional approval, for the 
purchase of gold coins from J.P. Morgan & Co. and the Rothschild family22 (JP Morgan Chase 




 The Pujo Committee was a United States congressional subcommittee which was formed between May 1912 
and January 1913 to investigate the so-called ‘money trust’, a community of Wall Street bankers and financiers 
that exerted powerful control over the nation's finances (Peeler 2010, p. 1). See section 4.2.19 for a detailed 
discussion on the Pujo Committee hearings. 
21
 The Panic of 1893 was a serious economic depression in the United States that began in that year. Similar to 
the Panic of 1873, this panic was characterised by by over capacity in the railroad network and subsequent 
defaults in the industry which led to a number of bank failures. 
22
 The Rothschild family is a wealthy family who established a banking business in the 1760s and established an 




2016). President Cleveland sought a guarantee from JP Morgan that the gold would remain 
in the US and not to be diverted to Europe. JP Morgan agreed to the request and immedi-
ately arranged for a US government bond issue to be sold to his connections, the proceeds 
of which were used to purchase the gold and thereby restore liquidity to the US Treasury. 
“The firm offered the bonds for sale at $112.25 and sold out the entire issue in New York 
within 22 minutes” (JP Morgan Chase 2016). Clegg’s (1989) Theory of Power is useful in ana-
lysing JP Morgan’s power in this example. The US Treasury’s dire need for gold reserves cre-
ated an exogenous environment which required a solution – otherwise known in Clegg’s 
terminology as a ‘technology of production’ which is a source of power in the facilitative cir-
cuit. This need for a technical solution empowered JP Morgan in the facilitative circuit, as he 
was one of very few investment bankers with the resources and knowledge to provide an 
appropriate solution.  
His knowledge of market appetite for bonds reflected the power of his relationships with 
other banks and investors. This power resided in his knowledge of investing appetite 
amongst the market participants which could only be gained through experience and an in-
timate knowledge arising from close relations. The relationships also permitted JP Morgan 
to ascertain the pricing level at which the bond appetite would become attractive to inves-
tors.  The extent and quality of JP Morgan’s network of contacts was unrivalled in the mar-
ket during this period. Further his innovative approach in solving the government’s needs 
which entailed an exchange of gold for bonds, fixed the rules within the dispositional circuit 
under which he would be willing to assist. This financing structure was the strict condition 
under which JP Morgan would assist the government. The strategy was very profitable for JP 
Morgan as it encompassed two tranches to the transaction. It ensured JP Morgan could earn 
commissions firstly from the bond sale process and secondly from profit margins on the gold 
purchase brokered for the government.  Again the exogenous environment of the govern-
ment funding dilemma gave it little choice given the lack of alternative remedies. JP Morgan 
achieved his desired outcome of selling gold to the US Treasury as he met all the criteria in 
Clegg’s (1989) episodic circuit: social relations through his professional network required to 
appeal to the ultimate decision maker in the country – US President, Grover Cleveland; the 
agency of his own firm and the Rothschild family through which he could implement the 
transaction; and the knowhow and financial resources to execute the transaction. 
JP Morgan’s influence, particularly through the use of his personal and professional net-
works and knowhow relating to fundraising and corporate restructuring, empowered him to 
undertake many more successful transactions. This exercise of power using the same con-
duits of networks and knowhow was repeated by the investment banking industry in the 
pre-GFC period. In this latter period, investment banks were successful in lobbying legisla-
tors against a restrictive regulatory environment and against a prescriptive accounting 




vestment banking industry’s lobbying efforts towards legislators and accounting standard 
setters respectively. 
As was shown above in this section, JP Morgan benefited substantially from effects of the 
Civil War through distributing Civil War bonds in London and the urgent replenishing of the 
US Treasury’s gold reserves. Funding the Civil War effort offered impetus to the investment 
banking industry in general and apart from allowing bankers to further develop government 
funding techniques it presented them with further opportunities to exploit important gov-
ernment relationships.  
4.2.17 American Civil War (1861 – 1865) 
The origins of the Civil War emanated from the aversion to slavery by the US northern states 
of America (Union) which was adopted as a formal policy by the Republicans in 1860 upon 
the election of Abraham Lincoln as the US President. The southern states relied heavily on 
large scale agriculture and specifically cotton plantations which utilised large numbers of 
slaves as manual labour (Foote 2006). The southern states’ objection to the moral attitudes 
of the northern states led to South Carolina seceding from the Union and this led other 
southern states to follow and form their own government, which, under the leadership of 
Jefferson Davis is referred to as the Confederate States of America (CSA) (Foote 2006; Killick 
2006). The ensuing war was costly both in terms of loss of lives and financially for both 
sides. In all, the war resulted in 650,000 deaths and casualties of over a million (Foote 2006). 
Contributing to the heavy casualties were the more sophisticated military strategy and wea-
ponry employed by both sides (Foote 2006).  
Civil War Financing 
Major differences existed between the Union and the CSA at the commencement of the Civ-
il War. Apart from military capacity, these included the industrial and economic stage of the 
respective region’s development and the level of financial support. The Union’s institutional 
financial support consisted of a multi-tiered taxation stream of income and an established 
government Treasury which was able to manage a range of debt issues and print currency. 
In contrast, the CSA relied mostly on donations, meagre taxation revenue, printing of cur-
rency and a more modest level of debt issues. Although there were similarities in the types 
of revenue generation sources, the warring factions differed with regards to funding strate-
gy and execution which led to varying effect and success. It was the raising of new debt 
where investment bankers and their special networks were most helpful to both sides espe-





As indicated in Figure 37 the cost of the various wars in which the US participated varied 
widely. The cost of the Civil War far exceeded the cost of any other war in which the US had 
participated during that era. 
Figure 37 - Military Costs of US Wars 1775 – 1900 (current and constant dollar values23) 
War in which The US Participated Years of War Spending 
Total Military Cost of War (USD) 
American Revolution                           1775-1783 
Current Year USD  101 million 
Constant FY2011USD                                 2,407 million 
   
War  of 1812                                                                       1812-1815 
Current Year USD  90 million 
Constant FY2011USD                                 1,553 million 
   
Mexican War                                                                                 1846-1849 
Current Year USD  71 million 
Constant FY2011USD                                 2,376 million 
   
Civil  War: Union                                                                           1861-1865 
Current Year USD  3,183 million 
Constant FY2011USD                                 59,631 million 
   
Civil  War: Confederacy                        1861-1865 
Current Year USD  1,000 million 
Constant FY2011USD                                 20,111 million 
   
Spanish American War                                                                        1898-1899 
Current Year USD  283 million 
Constant FY2011USD                                 9,034 million 
Source: (Daggett 2010, p. 1). 




 Current dollar value is the value at the time the expense was incurred. Constant dollar value is the current 




The dollar amounts included in the above table represent estimates which are expressed in 
USD at the time of each conflict (Current Year) and in constant USD that reflect values as at 
2011 for comparative purposes (Daggett 2010).  
This data shows that whilst the Union had spent over USD 59 billion in 2011 equivalent dol-
lars, the Confederation had spent a much lower USD 20 billion in 2011 equivalent dollars.  In 
other words, “the Union expenditure represented about 65 per cent of 1861 gross domestic 
product (GDP)” (Giroux 2012, p. 83). The combined expenditure of almost USD 80 billion in 
2011 equivalent dollars is by far the highest amount expended by Americans in any conflict 
during either the 18th or 19th centuries (Daggett 2010). 
Union War Financing 
In the early years of the Civil War funding was difficult for both sides. The Union Secretary of 
the Treasury Salmon Chase was conscious of earlier history such as the public fear and mis-
trust of taxing authorities and therefore was initially opposed to additional tax measures. 
The public fear of new tax measures emanated from the past experience of paying excessive 
taxes imposed by the British prior to the Revolution. Resentment against British taxes are 
often cited as a contributing cause to the Revolution. Additionally the public was wary of 
taxes generally given the resentment from certain quarters associated with the levying of 
excise taxes on spirits by the first federal government causing the Whiskey Rebellion24. A 
Protracted war would require additional resources and revenues. This became a problem for 
Chase at the time as the major source of federal government revenue came from customs 
duties which provided USD 40 million in 1861 and represented a meagre fraction of the total 
revenue required (Giroux 2012, p. 83).  




 The Whiskey Rebellion was the violent culmination of the opposition to the direct tax on Americans who 
produced whiskey and other alcohol spirits. In early 1791, to help pay off the national debt resulting from the 
Revolutionary War, Congress used its new constitutional authority to pass the first nationwide internal reve-
nue law which was an excise tax on distilled spirits. Congress took this action at the urging of the first Secretary 
of the Treasury, Alexander Hamilton. All payments had to be made in cash to the Federal revenue officer ap-
pointed for the distiller's county.  Resentment to the tax resulted in violent clashes between the rebels and the 





Figure 38 – Portrait of Salmon Chase Secretary of the Treasury between 1861 and 1864 
 
Source: (Carpenter 1861). 
Given the burden of the financing requirement, the Union needed to develop new taxes and 
accordingly Congress passed the Revenue Act (1862) which enabled the introduction of new 
taxes. Not only did the new stable source of tax revenue assist in funding the war, it estab-
lished an improved credit profile for the Union which was to become helpful in future bor-
rowings, especially from overseas sources. As stated by Brownlee (1996, p. 23):  
It was the nation's first modern war in the sense of creating enormous requirements 
for capital. Union war costs drove up government spending from less than 2 percent 
of the gross national (product) to an average 15 percent ... The capital requirements 
evoked a program of emergency taxation that was unprecedented in scale and 
scope.  
Economist, Adam Smith recognised the critical balance between taxes and borrowings for 
wartime finance and acknowledged the fear associated with new taxes: 
The ordinary expense of the greater part of modern governments in time of peace being 
equal or nearly equal to their ordinary revenue, when war comes they are both unwilling and 
unable to increase their revenue in proportion to the increase of their expense. They are un-
willing for fear of offending the people, who, by so great and so sudden an increase of taxes, 
would soon be disgusted with the war; and they are unable from not well knowing what tax-
es would be sufficient to produce the revenue wanted. The facility of borrowing delivers them 
from the embarrassment which this fear and inability would otherwise occasion. By means of 
borrowing they are enabled, with a very moderate increase of taxes, to raise, from year to 
year, money sufficient for carrying on the war, and by the practice of perpetually funding 
they are enabled, with the smallest possible increase of taxes, to raise annually the largest 
possible sum of money (Smith 1776, p. 1080). 
Chase was inexperienced in undertaking a large scale financing as required by the war ef-
fort. He realised that external assistance was necessary and sought assistance from Jay 




ter the sale of war bonds. This method became the principle means of financing the war ef-
fort.  
Figure 39 – Portrait of Jay Cooke, Financier to the Union. 
 
Source: (Tax Analysts 2014). 
Jay Cooke was born in 1821 and was another investment banker who mixed politics with 
banking. He was a member of Congress between 1831 and 1833 and worked for the firm 
E.W. Clarke & Co. before establishing his own firm in Philadelphia of Jay Cooke and Compa-
ny (Ellis & Vertin 2003). Jay Cooke and Company had an enviable reputation as an influential 
investment bank, and was to prove invaluable to Chase as its “reputation among investors 
around the world enabled the bank to sell…bonds when other brokerages could not” 
(Snowden et al. 1909, p. 107).   
The funding requirement in 1861 amounted to a historically high level for the federal gov-
ernment. According to reports from Chase to Congress in July 1861, the required financing 
amounted to “USD 320 million, with USD 80 million needed from taxes and the remainder 
from loans” (Thorndike 2001). Chase borrowed USD 150 million in 1861 from a consortium 
of New York banks. This loan was offered in gold and caused a drain on the gold reserves of 
many New York banks which consequently led them  to reject the gold standard in Decem-
ber 1861 (Thorndike 2001). The new debt was deemed insufficient and the federal govern-
ment proceeded to issue USD 150 million of paper currency (known as Greenbacks), pursu-
ant to The Legal Tender Act of 1862. The currency was to serve two purposes: firstly it was a 
source of income needed by the government to service its debts; secondly it was an attempt 
to introduce liquidity to the economy to enable the investing public to purchase govern-
ment bonds (Giroux 2002). The amount was subsequently increased to USD 450 million 
(Giroux 2002, p. 613). Features including identification numbers and signatures were de-
signed to limit counterfeiting, a major weakness of similar bills, called Continentals, issued 
during the Revolution. A unique and important difference of the currency issued by the fed-




2002). This meant that the face value of currency notes was at all times available to extin-
guish personal debt to the government, such as taxes payable. 
Figure 40 - Civil War Five dollar Greenback issued in March 1863 
 
Source: (Tax Analysts 2014). 
A cornerstone of the success of the Civil War financing by the Union was this level of innova-
tion which was the result of collaboration between Chase and his investment banker associ-
ate, Cooke. The principle intention was to make the bonds attractive to investors. Having 
interest paid in gold created a windfall for investors as the value of gold had historically in-
creased during times of war (refer Figure 41 for a graph of the gold price between 1790 and 
2010) and given that the Union was planning to print additional currency it was expected 
the value of the Greenback would depreciate. Given the relatively short supply of gold, and 
that paper notes were not redeemable in gold, the public established a strong preference 
for gold as a means of exchange and the price of gold escalated whilst confidence in the cur-




Figure 41 - Log Price of Gold between 1790 and 2010 
 
Source: (McClellan Financial Publications 2015). 
Innovations were not limited to the structure of the bond issues, however also extended to 
their settlement. Cooke & Co's innovative use of the telegraph to confirm sales allowed sell-
ing throughout the country to be coordinated in Philadelphia (Geisst 2001, p. 37). 
Chase therefore proceeded to sell USD 500 million in government war bonds (known as 
5/20s) to pay for the war effort. The term 5/20s was an abbreviation for bonds that paid six 
percent interest (in gold) and matured in 20 years, but were callable in five years. Chase 
worked with Jay Cooke & Co. to successfully manage the issue in 1862 (Geisst 1999, p. 54). 
Figure 42 - A One Thousand dollar 5/20 Bond featuring the face of Salmon Chase 
 




The cost of the war escalated, and by 1862, reached approximately USD 500 million (Giroux 
2002). The war attracted significant unscrupulous contractors and corrupt government offi-
cials. Fraud was not uncommon. As stated by robber baron25 Jim Fisk: "You can sell anything 
to the government at almost any price you've got the guts to ask" (McCullough 1981, p. 60). 
War expenditure rose to USD 1 billion in 1865 (Giroux 2012, p. 88). Chase and Cooke varied 
the debt instruments in order to attract the appetite of the broadest range of investor. 
These included individual bonds, serial bonds, which attracted different interest rates, 
Treasury notes, and certificates of deposits (Giroux 2012).  
                                                     
 
 
25 Robber baron was a term applied to a businessman in the 19th century who engaged in unethical and mo-





Figure 43 - Article by Jay Cooke & Co. regarding distribution of the 5/20 Bonds 
 
Source: (Cooke 1868) 
The above New York Times article in Figure 43 conveys Cooke’s argument that the 5/20 
bonds were subscribed by many types of retail investors such as ‘widows, orphans and peo-
ple of small capital’ as much as the wealthy capitalists. His argument is based on the records 
showing that ‘one half of the loan in amount was taken in  50s, 100s and 500s’ and further 
that as 2,877,813 pieces of these three denominations were issued against 371,197 pieces 
of the large denominations, the capitalists are in very small minority’. This record goes to 
support the argument that Cooke’s distribution strategy was indeed successful at reaching a 




ceed and again proves the power of a well-executed and designed distribution strategy 
which is still considered an important attribute in any capital market issue in modern times. 
The success of any bond distribution naturally relies on the effectiveness of reaching the in-
vestor. Many investment banking firms have therefore developed assertive sales cultures 
required to accommodate the necessity to sell bonds. The pressure of selling bonds is even 
more acute when the investment bank has itself underwritten them. Otherwise the unex-
pected residual risk of holding the remaining unsold bonds may be unacceptable and in 
some cases could place the firm in financial difficulty, either by imposing liquidity re-
strictions or leveraging the firm to unacceptable levels. The market risk associated with 
holding excessive levels of bonds are also problematic - particularly if the bonds decline in 
value. Given the risk of holding bonds with depreciating values, investment banks under-
writing issues would apply a relatively deep discount to their price during the competitive 
bidding process. They would subsequently offload the bonds to the public and other finan-
cial institutions at a significant profit. “Underwriting syndicates would buy these at a dis-
count and resell them to domestic and foreign bankers, usually at a substantial profit” 
(Gordon 1999, p. 94).  
It was important for the government to support its own bond issues given its reliance on this 
form of financing. In an innovative move, the government introduced legislation, in the form 
of the National Banking Acts requiring “a third of a national bank’s capital  to be invested in 
federal bonds, since the new currency notes were to be backed by federal bonds” (Gordon 
1999, p. 94). The federal government noted that the state banks which were subject to their 
respective state charters, were not bound by this federal regulation, and attempted to pro-
portionally increase the number of national banks to state banks thereby creating a greater 
demand for federal government issued bonds (Comptroller of the Currency Administrator of 
National Banks 2003). To encourage the state banks to convert to national banks, the feder-
al government imposed on the state banks a tax of 10% on the value of federal currency 
notes issued by state banks. By the end of the war, this new tax had the desired effect by 
quadrupling the number of US bond purchases and tripling the number of federal banks (Tax 
Analysts 2014). The imposition of this new legislation had two additional impacts for the 
banking community and government. It secured the value of the Union currency – being 
partly backed by government bonds, and induced demand for the government bonds which 
were critical to funding the war effort. 
The large government bond issues required a new and innovative plan to reach new poten-
tial investors. Cooke devised a marketing campaign involving patriotic newspaper adver-
tisements and a distribution network of 2,500 agents to sell the bonds. This campaign man-
aged to sell USD 3 billion of government bonds to approximately twenty five percent of the 
population (Brands 2010; Tax Analysts 2014). Cooke’s ‘bond distribution’ techniques have 




Figure 44 - An announcement advertising 7-30 Bonds 
 
Source: (Museum of American Finance 2015). 
Apart from his thorough and effective distribution strategy, Cooke’s greatest assistance was 
in the role of underwriting the bonds thereby guaranteeing part, or all, of the financing re-
quirement under a particular issue. Although Cooke earned a relatively modest underwriting 
commission of 0.5%, he generated significant earnings from the high transaction volumes of 
his firm which generated profits from the deep discount mechanism mentioned above upon 
the sale to the public. The volumes were made possible by his innovative technique of using 
the telegraph to streamline settlement of the sales which resulted in sales of over USD 1 bil-
lion in Treasury bonds (Brands 2010, p. 80). Government bond issues were focused on the 
domestic market as there was little appetite from European investors. The federal govern-
ment was represented in Britain by agents such as Joshua Bates and August Belmont, how-
ever only managed to sell approximately 10% of bonds to the European market, predomi-




Following the war in 1866, the federal government ran surpluses for almost 30 years (Giroux 
2012, p. 95). Financing the war was not only a challenge for the North. It proved to be an 
even bigger one for the Confederate States of America (CSA) which, not being regarded in-
ternationally as an established nation, found it difficult to obtain funding from overseas 
sources or even by way of taxes. 
Confederate War Financing 
The CSA had a very difficult time financing its war effort. The Union blockade prevented the 
export of most of the South’s cotton and other staple crops and stymied attempts to import 
specie (gold and silver coins) or other goods from abroad. Specie was therefore in short 
supply and tariff revenues were almost non-existent. The CSA, ostensibly founded on the 
principle of states’ rights, found it politically unacceptable to raise, let alone collect, direct 
taxes. Tax revenues therefore accounted for less than 10% of the CSA’s total receipts 
(Giroux 2012, p. 94).  
Given the blockade, the region’s short supply of specie, the uncertain outcome of the war, 
and its weak tax revenues, the CSA found it difficult to borrow domestically or abroad. Loans 
therefore accounted for only about a third of its wartime expenditures and much of its bor-
rowing occurred early in the war, when a quick victory appeared possible. Individual states 
supported the Confederacy by paying for war expenses out of their own treasuries. In addi-
tion, churches, corporations, and private individuals donated money, food and clothing for 
the army. These donations continued throughout the war and increased especially during 
the final months of the conflict (Museum of American Financial History 1994, p. 16). On Feb-
ruary 28, 1861, the Provisional Congress of the CSA authorized the first Confederate loan 
which became known as the ‘Fifteen Million Loan’. Under its terms, CSA Treasury Secretary, 
Memminger was authorised to issue 15 million dollars-worth of bonds bearing eight percent 
interest, payable in 10 years and redeemable in five years at the option of the government 




Figure 45 - USD 1,000 Confederate Bond  
 
Source: (Museum of American Financial History 1994, p. 16) 
Similar to the Union, the CSA was also unsuccessful in raising loans in London where the de-
fault on several loans by some of the Southern states following the 1837 financial crisis 
tainted their credit risk profile with European financiers. However, the CSA was able to ar-
range a relatively small loan in Europe in 1863. The CSA Treasury attempted to use the cot-
ton crop as collateral for securing this loan which was in the form of a bond issue. In 1862, 
John Slidell, the Confederate Commissioner to France, negotiated an agreement with Emile 
Erlanger and Co., a Parisian banking house, to manage the sale of a £3 million (USD 
14,550,000) Confederate bond issue secured by cotton. This agreement became known as 
the Erlanger Loan. According to the terms of the loan, the twenty-year, seven percent bonds 
were to be converted into cotton below market prices. The Confederate government hoped 
that the chance of lucrative profits would lure European investors and restore the South's 
credit rating abroad. Erlanger proposed to pay £77 for every £100 bond the Confederacy 
offered, and then to offer the bonds to the public at £90, providing an immediate profit of 
£13 which is considered abnormally high given comparable bonds issued concurrently by 
the Union were often issued at par or with only minor discounts. When the bonds went on 
sale in March 1863 they were soon oversubscribed, but within a few weeks the price of the 
cotton bonds began to fall. Trading of the bonds was curtailed, although it did not stop 
completely. By February 1865, 83% of the bonds had been sold, and the CSA realised about 
USD 8,000,000 out of the initial USD 14,550,000 issue (Museum of American Financial 
History 1994, p. 18).  
Although this money helped the South to acquire materials, it was not enough. The bonds 
became worthless when the South finally collapsed, but by that time Erlanger held no bonds 
(Lester 1974, p. 130). Given the deep discount on the bonds, the CSA paid a high price and 
appears to have been taken advantage of given the much reduced discounts paid by the Un-




risk profile or the same level of collaboration or close-knit relationship with its foreign in-
vestment banking firm as did the Union with its domestic firm, Jay Cooke. 
Sexton (2003) finds that the CSA implemented a flawed strategy in late 1861 by instituting 
an informal cotton embargo, hoping that this would increase the value of cotton. Instead 
the CSA should have considered shipping as much cotton as possible to European ware-
houses, where it could have been used as collateral for larger loans. Constrained by its limi-
tations in the debt markets and tax revenue potential, the CSA resorted to printing currency 
to supply most of its financial resources. Similar to the Continental forces during the Revolu-
tion, state governments issued bills of credit which were used as currency while the CSA is-
sued so-called ‘Graybacks’ analogous to Continentals.  
Figure 46 - 10 dollar Confederate Currency26 
 
Source: (Museum of American Finance 2014) 
Although similar in form and function to the North’s Greenbacks, CSA currency was issued in 
sums far greater in proportion to the Southern economy than the Union’s currency which 
was partly backed by Union bonds and considered “legal tender”. Given the CSA’s less so-
phisticated printing techniques, it suffered much more from counterfeit Graybacks than the 
north with its Greenbacks. The result of the rapidly expanding money supply was rampant 








inflation, second in American history only to the hyperinflation of the Revolution (Museum 
of American Finance 2014, p. 19). By 1863, it took 10 CSA dollars to purchase a gold dollar 
and by 1864, it took thirty. By early 1865 the price of a gold dollar was fifty or more CSA dol-
lars. By contrast, it never took more than three Greenbacks to buy a gold dollar (Museum of 
American Finance 2014, p. 29). 
The US investment banking industry clearly benefited from the fundraising activities of the 
North during the civil war conflict and much of this credit goes to Jay Cooke who collaborat-
ed effectively with the Union Treasury Secretary, Salmon Chase, to fund a majority of the 
Union war effort through the issuance of innovatively structured and well distributed bond 
issues. The clever use of taxation by the North also established a platform for its creditwor-
thiness and no doubt engendered the confidence necessary amongst investors for any large 
scale bond issue.  
On the other hand given the relatively smaller amount of debt raised by the South and the 
lack of evidence of close collaboration with the investment banking industry, the CSA were 
ultimately reliant on printing money which eventually caused severe economic and financial 
difficulties. The fact that the North was better able to fund its war efforts is often men-
tioned as a major contribution to its eventual victory. In addition Chase’s willingness to 
closely engage the expertise of one of the best investment bankers in the country, in Jay 
Cooke, ultimately made a major difference in the outcome of the war. 
The Civil War proved a challenge to the respective sides in finding new and innovative ways 
of seeking the necessary war financing. The newly united country was now left to focus on 
economic development. Following the Civil War, the manufacturing industry began to grow 
rapidly. For example sewing machines began being manufactured and the shoe industry be-
came mechanised. Horse drawn reapers became widely introduced, significantly increasing 
the productivity of farming. The use of steam engines in manufacturing increased and steam 
power exceeded water power after the Civil War, while coal displaced wood as the major 
fuel. The combination of railroads, the telegraph, machinery and factories began to create 
an industrial economy (North 1982). This growth in the economy, which dovetailed an in-
crease in exports of agricultural product to Europe, required an increased money supply 
which had the effect of raising the level of interest rates and placing pressure on the gold 
reserves held by the US Treasury. Consequently, an environment conducive to a financial 
crisis was produced.  
4.2.18 The Panic of 1907  
An analysis of the background to the Panic of 1907 is useful in understanding the context in 
which the investment banking community developed its influence over regulatory institu-




tary system in New York experienced significant volatility affecting both interest rates and 
liquidity of financial instruments. This market dynamic was caused by severe fluctuations of 
the volume of currency in the financial system caused by the seasonal export of cotton 
crops to Europe. As traders increased their trade finance facilities with banks which were 
used to pay for production costs, the supply of cash available in the local economy was de-
pleted causing a seasonal spike in interest rates. When proceeds of the cotton exports were 
later received by growers, the increase in money supply resulted in lowering interest rates 
(Tallman & Moen 1990, p. 3). Furthermore the US exported USD 30 million in gold to Lon-
don during the summer of 1907, which was an unusually high volume given the trading con-
ditions (Tallman & Moen 1990, p. 4). As a result, the New York money market was left with 
an uncharacteristically low volume of gold upon entering the autumn season. New York fi-
nancial markets were therefore squeezed by even less liquidity than usual.  
The climax of the crisis of 1907 materialised in October when F. Augustus Heinze27 attempt-
ed to take a majority stake in a mid-sized listed US corporation, United Copper Company. 
Heinz’s plan to raise the share price backfired and the share price instead declined. Heinze 
had an extensive list of Board directorships including banks. As Heinze’s involvement in 
banking became apparent, the failure of Heinze's scheme triggered a loss of confidence in 
the share market which was operating under the adverse conditions of a slowing economy, 
and a stretched money market. Depositors' fears of insolvency precipitated a series of runs 
on the banks where the two men held prominent positions including the popular Mercantile 
National Bank. Consequently a credit crisis characterised by a freeze on lending markets 
triggered a panic amongst banks which became known as the Panic of 1907.  




 Fritz Augustus Heinze (December 5, 1869 - November 4, 1914) was one of the three ‘Copper Kings’ of Butte, 
Montana. He entered the banking business, forming a close alliance with Charles W. Morse with whom he 




Figure 47 – Picture of Fritz Augustus Heinze 
 
Source: (King 2012). 
The New York Clearinghouse Association28 reviewed the Mercantile National Bank balance 
sheet and concluded that the bank was solvent. The clearinghouse stated that it would sup-
port Mercantile on the condition that Heinze and his board of directors resign. Both Morse 
and E.R. Thomas, another of Heinze's cohorts, were pursuaded by the clearinghouse to sell 
their investments in banks in return for the clearinghouse support of the affected bank 
(Gordon 1999).  
Almost simultaneously, the National Bank of Commerce stopped accepting the cheques of 
the Knickerbocker Trust Company. The Knickerbocker Trust Company was a bank owned by 
Frederick G. Eldridge, an associate of JP Morgan. The main activities of the Knickerbocker 
Trust Company  involved acting for individuals, corporations and estates (Wexler 1908). In 
1907, its funds were being used by the bank’s president Charles T. Barney in his plan to cor-
ner the market for copper and increase its price. This venture collapsed due to the dumping 
of millions of dollars in copper onto the market to prevent the abovementioned takeover of 
United Copper Company (Gordon 1999). On October 22 1907, Knickerbocker underwent a 




 The New York Clearing House Association, the nation’s first and largest bank clearing house, was created in 
1853, and has played a variety of important roles in supporting the development of the banking system in the 
US’s financial capital. Initially, it was created to simplify the chaotic settlement process among the banks of 
New York City. It later served to stabilise currency fluctuations and bolster the monetary system through re-




run and was finally suspended later that day. Following the publication on the next day of an 
article in the New York Times that Barney sat on the Board of Trust Company of America, 
the depositors’ run spread to that bank. (Tallman & Moen 1990, p. 7). 
JP Morgan was seen as a potential saviour to the financial community in the absence of a 
relevant regulatory authority. This position of informal responsibility was well documented 
in the press at the time (New York Times 1907; The Kingston Daily Freeman 1907). Even 
though JP Morgan and his cohorts refused to bailout the Knickerbocker Trust, The New York 
Times was still optimistic of the situation given the perception that JP Morgan was in charge. 
Following the meeting of the bankers, which decided the fate of the Knickerbocker Trust, 
The New York Times printed an article which commented as follows: 
 …It was the opinion of all the bankers at the conference that the general banking 
situation, not only as far as it concerned the banks, but the trust companies as well, 
has been very much strengthened, and no further trouble is apprehended. Such trust 
companies as may deserve assistance, it was learned, will receive it (New York Times 
1907). 
Although this optimism in a rescue by JP Morgan proved to be unwarranted, it nonetheless 
signalled the general public confidence in JP Morgan’s power and means to resolve prob-





















Figure 49 - The headquarters of the Knickerbocker Trust Company in 1905. 
 
Source: (McKim et al. 1915). 
The Panic of 1907  involved several types of financial intermediaries, each distinct, playing  
unique roles in the capital markets and operating under different sets of regulations. This 
regulatory framework created conditions that made a panic more likely than if regulation 
had allowed uniform access to all investment opportunities. The New York City trust com-
panies, a group of financial intermediaries that had grown rapidly in prominence at the turn 
of the century, had experienced the most severe depositor run during the Panic of 1907 
(Moen & Tallman 1992, p. 611). The run on the New York trust companies was preceded by 
a period of significant growth.  Between 1897 and 1907, their assets had grown by 244% as 
compared to national bank assets which grew by 97% and state bank assets by 82% (Moen 
& Tallman 1992, p. 612). Trust company growth can be attributed largely to freer invest-
ment opportunities that resulted from being less subject to regulation than national or state 
banks. Although trust companies were profitable, the fact they specialised in collateralised 
loans was perceived as risky since these loans were to firms that could not obtain credit 
through national or state banks. This situation added to the severity of the panic (Chen et al. 
2010). 
The conditions that prevailed during the 1907 crisis appear similar to the conditions existing 
prior to the GFC. Both periods involved a significant growth of financial assets within the 
banking system, a relatively lax regulatory environment for non-bank financial institutions, 
an evolving framework for licensed bank supervision and a focus on low credit quality as-
sets. Figure 50 outlines a timeline for the Panic of 1907 which exhibits similar characteristics 







Figure 50 - Timeline of the Panic of 1907. 
Oct. 9, 1907 Failed attempt to manipulate share of United Copper. 
Oct. 15, 1907 Shares start to tumble. 
Oct. 21, 1907 National Bank of Commerce announcement that it would stop accepting 
cheques for the Knickerbocker Trust Company, triggering a run of de-
positors demanding their funds back and the eventual collapse of the 
Knickerbocker Trust Company. 
Oct. 22, 1907 The start of the bank-run on the Knickerbocker Trust Company. 
Oct. 24, 1907 J. P. Morgan arranged for a number of bankers to provide the then sub-
stantial sum of USD 23 million to allow the New York Stock Exchange to 
continue operating. 
Nov. 2, 1907 Moore & Schley, a major brokerage firm, nears collapse because its 
loans were backed by the Tennessee Coal, Iron & Railroad Company 
(TC&I). Proposal is made for US Steel to purchase TC&I. 
Nov. 4, 1907 President Roosevelt approves of the US Steel's acquisition of the (TC&I). 
Source: (Chen et al. 2010). 
A final problem afflicted the US financial system, one of perceptions and image. As New 
York replaced Philadelphia as the money centre of the nation, other regions started to fear 
the financial influence located in New York City, especially among the largest banks. People 
used phrases such as the ‘House of Morgan’ or the ‘Money Power’ to characterise New 
York’s growing financial presence, frequently with the assertion that a ‘conspiracy’ to con-
trol the nation’s money was directed from within the Boardrooms of the banks (Chen et al. 
2010). A reflection of the public sentiment towards the ‘Money Power’ is depicted in Figure 
51. The subtitle appearing on this editorial cartoon in Puck states: "The Central Bank - Why 
should Uncle Sam establish one, when Uncle Pierpont is already on the job?" 
Figure 51 – Front Page of Puck magazine dated 2 February, 1910  
 





Each new panic resulted in a search for scapegoats. The fact that individuals such as JP Mor-
gan had saved the US Treasury on occasion only tended to exaggerate the fears of a New 
York money conspiracy, especially during the Populist era29. Consequently, when designing 
any new system, the banking reformers of the late nineteenth century inevitably sought to 
reduce New York’s influence. That concern, along with efforts to address the need for a 
lender of last resort for the nation’s banks (in place of JP Morgan), and centralise some of 
the banking functions in the US, played a key role in shaping the legislation that became the 
Federal Reserve Act of 1913. The Panic of 1907 caused over two thousand companies to fail 
but possibly the greatest impact was that it gave impetus to the US government to impose 
more federal regulation (Markham 2006, p. 146). The severity of the Panic of 1907 prompt-
ed a call for a commission to investigate the causes of the panic and suggest potential legis-
lation to avoid future crises. This commission was known as the Pujo Committee (Miron 
1986).  
4.2.19 The Pujo Committee of 1913 
In November 1910, Senator Nelson Aldrich, of Rhode Island, charged with the task to pro-
pose regulations for the banking system, arranged to have five men meet in secret on Jekyll 
Island, Georgia, to design a new financial system for the nation. Frank Vanderlip of National 
City Bank, Paul Warburg a powerful partner in Kuhn, Loeb & Co., (later to be merged into 
LB), Henry Davison, a JP Morgan partner, and Harvard professor A. Piatt Andrew created a 
plan that provided the skeleton for the Federal Reserve System (Bruner & Carr 2007, p. 
143). Their plan failed in Congress, partly because the concept was too centralised, and be-
cause it failed to address the problem of diminishing the power of New York. It became 
even clearer in 1912 that to succeed any plan had to deal with the issue of New York’s influ-
ence.  
Widespread cynicism spread as the public grew wary of the wealthy few in New York. Com-
mentators observed that whilst JP Morgan’s bank had survived, a large number of ‘money 
trusts’ failed. These commentators believed that the trust company failures (exacerbated by 




 The Populist Movement was a politically oriented coalition of agrarian reformers in the Middle West and 




JP Morgan’s refusal to support any of them) represented a conspiracy to advance the pro-
spects of some New York based banks. Pressure from the public relating to their distrust of 
the ‘money trust’30culminated in the formation of the Pujo Committee, which was a sub-
committee of the House Committee on Banking and Currency (Schweikart & Doti 1999, p. 
241). In 1912, Louisiana congressman Arsene P. Pujo, who was charged to lead the investi-
gation on the ‘money trust’, called witnesses (including JP Morgan) and gathered more than 
30,000 documents on the concentration of financial power among the nation’s largest banks 
(Schweikart & Doti 1999, p. 241).  
Figure 52 - Picture of Arsene P. Pujo 
 
Source: (US Library of Congress c.1910). 
The Power of the ‘Money Trust’ – and JP Morgan 
The committee’s investigation, spearheaded by Samuel Untermeyer, a New York corporate 
lawyer who had become increasingly ‘anti-big-business’, tried to redefine ‘trust’ as a mo-
nopolistic cooperation by bankers (Schweikart & Doti 1999, pp. 241-2). Untermeyer’s ques-
tioning of JP Morgan produced testimony that frustrated critics of the ‘big banks’ and, in-
deed, of the entire business system. Untermeyer asked Morgan if he favoured cooperation 
over competition. Morgan replied that he liked a combination, but “I do not object to com-
petition, either. I like a little competition….” (Pujo 1913a, p. 1050). At that point Untermeyer 




 A ‘money trust’ is a concept that describes the capture of political power combined with vast wealth by a 




asked JP Morgan, “Is not commercial credit based primarily upon money or property?” To 
which the JP Morgan responded, “No, sir, the first thing is character….before money or any-
thing else. Money cannot buy it… a man I do not trust could not get money from me on all 
the bonds in Christendom” (Pujo 1913a, p. 1084). This response indicated that credit deci-
sions, in JP Morgan’s eyes, were principally subjective and dependent on the quality of 
character as perceived by the credit provider. Therefore the response itself underlines JP 
Morgan’s belief that his own judgement was sufficient to either grant or deny a loan there-
by empowering the credit provider by subjugating the loan applicant to the personal judg-
ment of the credit provider.  
In another statement during the Pujo Committee hearings in 1912,  Morgan likened his own 
personal financial welfare with “the best interests of the country” (Mallios 2013, p. 3). This 
comment accurately captures the nationalistic frame of JP Morgan’s view of himself. He 
considered his interests on a national level rather than on a familial, local or even state lev-
el, thereby suggesting a sense of self-importance and with that notion, an ownership of 
power and influence. Whether his view was justified, JP Morgan’s business interests were 
indeed national and moreover international, and JP Morgan himself had recognised his 
sphere of influence. In addition to his own sense of self-importance, a depiction of JP Mor-
gan as “the most powerful private citizen in the world” (Mallios 2013, p. 3) had been in cir-
culation in the US since at least 1902 (Mallios 2013). Therefore if the public at large believed 
this characterisation of JP Morgan, then his influence would be perceived as significant.  
One of the lasting findings of the Pujo Committee which resonates following the recent GFC 
and which is explored further in this thesis is the notion of concentrated power and influ-
ence through networks within industry and with the regulatory and governmental fraternity. 
The Pujo Committee found the concentration of wealth in the country through director-
ships, share ownership, and holding companies was worse than critics had alleged. The Pujo 
Committee found that 22 percent of the total banking resources of the nation was concen-
trated in banks and trust companies based in New York City (Foster & Holleman 2010, p. 3). 
For example, George F. Baker, the Chairman of First National Bank of New York, held 58 di-
rectorships in 1912. The Committee published information showing the lines of financial 
ownership and control, focusing particularly on JP Morgan's far reaching financial and indus-
trial empire, highlighting chains of interlocking directorships through which such control was 
exercised. It identified an ‘inner group’ associated with the trio of JP Morgan, George F. 
Baker from the First National Bank, and James Stillman from National City Bank, as well as 
the various other banks and firms they controlled. Collectively, the inner group held three 
hundred directorships in over one hundred corporations. The Pujo Committee claimed that 
it was not investment but rather control over US finance and industry that was the object of 
the extensive web of holdings and directorships (Foster & Holleman 2010, p. 3). It concluded 




…an established and well-defined identity and community of interest between a few leaders 
of finance, created and held together through share ownership, interlocking directorates, 
partnership and joint account transactions, and other forms of domination over banks, trust 
companies, railroads, and public-service and industrial corporations, which has resulted in 
great and rapidly growing concentration of the control of money and credit in the hands of 
these few men (Pujo 1913b, p. 129). 
There was an irony to the Pujo hearings. Through the clearinghouse systems which repre-
sented the abovementioned ‘close community’, the nation’s banks had taken important 
steps to reduce the likelihood and severity of financial disruptions. As it happened, the most 
crucial tool in defusing panic was the cooperation and collaboration of the major banks in 
the absence of a governmental body or central bank. In essence, Untermeyer attacked the 
bankers for protecting depositors. However it was the public resentment over the power 
wielded by these few individuals in times of crisis without independent consultation that 
was at issue. The same power that alleviated the panic could also be used for profiteering, 
common in any monopolistic, or to a lesser extent oligopolistic, system. This period of the 
early 20th century was the time when investment bankers launched the new era of monop-
oly capital. Consequently, according to Hilferding (1910), the investment banks generated 
excess returns otherwise known as ‘promoter's profits’. 
One of the most critical indictments of the investment banking industry following the find-
ings of the Pujo Committee was elucidated by Brandeis (1932) who, eloquently provided an 
unflattering description of the investment banker and highlighted the dangers of granting 
important government functions such as those of a central bank to private industry partici-
pants: 
The dominant element in our financial oligarchy is the investment banker. Associated banks, 
trust  companies and life insurance companies are his tools ... The development of our finan-
cial oligarchy followed...lines with which the history of political despotism has familiarized us: 
usurpation proceeding by gradual encroachment rather than violent acts, subtle and often 
long-concealed concentration of distinct functions which are beneficent when separately 
administered and dangerous only when combined in the same persons...The makers of our 
own Constitution had in mind like dangers to our political liberty when they provided so care-




Although Arsene P. Pujo left Congress in 1913, the findings of the committee inspired public 
support for ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment in 191331, passage of the Federal Re-
serve Act32 that same year, and passage of the Clayton Antitrust Act33 in 1914. As a mark of 
irony in the first half of the 20th century, the undesirable themes that were prosecuted by 
the Pujo Committee consisted of conflict of interests, concentrated power through collabo-
ration and anti-competitive behaviour, were in stark contrast to those supported by Ferdi-
nand Pecora, as counsel for the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency in the 1930s. 
“Pecora effectively blamed the competitiveness of the securities industry for the ‘evils’ that 
beset the market during the late 1920s” (Schweikart & Doti 1999, pp. 240-2). 
The new era of monopoly capital spurred an expansion in the banking industry in the early 
20th century. By the 1920s, the ‘money trusts’ had reached a new peak of influence and 
commercial banks facing greater competition sought new avenues for profit generation. 
These areas included dealing in equities and some activities which were previously the tradi-
tional reserve of the investment banking industry. The consequent expansion of available 
funds for investment created asset bubbles which were to culminate in the stock market 
crash of 1929. The following section discusses the Great Depression and the new wave of 
regulation that followed. 
 




 The Sixteenth Amendment to the US Constitution permitted the US government to directly tax income on a 
national basis, without allocating it to the states.  
32
 The Federal Reserve Act (1913) established the Federal Reserve System as the country’s central banking 
framework and allowed it to issue legal tender in the form of the US dollar. 





4.3 Post-Depression Regulation Brings a Shift 
in Power 
4.3.1 The Great Depression and New Regulation 
The massive sale of bonds to finance WWI brought many new players into the securities 
markets. Banks were expected to help the war effort by lending investors the funds to pur-
chase war bonds on favourable terms. The banks did so in large numbers by expanding their 
bond departments or forming new securities affiliates. By 1922, 62 commercial banks were 
directly engaged in investment banking, and another 10 had launched securities affiliates 
(Neely 1995). The growth of the financial sector following the prosperous period post-WW1 
was driven by an emergent middle class and consequent growth in individual wealth. This 
economic progression also spurred interest in stock market investments. Commercial bank 
involvement in investment banking continued to grow in the 1920s. This was due to three 
major factors including: a reduction in corporate loan demand, caused by an increasing use 
of equity funding; the issuance of long-term corporate debt securities directly to investors 
thus bypassing the intermediary role of the commercial banks, a concept known as disin-
termediation; and large cash flows flowing from a prosperous economic period that elimi-
nated the need for borrowing by many companies. Consequently, commercial banks needed 
to search for alternative sources of income. Many large banks, buoyed by a rising stock mar-
ket and other factors, chose investment banking to fill that profit void. Between 1927 and 
1930, commercial banks' share of the new bond issuance participation market rose from 37 
percent to 61 percent (Neely 1995).  
Throughout the three decades up to 1929, the investment banking industry thrived and con-
tinued to be dominated by the ‘money trust’. The industry was “still dominated by an oli-
gopoly that consisted of J.P. Morgan & Co.; Kuhn, Loeb & Co. (later to be absorbed into LB); 
Brown Brothers; and Kidder, Peabody & Co” (Stowell 2010, p. 22). The transactions in which 
they participated lacked transparency and during activities such as initial public offerings, 
corporate restructures or mergers and acquisitions in which they were involved, there was 
little consideration for other stakeholders (Stowell 2010). This period represented a fertile 
environment for public equity issues. Due to a burgeoning equity market between 1926 to 
1929 the popularity of bond issues was usurped by equity issues which increased from USD 
0.6 billion to USD 4.4 billion (Stowell 2010, p. 22). Whether the corporate market was fa-
vouring bonds or shares as a fundraising technique was inconsequential to the investment 
banks as they were dominant in both and rode the wave of growth regardless. By 1930 
commercial banks and their securities affiliates were the principal players in the investment 
banking industry. Commercial and investment banking had effectively merged into a one 




legislation requiring the separation of commercial bank activities from those carried out by 
investment banks. Therefore to supplement their income, many commercial banks under-
took riskier investment bank activities. It was not uncommon for commercial banks to use 
their funding sources, such as customer deposits to finance their riskier activities such as 
underwriting of securities’ issues and share trading. As a principal objective of bank capital is 
to provide a buffer against potential losses, the riskier the banks’ activities, the greater the 
potential losses and the higher level of capital required. Fortunately the banks were mostly 
incorporated and therefore able to issue equity to the public to augment their capital re-
serves as required. This capital fuelled the dramatic expansion in investment banking as 
growth was not simply limited by partners’ capital. 
The escalating prices of listed companies created an unmaintainable bubble which finally 
burst in 1929 with the collapse of the stock market. During the Great Depression that fol-
lowed the capital available to the banks was insufficient to support the risks incurred from 
their investment banking transactions. This was a major contribution to the various bank 
failures (Benston 1990). The reformers were concerned about the power of the investment 
banking community and these concerns were crystallised in the form of a series of hearings 
in 1932, known as the Pecora hearings (Pecora was the eventual Chief Counsel of the Con-
gressional Committee that staged the hearings). Although the hearings found no evidence of 
outright fraud, they discovered that JP Morgan’s partners paid virtually no taxes in the re-
cent preceding period and that one of JP Morgan’s banks, National City Bank, had a ‘pre-
ferred list’ of clients who received preferential allocations and prices for new corporate 
stock issuances. This activity was considered contrary to the public interest however no ac-
tion was taken.  
By 1933, the US banking system entered a period characterised by fear, uncertainty, high 
levels of bad debts and a liquidity freeze which caused it to grind to a halt. Immediate action 
was required by the incumbent government led by President Roosevelt which undertook a 
series of reforms to address the malfunctioning banking system, the economic malaise and 
inadequate consumer protection legislation. The ensuing key legislation included: the Glass 
Steagall Act of 1933; The Securities Act of 1933; The Banking Act of 1933; The Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934; The US Bankruptcy Act of 1938; and The Investment Company Act of 
1940. A brief overview of this legislation follows. 
4.3.2 The Glass–Steagall Act of 1933 (GSA) 
One of the major outcomes of the Pecora hearings led to a reduction of the power and in-
fluence held by the joint commercial bank and investment bank conglomerates. The enact-
ment of the GSA in 1933 was in response to the demise of the banking system during the 




incurred in their investment banking activities, the GSA required the legal separation of 
bank activities from investment bank activities. For example, J.P. Morgan divided its opera-
tions into three entities: J.P. Morgan, which continued as a bank; Morgan Stanley which op-
erated the US investment banking activities; and Morgan Grenfell, which operated the Brit-
ish merchant banking business. Almost immediately upon enactment, the financial commu-
nity spearheaded by the banking/investment banking industry, lobbied to have the GSA re-
pealed. Over the years, this persistent lobbying led to a continual reinterpretation and liber-
alisation of the GSA, until the Act was repealed in 1999 (Crawford 2011). Just prior to the 
repeal, Senator Paul Wellstone prophetically stated his misgivings regarding the proposed 
repeal in the Senate:  
He said the repeal of Glass-Steagall would enable the creation of financial conglomerates 
which would be too big to fail. Furthermore, he believed that the regulatory structure would 
not be able to monitor the activities of these financial conglomerates and they would even-
tually fail due to engaging in excessively risky financial transactions. Ultimately, he said, pro-
phetically, that the taxpayers would be forced to bail out these too-big-to-fail financial insti-
tutions (Crawford 2011, p. 127). 
4.3.3 The Securities Act of 1933. 
The Securities Act of 1933, “required that any offer or sale of securities using the means and 
instrumentalities of interstate commerce be registered pursuant to the 1933 Act, unless an 
exemption from registration exists under the law” (Sarkar 2014). The Securities Act was 
Congress' initial attempt to stem securities fraud, primarily targeting the issuers of securities 
and those firms selling the securities, such as investment banks. Issuers have an incentive to 
present the company and its plans in the most favourable light possible in order to engen-
der appetite for their issues. To protect investors, the Securities Act serves the dual purpose 
of ensuring that issuers selling securities to the public disclose material information to inves-
tors, and that any securities transactions are not based on fraudulent information or prac-
tices.  In this context, ‘material’ means information that would affect a reasonable investor's 
evaluation of the company's stock. The goal was to provide investors with accurate infor-
mation enabling informed investment decisions (Sarkar 2014). Prior to the Securities Act, 




referred to as ‘Blue Sky Laws’34. The Securities Act initially co-existed with the various state 
laws partly due to a view that new federal law was unconstitutional (Sarkar 2014). 
4.3.4 The Banking Act of 1933 
The Banking Act of 1933 also attempted to level the playing field between the big business-
es of the large investment and commercial banks and the smaller local banks by instituting a 
depositor insurance scheme. The scheme protected depositors up to USD 100,000, and 
therefore enabled the smaller banks to compete for deposits with their larger competitors.  
Consequently the risks of bank failure were equalised between the two segments of the 
market (Skeel 2005a, p. 96). 
4.3.5 The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
Following the enactment of the Securities Act of 1933, which covered the primary trading of 
securities, the government needed to address the secondary trading of securities such as 
bonds, shares and debentures. This was effected by The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
which established The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) - the institution primarily 
responsible for the effective and fair trading of securities in the US and which has survived 
to the present day (Morrison & Wilhelm 2007).  
4.3.6 US Bankruptcy Act of 1938 
Under the New Deal , a series of economic and regulatory reforms initiated by President 
Roosevelt to stimulate the US economy after the Great Depression, the power of invest-
ment banks was further curtailed significantly. In particular, the enactment of the US Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1938, known as the Chandler Act, eliminated the equity receivership technique 
that J.P. Morgan had used to restructure many of the country’s railroads and large corpora-
tions. Investment banks would no longer control the process, instead a court appointed 
trustee would take charge of any large corporation that filed for bankruptcy. Further, the 




 The state based ‘Blue Sky Laws’ were established to control securities fraud by requiring corporations to 
register all new securities issues whilst providing all information related to making an informed purchase deci-
sion. One of the problems with these laws were that they varied between states and the federal government 




Trust Indenture Act of 1939, prohibited corporations from issuing bonds that could be re-
structured by a bondholder’s vote. This made it difficult for investment bankers who un-
derwrote bond issues to manipulate and control a restructuring outside of  bankruptcy 
(Skeel 2005a, p. 96).  
4.3.7 The Investment Company Act of 1940 
The Investment Company Act of 1940 defined an investment company and delineated the 
activities of investment companies such as mutual funds and investment banks. Further-
more, it established a limit on the number of investment bankers able to sit on the Board of 
an investment company and set strict criteria on transactions between investment compa-
nies and investment banks. Again, this Act reflected an attempt to curtail the breadth of the 
activities undertaken by investment banks and thereby limit their potential influence over 
the financial economy. 
4.3.8 New Regulations a Catalyst for a Shift of Power 
The new legislation had the effect of transferring some powers to the regulators. The highly 
prescriptive nature of the new regulations restricted the operations of investment bankers 
and curtailed the freedoms they once enjoyed. Consideration of reputation became less rel-
evant an issue in the solving of corporate problems by investment banks who were used to 
exercising a degree of discretion before acting to solve a crisis or to entertain a transaction 
for example (Morrison & Wilhelm 2007).  
Within Clegg’s (1989) framework of power, the series of successive restrictive legislation 
represented a new operational environment for the investment banks. Clegg’s (1989) exog-
enous environment, has the potential to redefine or refix the relations between the regula-
tor and the regulated. Where once, investment banks were able to dictate their own terms, 
they were now compelled to comply with a strict set of rules, which affected their day to 
day activities. The laissez-faire exogenous environment had changed. This change clearly 
established which parties were subjected to control and which could exercise dominance. 
The dynamics of this shift which refixed relations between the regulator and the investment 
banks are found in Clegg’s (1989) facilitative circuit.  The obligatory passage point through 
which this shift of power is transmitted is represented by the compliance process where the 
power is transmitted to the episodic circuit. In this circuit the day to day activities of the in-
vestment banks changed and were subjugated to the wishes and oversight of the newly 
empowered regulators. From a wider perspective the new interventionist approach advo-
cated by President Roosevelt represented a backlash over decades of public mistrust of the 
‘money trust’ and big businesses which operated without transparency in the pursuit of ab-
normally high profits. The foreshadowed shift in influence from the powerful elite to a gov-




York Superintendent of Insurance who desired “elimination of Wall Street control” 
(Morrison & Wilhelm 2007, p. 13).  
Pre WW2 the investment banking community was investigated by a number of Congres-
sional committees and the industry’s ability to influence the environment to generate fa-
vourable outcomes became increasingly constrained (Morrison & Wilhelm 2007). The post-
depression backlash of heightened regulation new to the industry and the general distrust 
of participants continued to pervade the public, political and regulatory spheres throughout 
the 1940s and 1950s. A good reputation, traditionally a core asset of a firm, was hard to re-
establish and protect. The focus on regulation was to diminish in the years following WW2 
due to the failure of an anti-trust case brought by the US Justice Department against a group 
of investment banking firms. The world economy grew during this period and as usual fol-
lowing such growth so did the fortunes of the investment banking industry. This modern era 
brought with it new challenges for the industry such as: the diminishing importance of tacit 
skill; a simultaneous reduction in the importance of reputation; a period of innovation and 
technological advancement; the problem of staff mobility; the need for new capital to fund 
an expanding corporate sector; and increased competition from the commercial banking 
sector.  
4.4 Post World War Two (WW2) Transfor-
mation 
This section deals with the transformation of the investment banking industry in the post 
war years. Discussion will focus on the trend for partnerships to incorporate in an effort to 
seek additional capital from shareholders which was needed to support: a growing business 
base; an escalation in risk taking activities; and the required investment in costly infor-
mation technology. Additionally the swing back to a liberal approach in regulatory reform 
post-1950 is analysed and found to be reactive in nature. The consequences of this trans-
formation produced a corporate approach to the investment banking business which relied 
less on tacit skill and reputation. This led to a less personal approach to business where 
physical distribution capacity overtook tacit skill as a key differentiator at a time when the 
business model evolved from an advisory focused enterprise to a model that placed greater 
emphasis on securities trading. The trend to incorporate also led to an increase in staff mo-
bility and a restructure in senior executive remuneration arrangements which promoted 
higher risk taking business activities.   
The role of power is analysed in this section from two perspectives. Firstly, the role of power 




a landmark court case which set the scene for the ensuing ‘light touch’ period of regulatory 
reform. Secondly, an attempt is made to  understand the changing nature of the source of 
power from one relying on tacit skill of key personnel to a more hierarchical management 
structure where the power of the CEO replaced the democratic style decision-making typical 
of a partnership. Additionally, this section suggests that the trend to incorporate was influ-
enced by mimetic isomorphism whereby the safe option of competing in an industry facing 
the challenges of a tough economic climate was to replicate the business model of other 
firms which were perceived as successful.  
The post WW2 era signalled a reversal in the regulatory approach towards the investment 
banking industry. This was likely driven by the economic circumstances of the time which 
required a stimulus following many years where industrial production was dedicated to the 
war effort. Focus in the new post war era was directed towards the commercial sectors of 
the economy including the technological improvements which spurred demand in consumer 
and industrial production. The capital investment required was be met by financial institu-
tions and investors in general and the investment banking industry was seen as an im-
portant source of this capital. Too much regulation in this period was seen to interfere with 
this buoyant economic environment. However the legacy of the anti-investment bank sen-
timents prevailing during the earlier part of the 20th century persisted in certain government 
circles. The US government attempted to challenge the investment banking industry in a 
1950 court case by claiming seventeen firms were guilty of anti-competitive behaviour from 
1915 onwards. The complaint was summarised by the prevailing judge as: 
Beginning in or about the year 1915 and continuing thereafter up to and including the date 
of the filing of this complaint, the defendants named herein, have engaged, knowingly and 
continuously, in a wrongful and unlawful conspiracy to restrain unreasonably and to monop-
olize the securities business of the United States ... all in restraint and in monopolization of 
the interstate commerce described in this complaint … (Whitney 1955, p. 325). 
An example of unconscionable and uncompetitive behaviour involved Kuhn Loeb & Co, a 
firm (which was ultimately merged into LB), cited by Whitney (1955, pp. 323-4), which in 
1945 was accused of having removed a client’s securities issue from the market simply be-
cause the client had requested a lower underwriting commission. This case, known as the 
‘Investment Bankers case’ lasted for three years until 1953 when the court decided against 
the government by concluding that the 17 investment banks brought to trial were innocent 
of any wrongdoing (Whitney 1955). In dismissing the government’s case, the judge, Harold 
R. Medina, stated that “The government case depends entirely upon circumstantial evi-
dence” (Medina 1954, p. 9). Further, the judge concluded that even though the evidence 
suggested that investment bankers had attempted to collude in the earlier part of the cen-
tury as a consequence of cultural practice, recent statistical evidence contradicted the US 




However it is interesting to note that the statistical evidence was supplied by the invest-
ment bankers themselves, suggesting a possibility of them providing filtered and biased sta-
tistics in support of their case. The success of the investment banking community reflected 
their power in resisting the might of the US government’s resources in prosecuting the case. 
The group of investment banks had matched the government’s legal teams which would 
have required significant financial resources given the longevity of the court proceedings.  
Financial Resources as a Means to Power in the Episodic Circuit 
This example of power exerted by the investment banking group rests on the might of their 
financial resources which facilitated an effective defence. The adversarial social relations 
with government created a legal conflict where only one party could win. The probability of 
success was partly reliant on the quality of the case presented which was partly influenced 
by the quality of the legal defence team. It is assumed that given the gravity of the case and 
the dire consequences for key players such as J.P. Morgan, an expensive team of lawyers 
was engaged for the defence. Through the agency of the legal team and the resources ap-
plied, which constitute a ‘means’ within the Clegg’s (1989) episodic circuit, the investment 
banks were able to generate a positive verdict. 
4.4.1 The Empowering Role of ‘Reputation’ in the Pre-
1950s 
The idea that the investment banks were involved in a conspiracy to prevent competition 
failed to include the role of reputation as a natural barrier to entry. The importance of repu-
tation as a concept in the survival and success of investment banks and as an obstacle to 
new entrants attempting to establish a foothold may not have been fully understood by the 
government in the post war era. The seemingly strong grip on the investment banking busi-
ness by existing participants had become the instigator for the government case. The gov-
ernment’s decision to undertake legal action was also fuelled by strong public opinion and 
distrust of investment bankers (Morrison & Wilhelm 2007). These bankers, many of whom 
were perceived as a privileged class exhibiting the usual trappings of wealth, presided over 
the sale of securities to unsuspecting investors, the value of which were to drop dramatical-
ly in the aftermath of the 1929 stock market crash and contribute to widespread distress 
during the Great Depression. Therefore the seemed a suitable scapegoat for the govern-
ment and the wider population (Morrison & Wilhelm 2007).  
Reputation was an important element in the ability of investment banks to attract clients. 
The more observable the historic success of an investment bank, the greater the potential 
to grow reputation. An investment bank’s success is due to the skill of the bankers and the 
techniques applied in each transaction. (Whitney 1955) suggests that in addition to skill and 




sentially, an investment banking firm is a combination of men of two different kinds - men 
with capital and men with a great deal of initiative and enterprise” (Whitney 1955, p. 322). 
As clients’ problems are solved or needs met, the investment banks develop an intellectual 
capital which can be used for subsequent transactions. The power enabling techniques and 
innovation necessary in producing a market leading reputation is found within Clegg’s 
(1989) facilitative circuit. The resultant power is influential in positively affecting the firm’s 
reputation with clients leading to close and fruitful social relations. The positive social rela-
tions which operate in a cycle between the facilitative circuit and the episodic circuit im-
pacts on the future successful business outcomes of the firm as subsequent transactions 
ensue. The success of the investment banking industry in proving an absence of anti-
competitive behaviour, in part provided justification for a liberal approach to future regula-
tory impositions.  
As the US requirement for post WW2 capital increased, the investment banking industry 
needed to address their ability to meet the associated funding demands. These demands 
not only included funds from their own balance sheets (which would prove insufficient), but 
also from public investors. To facilitate the flows of capital from investors to the industrial 
corporate sector, the investment banks needed to enhance their distribution networks and 
retail businesses. The greater emphasis on retail brokerage was supported by improvements 
in technology and coincided with a reduction in reliance on tacit skills largely required by 
the advisory departments, as this side of the business became relatively less important. The 
associated expansion of the investment banks’ business re-introduced a requirement for 
further capital which instigated a re-assessment of the investment banking model, and 
spurred a trend towards incorporation. 
4.4.2 Transformation from Partnership to Corporation 
The business model of investment banks up until the immediate post WW2 period largely 
comprised the partnership business structure (Geisst 2001). The ability of this structure to 
generate additional capital was limited to the capacity of the partners to inject additional 
funds or introduce new partners. As existing partners were generally reluctant to dilute 




incorporation. According to Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (2013), 
“The CPI-adjusted capitalisation of the top 10 investment banks soared from USD 1 billion in 
1960 to USD 194 billion in 2000”. This expansion coincided with an increase in the number 
of banking professionals35 employed by the top five investment banks (ranked by capitalisa-
tion) from 56,000 to 205,000 between 1979 and 2000 (Securities Industry and Financial 
Markets Association 2013). Apart from a general increase in economic and financial market 
activity, this expansion in capitalisation and employee numbers was caused by a significant 
shift from the partnership form of business entity to the corporate form.  
The major firms which had substantial wholesale trading and brokerage activities and pro-
ceeded to list on the stock exchange included: Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette (1970); Merrill 
Lynch (1971); Reynolds Securities (1971); Bache & Co (1971); Lehman Brothers (via the ac-
quisition by American Express in 1984, and later independently in 1999); Bear Stearns 
(1985); Morgan Stanley (1986); and Goldman Sachs (1999) (Morrison & Wilhelm 2007, p. 50; 
Schellhorn 2011, p. 113). (Gross 2010, p. 1) argues that it was inevitable for investment 
banks to seek public listing since, "In order to have a capital base that would support the 
funding they needed, they had to be public". This transformation was largely driven by a re-
duction in the reliance on tacit skill, a potential for corporate executives to maximise their 
executive compensation through incentive schemes, an increasing emergence of the power 
of information technology and the need for risk capital.  
According to Morrison and Wilhelm (2007, p. 46), the constant objective of the investment 
banker, “is to enforce private laws that support the exchange of critical information”. This 
requires “network and reputation management as the two core competencies that support 
this mission” (Morrison & Wilhelm 2007, p. 46). As networks are driven by social interaction 
and reputation is governed by personal decision-making and action, the implication for the 
role of an investment banker is that personal qualities including appropriate behaviour are 
important elements to the attainment of these attributes. It is difficult to learn such qualita-
tive characteristics from technical training. Instead these skills have been historically passed 
on through mentoring and supervision by superiors representing tacit skills as opposed to 
codifiable skills (Morrison & Wilhelm 2007, p. 12). The partnership form of business struc-
ture is considered ideal for the passing on of tacit skill as partners and senior members of 








the firm undertake the role of mentors and supervisors. Junior members are also introduced 
to existing networks upon which they can expand. According to Morrison and Wilhelm 
(2007, p. 15), “managing the information networks upon which security issuance relies is a 
tacit skill”. 
Tacit skill is also important to the corporate restructuring and mergers and acquisition parts 
of the business as these transactions require personal relationships that facilitate the origi-
nation of transactions, the gentle management of stakeholders and negotiations with exter-
nal parties. The reliance on tacit skill has been the foundation of the development of the 
knowhow inherent in investment banking firms during the past three centuries. Unique 
knowhow, combined with a good distribution network are amongst the most important fac-
tors which can differentiate the quality and competence and therefore the attractiveness of 
a firm to potential clients. The mentoring and training of junior members of a firm is pri-
marily motivated by a desire of the partners to protect the capital invested in the firm. As a 
good reputation is an important attribute, a well-trained employee who will protect the 
reputation will also preserve the financial as well as social capital of a firm. Therefore the 
more that tacit skill can be passed on within the firm, the greater the potential for an en-
hanced reputation (Morrison & Wilhelm 2007, 2008; Polanyi 1966). This highly valued repu-
tation, closely guarded by partners, is also important for investment banks which co-
participate in one another’s equity or bond issues. In these situations failure of the issue will 
impact adversely on their clients, which may compromise both the issuer and the eventual 
buyer of the financial securities as well as their investment bank co-participants. This could 
affect future business as new customers and transaction arrangers react to each investment 
bank’s historical performance and behaviour. 
4.4.3 Tacit Skill Usurped through Incorporation 
During the 1960s, an era of corporate conglomerates emerged, where takeover activity was 
combined with a growing industrial corporate sector, operating under prosperous economic 
conditions. This environment created an increased demand for capital from industry and in 
turn from the investment banking firms which had been arranging the related funding and 
advisory services. Furthermore, the industry was undergoing a period of significant change 
where innovations in information technology led to an automation of previously manual 
processes. The nature of many investment banks’ business had altered from an advisory and 
underwriting focus to one of trading and brokerage where information technology could 
provide efficiencies. The increase in importance of brokerage is exemplified by the higher 
proportion of 70% this segment of Merrill Lynch’s business contributed to total revenue of 
USD 192 million revenue in 1960, whilst the  traditional investment banking segment repre-
sented only 5% (Morrison & Wilhelm 2007, p. 50). This change necessitated additional com-
puting capability and placed less importance on tacit skill. The computers necessary for this 




ture this additional capital was limited to the personal wealth of its partners. As the need for 
capital outweighed the need for tacit skill, many investment banks began to incorporate 
their business structures whereby capital could be increased by tapping the investing public 
(Morrison & Wilhelm 2007, 2008). 
The process of incorporation also required a change to the management structure of the 
firm. Whereas the governance of a partnership normally rested with an executive commit-
tee of peers, the corporate form would entail a board of directors often with some repre-
sentation of non-executive directors. Control by partners was ceded to boards which were 
subject to numerous regulations within Corporations Law and a term of office which is sub-
ject to a vote at a shareholders’ annual general meeting. See section 10.3 for an analysis of 
LB’s Board of Directors and the firm’s governance practices. Boards could also approve in-
centive arrangements for key officers of the corporation. Normal practice would entail the 
board authorising a bonus pool which would be distributed at the discretion of the CEO or a 
compensation committee of which the CEO was usually a key member. This was a significant 
attraction for potential CEOs of the corporation who would have an influence in the incor-
poration process. As incentives included in executive compensation were aligned with per-
formance generally, the limited liability status of a corporation meant that CEOs could take 
abnormal risks with the expectation of generating abnormal profits without placing them-
selves at personal financial risk. Further a CEO was not compelled to allocate a share of the 
profits with other executives and could therefore monopolise the bulk of the available bo-
nus pool. The incentives however for partners were limited to their drawing rights from 
their current account in the partnership and given a partner’s direct ownership, there was a 
reduced propensity for risk-taking for fear of weakening the capital structure of the firm.  
The transformation to a corporate form also introduced the problem of employee mobility 
which had the effect of increased staff turnover.  The mobility problem followed from a 
lessening of staff loyalty, driven by the reduced level of close mentoring by superiors and 
management’s greater access to departmental and employee key performance indicators 
(KPI’s). KPI’s enabled employees to be divided between those performing at or above expec-
tations and those underperforming. Whilst the better performing employees were subject 
to poaching by competitor firms, underperformers were filtered out. The departure of key 
staff created the problem of a corresponding loss of their associated networks and 
knowhow. 
4.4.4 The Capital Problem for Risk Taking 
As the US corporate sector grew in the post WW2 era, investment banks were called upon 
to underwrite an increasing volume and size of securities issues. (Refer to Figure 53 and Fig-





Figure 53 - US Non-Financial Corporate Equities Outstanding 1949 - 2013 
 
Source: Data for the graph was extracted from Federal Reserve database (Federal Reserve 
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Figure 54 - US Debt Instruments Outstanding 1949 - 2013 
 
Source: Data for the graph was extracted from Federal Reserve database (Federal Reserve 
Bank of St Louis 2015c). 
When a securities firm underwrites a new issue of equities or bonds it would need to as-
sume the risk of that undertaking until it is sold to the ultimate investor. The actual cash or 
credit used by the securities firms to initially subscribe to the bonds or shares during the 
underwriting period is obtained from either cash at the bank or debt facilities. In their credit 
assessment of the underwriting firms, the credit providers would require acceptable levels 
of capital amongst other credit risk attributes. Traditionally, the capital was either supplied 
by the partners’ own funds or once incorporated, by the stockholders of the firm. Two ad-
vantages of the corporate form for a securities firm was the access to a potentially larger 
stockholder base to facilitate additional fund raising through equity and debt issues, and the 
limited liability of the corporate entity which was unavailable to partners of a partnership 
form. As new issues became larger during the latter part of the 20th century, it became in-
creasingly difficult for the partners of private partnerships to fund the increasing levels of 
capital needed to support the bank borrowings required for the underwritings. Partnerships 
were able to last as long as the speed of economic growth remained slow to moderate. Con-
sequently during the 1970s and 1980s many partnerships succumbed to the ever increasing 
















































































































The limitations of insufficient capital plagued Wall Street firms and provided an element of 
discontinuity to the development of the firm because capital in a partnership was quasi 
transient. As capital was provided by partners of a partnership, it could be withdrawn upon 
a partner’s death or retirement. When this occurred, firms found themselves in difficult fi-
nancial positions. The recurring theme of capital constraints plagued many firms especially 
during financial crises which occurred periodically during the latter part of the 19th and ear-
ly part of the 20th centuries and specifically during the crisis years 1869, 1873, 1884, 1893, 
1903, and 1907 (Geisst 2001, p. 60). The burgeoning corporate sector during the period 
1960s to 1980s encouraged non-traditional institutions, mainly large commercial banks, to 
encroach on some of the business segments which were the traditional domain of the in-
vestment banking industry. In response to this threat the traditional partnership form gave 
way to the corporate form as the firms sought to compete by expanding their activities 
which in turn required higher levels of capital that a corporate form could satisfy. 
The business of investment banking prior to the GFC was dominated by traditional firms 
which were able to adapt to the changing environment in the previous decades. Figure 55 
represents the relative size of the major investment banks in 2007, the year acknowledged 
as the beginning of the crisis and the year before the collapse of LB. 
Figure 55 - Ranking of Major US Investment Banks by Market Capitalisation in 2007 
Investment Bank 
Highest stock price 
2007 
Highest market value 
2007 Billions 
Average number 
of employees 2007 
  
   Merrill Lynch  USD 98.68 USD 150.89 64,200 
Goldman Sachs  USD 246.40 USD 107.05 30,522 
Morgan Stanley  USD 75.15 USD 83.34 56,000 
Lehman Bothers USD 86.18 USD 59.38 28,556 
Bear Stearns USD 170.62 USD 20.47 13,700 
TOTAL 
 
USD 421.13 192,978 
Source: (Arslan 2009, pp. 5-6). 
4.4.5 Incorporation as Mimetic Isomorphism 
After the first firms incorporated in 1970, a wave of similar firms gradually incorporated as 
each firm experienced similar capital constraints and challenging business conditions in the 
prevailing economic environment. DiMaggio & Powell’s (1983) New Institutional Theory 
suggests that firms tend to replicate business models and practices adopted by other suc-
cessful industry participants if they are easily understood and provide legitimacy to external 
stakeholders. This theory further proposes that such isomorphism is undertaken regardless 
of whether economic benefits accrue. Given the uncertainty in dealing with these challenges 
in the 1970s and 1980s, firms looked to each other as to which strategic course to follow. 




tion was deemed a viable option to the challenges presented as it offered legitimacy from 
various perspectives. Parties who accorded this legitimacy included stockholders and credi-
tors, regulators, customers, executive management, existing partners, and lastly the co-
participants in transactions.  
For partners and stockholders, the corporate form enabled a potential increase in capital to 
expand business activities. The potential expansion would have signalled a probable in-
crease in earnings receiving stockholder approval so long as the return on capital was not 
diluted. Naturally the economic benefits would have been uncertain at the time of incorpo-
ration however the popular notion that ‘bigger is better’ could have crept into the percep-
tions of both partners and following incorporation, stockholders. Creditors including lenders 
would view a potential increase in capital as an improvement to the balance sheet structure 
notwithstanding the removal of unlimited liability which is almost always a feature of the 
partnership structure. A better capitalised business generally translates to a more robust 
credit profile and therefore a lower probability of default on monies outstanding. A corpo-
rate form would subject them to a comprehensive corporate regulatory umbrella. Applica-
ble regulations would oblige disclosure of relevant qualitative and financial information. As 
an important element of the financial system, any improvement in the level of transparency 
of investment banks would inform stakeholders and reduce uncertainty in the financial 
markets. Corporate regulation also imposes discipline on investment banks, covering mat-
ters from corporate governance to consumer protection. As potential additional capital 
would permit investment banks to diversify their service offering and increase underwriting 
capacity for new securities issues, customers would perceive incorporation with its addi-
toonal capital raing benefits, as a positive development.  
The transformation from the partnership form to the corporate form enabled many invest-
ment banks to face the challenges and opportunities of the 1970s and 1980s. The primary 
challenge was the need for extra capital necessary to meet the financing demands of the 
growing corporate sector, to shore up balance sheets in the face of increased risk levels, 
fund the investment required in information technology and compete with the larger com-
mercial banks, which had encroached on some of their traditional business activities. The 
corporate form also allowed investment banks to introduce generous executive compensa-
tion schemes which need not be shared equitably amongst partners. However this evolution 
meant that the traditional reliance on reputation and tacit skills, had diminished, removing 
the personal style and image traditionally imbued by the partners. 
Ultimately, the rapid growth of the corporate sector attracted some Machiavellian charac-
ters seeking to exploit the market conditions. This has been a pattern throughout the histo-
ry of investment banking. The US corporate sector and the investment banking industry 
have been littered with a series of scandals where emboldened individuals undertook ac-




which emerged prompted a cycle of reactionary responses which typically involved the in-
troduction of further regulation.   
4.4.6 Regulation – A Reactionary Response  
Most of the large corporate scandals in the US, from Jay Cooke's 1873 collapse to the 2002 
corporate scandals36, can trace their causes to the confluence of the same three general fac-
tors: risk taking; competition; and manipulation of the corporate form (Skeel 2005a). Given 
that most CEO compensation structures involved a combination of shares and options, CEOs 
can expect a large payoff if the company's share price increases, however, if share prices 
decline, the CEOs personal capital is not at risk. This can introduce a moral hazard problem 
whereby CEOs are motivated to take higher risks to take advantage of potentially large bo-
nuses (Skeel 2005a). Therefore, theoretically, CEOs are generally incentivised to take risks 
up to a point where bankruptcy costs37 equal the marginal return of the risking up of the 
business. 
The second factor is competition. Although competitive markets are generally viewed as 
healthy for an economy, they too can reinforce managers' incentives to take risks. The US 
has had an historic dislike for concentrated economic power, in favour of industries with a 
multitude of competing companies. In this kind of marketplace, the success of a business 
innovator attracts competitors. If an innovative company's profits are eroded by the influx 
of competitors, its managers may be tempted to respond by taking increasingly misguided 
and even illegal risks, or disguising their precarious finances, as they attempt to replicate 
their early success. 




 In 2002 there were a high number of corporate scandals which involved accounting anomalies. Such mis-
deeds typically involved complex methods for misusing or misdirecting funds, overstating revenues, understat-
ing expenses, overstating the value of corporate assets or underreporting the existence of liabilities. US com-
panies involved included: Adelphi, AOL, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Duke Energy, Dynegy, El Paso Corporation, Fred-
die Mac, Global Crossing, Halliburton, Homestore.com, ImClone Systems, Kmart, Merck & Co., Merrill Lynch, 
Mirant, Nicor, Peregrine Systems, Qwest Communications, Reliant Energy, Sunbeam, Symbol Technologies, 
Tyco International, and Worldcom. 
37
 Bankruptcy costs are all the costs for a corporation associated with an increase in the probability of default 
on debt. The closer a corporation reaches the point of bankruptcy, theoretically the higher the bankruptcy 
costs, particularly as management time is distracted by matters related to bankruptcy instead of being focused 




The final factor is manipulation of the corporate form. The ability to tap large amounts of 
capital in enterprises that are set up as corporations, together with the large number of 
people whose livelihood depends in one way or another on the business, means that an ex-
ecutive who takes excessive or fraudulent risks may jeopardise the financial lives of thou-
sands of employees, investors, and suppliers of the business. The corporate form itself can 
also multiply the opportunities for mishaps. By permitting corporations to hold the shares of 
other corporations in the late nineteenth century, lawmakers gave corporate managers the 
ability to store some of the assets of a business in one corporate entity and other assets 
elsewhere. This corporate smoke and mirrors figured prominently in the collapse of Samuel 
Insull38 and other utility empires in the 1930s, and it was equally central to Enron's39 man-
agers' efforts to keep investors in the dark as they ratcheted up the corporation's risks. Ul-
timately this technique was also used by LB which made extensive use of special purpose 
vehicles and other unusual accounting interpretations such as those known as ‘Repo 105’ – 
refer to 9.1.2 for a fuller explanation of this financial transaction.  
Once a corporate scandal is revealed there is often public indignation which incites exten-
sive corporate reforms that simply would not be possible in a more imperturbable corporate 
and financial environment. For example there were regulatory implications following many 
scandals, in the 1870s, the 1930s and the early 2000s. An early example is when Jay Cooke's 
business empire collapsed in September 1873, which followed a series of railroad scandals 
that also included a conflict over the Erie Railroad40 and corruption over the funding of the 




 Samuel Insull (November 11, 1859 – July 16, 1938) was a US businessman who developed electrical infra-
structure in the US. His conglomerate failed during the Great Depression following which he was accused of 
profiting personally by selling worthless stock to unsuspecting investors who trusted him because of his posi-
tion and reputation. 
39
Enron Corporation was an US diversified corporation whose main business was the operation of energy gen-
erating assets and the trading of commodities including electricity. When the corporation failed in 2002, it was 
the largest bankruptcy in US history up to that time. The bankruptcy followed the discovery of fraudulent ac-
counting practices and financial reporting. The enactment of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 was largely in 
response to the events surrounding the Enron collapse. 
40
 The Erie scandal of the 1860s, involved a hostile takeover attempt on the Erie Railroad by a group of inves-
tors including Daniel Drew, James Fisk and Jay Gould. These investors fraudulently injected 50,000 shares of 





Union Pacific Railroad41. The US government responded by cancelling the subsidies that had 
been used to finance the railroads. In Pennsylvania, the state government responded to the 
scandals by amending the state constitution to prohibit the state from authorizing any gov-
ernment entities "to obtain or appropriate money for ... any corporation, association or in-
dividual" (Skeel 2005b, p. 157). Similar statutes in other states were, in a sense, an early ef-
fort to limit corporate influence over the political process. According to Skeel (2005b), the 
1873 crisis spurred further regulation. The scandal would eventually contribute to railroad 
rate regulation through the enactment of the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 and to fed-
eral regulation of antitrust issues under the Sherman Act of 1890. 
The corporate scandals of the 1930s inspired another major wave of corporate reforms. Un-
der the presidency of Franklin D. Roosevelt congress enacted a broad array of sweeping re-
forms that still provide the principal framework of US corporate and market regulation. See 
section 4.3.1 for details of the major pieces of legislation. In the 1940s, Richard Whitney, the 
head of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), was found to have misappropriated several 
million dollars from the exchange. The reaction to his misconduct enabled SEC Chairman, 
William Douglas, to coordinate a major restructuring of the exchange. In the early 1970s, 
following the Watergate scandal, investigators discovered that several major US corpora-
tions had allocated funds for bribing foreign officials. In response, the US government en-
acted the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, which forbids payments from US corporations to 
foreign officials. Most recently, scandals involving Enron and WorldCom inspired the Sar-
banes-Oxley Act of 2002. See section 4.4.7 for details of this Act.  
Each of these reforms followed the same pattern of an alarming scandal which stimulates 
the public outcry for government and or regulatory action. This action is usually in the form 
of legislative reforms that provide the federal regulatory framework for the subsequent pe-
                                                     
 
 
41 The Union Pacific Railroad scandal involved the awarding of favourable contracts by the Union Pacific to a 
company known as Credit Mobilier which was owned by the majority stockholders of the Union Pacific Rail-
road. In an attempt to conceal the transaction, shares in Credit Mobilier were transferred to a group of US 
congressman who ensured the passing of legislation covering government subsidies for the construction of the 





riod. As a new wave of scandals emerged in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the typical reac-
tionary response of introducing new regulations was again triggered.  
4.4.7 Regulation – Post WW2 
Following WW2 the reconstruction of Europe combined with the re-tooling of US manufac-
turing and growing consumer demand led to a burgeoning US economy. This combined with 
an absence of major corporate scandals up until the 1990s, engendered a liberal approach 
to regulatory reform. It was not until after the late 1990s that a wave of new legislation was 
introduced – again largely prompted by corporate scandals. These scandals which com-
prised fraudulent activities resulting in the collapse of corporations such as WorldCom, En-
ron and Global Crossing, prompted public indignation as is common after corporate scandals 
are revealed. The prevailing public sentiment led to a series of legislation.   
The major pieces of legislation which impacted on the investment banking industry during 
this post war period include the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Regula-
tion Analyst Certification (Regulation AC) and more recently, but outside the time period of 
this thesis, the Dodd-Frank Act. Each piece of legislation was seen to be a reaction to a crisis 
or series of events which had an adverse impact on the investing public. In some cases the 
ultimate legislation was seen to be a watered down version of the bill originally introduced 
to Congress, typically as a result of strong lobbying from the investment banking industry 
(Kroszner & Stratmann 1998). See section 8.2.2 which discusses the power of investment 
bank lobbying. A brief overview of selected key legislation which impacted the investment 
banking industry and introduced at the end of the 20th century and soon thereafter, is in-
cluded in the following sections. 
The Gramm Leach Bliley Act of 1999 essentially repealed the Glass Steagall Act of 1933. The 
new act allowed commercial banks and investment banks to again operate within a single 
group. The larger combined group, it was argued, could withstand downturns better than if 
they were split. The complementary business models implied that in a thriving economy 
when cash levels were high, banks could improve profitability by increased lending funded 
by higher levels of deposits. Conversely, whilst the corporate sector was well funded by in-
ternal cash generation, demand for securities issues would be low, thereby impacting nega-
tively on investment banks. The balance to each other’s financial performance was purport-
ed to generate less volatile earnings and therefore a more stable financial system. A second 
argument centred on the unfair playing field that Glass Steagall had created. Whilst US in-
vestment banks had to comply with the separation principle, the US based European in-
vestment banks and commercial banks were able to continue to operate as combined units. 
In view of the globalisation of the industry, amalgamations between investment banks and 




The Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 was a direct reaction to the abovementioned corporate 
scandals of the late 1990s and covered wide ranging reforms focused on improving corpo-
rate governance. The act impacted on investment banks insofar as it intended to foster 
greater transparency. Investment banks were required to separate the activities of share 
analysts form the underwriting departments thereby lowering the risk of biased research 
reports. Other governance related sections of the act impacted directly and indirectly on 
investment banks including provisions for greater auditor independence, requiring corpo-
rate executives to formally attest to any information made public, requiring greater disclo-
sure by firms issuing securities, and a general improvement on corporate compliance provi-
sions supervised by the SEC. 
The Regulation Analyst Certification Act of 2003 intended to improve the quality of research 
reports produced by investment banks by requiring analysts to certify that the research re-
ports represented an accurate opinion of the analysts’ view. Further it was intended to im-
prove transparency by requiring analysts to disclose any remuneration directly related to 
the research reports. 
4.4.8 Capital Regulation 
In the investment banking industry the principal section of prudential regulation aimed at 
protecting stakeholders was a rule governing minimum capital levels - Rule 15c3-1 under 
the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. This rule was amended by the US SEC in 1975 and 
revised in 1997 and 2004 (Securities and Exchange Commission 1975, 1997, 2004). A key 
amendment to this rule in 2004, commonly known as the ‘Net Capital Rule’, effectively 
permitted the larger investment bank groups to raise their allowable leverage from a level 
of 12 to 1 to over 30 to 1 (Coffee 2008). The leverage ratio required a registered broker-
dealer owned by an investment bank to maintain ‘aggregate indebtedness’ to a maximum of 
12 times (or 15 times if the investment bank provided an early warning to the SEC of a po-
tential breach). This ratio can also be expressed as holding a minimum amount of net capital 
equal to at least 6.67 percent of total ‘aggregate indebtedness’. However Sirri (2008) notes 
that broker-dealers subject to the 12-to-1 net capital leverage ratio effectively understated 
their ratios as the regulatory definition of ‘aggregate indebtedness’ excluded securities fi-




of an investment bank’s balance sheet. Moreover, the Net Capital Rule never applied at the 
investment bank holding company level, where the group would conduct risky transactions 
such as originating and warehousing of real estate and corporate loans and derivatives 
transactions involving CDOs and Residential Mortgage Backed Securities (RMBS)42 outside 
the balance sheet structure of the broker-dealer subsidiary (Sirri 2008).  
According to Sirri (2008) no regulator in the US as at 2008 was given explicit authority and 
responsibility for the supervision of investment bank holding companies with bank affiliates. 
Although the US regulatory framework included mandatory capital requirements by the 
Federal Reserve Board for commercial bank holding companies, holding companies of in-
vestment banks that did not have Federal government regulated US banks within the con-
solidated group, were subject to a voluntary regime of regulations. Therefore, there was a 
gap in the US regulatory framework for large US investment bank holding companies to 
meet net capital adequacy limits and maintain liquidity on a consolidated basis (Sirri 2008). 
A history of the capital regulations for investment banks is useful in understanding their ef-
fect on the industry. The concept of a rule requiring a broker-dealer to maintain a liquidity 
buffer to protect customers’ claims on the firm originated from the aftermath of the Great 
Depression of the 1930s when the SEC established Rule 15c3-1 under the Securities and Ex-
change Act of 1934. This Act required registered broker-dealers to maintain minimum levels 
of liquid net assets in order to speedily liquidate positions to meet client claims (Wolfson & 
Guttman 1972). In the late 1960s, US broker-dealers were inundated with unprecedented 
securities trades which caused processing failures. The broker-dealers relied on short-term 
debt to fund their portfolios of securities and as investors attempted to liquidate their hold-
ings, these funding lines were placed under severe stress causing defaults amongst industry 
participants. The failures precipitated a financial crisis resulting in substantial losses for in-
vestors and a loss of confidence in the stock market.  Following this crisis, the SEC intro-
duced a capital regulation in 1975 requiring broker-dealers to maintain minimum levels of 
capital and liquidity (Wells 2000). These regulations however did not extend to the holding 
companies of the broker-dealers. The 1975 net capital rule involved a process of two calcu-




 A RMBS is a security issued through a securitization process by a special purpose vehicle established to  hold 
a pool of residential mortgages which are either originated by a related sponsoring financial institutions or 




lations. Firstly net capital was calculated from the broker-dealer’s balance sheet as total 
capital less deductions such as illiquid assets, unsecured receivables, charges for aged credit 
exposures and market risk haircuts43. Secondly the required net capital was calculated as a 
percentage of ‘aggregate indebtedness’. Actual net capital was required to exceed the re-
quired net capital (Haberman 1987, p. 4). 
The 1980s represented a period of growth for the securities industry and as broker-dealers 
expanded operations, regulators focused attention on the solvency of the broker-dealers’ 
holding companies as well as the broker-dealer subsidiaries however resisted introducing 
specific regulations covering holding companies. Concerns were realised with the bankrupt-
cy in February 1990 of Drexel Burnham Lambert group which operated as an investment 
bank with a broker-dealer division (Carney 2012). Drexel Burnham Lambert’s bankruptcy 
prompted the SEC to conduct assessments of groups which were affiliated to broker-
dealers. Formally these measures included: the establishment of the Market Reform Act 
1990 requiring larger broker-dealers to report risk-related data of group entities to the SEC; 
persuading industry participants to form a Derivatives Policy Group to voluntarily supply in-
formation about their derivatives activities which were still unregulated; and, a program in-
volving the supervision of OTC derivatives transacted by broker-dealers. 
The 2004 amendments to the Net Capital Rules addressed the need to recognise the re-
quirement for calculating net capital for the wider investment banking group as well as the 
broker-dealer subsidiaries. When Congress enacted the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in 1999, it 
neglected to authorise any government agency to regulate large investment bank holding 
companies such as Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch and Bear Stearns. The 
2004 amendment effectively established a class of larger investment banks to be known as 
Consolidated Supervised Entities (CSEs). The CSEs could volunteer to comply with the Net 
Capital Rule under SEC supervision. Otherwise they could remain under the existing regula-
tions which applied solely to their broker-dealer subsidiaries. The five main elements of the 
CSE program entailed the following:  




 The haircuts refer to the discounts applied to the market value of securities to reflect their risk characteris-
tics. The value of the securities after the haircut is used in the calculation to determine the available liquid as-




First, CSE holding companies are required to maintain and document a system of internal 
controls that must be approved by the Commission at the time of initial application. Second, 
before approval and on an ongoing basis, the Commission’s staff examines the implementa-
tion of these controls. Third, CSEs are monitored for financial and operational weakness that 
might place regulated entities within the group or the broader financial system at risk. 
Fourth, CSEs are required to compute a capital adequacy measure at the holding company 
that is consistent with the Basel Standard. Finally, CSEs are required to maintain significant 
pools of liquid assets at the holding company, for use in any regulated or unregulated entity 
within the group without regulatory restriction. This liquidity pool is sized to ensure that the 
holding company has sufficient stand-alone liquidity to meet its expected cash outflows 
without access to unsecured financing for a period of at least one year Sirri (2008). 
Investment banks could qualify as CSEs if they had net capital of more than USD 5 billion and 
therefore take advantage of two key concessions relating to the calculation of net capital. 
Firstly CSEs were allowed to calculate net capital using their own risk models. Secondly they 
could adopt the same risk weightings which were adopted by commercial banks under their 
Basel II capital adequacy guidelines. These risk weightings were derived by the Bank of In-
ternational Settlements as part of their prudential guidelines and used to weight assets in 
accordance with their risk to arrive at a total risk weighted asset base against which capital 
was applied in the capital adequacy calculations. As at 2008, four major investment banks, 
including LB, Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch and Morgan Stanley volunteered to be classified 
as CSEs and comply with the regulations (Review of Regulatory Proposals on Basel Capital 
and Commercial Real Estate  2006, p. 114). The SEC also deferred its supervisory function 
over a CSE affiliate, to the relevant functional regulator of that CSE affiliate. 
Not only did the 2004 amendments increase the allowable leverage for CSEs, they contrib-
uted to a change in business direction of the investment banks. According to Friedman and 
Kraus (2011), the 2004 amendments incorporated risk weightings for assets that were used 
in the net capital calculations for investment banks which were similar to those used in the 
capital adequacy calculations included in the Basel II regulations for banks. These risk 
weightings favoured the holding of mortgage assets which were risk weighted at 50 percent 
of the principal amount and investments in mortgage securities which were risk weighted 
according to the credit rating applied by the independent CRAs. For example mortgage 
bonds with a credit rating of ‘BB’ or ‘BBB’ were weighted at 100 percent whilst mortgage 
bonds rated ‘A’ were risk weighted at 50 percent and bonds rated at AA or AAA were risk 
weighted at 20 percent. Therefore, the higher a bond was rated, the lower the required cap-
ital allocation. When capital was considered a scarce resource, banks and investment banks 
preferred assets with relatively lower risk weightings and therefore the issuance of mort-
gage-backed securities expanded significantly following the 2004 amendments (Friedman & 
Kraus 2011). Accordingly, the balance sheets of investment banks accumulated higher pro-




The 2004 amendment is viewed as a seminal point in the history of capital regulation for US 
investment banks as it allowed the large investment banks the choice to volunteer to be 
classified as a CSE and in turn the choice to utilise an internal model to calculate their own 
capital adequacy ratios. All major investment banks elected to use the internal model ap-
proach which provided them with significant flexibility in their calculations of the compo-
nents of the capital ratios such as asset classifications, probability of defaults for different 
credit risks, and loss-given default rates. The decision to be classified as a CSE was also a le-
gitimacy-seeking behaviour by agreeing to be subject to the newest regulatory initiative. A 
testament to the inadequacy of this lax regulation is exemplified by the SEC’s prompt reac-
tion to the LB bankruptcy. In just eleven days following the bankruptcy, the SEC introduced 
legislation requiring large investment banks to submit to compulsory regulation (Cox 2008a). 
The pre-2008 accommodative legislative environment which included a generous capital 
adequacy requirement was sufficient to encourage the investment banks to maximise their 
leverage, and take advantage of new and innovative business activities, which introduced 
new and heightened risks for the firms. These risks were found to be understated and mis-
understood leading to dire consequences.  
4.5 Summary and Discussion 
This chapter provides a chronological outline of the history of the US investment banking 
industry since the 18th century, highlighting and analysing a sample of critical events and 
some key individuals who had a material impact on the development of the industry. The 
chapter briefly charted the backgrounds of some of the personalities who pioneered and 
imparted their influence within their own firms, to the industry, to government and institu-
tional authorities and to the wider financial and corporate communities.  
The chapter provided the historical context of this thesis and illuminated some of the com-
mon themes which pervaded this evolution. These themes involved the personal relation-
ships developed with government authorities and officials, and the influence exerted by in-
vestment bankers through their networks and the personal characteristics and behaviour, 
including organisational culture found in US investment banks since the American Revolu-
tion. The benefit of highlighting these themes is to draw a comparison between them to 
those factors which impacted on the failure of LB, in particular the characteristics exhibited 
by the senior management and organisational culture of LB.  
The theoretical framework used to analyse the influences encompassed Clegg’s (1989) The-
ory of Power and DiMaggio & Powell’s (1983) New Institutional Theory. The use of the two 




lomon, Robert Morris, Albert Gallatin, David Parish, John Jacob Astor, Stephen Girard, 
Nicholas Biddle, Clarke Dodge, James Gore King, Anthony Joseph Drexel, and the well-
known John Pierpont Morgan. These individuals are highlighted since they represent a sam-
ple of prominent US investment bankers operating during the formative years of the indus-
try. They were therefore the early leaders who were able to shape the culture and practices 
within the industry from its beginnings. This thesis argues that this culture and the many 
practices formed in the early years of the industry persisted through to the pre-GFC period.  
4.5.1 Formal and Real Power 
The power acquired by these individuals was typically fashioned through the combination of 
unique skills and knowhow, superior ability to distribute financial instruments and special 
relations developed with key individuals within commercial and government circles. These 
attributes and practices, and the accompanying power would set the bankers apart in their 
industry and commerce generally and offer them a privileged position in conducting further 
profitable business. An interesting distinction in the power relationships between the se-
lected investment bankers is that perceived as ‘formal’ power resting with government and 
official institutions, and the ‘real’ power which was exercised by investment bankers. 
The power held by government is typically created in Clegg’s (1989) dispositional circuit 
where it is responsible for the establishment of regulation and laws. The ability to establish 
the rules and discipline associated with the laws and regulation is the source of this formal 
power. The power that is primarily generated in the dispositional circuit relates to the simi-
lar fixing and refixing of rules to which an organisation is subjected. A breach of these laws 
and rules in the ordinary course of daily events would result in punishment either through 
jail sentences, official sanctions or penalties, which are the means by which formal power 
can be enforced. As explained in this chapter there were numerous instances where individ-
uals escaped this punishment. Moreover, through special relationships, they prospered 
economically by pursuing their objectives regardless of the formal legal and regulatory 
frameworks. The evasion of punishment and ability to direct economic and legal outcomes 
by the investment bankers reflect a real power which overcame the formal power held by 
government and other authorities.      
Although the formal power held by officials passed through the dispositional circuit where-
by rule-makers can fix and refix rules and their meanings, the real power that rested with 
the investment bankers was created in a more subtle and even obscure way. As a covert in-
strument, the investment bank’s power proved more potent as it was less obvious to recog-
nise, and therefore mitigate or challenge. Often this power arose out of a need precipitated 
by crisis, war or technological knowhow. The exogenous environment, in which these 
sources existed, represented the fertile ground which instigated the process of empower-




tative circuit, transmitted the investment banker’s power to the episodic circuit where the 
actions of the investment bankers provided for positive outcomes from which they benefit-
ed. 
In some instances, the investment banker virtually assumed the unofficial role of the gov-
ernment treasury officials. For example, Haym Salomon advised Robert Morris in raising the 
required financing for the Continental Congress’ war effort during the American Revolution-
ary War. Further Albert Gallatin, the Secretary of the Treasury sought the direct assistance 
of the syndicate of well-known investment bankers, Girard, Astor and Parish in structuring 
and delivering the much needed bond issue to finance the War of 1812, without which the 
government would have been unable to prosecute the war. Finally, JP Morgan was able to 
pursuade the US government to accept a gold financing transaction to alleviate financial 
pressure following the panic of 1893. In the process he generated even higher profits by uti-
lising an innovative technique. 
4.5.2 Investment Banking Organisational Culture 
Organisational culture can be defined in a variety of ways. It is commonly described as a set 
of shared assumptions that guide what happens in organisations by defining appropriate 
behaviour for various situations (Ravasi & Schultz 2006). Organisational culture guides the 
way employees either as individuals or in discreet groups interact with each other, and with 
stakeholders. It may also influence how much employees identify with their organisation 
(Schrodt 2002). As identified in this chapter a recurring theme is the persistence of an or-
ganisational culture within the investment banking industry which often allowed for a Mach-
iavellian approach to business. This was typified by a relative absence of morals, where eth-
ics and professional standards were sacrificed in favour of the profit motive. New Institu-
tional Theory is helpful in understanding how a common culture pervaded the industry and 
was perpetuated through generations. Once the success of an investment bank’s activities 
was observed by other industry participants, an isomorphic process ensued such as the rep-
lication of effective distribution networks, the use of advertising for bond issues, creating 
useful relationships with government, development of innovative securities transaction 
structures and networking with influential individuals, corporations and other firms. In most 
cases these influences were either mimetic or normative in nature. The security and legiti-
macy generated by the isomorphic process encouraged a cultural consistency within the in-
dustry. The public cultural and moral standards of the early years of the investment banking 
industry sanctioned actions of key individuals. The consequent behaviour continued into the 
21st century as will be discussed in the latter chapters of this thesis 
The chapter also highlights certain events in the history of investment banking which can be 
interpreted as milestones as they presented opportunities and posed threats to participants 




the development of the industry in general. These events also set the context within which 
the key individuals operated. The following section outlines the history of LB, which exhibits 
some parallels to the development of the industry and permits a more detailed and specific 




 HISTORY OF LEHMAN BROTHERS CHAPTER 5
This chapter draws upon the themes established in the previous chapter relating to the his-
torical influences on the investment banking industry and draws parallels with the influ-
ences impacting LB. The purpose of this chapter is to outline a chronological history of LB 
highlighting events and personalities that have contributed to the development of the three 
themes of this study: reliance on key relationships with government authorities and offi-
cials; influence through official, personal and commercial networks; and the impact of per-
sonal characteristics and organisational culture. Factors relating to these themes led to the 
‘survival at all costs’ mantra embedded within LB in the days prior to its downfall. 
This chapter is structured in two sections that relate to the corporation’s president Richard 
Fuld. The first is an account of the pre-Fuld era to develop an understanding of the origins of 
the firm, taking into account the founders’ influence44 which was significant to LB’s culture. 
The second section covers the post-Fuld era, which starts with Richard Fuld’s presidency of 
the company and unearths Fuld’s influence on the organisation’s culture through his own 
behaviours and set of values.  
5.1 The Pre-Fuld Era (1850 – 1994) 
A recurring theme in the early history of the firm is a pioneering entrepreneurial culture 
driven by knowledge of products and markets and implemented through strategies often 
involving key relationships. The firm’s innovative culture prompted the exploration of vari-
ous markets at their very early stages of development. This pioneering spirit was coupled 
with the firm’s constant search for business opportunities that were similar or adjacent to 




 Founder’s influence is the process by which a firm’s founder(s) exhibits behavioural patterns which estab-
lishes a cultural environment within an organisation which governs social interactions within and outside the 
firm. The founder(s) are distinguished from other members of a firm usually by a position of leadership charac-




their existing operations. In entering these new businesses, the firm was willing to assume 
different and often higher levels of risk (Geisst 2001).  
5.1.1 The Founders 
LB was founded in 1850 in the US by three brothers, Henry, Emanuel and Meyer Lehman, 
Jewish emigrants from Bavaria  (currently part of Germany). The Lehman brothers were 
sons of Abraham and Eva, the father being a cattle and wine merchant in a small village in 
Bavaria. Henry started working for his father from the age of fourteen. Henry’s grandfather 
Seligmann Low was also a trader travelling around Germany selling skins, grains, wool and 
spices. The local law allowed only the eldest son of a Jewish family to remain in the village 
into adulthood, and as Henry was the sixth of 10 children and the second eldest son, he in-
tended to leave the village as a young man. Henry, the eldest of the three brothers, was the 
first to immigrate to the US in 1844. He was born under the name of Hayum Lehmann, as 
confirmed on the passenger list of the Burgundy, the ship which carried him to New York 
from Bavaria and shortly after arrival changed his name to Henry Lehman (Chapman 2010). 
Henry sailed to Alabama USA in search of a new life, following two friends Meyer and Arnold 
Goldschmidt who were travelling to see a relative in Mobile, Alabama (Flade 1999).  
Being a member of a minority group, Henry first learned to assimilate into the local society 
by changing his name and attending a Jewish school in the morning and a Catholic school in 
the afternoon. This adaptability combined with his family’s merchant and trading back-
ground laid a solid foundation for his future commercial exploits (Geisst 2001). 
Figure 56 – Pictures of the Lehman Brothers 






Source: (Herbert Lehman Collection n.d.) 
 
Common to other German Jewish families, they immigrated to the US to pursue a better life 




‘Our Crowd’ group and amongst others included: the Seligmans; Kuhns; Loebs; Goldmans; 
Sachs’; Schiffs; and Lewisohns (Birmingham 1967; Geisst 2001). In their home countries 
many of these families were involved in the cattle trade and once in the US, they quickly es-
tablished reputations as being successful in business, initially as merchants and traders. 
“Buying and selling was, for them, like mother’s milk” (Libo 2008). 
Initial Signs of Normative Influence 
In an attempt to assimilate into US society, Henry anglicised his Christian name from Hayum 
to Henry whilst his surname took upon a less German look by dropping the last ‘n’. Even the 
pronunciation of the surname changed from ‘Lay-man’ to a more anglicised ‘Lee-man’ 
(Chapman 2010).  The simple act of changing his name signified a desire to conform to the 
American way of life which would facilitate his immersion into society. Further, the desire to 
assimilate into the US would help him avoid potential anti-Semitism and promote ac-
ceptance into the commercial networks which would assist in the development of the busi-
ness empire.  
The act of conforming to social norms to facilitate integration into society can be interpret-
ed as an example of DiMaggio &Powell’s (1983) normative isomorphism where legitimisa-
tion by the business community was considered beneficial for business. Henry exhibited an 
emotional intelligence and adaptability to endear himself to various sectors of society. He 
was able to mix with anglicised society whilst retaining his intimacy with the Jewish commu-
nity (Chapman 2010). The pressure to conform to the values and expectations of both 
groups was important for his commercial success. Henry soon established a business operat-
ing as a dry goods and grocery store which at this stage was known as ‘H Lehman’ 
(Wechsberg 1966, p. 233). He settled in Montgomery, Alabama as the cotton industry in the 
state was experiencing significant growth. Henry predicted that the local economy would 
benefit from such growth and anticipated that the associated benefits would support a 
business involved in consumer supplies (Wechsberg 1966). Henry’s younger brother Emanu-
el Lehman, arrived in the US in 1847 to join the firm, which then changed its name to ‘H. 
Lehman and Bro.’. Emanuel commenced working in Mobile, Alabama as a trader on behalf 
of the firm. He purchased supplies using credit from a Jewish wholesale supplier known to 
his family in Bavaria and sold the merchandise further down the Alabama River to farmers 
and local residents (Libo 2008). Thus with the assistance of a family contact, relying on Jew-
ish connections and an instinct for trade, the firm established its roots.   
Power through Connections 
The advantage gained from the trade credit enabled Emanuel to buy supplies without the 
need for his own cash resources or with any other financing arrangement which would incur 




many of whom had to pay for credit. In the episodic circuit where the application of re-
sources is a precursor to the exercise of power, Emanuel was able to achieve a position of 
superiority through his financing strategy. The family connection within the Jewish commu-
nity constitutes a relationship where the sense of obligation between family members led to 
a socially constructed meaning which guided their commerical interactions. The guidance is 
akin to an unwritten rule prompting assistance between like-minded members of the Jewish 
community. Clegg (1989) places this unwritten rule in the dispositional circuit where rules 
are fixed.  The rule which fosters trade and financial transactions amongst the Jewish com-
munity provides commercial benefit to the participants. The obligatory passage point repre-
sented by the the connections within the Jewish community enabled the transfer of power 
to Emanuel in the episodic circuit where the day to day financing transaction occured. The 
manifestation of this power was the competitive advantage achieved in his business deal-
ings. 
The dispositional circuit is concerned with the members of a group that formed through  
social integration. The relevant larger group comprises the business community in which the 
Jewish community was a sub-group. The members of this sub-group mostly treated each 
other as equals, however, as a sub-group they largely considered outsiders as legitimate 
competitors. The relevant rules which they followed reflected a common unwritten under-
standing of co-operation between members. This us-them culture provided stability within 
the sub-group and legitimised practices accepted by the wider Jewish community.    
5.1.2 Expansion of the Business 
Henry and Emanuel were soon followed by a third younger brother Mayer Lehman who em-
igrated to the US in 1850 to join the business, and thus the firm was named Lehman Broth-
ers, the name it carried until 2008. The merchant business sold a variety of manufactured 
cotton products, and raw cotton which were often accepted as payment for other products 
sold by the store (Libo 2008).  
Figure 57 - LB Montgomery, Alabama Store 
 




The store was in a prominent location in the commercial centre of Montgomery. The broth-
ers’ innate trait for business was again revealed with the realisation that distribution was an 
important element in trade during that period. This drove them to select a site with excel-
lent exposure to customers. This modus operandi would later prove useful when designing a 
distribution strategy for the securities trading activities in the early days of the firm. In 
commenting on the firm’s beginnings and bartering activities, Mayer’s son Herbert, de-
scribed it as follows:  
the farmers would come in with their cotton and trade it for shirts and shoes and fertilizer, 
such little as was used in those days, and seed, and all the necessities. That’s how they got 
started in the cotton business (Cohen, p. 116).   
During the 1850s, cotton became one of the most important commodities in the US and its 
increasing value spurred the growth of the cotton trading segment of the LB business 
(Wechsberg 1966, p. 233). The cotton trading business quickly outgrew the original mer-
chandising business and the trading culture which permeated the firm’s organisational be-
haviour throughout its 150 year history was born.  
Figure 58 - Newspaper Advertisements Promoting LB’s Trading Business  








The brothers split their responsibilities to cover a wider range of business interests and 
streamline the operations of the firm. In the early 1850s, whilst Emanuel sourced supplies of 
cotton from New York, Mayer supervised the Montgomery store which continued to trade 
with the local community. Henry was also involved in real estate investment and as their 
wealth increased he augmented the practice of extending trade credit to offering long term 
loans to farmers. The accommodating and innovative Henry accepted both cotton bales and 
currency as repayment for the loans. This practice was an acknowledgement of the shortage 
of cash held by the farmers in pre-harvest periods. Following Henry’s death in 1858, the re-
maining brothers established a branch in New York, representing the centre of the cotton 
broking industry. In close proximity to the branch were the offices of other Jewish families’ 
businesses such as Kuhn, Loeb, Goldman, Saches and Seligmans, all of whom eventually es-
tablished their own investment banks (Libo 2008). 
Figure 59 - Lehman Brothers Branch at 119 Liberty Street, New York 
 
Source: (US Slave c.1850). 
5.1.3  New York Network Expands Influence  
Mayer joined Emanuel in New York two years after Emanuel’s arrival. They moved their 
premises to Pearl Street where they remained for 10 years, after which they moved again to 
larger premises at 40 Exchange Place. Emanuel Lehman made New York City his permanent 
residence. He quickly developed a network and became a director with several prominent 
financial institutions and organisations such as: Mercantile National Bank, Queens County 
Bank, Metropolitan Ferry, The 10th and 23rd Streets Railroad, the Third Avenue Railroad, the 
Alabama Mineral Land Company and the Berry Brice Cotton Company (Ingham 1983, p. 
783).  
This group of directorships exposed Emanuel to numerous other directors and executives 




ing developed which would become useful in the day to day business dealings of the firm. 
The early formation of this business network put LB in direct contact with potential custom-
ers, referrers of business and transaction partners. The customer and referrer groups would 
come from the various boards on which Emanuel sat. The transaction partners, who regular-
ly shared in underwriting transactions as co-participants in securities issues, primarily con-
sisted of other Jewish family firms who shared similar beginnings and were conveniently lo-
cated within close proximity of LB’s office (Geisst 2001). There were two forces at play in 
generating the influence these valuable networks were able to impose, which are discussed 
below.  
Normative Influence of the Jewish Connection (Our Crowd) 
Firstly, the connections with other Jewish firms provided for reciprocal business opportuni-
ties between the members of this group known as as ‘Our Crowd’. This form of co-operation 
is viewed as a normative influence. As many securities issues were too large for one firm to 
underwrite, a common practice was to syndicate the underwriting exposure amongst two or 
more firms. The efficiency and risk benefits resulting from this practice became normalised 
within the industry. By allocating a tranche of an underwriting commitment to a fellow Jew-
ish firm, LB was able to achieve two advantages.  
One advantage accrued from establishing an obligation for a continuing reciprocity of busi-
ness; a second benefit involved efficiency in processing a transaction. The efficiency arose 
through a common tolerance, understanding and appreciation of the risks of each transac-
tion allowing any analysis of the issuer to be expedited. If LB chose a co-participant firm with 
a different view of the risk, that firm was likely to decline the transaction leaving LB the ar-
duous task of finding another firm willing to co-participate. These practices were institu-
tionalised so much so that they persist today, whereby lead arranging banks seek out banks 
with common credit standards to co-participate in transactions. This conformity of practice 
throughout the history of the professional field represents an example of DiMaggio & Pow-
ell’s (1983) normative influence. This normative influence impacted their business practices 
especially in their sharing of risk in underwriting transactions, which was determined collec-
tively and affected their cognitive approach to their day to day dealings and routines. For 
example Supple (1998), referring to the friendship and business association between the 
Goldman and the Lehman families in relation to transactions, states that:  
the Goldman family had to rely more heavily on the intangible factor of friendship. For asso-
ciates were needed to help supply capital and it was clear that in view of its inexperience, no 
established house would fully participate without the strongest of safeguards. In these cir-
cumstances it was only natural to turn to Lehman Brothers… [who] were not only a member 




Cohen (2012) proffers three reasons to explain the rising prominence of the Jewish family-
based investment banks in the period immediately following the Civil War. Firstly, many 
firms were already successful in the years prior to the war due to their common activity of 
starting out as merchants which enabled them to accumulate capital to take advantage and 
establish other finance-related businesses in the post war period. Secondly, Cohen cites that 
the “familial and ethnic networks were important in Southern Jewish economic life. Close-
knit networks in the pre-Civil War period provided access to Northern capital and markets, 
and these networks were extended in the post-Civil War years, as well-established Jewish 
firms capitalized smaller Jewish businesses” (Cohen 2012, p. 130). Additionally German-
Jewish families imported from their home country the concept of solidarity amongst their 
own ethnic community. In tandem with the close business associations, the families shared 
“common interests and aspirations  - an identification of the family and the firm which in 
the early days…led to a continuous pooling of capital for both private and business use” 
(Supple 1998, p. 168). Thirdly, Cohen (2012) relates the success of several Jewish firms, in-
cluding LB to their involvement in the prosperous cotton industry:  
Cotton propelled the proprietors of strong antebellum businesses toward upper class status, 
and it allowed many new postbellum merchants to quickly reach the middle class…Thus, trac-
ing the flow of capital that allowed these Jewish businesses to thrive suggests that cotton, 
capital, and ethnic networks were critical factors in their growth (Cohen 2012, p. 131).  
Dispositional Power from Board Directorships 
Membership of various boards of directors enabled Emanuel to attain power directly and 
indirectly. He did this directly within the firm of which he was a director, in the official ca-
pacity of a board member who can apply influence in strategic decision-making, and indi-
rectly through his relationships with other board members. Given the extent of his director-
ships, this power permeated through the corporate circles of New York and is characteristic 
of power sourced from an elevated position within a community – one of the  preconditions 
of a power sourced through the dispositional circuit.  
In this circuit the clique of directors during the period represented a small but powerful 
group of individuals who largely controlled commerce in New York, the financial centre of 
the US. The unofficial membership of such a ‘club’ bestowed a privileged status within the 
business world and society in general. The informality of these social relations permitted a 
transfer of favours and influence respectively between members. This process of exchanging 
favours is considered the passage point through which power was transmitted to the epi-
sodic circuit. The favours and influence assisted Emanuel to generate successful outcomes in 
his day to day business affairs such as introductions to securities underwriting opportunities 





5.1.4 Profiting from the American Civil War 
An important impetus for change was the American Civil War. With much of the firm’s op-
erations tied to the economies of the southern states of the US, LB was severely affected by 
the Civil War (Birmingham 1967, p. 47). The Lehman family was close to the Southern cause 
during the Civil War with Emanuel fighting in the Confederate Army and later helping to sell 
Confederate bonds in London (Birmingham 1967).  
According to Ellis and Vertin (2003, p. 237), even though “Emanuel was the conservative in-
side man”, he was not afraid to run the blockade45 by travelling to Germany to sell cotton 
acquired in the southern states of America for significant profits. Patriotism was not incon-
gruent with the conducting of business and “may even have involved smuggling…” (Ellis & 
Vertin 2003, p. 237). This behaviour goes beyond one of an entrepreneurial spirit, to include 
elements of risk which are deemed extreme. Not only was Emanuel engaged in commercial 
risk in his attempts to sell cotton in Germany, but he was also incurring personal and poten-
tially legal risks in running the blockade and entertaining any semblance of smuggling. 
It was also in the the Lehman brothers’ interest to be seen to fit in with the local business 
community and thereby adopt customs commonly found in the Southern states. During the 
antebellum period and over the period covering the American Civil War, slavery was com-
mon in the Southern states until it was abolished in 1885. As part of their cotton trading ac-
tivities, the Lehman brothers would have had to regularly deal with cotton growers who 
routinely acquired slaves as labour for their farms. According to Fleischman and Tyson 
(2004), the practice of accounting by merchants and farmers at that time was complicit in 
sustaining slavery and its institutions. “In essence, accounting was used to convert qualita-
tive human attributes into a limited number of discrete categories (age, sex, color) that 
could be differentiated and monetized in order to facilitate commercial slave trading” 
(Fleischman & Tyson 2004, p. 393). Given the commercial imperative of having to deal with 
cotton growers for their business, it was convenient for the Lehman brothers to disregard 
the moral aspects of plantation slavery. It could be suggested that as members of a minority 
Jewish community, they were well aware of the power disadvantages of being identified as 




 The Union blockade was carried out by the Union navy during the American Civil War to prevent Confeder-
ate ships from transporting trading goods. By hindering Confederacy trade the Union was attempting to stifle 




a minority. Their attempts at anglicising their name and possibly even Emmanuel’s decision 
to fight in the Confederate Army could be viewed as astute attempts to avoid racial vilifica-
tion and become subject to the resultant power disadvantage as experienced by the slaves 
at that time. 
In 1862, during the Civil War, when general commerce was limited, LB was searching for al-
ternative business activities and a means of capitalising on its knowledge of the cotton trad-
ing business. The firm established a partnership with John Durr, a cotton trader. Durr pro-
vided the additional capital required for the construction of a larger warehouse, enabling 
the firm to engage in higher volumes of cotton transactions (Ellis & Vertin 2003). This busi-
ness strategy dating back to the 1860s of warehousing commodities to enable larger trans-
actions and therefore increased profitability, is a similar strategy undertaken by other in-
vestment banks during the modern era of warehousing subprime mortgages (see section 7.3 
for a discussion of modern day financial warehousing).   
Both strategies intended to take advantage of the leverage and economies of scale effects 
on profitability. In the former case however, debt leverage was replaced by John Durr’s capi-
tal. The use of capital as opposed to debt reduced the overall risk of the venture to the firm. 
This contrasts to the increased debt leverage used in the case of the subprime mortgage 
warehouses which were used by LB prior to the GFC.  
The founders’ influence on the firm was to be significant. Early risks such as establishing a 
dry goods and grocery store, selling cotton in Germany by running a blockade and the strat-
egy to invest in cotton warehousing were consistent with the brothers’ vision for the firm.  
The strategy to engage in trading businesses where they could add value in terms of 
knowledge and/or relationships proved to be successful. Obviously founders are crucial ear-
ly in the existence of any firm, but does their influence persist?  
In section 5.1.1, the risk culture established by the founders is shown to persist and mani-
fest itself in activities such as the development of new lines of business; the extension of the 
client base to include those in riskier emerging industries; the use of complex and innovative 
financial instruments such as credit derivatives and multi-level securitisation structures; an 
aggressive acquisition strategy of businesses; and the use of leverage to achieve the associ-
ated growth strategies. Further, the practice of exploiting networks also survived within the 
firm, where networks became useful in the acquisition of new clients – Philip Lehman and 
Pete Petersen represent good examples of leaders who used their networks to the benefit 
of the business; and in the influence over regulators and accounting standard setters (refer 





5.1.5 Transformation to the Business of Investment Bank-
ing – An Exercise of Power 
In 1867, after several years of operating as a merchant and trading business, LB undertook 
its first major investment banking transaction to sell bonds of the State of Alabama. This 
was not seen as a simple task given the State’s poor financial condition following the war. 
The firm was also appointed as the State’s principal financial advisor for its debt obligations, 
thus beginning a long tradition of LB’s government and municipal finance (Nicholson & 
Pastor 2008). LB’s financial expertise and access to financial resources enabled innovation, 
exemplifying Clegg’s (1989) facilitative circuit. The financial techniques necessary to under-
take the fundraising for the State of Alabama were not well understood (Nicholson & Pastor 
2008). Any bond issue for a southern US state which was defeated in the Civil War required 
not only an acute assessment of the risk of the State’s relatively poor financial condition but 
also an ability to market the bonds as a safe investment to potential investors. This process 
can be understood as a rare technology of production usually found in a facilitative circuit. 
The possession of this knowhow empowered LB to dominate the specific field of govern-
ment finance during these early years.  
This power emanated from the facilitative circuit where the funding needs of the state gov-
ernment created an opportunity for an investment bank to offer a solution. The firm’s es-
tablished relationships with the state government officials and its broader business network 
constitute the obligatory passage point needed to transfer power to the episodic circuit. 
LB’s power was realised in the episodic circuit through the favourable business outcomes 
achieved from the ongoing business with the state government (Clegg 1989). LB’s adaptabil-
ity in changing strategy and adopting new businesses through the exercise of power using 
knowledge and relationships is evident during this period with the evolution from cotton 
trading to investment banking as a primary source of income after the Civil War. 
In the years following the Civil War, railroad development assisted in the transformation of 
the US from an agrarian to an industrial economy (McPherson 1988, pp. 24-5). The boom in 
railroad construction generated an extraordinary need for capital which up until then was 
traditionally met by the equity capital markets. As mentioned in CHAPTER 4, the need for 




issues in affordable parcels aimed at retail investors. These became known as railroad 
bonds. LB noted this trend and thus began to routinely engage in the selling and trading of 
these bonds (Geisst 2001; Nicholson & Pastor 2008).  
The post-Civil War period was characterised by LB embracing the concept of profiting 
through trading various commodities. In 1870, LB was instrumental in the establishment of 
the New York Cotton Exchange46. Due to the firm’s role in the Exchange’s formation, Eman-
uel was granted a membership of the Board of Governors which lasted until 1884. Soon LB 
began trading coffee and petroleum and was instrumental in the formation of the Coffee 
Exchange in New York in 1882 (Nicholson & Pastor 2008).  
By this time, the firm was an established trader of commodities and debt securities and in 
1887, realising that their trading and brokerage skills could apply to the trading of stocks, it 
became a member of the  New York Stock Exchange. This development can be identified as 
the seminal  moment in LB’s history whereby the firm “completed its transformation from a 
merchandiser to a merchant banking firm” (Geisst 2001, p. 50). LB only gradually embraced 
the share issuance sector, waiting until 1899 to underwrite its first initial public offering for 
the International Steam Pump Company. Equity securities underwriting only became a 
mainstream line of business from 1906 under Philip Lehman, the son of Emmanual Lehman 
(Geisst 2001, p. 51).  
5.1.6 Retention of Power through Family Control 
LB had a policy of admitting only direct family members as partners until 1924. Even in-laws 
couldn’t aspire to partnership level. An example of this focus on bloodline partnership ac-
cess is as follows: 
John L. Loeb Jr. recalled that his father, who was married to Mayer’s granddaughter Frances, 
couldn’t get a job at Lehman Brothers when he wanted to work on Wall Street. They 
wouldn’t hire any in-laws, and in fact for years I don’t think there was even a descendant 
who had a name other than Lehman who got the job (Libo 2008). 









Employing family members was a practice of many Jewish family-controlled firms. According 
to Supple (1998, p. 168) “nothing was more natural than to find a place for a relative”. The 
employment decisions were usually centralised with the patriarch, thereby maintaining 
their influence through a coercive control. “As long as decision-making could be concentrat-
ed…the personality of the head of the firm, his ability, his contacts and reputation - was all 
important” (Supple 1998, p. 170). Due to their religious faith and race, it is likely that being 
employed within a family-controlled firm may have been the only means by which a Ger-
man-Jew could have gained a role in investment banking. Supple (1998, p. 170) asserts that 
“it is a remarkable feature of the rest of the financial world that other prominent firms nev-
er had Jewish partners”. 
The policy of employing exclusively Lehman descendants was an attempt to retain power 
through fixing membership to relations, a characteristic of a dispositional circuit (Clegg 
1989). Naturally partners outside the family would dilute the family ownership since part-
nership interests represent a share in the ownership of the firm. The majority membership 
of LB by Lehman family members ensured that power of the head of the firm was exercised 
in the episodic circuit. Although major decisions were often made by the head of the firm, 
they were often undertaken with some influence from other family members. This day to 
day decision-making reflects the social relations between family members to ensure the 
outcome was sympathetic to the ambitions of the head of the firm. Family control of the 
firm was thus safeguarded. The firm employed numerous family members over the years. A 




5.1.7 The Second Generation 
After Mayer’s death in 1897 and Emanuel’s retirement shortly afterwards, a second genera-
tion of Lehman’s – Philip, Sigmund, Arthur, Meyer H. and Herbert took over and steered the 
firm towards a pure investment banking business. Philip, the son of Emanuel, became a 
partner in the family-owned firm in 1887 and was the firm's managing partner from 1901 to 
1925. As discussed in section 4.2.14, the Jewish firms preferred to work with each other in 
securities transactions. Philip continued this practice and in 1906 he formed an informal 
partnership with Henry Goldman, the leading partner in the Jewish firm Goldman Sachs, to 
exploit the flourishing securities market. The association between the firms allowed them to 
fulfil the funding requirements of many Jewish corporations involved in the retail, textile, 
and cigarette manufacturing industries. The two firms co-participated in several high profile 
securities underwriting transactions for corporations such as: Sears, Roebuck & Co.; F.W. 
Woolworth Co.; May Department Stores; Gimbel Brothers, Inc.; and R.H. Macy & Co. In this 
twenty year period to 1926, LB underwrote approximately one hundred new equity issues, 
very often in conjunction with Goldman Sachs (Geisst 2001). 
5.1.8 Bobbie Lehman - Head of Lehman Brothers Partner-
ship 1925 - 1969 
One of the more notable and the longest serving LB managing partner of the 20th century 
was Robert (Bobbie) Lehman who took over the leadership position in 1925 and continued 
in this role until 1969. Family control was assured when Bobbie succeeded his father Philip 
Lehman, following Philip’s death.  
Figure 60 – Picture of Robert (Bobbie) Lehman 
 




The first exception to the family member partner policy occurred in 1924 when John Han-
cock (a non-Lehman family member) was admitted as a partner. This represents the begin-
ning of a more liberal management approach from the firm’s new generation of leaders. 
Bobbie Lehman continued the firm’s pioneering spirit by backing companies in emerging 
industries. This strategy was encapsulated in Bobbie’s business philosophy that the future of 
US economic prosperity would be based on mass consumption and not on production. He 
therefore developed a strategy of identifying and financing growth industries. Some of these 
industries were involved in developing high technology applications. Companies supported 
by LB included Digital Equipment Corporation, Allan B. Dumont Laboratories the first televi-
sion manufacturer, Radio Corporation of America (RCA) a pioneer in radio communications, 
and a number of corporations involved in the highly risky film and entertainment industries 
including RKO, 20th Century Fox and Paramount Pictures. Another example of the pioneering 
spirit of the firm at this time was the financing of a small airline, run by Juan T. Trippe, a fel-
low alumnus of Yale University. The service eventually became Pan American World Airways 
(Barker Library Historical Collections 2012). Bobbie Lehman directed the firm towards indus-
tries which more established firms considered to be too risky. The firm also continued to 
support the retailing industry where it had developed  strong knowledge given its merchant 
trading background. The electronic and petroleum industries were considered high risk, 
emerging industries for financiers given the uncertainty surrounding the sustainability and 
longevity of the natural resource or technologies employed. This is another example of how 
LB’s strategies allowed it to venture into high business risk activities in search of growth 
(Geisst 2001).  
LB continued to search for ways of capitalising on the firm’s knowhow and relationships 
within the various industries to which it was exposed. The Great Depression of the 1930s 
made it difficult for many corporations to raise capital. In response to this difficult capital 
market environment, LB developed an alternative yet adjacent business activity. This activity 
involved circumventing a public issue by issuing securities of corporations with a strong 
credit profile to investors directly and privately. The practice was known as a private place-
ment and contained conservative loan terms and conditions to provide a tolerable level of 
risk and an acceptable rate of return for the lenders, whilst enabling borrowers to raise 
large amounts of much needed capital. Although this is a standard financing technique to-
day it was quite innovative at the time. The continued use of this technique until the mod-
ern era represents a normative influence on the industry similar to the continued use of 
syndicates to share risk of large underwriting transaction as described in section 5.1.3. In 
both cases, the practice of offering a technique or financial product becomes institutional-
ised as it legitimises their role as experts with a breadth of skills.  
Meanwhile, the company's political power was rising. Herbert H. Lehman, who had been a 
partner for two decades, was elected Lieutenant Governor of New York in 1928 under 




for 10 years. In 1949 he was elected to the US Senate, a post he held until six years before 
his death in 1963 (Cole 1984). By the early 1970s, after Bobbie Lehman and other key part-
ners died, the firm found itself struggling to survive. Bobbie Lehman took LB from a modest 
sized firm to become one of the largest investment banks in the US. At the time of Bobbie’s 
death there was no other Lehman family member employed by the firm and therefore there 
was no clear choice for a successor. In the four years following the death of Bobbie Lehman, 
the firm struggled under the leadership of Frederick Ehram, who had worked at LB since 
World War 2. However given the lack of Ehram’s authority, the firm’s performance suffered. 
Following a board coup in 1973, Ehram was removed as Chairman and replaced by Pete Pe-
terson (Chapman 2010).   
5.1.9 Peter Petersen – Chief Executive Officer 1973 - 1983 
Figure 61 – Picture of Peter Petersen 
 
Source: (Alchetron Encyclopedia 2015b). 
Peterson is credited with reviving LB, turning it into one of the most profitable investment 
banking firms in New York, and establishing it as an internationally significant firm which 
often advised developing nations. During the 1950s and 1960s as the US economy experi-
enced high levels of economic growth, the firm continued to prosper by financing the com-
panies in the abovementioned risky segment of industrial sector. The early 1970s however 
coincided with the onset of a severe recession and by 1973, the firm’s operating income was 
in decline. Petersen was previously US Secretary of Commerce from February 29, 1972 to 
February 1, 1973 and CEO and Chairman of Bell and Howell Corporation from 1963 to 1971. 
He was recruited to LB in 1973 with the titles of CEO and Chairman. This position of authori-
ty empowered him (subject to Board directions) to rescue the firm (Geisst 2001, p. 77).  
Petersen was well connected, with associates at the upper end of New York society and 
within government departments. For example, he was often invited to fill casual roles in 




dations and Private Philanthropy’ where his invitation to join was at the bequest of John D. 
Rockefeller III, Council of Foreign Relations Chairman, John J. McCloy, and former Treasury 
Secretary, Douglas Dillon. The Commission became known as the “Peterson Commission” 
(Brookhart 1998, p. 2); and in 1971 to the role of Assistant to the President for International 
Economic Affairs by US President Richard Nixon (Council on Foreign Relations 2016). Pe-
tersen’s influential network within political spheres, which he successfully utilised through-
out his business career, was well established by the time he joined LB. Petersen’s humble 
upbringing produced an empathetic quality which was well recognised in Washington and 
New York and merited a vast network of useful contacts. Malloch and Mamorsky (2013, p. 
33) describe him as “warm, thrifty and a Wall Street outsider, having grown up in Nebraska, 
the son of Greek emigrant shop-keepers, it was his entry into Wall Street”.  
Petersen inherited a significant challenge when he joined LB in the early 1970s. NYSE seat47 
prices had reduced significantly and in 1975 rules were introduced to cease the practice of 
charging minimum fixed commissions. Introduction of this rule coincided with a drop in 
trading volumes resulting in a significan reduction in NYSE seat prices from USD138,000 to 
USD35,000 over a two year period to 1977 (Barrett 1999). This prompted a discounting war 
amongst brokers, which placed further financial pressure on firms. Furthermore, Wall Street 
faced increased competition in its traditional fields from a variety of sources. Some industri-
al corporations began to underwrite their own issues. Mergers and bankruptcies had driven 
the number of NYSE member firms down from the 1960s high of 681 to 490 in 1975 (Kepos 
& Derdak 1994).  
Petersen immediately set about formulating a strategy for a turnaround which involved ex-
pansion and diversification of products offered. Petersen restructured the firm’s product 
base by focusing the firm’s activities on capital markets trading with an emphasis on com-
mercial paper trading in an effort to restore the firm’s profitability. Petersen’s ultimate suc-
cessor, Lewis Glucksman was charged with building the Commercial Paper Division. See sec-
tion 5.1.10 for a background of Lewis Glucksman. 




 A seat on the New York Stock Exchange was a membership right to trade on the floor of the New York Stock 
Exchange either for the personal account of the owner of the seat or on behalf of a client. Seats had a value 
and could be traded subject to meeting the stock exchange’s qualifying criteria. Ownership of a seat conferred 
a level of prestige, especially during the 19
th
 century. The seat system ceased in 2007 once electronic trading 




Many firms dealt with the downturn in revenues by merging operations. Under Petersen’s 
leadership the firm merged with Abraham & Co. in 1975 and Kuhn Loeb & Co in 1977. The 
firm was renamed to reflect the enhanced domestic and international business lines. Whilst 
Lehman Brothers, Kuhn, Loeb Inc. was the business name of the US operations,  Kuhn, Loeb, 
Lehman Brothers Inc. was the business name for its offshore operations reflecting the dom-
inance of Kuhn & Loeb’s international presence. “The merged entity was the country’s 4th 
largest investment bank behind Salomon Brothers, Goldman Sachs, and First Boston” 
(Sloane 1977).  
Kuhn Loeb & Co was one of the country’s pre-eminent investment banks which had also 
forged its reputation on financing the railway developments of the 19th century. However 
like many of the other New York firms, it too was struggling during the 1970s. Abraham & Co 
was a smaller family owned stock broking firm. As a result of these mergers, LB was able to 
turnaround its performance. “Peterson led the firm from significant operating losses to five 
consecutive years of record profits with a return on equity among the highest in the invest-





























































During the 1980s Petersen steered the firm to become increasingly involved in the emerging 
high tech industries of personal computers and biotechnology by backing their fund raising 
activities. This strategy represented a continuation of direction fostered by Petersen’s pre-
decessor, Bobbie Lehman who focused on seeking out new markets where small organisa-
tions could, with the expertise of design, engineering, new applied research and program-
ming, develop into large companies.  
Merger and acquisition activity increased in the 1980s as US corporations moved to expand 
both domestically and internationally. LB followed this trend by participating in the associ-
ated advisory services needed to consummate these transactions. LB “advised on several 
notable US and cross border merger transactions including those between Bendix and Al-
lied, Chrysler and American Motors, General Foods and Philip Morris and Genentech and 
Hoffman-LaRoche. Furthermore LB increased its underwriting activity under Petersen and 
managed a total of 130 deals from 1973 to 1983” (Barker Library Historical Collections 
2012). See Appendix C for a full list of deals undertaken by LB. Petersen’s legacy as a turna-
round expert lasted into his later years during which he co-founded the private equity firm, 
Blackstone Group. In 2008, Peterson was ranked 149th on the ‘Forbes 400 Richest Ameri-
cans’ with a net worth of USD 2.8 billion and had subsequently in 2012, been named the 
most influential billionaire in US politics (Hiltzik 2012). 
5.1.10 Lewis Glucksman Chief Executive Officer 1983 – 1984 
Figure 63 - Picture of Lewis Glucksman 
 
Source: (Valuestockplayers.com 2015). 
Lewis (Lew) Glucksman joined LB in the Commercial Paper Trading Department in 1963. “He 
graduated from the College of William and Mary and later earned a Master's degree in busi-
ness administration from New York University” (Onaran & Baer 2006).  
Although the Investment Banking Division within the firm gained much prestige associated 
with its advisory roles, the Trading Division which was later headed by Lewis Glucksman was 




tinguished banker, had traditionally supported the Investment Banking Division whose share 
of LB's profits was declining, generating in 1983 less than a third of the firm's profits against 
the approximately 60% generated by Glucksman’s Trading Division (Auletta 1985; Fishman 
2008). However partners from the Investment Banking Division still held 60 percent of LB’s 
stock, and constituted 42 of the firm's 77 partners (Auletta 1985).  
Consequently by the early 1980s serious friction emerged between the Investment Banking 
Division and the Trading Division. In order to reconcile the disparity between the profit con-
tributions of the two divisions and their respective representation in senior management, 
Petersen promoted Lewis Glucksman, the representative of the Trading Division to be a Co-
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of LB in 1983. Glucksman asserted his authority and quickly 
made changes to favour the traders. This reignited hostilities between the warring factions 
and coupled with the 1983 declining stock market, a battle for management control ensued 
between Glucksman and Petersen. According to Geisst (2001, p. 78) the struggle ended with 
Glucksman taking control as the sole CEO, “and just like that, the traders were in charge” 
(Fishman 2008, p. 3). 
Use of Power to Ascend to Leadership 
This ascension to the sole leadership position was akin to a coup, where a power struggle 
eventually favoured Glucksman:  
Hostilities between the firm's investment bankers and equity and commodity traders caused 
internal strife. An ex-Chairman of the firm's M&A committee recalls in an interview that 
Lehman Brothers had an extremely competitive environment which ultimately became dys-
functional (Ryback 2010).  
This was the first time in the history of LB where such a hostile coup had taken place and 
signalled the beginning of the overt appetite for power by a non-family member of the LB 
leadership team. Glucksman’s aggressive nature had driven him to corral support from oth-
er partners (Auletta 1985). In terms of Clegg’s (1989) circuits of power, Glucksman under-
took concerted action to effect change by communicating the contributions of the Trading 
Division to the partners and through clandestine meetings of senior management had 
sought sanction for his action (Geisst 2001). His influence over fellow partners was mani-
fested through his position of Co-CEO.  
Glucksman’s influence began in the dispositional circuit, where he used his senior position in 
the hierarchy of the firm to disseminate communication in a compelling way to address con-
flict amongst the two camps of traders and investment bankers (in this chapter investment 
bankers refers to those employees involved in the advisory side of the business, that is, from 
the non-trading division). Glucksman’s position of Co-CEO enabled him to exercise power 




Glucksman’s authority was legitimised not only through his position of authority but also 
through the Trading Division’s successful track record and recent profit contribution which 
exceeded that of the Investment Banking Division. Partners could not ignore that the future 
of LB was inextricably reliant on the continued profits from the Trading Division. An increase 
in profits translated to higher income for the partners - a motivation of self-interest. How-
ever, for this power to be effective, the process of organising must be present (Boje & Rosile 
2001). In this instance the organising was taking place during clandestine meetings with sen-
ior management, which can viewed as the passage point between the dispositional circuit 
where Glucksman’s power was generated and the episodic circuit where Glucksman was 
perceived as the influencing agent over other partners and where the decision was made to 
elevate Glucksman to the sole CEO position. 
The process of Glucksman’s exercise of power through the episodic circuit took place during 
a temporary downturn in the market for investment banking services. This background con-
stitutes an environmental contingency consistent with Clegg’s (1989) facilitative circuit. Ac-
cording to Boje and Rosile (2001), the facilitative circuit is a major conduit of variations in 
the circuits of power, and the market downturn conferred the necessary power to Glucks-
man as partners searched for a way to emerge from the gloomy market conditions, thereby 
looking to leadership change as a possible solution. From the external environment de-
scribed by the facilitative circuit, Glucksman was empowered.  
The overt exercise of power by Glucksman had established a pattern of acceptable behav-
iour for the future CEO, Richard Fuld, who had worked under Glucksman for most of his ca-
reer. See section 5.2 for a discussion of Fuld’s behavioural traits. Eventually, Glucksman’s 
assertive management style would generate a degree of animosity amongst a cohort of in-
vestment bankers, which would eventually diminish his power within the firm (Geisst 2001). 
5.1.11 The American Express Takeover 
Disaffected investment bankers left the firm and amidst this disintegration, Glucksman re-
sorted to selling the firm. He left LB following the sale and continued his career several years 
later with Smith Barney, later to become part of Citigroup. The partners sold the firm to 
Shearson American Express, a wholly owned subsidiary of American Express. Shearson 
American Express found the business activities of LB to be complimentary to its own which 
focused on brokerage activities rather than investment banking (Cole 1984). The acquisition 
was considered significant at the time with Shearson American Express paying USD 360 mil-
lion for LB in 1984. The combined firm became known as Shearson Lehman American Ex-
press (Cole 1984). By 1990 Shearson Lehman Brothers, the investment banking arm of the 
Shearson Lehman American Express conglomerate, split its operations into a Shearson Retail 
division and a LB Investment Banking/Trading Division, whilst under continued ownership of 




of the Investment Banking/Trading Division with J. Tomlinson Hill, who headed the Mergers 
and Acquisition Division (Halpern 2011). The two executives were involved in a power strug-
gle. Ultimately Fuld manoeuvred his way to become the sole CEO when Hill eventually de-
parted in 1993 to join Petersen in the well-known private equity firm, Blackstone group 
(Halpern 2011). 
Following the LB acquisition by the American Express group, there were some major man-
agement changes. An important appointment was that of Peter Cohen, who became the 
Chairman and CEO of the Shearson Lehman American Express division of the American Ex-
press group (Forbes.com 2011). American Express had for several years during the 1980s 
and early 1990s been pursuing a financial services diversification strategy which involved 
several major acquisitions. The first involved the acquisition of the second largest brokerage 
firm in the USA, Shearson Loeb Rhoades in 1981 to establish the group’s brokerage arm to 
be known as Shearson American Express. (Geisst 2001). In 1984, the American Express 
group acquired Investors Diversified Services. The firm had been established for 90 years 
and consisted of a valuable team of financial advisors and a wide range of personal financial 
products. Shearson American Express then purchased E.F. Hutton & Co., another well-
established securities firm dating back to 1904 and changed its name to Shearson Lehman 
Hutton Inc (Cole 1987).  
5.1.12 Harvey Golub – CEO, American Express 
Figure 64 - Picture of Harvey Golub 
 
Source: (Alchetron Encyclopedia 2015a). 
In 1993, American Express, under its new Chairman, Harvey Golub, undertook a reversal of 
the previous strategy in an effort to improve its performance during an economic cyclical 
downturn and reduce its exposure to the securities industry. The financial conglomerate 
disposed of its retail brokerage and asset management operations known as Shearson to 
Primerica which merged it with its own retail brokerage business, Smith Barney, to form 




itself of Lehman Brothers Kuhn Loeb. This was effected by way of an initial public offering 
(IPO), with the result being a new entity to be known under its final name of Lehman Broth-
ers Holdings, Inc. (Geisst 2001). LB was now independent of any parent company and an-
swerable to its own public stockholders. LB continued to operate in many of the same busi-
ness lines that it had done previously with a continued focus on mergers and acquisitions 
and trading. The focus between the two main areas of business would vacillate in the ensu-
ing years depending on the economic circumstances and the firm strategy as dictated by 
Richard Fuld. A table listing the leadership of LB over the years since its inception is set out 
in Figure 65. 
Figure 65 - Leadership of Lehman Brothers 1850 - 2008 
Period of Leadership Leader Summary 
1850 - 1906 The Lehman Brothers The founders who established an Ala-
bama based dry-goods store and a 
New York headquartered commodity -
brokerage 
1906 - 1925 Philip Lehman Expanded LB from a commodities 
business to an investment bank in-
volved in new securities issues 
 
1925 - 1969 Robert ‘Bobbie’ Lehman Steered LB through the Depression by 
focusing on venture capital and sup-
ported innovative corporations in new 
industries. Managed LB through a 
prosperous period. 
1969 - 1973 Frederick L. Ehrman An interim Managing Partner 
1973 - 1983 Pete G. Peterson A well credentialed corporate execu-
tive who was employed to rescue LB.  
He led LB to become the fourth-largest 
US investment bank. 
1983 - 1984 Lewis Glucksman Ousted Peterson, by pursuing a great-
er influence for the Trading Division 
which accounted for the bulk of the 
profits. Subsequent poor performance 
led to the acquisition by American Ex-
press. 
1984 - 1990 Peter A. Cohen Cohen was the head of American Ex-
press. Fuld assumed the leadership 
once LB was listed by American Ex-
press. 
1994 - 2008 Richard Fuld CEO until its bankruptcy. 




5.1.13 Summary and Discussion 
The pre-Fuld era spanning the period from the founding of the firm to the listing on the 
NYSE witnessed various episodes of tumultuous change. However despite the rollercoaster 
ride of fortunes and leadership, from a historical perspective, the firm endured a parallel 
course with the investment banking industry. The underlying themes affecting the invest-
ment banking industry discussed in CHAPTER 4 are analogous with those evident in the de-
velopment of LB. Similar to the industry at large, the penchant to develop personal relation-
ships with government authorities and officials, the influence exerted by investment bank-
ers through their networks, and the thirst for power internally and over external parties, 
imbued the organisational culture of LB. A summary of the parallels examined in this section 
are set out below. 
Networks and Connections with Government 
The effective use of networks by LB began with the founders who exploited the Jewish con-
nection and the influence gained through Emanuel’s directorships of other corporations and 
membership of official institutions such as the New York Cotton Exchange. The Jewish net-
work was helpful in obtaining commercial advantage through free trade credit and later by 
the club arrangements with other Jewish investment banks, whereby co-participation in one 
another’s deals protected a segment of the market from external competition.   
The extent to which the Lehman brothers pursued acceptance by New York society to fur-
ther their ability to penetrate the valuable commercial and social networks included chang-
ing their names and relocating their business premises to be close to their associates and 
competitors. The normative influence which spurred these actions only succeeded in ce-
menting their key relationships, and therefore enhanced their power base. The emphasis on 
nurturing networks to facilitate further business and gain favour was no different for subse-
quent generations. This was evident in the 1970s, when the family appointed well net-
worked Petersen as the new CEO, in the hope that the combination of his business acumen 
and valuable corporate and political connections could turnaround the firm’s fortunes dur-
ing difficult times. 
The value of political connections is also demonstrated when LB was appointed as the finan-
cial advisor to the State of Alabama. This achievement coincided with the first bond issue for 
the State following the Civil War. The bond issue presented a challenge given the poor fi-
nancial condition of the State which was caused by the war. Therefore the transaction re-
quired particular knowhow and skill in arranging the bond structure and in convincing po-
tential investors of the merits of the issue. Again this knowhow differentiated LB from its 
competitors, which positioned the firm to be unique as a provider of the structuring needed 




ther favour from the government. The abovementioned networks provided the firm with 
the influence to entrench itself in the commercial world and expand its business interests 
domestically and internationally. The networks were ultimately a means of generating pow-
er to facilitate the outcomes desired by the stockholders and management.  
Risk Taking and Innovation 
The concept of taking elevated risks to generate a commensurate return was a concept well 
understood by the firm, and entrenched as a cultural behaviour by the founders. The Leh-
man brothers realised early the benefits of warehousing inventory. This innovative practice 
introduced risks associated with the exposure to a volatile price for cotton which could have 
resulted in losses magnified by the large volumes of inventory held, but also provided the 
potential for enhanced profitability. It also facilitated a degree of power within the cotton 
industry as the warehousing strategy enabled LB to meet customer demand, take advantage 
of pricing cycles and even control the supply of commodities such as cotton. 
The extending of credit to farmers, who themselves represented  risky credit due to the un-
certainty of the quantity and quality of harvests, was innovative by way of accepting repay-
ment in the form of cotton bales. This practice represented an extension of the firm’s previ-
ous experience of bartering general merchandise from their store in exchange for cotton 
goods from the public. Other evidence of the risk taking culture exhibited by the founders 
included the running of the Union blockade during the Civil War, where their merchandise 
was at risk of piracy, ship damage or loss, or even confiscation by the Union army.  
The risk culture established by the founders continued to the Philip and Bobbie Lehman 
eras. During these years LB was involved in servicing corporate clients by underwriting their 
securities issues. Both Philip and Bobbie pursued a strategy of supporting nascent industries 
such as the film, petroleum, high technology and biotechnology industries, in which corpo-
rations were less well established and therefore posed greater credit risks. However the 
commissions earned for these transactions were also higher and linked to the riskiness of 
the exposures to the corporations. Coupled with this type of risk taking was the innovative 
approach to fundraising, which was developed by establishing the first private placement. 
Again the innovation displayed allowed the firm to meet a financing need whilst enhancing 
their profitability through higher commissions and a degree of market power which was well 
exploited. 
Power and the Distortion of Culture 
The exercise of power was an effective means of promoting the business and retaining con-
trol by the firm’s leadership. The policy of restricting the appointment of partners to family 
members was an example of this type of power. It was not until decades after the formation 




thinning of the Lehman ranks. Control was seen as important in pursuing personal goals as 
much by the Lehman family as it was for Richard Fuld. However in the latter years of the 
pre-Fuld era, the exercise of power by certain individuals promoted episodes of dysfunction 
within the ranks of senior management. Firstly the internal struggle for power between 
Glucksman and Petersen ended with the acrimonious departure of the latter CEO. Then 
Glucksman departed after resorting to selling the firm following a virtual revolt by the other 
partners. This was followed by another similar pursuit of power by Fuld when as Co-head of 
the Investment Banking and Trading Division, he ousted fellow Co-head Tomlinson-Hill to 
assume the sole leadership position of the division.      
This overtly aggressive culture continued over after Fuld was appointed CEO and Chairman – 
being the post-Fuld era. Fuld, whose tenure with LB overlapped both the pre-Fuld and post-
Fuld periods, was able to assimilate the behavioural traits exhibited by his mentor, Glucks-
man. He was therefore able to transmit the observed experiences of social interactions 
within the firm and able to further mould the organisational culture to match his own per-
sonal objectives and values. The following section outlines the key personalities within LB 
during the post-Fuld era and analyses how Fuld was able to exert his influence throughout 
the firm by using subordinates as instruments of his design or according to Clegg (1989) as 
his ‘obligatory passage point’ in the quest for power. 
5.2 The Post-Fuld Era (1994 – 2008) 
This section examines the history of the firm from the time Fuld ascended to the leadership 
position of CEO and examines the impact of some key events during this period on the de-
velopment of the firm’s business activities, corporate culture and relationships within and 
external to the firm. The post-Fuld era is considered the period in which the beginning of 
LB’s downfall was rooted. This period was characterised by the appointment of like-minded 
individuals who followed Fuld’s mantra of ‘growth at all costs’ and a risk appetite clearly 
higher than had been prevalent in the past. The growth of LB during this period also coin-
cided with the growth in innovation in financial products, corporate activity, and financial 
markets trading volumes. Whilst investment banking firms experienced significant growth, 
the partners in firms were well rewarded and found comfort in their job security. This envi-
ronment was conducive to a general state of satisfaction in leadership which ultimately en-
gendered a degree of hubris which was found evident at LB. Refer to CHAPTER 6 for evi-
dence of hubris in the last days of LB. 
5.2.1 Richard Fuld 




2008). Fuld then moved to LB in the Trading Division as a commercial paper trader in 1969. 
Glucksman, similarly a trader by background, was the head of that division at the time and 
had become a major influence and mentor to Fuld. By the 1980s Fuld was promoted as head 
of the Fixed Income and Equities Division. This was known as a significant role heading a 
core activity of the firm (Halpern 2011).  He served as CEO of LB from the time of its spin-off 
from American Express in 1994 until December 31, 2008. Since joining the firm, Fuld’s ca-
reer with LB had spanned 30 years. An extract from LB’s prospectus reveals that at the time 
of LB’s bankruptcy Fuld held numerous positions outside of the firm. Fuld served on:  
the Board of Directors of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and is a member of the Exec-
utive Committee of the Board of Directors of The Partnership for New York City. He is a mem-
ber of the International Business Council of the World Economic Forum and The Business 
Council. In addition, he serves on the Board of Trustees of Middlebury College and New York 
Presbyterian Hospital, as well as on the Board of Directors of the Robin Hood Foundation 
(Lehman Brothers Holdings 2008j, p. 48).  
His roles with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and International Business Council of 
the World Economic Forum provided him access to numerous influential executives in the 
regulatory and economic policy fields. In 1984 American Express acquired LB and folded the 
firm in with the Shearson business which was acquired in 1981. The combined division was 
known as Shearson Lehman Brothers which operated three divisions: investment banking, 
equities and fixed income (Halpern 2011). In 1990 the consolidated Shearson Lehman 
Brothers division, which at the time operated under the American Express corporate um-
brella, split its operations into two divisions: a retail division under the name of Shearson; 
and Lehman Brothers Investment Banking/Trading Division (Halpern 2011). As mentioned in 
section 5.1.11, Fuld became Co-CEO of the Lehman Brothers division, sharing the title with J. 
Tomilson Hill, who he finally ousted to assume the sole leadership position of the division.  
Figure 66 - Picture of Richard Fuld CEO of Lehman Brothers 1993 - 2008 
 




Fuld was a very successful trader within the Fixed Income Division, however perceptions of 
his interactions with co-workers were decidedly limited throughout his career (Halpern 
2011). As a manager, Fuld was severe and exacting. He is quoted as saying “I take it as a per-
sonal failure to lose money”(Fishman 2008, p. 3). In addition Fishman (2008, p. 3) claims 
that Fuld managed by intimidation “he thought he could intimidate you out of losing mon-
ey”. A notorious temper earned Fuld, who had been a weightlifter, the nickname of "gorilla" 
(Tully 1995). Fuld possessed a “palpable inner intensity, which give him an almost animalis-
tic presence…[and]…made it seem like [a situation] will lead to physical violence if you didn’t 
relent” (Fishman 2008, p. 1). 
As Fuld’s direct manager for many years, Glucksman became an influential role model to 
him. Fuld’s Jewish middle class background differed from Glucksman’s, who was resentful of 
the typical ivy-league educated investment bankers from the non-trading division whom he 
often referred to as  “Fucking bankers” (Fishman 2008, p. 3). Investment bankers as op-
posed to the traders were often perceived as elitists within the industry who commanded 
intellectual superiority. Traders such as Glucksman and Fuld were transaction focused and 
prided themselves on generating quick profits which didn’t rely on time consuming relation-
ship building (Auletta 1985). This perception was based on the functions performed within 
the business. Glucksman was confrontational towards investment bankers, with authority 
and indignation. Glucksman’s outbursts became legendary within LB. “In a rage, he once 
ripped the shirt off his own back and Fuld followed in the master’s footsteps” (Fishman 
2008, p. 4).  
Fuld readily accepted Glucksman’s behaviour as normal within the Trading Division where 
an aggressive attitude be-fitted the image commonly portrayed in that environment. Trad-
ers were expected to make profits from betting on price movements of financial instru-
ments and were required to beat their counterpart in the fast paced deal-making. Trading 
activity was considered combative and a weak demeanour was perceived as undesirable. 
Fuld understood the importance of sustaining a strong willed appearance in the trading 
room environment. He enjoyed being referred to as ‘the gorilla’ and positioned a life-size 
image of a gorilla in his office near the trading floor (Fishman 2008). This behaviour is evi-
dence of an aggressive corporate culture where dysfunctional behaviour was mimicked and 
condoned. 
Fuld’s nature can be traced to the early years of his career. He graduated with a Bachelor of 
Arts and Bachelor of Science from the well regarded University of Colorado and a Masters of 
Business Administration from New York University’s Stern School of Business, one of the 
prominent business schools in the US. Following his studies, Fuld entered the US Airforce to 
train as a pilot. However he was soon dismissed for engaging in a violent altercation with his 




of Fuld’s aggressive nature and willingness to sacrifice such a valuable opportunity, being his 
air force career, on an impulse. 
As CEO in 1994 Fuld was faced with a challenging task. When American Express group CEO 
Harvey Golub sold its retail brokerage and asset management operations known as Shear-
son to Primerica and then divested of Lehman Brothers Kuhn Loeb through an IPO, he 
sought to extricate the large financial group from the volatile brokerage business. In the 
process he burdened LB with significant financial liabilities. Under the arrangements of the 
approximately USD 2 billion initial public offering (IPO) in 1994 American Express had trans-
ferred to LB potentially damaging liabilities for a number of failed limited partnerships. 
American Express had also contracted to receive some of LB’s future profits and for LB to 
lease vast areas of floor space owned by American Express under long term leases. These 
arrangements were designed to improve American Express’ return on its original investment 
in Shearson/Lehman 10 years earlier. Immediately following its IPO, LB’s shares were trad-
ing at less than book value (Tully 1995).  
5.2.2 Fuld’s New Team 
Fuld needed to react to the markets’ negative perceptions of LB following the American Ex-
press disposal and set about forming an inner circle of executives who shared a similar 
background, both intellectually and socially. Fuld sought out executives who shared com-
mon attributes, such as an ambition to succeed. Fuld refused to appoint a deputy for 8 
years.  His reluctance to appoint a natural successor may be due to his experience of observ-
ing the struggle for leadership between Peterson and Glucksman. Fuld soon undertook a 
management restructure which entailed replacing the heads of the three main divisions of 
investment banking, equities, and fixed income. One of Fuld’s first tasks was to prioritise 
investments into the best performing business division. Notwithstanding his contempt for 
the Investment Banking Division which he inherited from Glucksman, the mergers and ac-
quisitions department (part of the investment banking team) generated the highest margins 
within the group. He therefore directed most of the firm’s investments to this activity, also 
supporting the equities department by recruiting several expensive candidates. This restruc-
ture increased the firm’s risk profile as the Mergers and Acquisitions and Equities Trading 
Divisions were highly subject to fluctuations in economic conditions (Halpern 2011). Fuld’s 
commitment to surround himself by high achievers is reflected in the compensation he was 
prepared to pay to new recruits:  
In January 1997 Fuld approved USD 48 million for additional executive compensation. From 
this amount, USD 46 million was earmarked for the Investment Banking, and Equities Divi-
sions, with USD 2.4 million for the Fixed-Income Division. Fuld’s strategy was to clearly repo-




This strategy shows that Fuld, as an ex-division head of fixed income, didn’t allow sentimen-
tality to interfere with a business strategy that he preferred to pursue. Fuld revealed in a 
speech in 2007, that he disliked disagreements amongst his senior management, emphasis-
ing that a team approach to a common goal was the attribute he most desired in an em-
ployee. “The most dissension [Fuld] will tolerate is an agreement to disagree. What [Fuld] 
needs is peace in the family” (Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania 2007). Fuld 
selected key employees who like himself, exhibited initiative. He therefore placed im-
portance on leading by example. “Real power is the ability to empower others…a good 
leader brings out the best in others. The real reward is in seeing others’ achievements” 
(Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania 2007). The result was a team that largely 
consisted of individuals that shared similar leadership qualities with Fuld and therefore a 
propensity to make similar management decisions. 
An avid squash player, Fuld preferred to recruit executives with a background in sport. 
"They know how to compete and lose, how to pick themselves up and go on to win again” 
(Wells 2004). Bonuses were largely paid in shares and for the executive committee were 
vesting after five years, in an effort to retain successful employees who had large bonuses 
accrued. “You had to decide whether you were going to stay and try to make this work. A lot 
of people left” (Fishman 2008, p. 3). For those who remained, Fuld was able to generate in-
tense loyalty, especially from the group of colleagues who followed his rise through the 
Fixed Income Division. A brief description of Fuld’s inner circle is set out below. Individuals 
selected were executives either on the executive committee or former heads of one of the 
key divisions or were influential in the leadership of the firm. They were influential in the 
formation of the firm’s culture in the immediate years prior to LB’s bankruptcy, and were 
therefore implicit contributors in the financial decline of the business. An overview of their 
backgrounds is necessary as they feature in the analysis of power undertaken in this thesis.  
5.2.3 Chris Pettit – Chief Operating Officer 
Figure 67 - Picture of Chris Pettit – Chief Operating Officer LB, 1996 
 




Chris Pettit - President and Chief Operating Officer (COO) worked under Fuld for twenty 
years. As a long-serving deputy, he was trusted by and worked closely with Fuld. Pettit, a 
graduate of West Point, served as a captain in Vietnam and was described as a high achiever 
considering his numerous accomplishments - twice all-American leading scorer, and captain 
of the lacrosse, football and basketball teams at Westpoint and named to the Long Island 
Lacrosse Hall of Fame (West Point Association of Graduates 1997). Fuld relied heavily on his 
second in charge to run the business on a day to day basis and therefore Pettit held the 
most important and influential position after that of CEO. Pettit, a loyal employee of LB had 
a personal objective similar to that of Fuld:  
to wind Lehman back closer to how he found it in 1977 when he signed on as a young sales-
man fresh out of teaching math in junior high school - a proud institution run by loyal part-
ners. It's not a job, he seems to believe it is his destiny. ‘Many, many years from now,’ he 
says, ‘I want my name etched in granite in the corridors of Lehman (Tully 1995, p. 1). 
On 15 March 1996 Pettit resigned under circumstances which were kept confidential at the 
time, however later in a public announcement by the firm it was disclosed the resignation 
was due to his disagreement over the direction of the company (Truell 1997). In reality, Fuld 
had discovered that Pettit had an extramarital affair which violated Fuld's unwritten rules on 
marriage and social behaviour (Truell 1997). Even as a loyal lieutenant, Pettit couldn’t be 
protected from the drastic reaction of the firm to publicly distance itself on grounds of a 
personal matter occurring in a private domain. Despite the embarrassing circumstances sur-
rounding Pettit’s resignation, it was reported that “friends and colleagues of Mr. Pettit said 
he eventually had a falling out with Richard S. Fuld Jr., the Chairman and CEO, over whether 
Lehman should be run by a committee or by one strong figure like Mr. Pettit” (Truell 1997). 
Pettit, a strong leader, obviously garnered significant support from his team and friends and 
appeared to pose a challenge to Fuld’s overarching leadership. The true reasons for Pettit’s 
resignation can therefore only be presumed however either way it represented the removal 
of a key executive that no longer fitted in within Fuld’s newly constructed organisation. 
Christopher Pettit died one year after his resignation in 1997 due to a snowmobile accident, 
at the age of 51 (Truell 1997). 
An Exercise of Power 
Pettit’s ousting is an example of the way Fuld’s personal beliefs and values were inculcated 
into the firm’s decision-making framework. Not only did Fuld exercise his power through 
Clegg’s episodic circuit by the act of Pettit’s dismissal, which imposed his own values and 
beliefs on the firm, he managed to influence the firm’s culture through the dispositional cir-
cuit of power which constitute the rules of the firm. The dismissal sent a clear signal to all 




Fuld replaced Pettit in 2002 with Bradley Jack and Joseph M. Gregory. Jack was soon de-
moted to head up the firm’s investment banking relationships and left in June 2005 with a 
redundancy package of USD 80 million, leaving Gregory as the sole COO (National Public 
Library 2016). Bart McDade, previously in the position of head of equities, replaced Jack and 
continued in this role until the collapse of LB. 
5.2.4 Bradley Jack Co-Chief Operating Officer 
Figure 68 - Picture of Bradley Jack  
 
Source: (Dolmetsch & Dillon 2011). 
Fuld’s cronyism is exemplified by favouring individuals form the Trading Division, where his 
own career had been established and where individuals mostly shared values similar to his 
own. Jack commenced with LB as an associate in the Fixed Income Division in 1984 after 
completing his Bachelor of Arts from the University of California. He soon became the head 
of the Fixed Income and Global Syndications Division, and later ascended to the role of Head 
of Investment Banking in 1996 in which he remained until 2002. There is little other infor-
mation about Jack’s involvement in LB including the circumstances around his demotion. 
However according to a statement issued by Fuld, Jack retired in 2005 to pursue work in the 
non-profit sector and spend time with his family (Carmiel 2012).  
In 2011, well after he retired from the firm, Jack, then 53, turned himself in and was charged 
with second-degree forgery for an incident at a pharmacy in which he faked the date on a 
doctor’s prescription for a controlled substance (Dolmetsch & Dillon 2011). A further testi-
mony to Jack’s character is that he was forced to sell his home after having failed to pay 
property taxes on his property estate. The tax matter was resolved eventually, and the 
property was sold for USD 62 million in October 2013 (Budin 2013). “He is the most delin-




5.2.5 Joseph Gregory - Chief Operating Officer 
Figure 69 - Picture of Joseph Gregory  
 
Source: (DeCambre 2009). 
Joseph Gregory was appointed President and COO in 2004 after sharing that position with 
Bradley Jack since 2002. Like Fuld, Gregory joined LB as a commercial paper trader following 
the completion of his Bachelor of Business Administration in 1974 at Hofstra University, 
New York and was an employee of LB until its collapse (Fitzgerald 2009). Gregory held sev-
eral management positions from 1980 to 1991 and from 1991 to 1996 he became Co-Head 
of the Fixed Income Division. He moved to head the Equities Division from 1996 to 2000 and 
from this time until 2002, he was the Chief Administrative Officer.  
Gregory complemented Fuld and openly declared he had no interest in the CEO position. 
“He was known as ’Mr. Inside’ (Fuld was known as ‘Mr. Outside’), and ran the firm opera-
tionally on a daily basis” (Fishman 2008, p. 4). Gregory delivered Fuld’s objectives and fo-
cused on generating a culture of team outperformance believing this was the key to success. 
As explained by a former executive, it was Gregory’s view that “If you got the people and 
the culture right, they would run the firm day-to-day in a great way” (Fishman 2008, p. 4). 
Gregory was also reported as saying “Trusting your instincts, trusting your judgment, believ-
ing in yourself…and making decisions on the back of that trust is a remarkably powerful 
thing” (Fishman 2008, p. 4). This is considered a telling comment from the second in charge 
of a sophisticated investment bank. Common wisdom in management literature promotes 
rational decision-making, a process where decisions should be made on an informed basis 
using all information and resources available as opposed to the use of instincts. Instincts and 
personal judgement as opposed to informed decision-making was a common trait amongst 
traders at LB (McDonald & Robinson 2009). Gregory was replaced by Bart McDade, shortly 






5.2.6 Thomas Russo – Chief Legal Officer  
Figure 70 - Picture of Thomas Russo  
 
Source: (Equilar Atlas 2008). 
Since the early days of LB following the American Express sign-off, Thomas Russo held the 
position of Chief Legal Officer at the management level of Executive Vice President. In this 
role he became a member of and counsel to the firm's executive committee. Prior to joining 
LB, Russo was a senior partner at Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft (CWT), a New York law 
firm. His interests also lay in institutional and regulatory authorities such as: The Institute 
for Financial Markets where he was Vice Chairman of the Board of Trustees; The Regulatory 
Policy Committee of the Board of Governors of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority 
(FINRA)48 where he was a member; The Federal Reserve Bank of New York where he was on 
the International Advisory Committee; and member of the Committee on Capital Markets 
Regulation (Equilar Atlas 2008). Russo was well known within regulatory circles given these 
roles and during his time at CWT, he specialised in corporate law, Commodity Futures Trad-
ing Commission (CFTC) matters, SEC enforcement and broker-dealer operations. His interest 
in regulation was formed in the early part of his career when from 1969 to 1971 he was a 
lawyer in the market regulation division of the Securities and Exchange Commission and 




 FINRA, previously known as the National Association of Securities Dealers regulates securities firms and US 




from 1975 to 1977 Russo was the deputy general counsel and the first director in the Divi-
sion of Trading and Markets of the CFTC. Russo’s reputation in government circles also qual-
ified him in 1987 to serve as an advisor to the Brady Commission. This career and extensive 
experience gave the firm access to an extensive network of regulators and insights into the 
regulatory process and more importantly the philosophies amongst regulators at the time. 
See section 8.2.5 for an explanation of the ‘revolving door’ concept (Equilar Atlas 2008). 
5.2.7 Ian Lowitt – Chief Financial Officer  
Figure 71 - Picture of Ian Lowitt  
 
Source: (Carney & White 2010). 
Ian Lowitt graduated from the University of Witwatersrand in Johannesburg, South Africa 
with a Bachelor of Science in Electrical Engineering and Masters of Science in Digital Elec-
tronics. He also gained a Bachelor of Arts in Philosophy, Politics and Economics and Masters 
of Science in Economics from the University of Oxford where he was a Rhodes Scholar. 
Lowitt moved to LB from McKinsey and Co. in 1983 as Head of Corporate Development and 
from 2000 to 2008 had progressed through several senior management positions. He held 
roles such as: Treasurer and Global Head of Tax; Executive Vice President for Lehman Broth-
ers Europe; Co-Chief Administrative Officer; and from June 2008 to the time of the bank-
ruptcy, as the Chief Financial Officer. The role of Treasurer within any financial institution is 
a key position and important in the strategic and day to day funding activities of the firm. 
Therefore Lowitt would have had a deep insight of the firm’s liquidity management in the 









5.2.8 Michael Gelband - Global Head of Fixed Income 
Figure 72 - Picture of Michael Gelband 
 
Source: (The Real Deal 2015). 
Michael Gelband graduated from the University of Georgia with a Bachelor of Business Ad-
ministration and from the Ross School of Business at the University of Michigan with a Mas-
ters of Business Administration. He commenced with LB in 1983 and held several senior po-
sitions within the Fixed Income Division culminating in the role of Global Head Fixed Income 
Division from 2005 to 2007. Gelband was also appointed to the most senior executive com-
mittees of LB (McDonald & Robinson 2009). Gelband proved to be a skilled operator within 
the Trading Division and his relevance in this thesis evolves more from the circumstance of 
his departure than his appointment. Gelband was removed for his disagreements with Fuld 
on the excessive risk taking by the firm (McDonald & Robinson 2009). Gelband left LB in May 
2007 and was eventually employed by Millennium Management, a New York based alterna-
tive investment manager (HedgeWeek 2008). Rather than publicly announcing Gelband’s 
dismissal from LB, it was announced that he departed to pursue other interests (Mathiason 
et al. 2009). Gelband was of only a few subordinates willing to challenge Fuld in the strategic 
direction of the firm and on large transactions which although appeared profitable and pres-
tigious at inception would have burdened LB with very high risks at a time when the proper-
ty market was increasingly susceptible to a downfall. The following reveals this opinion was 
shared from within the firm: 
The truth, though, was somewhat different. Gelband was, according to Lehman insiders, at 
loggerheads with Fuld's lieutenants. He had rallied against a huge buying of a collection of 
subprime mortgage lenders, and also in particular a USD 15bn property consortium bid, led 
by Lehman, to buy the US's biggest apartment company at the top of the market… According 
to Lehman insiders, he was almost alone among the 26,000-strong organisation in being 
prepared to stand up to the now disgraced former chairman and chief executive of what has 




The above comments by Mathiason et al. (2009) is evidence of Fuld’s objection to having 
close senior executives challenging his own personal decisions, especially if they involved 
barriers to the firm’s growth strategy.  
5.2.9 Herbert ‘Bart’ H. McDade III – Chief Operating Officer 
Figure 73 - Picture of Herbert ‘Bart’ H. McDade III 
 
Source: (Bloomberg 2015a) 
Bart McDade joined LB in 1983 and similar to Fuld, Jack, Gregory and Gelband he started in 
the Fixed Income Division.  He graduated with a Bachelor of Arts from Duke University and a 
Masters of Business Administration from the University of Michigan. In 1991 MacDade was 
appointed as Head of the Corporate Bond Department and in 1998 he progressed to the po-
sition of Global Head of Debt Capital Markets and concurrently named as a member of the 
Group Head Committee of the Investment Banking Division. In 2000 McDade was elevated 
to the key Executive Committee and at the same time assumed the role of Co-Head of the 
Fixed Income Division. From 2005, he headed the Global Equities Division and eventually 
replaced Gregory as COO shortly before the bankruptcy (Plumb & Wilchins 2008b). During 
his period in executive management, McDade’s responsibilities encompassed the mortgage 
business which after recording huge losses was a major contributor to LB’s collapse. 
McDade later joined Barclays for a brief period following the British banks acquisition of the 









5.2.10 Hugh E. ‘Skip’ McGee III - Head of Investment Banking 
Figure 74 - Picture of Hugh E. ‘Skip’ McGee III  
 
Source: (Levin 2015). 
Hugh (Skip) McGee graduated from Princeton University with a Bachelor of Civil Engineering 
and achieved a Juris Doctor degree with honours from the University of Texas Law School. 
He was considered an intellectual and continued his association with the University sector 
as a Member of the Advisory Council of McCombs School of Business at the University of 
Texas and a member of the Advisory Council for the Bendheim Centre for Finance at Prince-
ton University (Intrepid Financial Partners 2016). McGee joined LB in 1993, and became the 
Head of LB’s Global Natural Resources and Power Investment Banking Groups and a mem-
ber of the Operating Committee of Investment Banking. He also became the executive in 
charge  of the Global Investment Banking Division from 2002 until 2008 (Williams 2010). At 
the time of his promotion to Head of Global Investment Banking, he was the longest serving 
head of an Investment Banking Division in New York. During his time in the Investment 
Banking Division he presided over some significant transactions, including the largest lever-
aged buyout in history (former TXU Corp) and a USD 41 billion acquisition of XTO Energy by 
Exxon Mobil (Perlberg 2013). McGee also helped lead Lehman’s efforts to spin off toxic as-
sets during the crisis.  
McGee was an executive who was responsible for the substantial increase in LB’s risk profile 
in 2006 and 2007. According to Valukas (2010, pp. 58-9), “Along with Fuld and President Joe 
Gregory, and over the objections of other senior executives, McGee advocated that Lehman 
loosen controls and lend its own capital to private-equity companies for leveraged buyouts”. 
Despite his apparently impeccable reputation within the investment banking community in 
his early career, in later life McGee’s ethics were questioned. Following his career at LB, and 
during his role as head of the US operations of Barclays, he was involved in a large fraud. 
McGee oversaw a trading operation which was found guilty of manipulating energy markets 
for profit. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission commanded Barclays, including four 
of its former traders to pay a total of USD 488 million in penalties (Abelson 2013). The re-




“investment banker McGee helped lead a source of entitlement and ethical ambiguity… A 
few investment bankers seemed to lose a sense of proportion” (Abelson 2013). Steep bo-
nuses and pay for top executives were considered a root cause of the fraud. It “contributed 
significantly to a sense among a few that they were somehow unaffected by the ordinary 
rules” (Abelson 2013). 
5.2.11 Summary and Discussion 
This chapter outlines a history of LB highlighting events and personalities that contributed to 
the development of the three overriding themes of this study: reliance on key relationships 
with government authorities and officials; influence through official, personal and commer-
cial networks; and personal characteristics of key individuals and culture of the firm. The 
chapter was divided between the pre-Fuld and post-Fuld era to delineate the influences of 
past leaders. As Fuld was the CEO immediately preceding the bankruptcy, a focus on his 
stewardship is considered of greater importance to this thesis. Fuld had characterised his 
leadership by appointing to crucial positions like-minded, compliant staff who shared his 
values. These appointments almost exclusively originated from the trading side of the busi-
ness, an area in which Fuld devoted much of his career and where he understood the trader 
transaction oriented mentality. Of the eight executives described above, six originated in 
the Trading Division, the exceptions being Russo whose position required a specific legal 
background and McGee who as Head of Investment Banking was appropriately sourced 
from that side of the business and was the only representative from the Investment Banking 
Division, the only other major division in the group at that time. Moreover these appoint-
ments reflected an inner circle with whom Fuld could feel comfortable and avert conflict.  
In Pettit he found his original second in command, a loyal follower who eventually contra-
vened Fuld’s own personal values and was therefore cast adrift. In Gregory, he found a syc-
ophant, who overtly confessed that he had no aspirations for the leadership role and there-
fore became a safe ally in Fuld’s quest to survive his leadership position. In Jack he found a 
fellow fixed income trader with similar ideals, motivations and practices, especially a moti-
vation for self-enrichment. In Lowitt he found a malleable and skilled operator who could 
transform from the central function of a Treasurer which required a trader’s skill base, to a 
Chief Financial Officer. In this latter role, Lowitt was responsible for the accounting and fi-
nance function, a crucial role in the preparation and presentation of financial information to 
the wider investment community and establishing positive perceptions necessary to ensure 
continued funding. In Russo he found a skilled regulator who had access to useful connec-
tions within the regulatory and legal spheres and who would be found to conform to the 
firm’s ideological interpretations of regulations and accounting practices. In Gelband, 




succeed and could be relied upon to maximise the firm’s profits. In summary each appoin-
tee was useful to Fuld’s ambitions and stated objectives of ‘growth at all costs’. 
The cohort of senior management afforded the CEO the power to pursue his personal agen-
da. This power can be located in Clegg’s (1989) dispositional circuit where, as the most sen-
ior executive in the group, Fuld had the power to promote or dismiss any executive. 
Through Fuld’s dominant position in the hierarchy, he was able to influence his personal re-
lations with each individual and his social relations with them as a group representing the 
passage point to the episodic circuit where these subordinates would carry out the firm’s 
tactical decisions. Each executive therefore represented an agency through which Fuld was 
able to carry out his strategic objectives. They were provided with the resources and moti-
vation to generate the outcomes that Fuld desired. Any resistance was addressed by Fuld in 
one of three ways: a reprimand, usually involving aggressive behaviour by Fuld; a sidelining 
of the executive to an innocuous position; or in the worst case, dismissal. 
Fuld was able to legitimise his power through the firm’s rules of practice also found in 
Clegg’s (1989) dispositional circuit and which included amongst others, the group account-
ing policy manual, personal compensation practices, internal reporting framework and the 
firm’s risk management policy documents. These documents regulated work practices and 
guided behaviour within the firm. Breaking the rules incurred consequences. Apart from the 
rules of practice contained in formal internal documentation, Fuld had allowed a cultural 
and moral organisational culture to evolve in accordance with his own values driven by an 
insatiable desire for growth, even if that meant elevating the risk profile of the firm. The 
written and unwritten rules of practice were integrated within the firm through individual 
and social relations established by Fuld and his executives. These rules of practice, which 
filtered down throughout the organisational hierarchy, fixed relationships of meaning and 
membership amongst staff. A principal outcome of which was the loyalty Fuld generated 
amongst a large majority of his team. This enabled Fuld to prolong his grip on power and his 
claim to being the longest serving CEO in LB’s history since Bobbie Lehman’s reign. 
The power located in the episodic and dispositional circuits was enabled at the macro level 
through the facilitative circuit where the firm’s system of reward and punishment was for-
mulated. Although the actions of reward and punishment occur in the episodic circuit 
through the day to day dealings between superiors and their subordinates, the expectations 
of what is acceptable behaviour is established in the facilitative circuit. These norms are 
built up over time in the context of social and cultural change and innovation which can 
transform the structuring of empowerment and disempowerment. The use of job design,  
which involved the procedures relating to the dealing and recording of transactions, is a 
worthwhile example. The accounting for Repo transactions (further explained in CHAPTER 9) 




applying power through internal relationships and with stakeholders alike. The act of con-
cealment, that is, controlling an information flow, is an application of power. This level of 
power within the facilitative circuit contributed to affecting the organisational morality to a 
point where it differed with the moral standards of society at large. 
This chapter contributed to an understanding of the organisational culture of LB through an 
analysis of certain periods throughout its history and an analysis of the behavioural charac-
teristics of key personalities within LB. At various points in its history, power was exercised 
within the firm to generate outcomes beneficial to the CEO and at times arguably to the 
detriment of the firm – especially in terms of risk. The foundations of LB’s business model 
and organisational culture were clearly established in the pre-Fuld era. In this era of LB’s his-
tory, the founders’ influence relating to innovation, business expansion, and effective use of 
networks and knowledge were combined with a focus on pursuing business activities con-
sistent with the competitive strengths of the firm. A high degree of control exerted over 
subordinates and decision-making by the firm’s leadership was integral to achieving the ob-
jectives of the managing partner or CEO. For example the elevation to partnership of only 
Lehman family direct descendants ensured  tight control over the firm’s strategic direction. 
As explained in this chapter, this control was effected through Clegg’s (1989) various circuits 
of power.    
In the post-Fuld era the inherited organisational culture emphasised the employment of in-
dividuals with sympathetic goals to those of the CEO. Key individuals were also required to 
have an attitude to risk taking arguably at the upper boundaries of the norms within the in-
dustry. Behaviour inconsistent with the values of the CEO was not tolerated and the exer-
cise of power to shape the moral values within the firm was not withheld. In the following 
chapter, the thesis reveals the consequences of the power exercised by Fuld and his execu-
tives in the period prior to the bankruptcy. The behaviour of executives within LB during this 
brief but critical period was influenced by the already established organisational culture. It 
was also impacted by institutional influences within the investment banking industry and 
the benevolence of regulators. Refer to CHAPTER 7 and CHAPTER 8 for a discussion on the 





 THE LAST DAYS OF LB CHAPTER 6
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter chronologically examines the last days, weeks and months prior to LB’s col-
lapse. In following the chronology, key events and developments are identified which pre-
cipitated the failures of a number of financial institutions including that of LB. The analysis 
of the events reveals a repeated exercise of power and the effect of institutional influence 
on the activities of LB, the industry and regulatory and government attitudes. This thesis ar-
gues that dysfunctional behavioural and cultural influences on LB had established the foun-
dation for a series of decisions which led to a deterioration of LB’s risk profile which ulti-
mately caused its bankruptcy. The chapter goes further to analyse the interactions involving 
power between Fuld, LB’s employees and external parties and the institutional pressures 
which steered the company towards failure. 
Section 6.2 examines the role played by innovation including the use of Collateral Debt Obli-
gations and their eventual credit downgrading. An explanation is provided of LB’s practice of 
warehousing mortgage related assets and the ultimate difficulty the company experienced 
in securitising these assets as a way of recycling the firm’s balance sheet. This led to an 
overexposure to illiquid mortgage assets and CDOs which had been downgraded by the 
credit rating agencies. The effect on LB’s share price especially through the shorting of LB’s 
shares is discussed once the investment community discovered that LB was left with a large 
portfolio of sub-standard assets. The shorting of LB shares is offered as evidence of mimetic 
pressure operating within the investment banking industry. The section concludes with an 
explanation of how Fuld’s resistance to a series of warnings relating to the firm’s declining 
asset values is an exercise of power. Section 6.3 exposes the discovery by analysts - during a 
pivotal telephone conference, of a lack of sufficient transparency considered important to 
maintain investor confidence. The section follows with an analysis of Fuld’s approach to 
dealing with market disquiet which involved succumbing to a flawed strategy spurred by 
mimetic pressure from within the industry. Fuld’s denial of his own accountability is reflect-
ed by his response in using loyal staff members as scapegoats. This section also reveals the 
problems experienced by Bear Stearns and Fuld’s reluctance to learn from its mistakes. Two 
key events immediately preceding LB’s bankruptcy are covered in Sections 6.4 and 6.5. First-
ly the government rescue of the large and important mortgage institutions, Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac; and secondly the detailed sequence of LB’s last weekend. A contrast is made 
between the regulatory and political attitudes to the mortgage institutions, as well as Bear 




ing why LB was allowed to fail whilst others were rescued. Section 6.6 includes a discussion 
of how LB’s failure culminated from a combination of exogenous environmental and endog-
enous factors which disempowered Fuld and his team and produced an institutional shift by 
the government and regulators towards an increasingly interventionist approach. Finally 
section 6.7 of the chapter summarises the effect that LB’s bankruptcy had on financial mar-
kets and the government’s attempts to stabilise them. 
It is difficult to pinpoint the commencement of the last days of LB as any date chosen would 
be arbitrary. A case could be made to plot the start of the firm’s demise during the period 
spanning the usurping of leadership by Glucksman from Petersen. The subsequent events 
leading to the sale of the firm to American Express highlighted the dysfunctional internal 
divisions between the ‘traders’ and the ‘investment bankers’ and signalled the emergence 
of the trader mentality into the strategic decision-making of the firm.  Alternatively, the last 
days could be sign-posted by the American Express group spin-off of the firm, amassing it 
with liabilities. This was a time when Fuld’s overriding influence as the ‘new’ firm’s leader 
effectively commenced. For the sake of continuity in this thesis, an arbitrary timeline has 
been selected which portends that the last days of LB began during the latter part of 2006 
when the number of rating downgrades issued by the major rating agencies such as Stand-
ard & Poors, Moodys and Fitch for CDOs peaked. 
6.2 Innovation and its Pitfalls 
6.2.1 The CDO Rating Route 
CDOs had become a popular financial instrument in the 2000s as they enabled investors to 
access a complex financial product which was backed by home mortgages. Previously access 




financial structures such as RMBS or Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS)49 (Fabozzi et al. 
2006).  
The combination of an exponential growth of the CDO market, (refer to the graph in Figure 
78) in the two years prior to the collapse of LB, the sudden credit downgrading by the CRAs 
of most of these instruments and the deterioration of the quality of the subprime mortgage 
portfolios in general signalled the first publicly visible indications that LB was in trouble. LB 
had amassed a large quantity of CDOs and residential mortgages ready for packaging during 
this time and had therefore developed an overweight asset exposure to this market as 
shown in Figure 75.  
Figure 75 - Warehoused Mortgage Assets and Other Investments as % of Total Assets 
 




 A MBS is a security issued through a securitization process by a special purpose vehicle established to  hold a 
pool of mortgages which are either originated by a related sponsoring financial institutions or purchased from 
another financial institution. The assets in the pool can consist of residential mortgages in which case the term 
used is Residential Mortgage Backed Securities (RMBS) or mortgages over other assets in which case the term 


















Source: The data used for the graph was extracted from Orisis corporate database (Osiris 
2014). 
Once the credit ratings of CDOs were downgraded, existing and potential investors and 
creditors possessed explicit information signalling the likely negative impact on LB’s financial 
position of its overweight position in these assets. These external stakeholders began to an-
ticipate write downs on the value of the firm’s CDOs and residential mortgage portfolio as 
explained later in this chapter. Consequently a negative sentiment of the firm’s risk profile 
developed as indicated by the firm’s declining share price (Figure 83). This development also 
impacted on other investment banks and most notably Bear Stearns which had a level of 
CDOs and subprime mortgage inventories similar to that of LB (Figure 75). Other hedge 
funds and commercial banks which were heavily exposed to these financial instruments 
were not immune to the market reaction. An atmosphere of nervousness and uncertainty 
permeated the market, which was starved for detailed financial information regarding the 
value of portfolios invested in credit derivatives and residential mortgages generally.  
6.2.2 Warehousing and the Process of Securitisation 
Warehousing involves the accumulation of securities or financial products such as residen-
tial mortgages by an originator into either the balance sheet of the originator, or a special 
purpose vehicle (Australian Securitisation Forum 2018). Where the originator is a bank or 
other financial institution that must meet capital adequacy requirements, the arrangement 
usually involves a complex structure whereby the pooled assets are sold to a ‘special pur-
pose vehicle’ (SPV). The SPV then issues securities to investors, the proceeds of which fund 
the SPV’s purchase of the pooled assets. Once the assets are transferred to the SPV, there is 
normally no recourse to the originator. In order to achieve this, the governing document of 
the issuer (SPV) restricts its activities to only those necessary to complete the issuing of se-
curities (Australian Securitisation Forum 2018).  
The entity (either a SPV or financial institution) in which the pooled assets are being held 
during the accumulation process, is referred to as ‘a warehouse’. The securitisation process 
extracts these assets from the warehouse to on-sell them to investors in the form of new 
securities often categorised into tranches according to their credit ratings. Refer to Figure 76 
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Source: Diagram developed from Financial Crisis Enquiry Commission (2011, p. 128). 
CDOs first appeared in the 1980s, however it wasn’t until the 1990s when volumes of issues 
began to rise (Fabozzi et al. 2006). Figure 78 illustrates the growth in CDOs issued from 2000 
to 2007. As the graph indicates, CDO issues grew exponentially until 2006 and levelled off in 
2007 which coincided with the tightening of credit conditions, known as the global credit 
crisis (Fabozzi et al. 2006). This growth paralleled the significant growth in structured fi-
nance and credit derivative transactions generally during this period. Refer to Figure 77 and 
Figure 78 for the evolution of the of structured finance market in the period leading to the 
GFC. 
Figure 77 - Total Number of Structured Finance Tranches Issued 




29 1,581 9,353 47,055 
USD na na 1,839 86,572 
Source: (Benmelech & Dlugosz 2010, pp. 166-8).  
 
Figure 78 - Total CDOs Issued 2000 - 2007 
 
Source: The data used for the graph was extracted from SIFMA Global CDO Issuance Tables, 
(Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association 2013). 
The credit rating agencies assigned the highest rating of ‘AAA’ to the majority of CDOs out-
standing globally in 2006 but by 2007 30% of the ‘AAA’ tranches had been downgraded 
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and 2007, reflecting the deteriorating credit profile of the CDO market during this period. 
During the four year period between 1999 and 2002 inclusive, CDO downgrades by all major 
ratings agencies totalled 3,116. During the four year period between 2003 and 2006 inclu-
sive, it amounted to 6,173 downgrades and in the year of 2007 alone, downgrades totalled 
8,109 (Benmelech & Dlugosz 2010, p. 161). Many downgrades occurred from AAA to BB or 
lower (considered junk bond50 quality) (McDonald & Robinson 2009, p. 200). Such sudden 
and steep downgrades were considered rare and therefore caught much of the market by 
surprise. 
The downgrades were driven by an increasing default rate prevailing on home mortgages, 
which were the major asset class underlying the CDO instruments. Many of these CDOs had 
packaged subprime mortgages as their underlying asset and most of these mortgages were 
structured with adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs) (Fabozzi et al. 2006). Given these mort-
gages mainly originated within the previous two years, their interest rates were in the pro-
cess of being reset above the original discounted ‘honeymoon’ rate51. Consequently home-
owners were experiencing increasing difficulty in servicing their repayments because of 
higher interest reset rates which reached a peak of 27% in December 2006 (McDonald & 
Robinson 2009, p. 201). These difficulties translated into higher loan delinquency levels. 
There were other reasons for the downgrades which are addressed by Ashcraft (2009) who 
contends that the ratings models used to assign the original ratings were flawed. He also 
argues that the CRAs were under pressure by the investment banks to increase the number 
of ratings for new issues which promoted munificence amongst rating staff. This issue was 
compounded by the deteriorating credit quality of the underlying assets. “CDO structures 
were willing to accept loans that traditional investors would not have accepted, and origina-
tors began originating riskier and riskier loans” (Ashcraft 2009, p. 638). 




 A junk bond is a colloquial term for a high-yield or non-investment grade bond with a relatively high default 
risk relative to investment grade bonds. Junk bonds are fixed-income instruments that are assigned a ‘BB’ rat-
ing or lower by Standard & Poor's, or 'Ba' or below by Moody's. 
 
51
 ‘Honeymoon’ rates were introductory interest rates offered by banks as a marketing ploy to induce borrow-
ers to enter into loan contracts. In most cases the introductory rate was at a discount to normal market rates 





The problem was compounded by the outsourcing of the origination process to commission 
agents who had little concern for the credit quality of the loans being accumulated. As they 
were not employed by the investment banks, their accountability for the credit quality was 
negligible and they were largely driven by the amount of commission they earned which 
was based on volume of loans written. Further the responsible executives within LB had a 
relatively low concern for the credit quality of the loan portfolios as their intention was to 
speedily securitise the assets and transfer the associated risk to the ultimate security hold-
ers. Whilst the securitisation process proceeded quickly, and the housing market remained 
buoyant, the on-balance sheet credit risk to LB was considered low. 
LB was a major instigator in the origination and selling of CDOs and mortgage related struc-
tured assets generally. On November 30, 2006 LB had approximately USD 57.73 billion in 
mortgage-related assets, equivalent to 300% of the firm’s total equity. Of the USD 57.73 bil-
lion in mortgage-related assets, USD 15.93 billion was subprime quality and mostly repre-
sented the remaining unsold portions of issues arranged by LB. In other words, by the end of 
2006 LB had 83% of its equity tied up in extremely risky mortgage-related assets (Deng et al. 
2009). During 2007, LB’s mortgage-related assets jumped from USD 57.73 billion to USD 
89.11 billion, representing 25.5% and 28.5% of total financial instruments owned in 2006 
and 2007 respectively. Of the USD 89.11 billion mortgage-related assets in 2007, approxi-
mately 46.5% had been repackaged into complex asset-backed securities. As of 30 Novem-
ber 2007 LB had USD 17.31 billion in either subprime holdings or retained interest in securit-
isations, and only USD 22.49 billion in total equity (Deng et al. 2009). 
Figure 79 shows all outstanding CDO tranches as at 1 January for years 1990 to 2008 which 
were downgraded, upgraded or withdrawn. It is important to note that Figure 79 provides 
information for all outstanding tranches and not solely new issues for the year. In 2007, alt-
hough CDOs outstanding grew by 31.7%, the number of downgrades increased by approxi-
mately 800%, indicating a serious credit problem associated with the underlying assets of 
the structures of CDOs. This trend continued into 2008 when “there were 36,880 down-
grades of structured finance tranches in the first three quarters of 2008, overshadowing the 
cumulative total number of downgrades in 2005/07 … Downgrades were not only more 




Figure 79 - Credit Rating Downgrades, Upgrades and Withdrawn 
 
Note: b = Rating actions between 01/01/2008 and 22/09/2008. 
Source: The data used for the graph was extracted from Benmelech and Dlugosz (2010, p. 
181). 
LB’s large mortgage holdings, especially subprime mortgage holdings and investments in the 
equity tranches of asset-backed securities caused major financial difficulties for LB. In the 
fourth quarter of 2007, LB recorded a USD 3.5 billion write-down in mortgage assets, fol-
lowed by another USD 4.7 billion mark-to-market loss in the first quarter of 2008. This reve-
lation of the deteriorating quality of LB’s portfolios of CDOs precipitated a decline in LB’s 
share price. See Figure 83 for a chart of LB’s share price.  
A disturbing feature of this period is that LB had been made aware of the deteriorating qual-
ity of the CDO portfolios by internal and external sources. Despite these warnings, LB con-
tinued to issue new tranches of similarly structured CDOs. McDonald and Robinson (2009, p. 
201) acknowledge that Alex Kirk, then Global Head of Credit at LB, had predicted the prob-
lems associated with LB’s portfolios. “[Kirk]…was the first to flag it, in May 2005 - one year 
and seven months before it started to fall apart”. Alex Kirk was well qualified to comment, 
having held positions within LB of Global Head of Principal Investments, Global Head of 
Credit from 2006 to 2008, Chairman of the High Yield Committee from 2002 to 2005 and 
head of the Global Distressed Division from 1994-2001. Kirk had advised Fuld of the impend-
ing problems. Gelband also warned Fuld of the impending deterioration of the portfolio held 
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Mike Gelband (who at the time had responsibility for commercial and residential real estate), 
yelled it publicly, with facts and figures, for everyone to hear, from Fuld downward at 7.06am 
on June 7 2005 - one year, six months, and three weeks before… many at Lehman Brothers 
had heard the warnings, and all through those months heard the rumours (McDonald & 
Robinson 2009, p. 202).  
Lawrence Lindsay, an external consultant to LB, as president of The Lindsay Group, and a 
former director of President George Bush’s National Economic Council also made presenta-
tions to LB’s executive committee about the home lending market. He warned LB about the 
problems faced by borrowers as their interest rate resets were applied and about the po-
tential negative impact these would have on the banks’ distressed debt levels (Becker et al. 
2008; McDonald & Robinson 2009). These warnings were ignored by Fuld and ran contrary 
to his stated ambition to invest further into hedge funds (holding subprime residential 
mortgages and CDOs) in order to increase profitability and hence the share price. Refer to 
Figure 80 which is a slide in a Global Strategy Offsite Presentation setting out the firm’s 
strategy to grow hedge funds at a compound annual growth rate of 17% between 2005 and 
2009.  
Figure 80 - Lehman Brothers Global Strategy Offsite Presentation – March 2006 
 





Fuld was pre-occupied with LB’s share price, making it the focus of the firm’s strategy as de-
picted in the same presentation. Refer to Figure 81 for the presentation introduction which 
featured the overriding strategy of reaching a share price of USD 150. At that time the aver-
age share price for March 2006 was USD 144, having increased from USD 128 on 1 January 
2006 and USD 87 on 1 January 2005. Fuld also intended Lehman to rank first or second in 
targeted business segments. As the bulk of Fuld’s compensation was awarded as LB stock he 
had a personal interest in maximising the firm’s share price. See section 10.5 for a detailed 
discussion of the methods used and amounts comprising the top executives’ compensation 
for 2007. 
Figure 81 - Introduction of Lehman Brothers Global Strategy Offsite Presentation, 2006 
 
Source: (Lehman Brothers Holdings 2006, p. 2) 
Consequently LB continued to grow its exposure to the CDO and subprime mortgage mar-
ket. Once these instruments were ultimately revalued by LB, for financial reporting purpos-
es, the write downs had to be brought to account. Refer to Figure 82 for the latest an-
nounced write downs for LB during 2008. The ABS CDOs and RMBS write downs represented 













RMBS Other Total 
LB’s Write downs 
(USDm) 
Note (a) 200 1,300 4,100 3,400 9,000 
% of Total Industry  
Write downs 




Note (b) 218,215 53,325 84,809 163,735 520,084 
Sources:  
a) LB’s Quarterly Reports for quarters 1, 2 and 3, 2008, (Lehman Brothers Holdings 
2008b, 2008c, 2008d) 
b) Relates to write downs for 2007 (Benmelech & Dlugosz 2009, p. 163) 
Exercise of Power in Resisting Warnings 
The process of communicating concerns to Fuld was undertaken in the normal course of day 
to day business activities. The experts, Kirk and Gelband viewed it as their duty to warn Fuld 
of the impending dangers to LB of developments in the subprime mortgage market and the 
associated exposures held by LB. The warnings also came from outside sources such as Lind-
say and therefore were independently validated (McDonald & Robinson 2009, pp. 200-24). 
Fuld’s resistance to this advice is an example of Fuld’s assuredness of the superiority of his 
knowledge regarding the market environment. This perceived knowledge situates Fuld, a 
CEO with a long history in the financial markets, in a position of influence over the wider 
firm’s employees – in particular those without an expertise in the field of knowledge 
claimed by Fuld. This confers power to Fuld over subordinates in the firm within Clegg’s epi-
sodic circuit and allowed him to pursue a strategy consistent with his own views of the mar-
ket. This power which is often exercised intermittently, involves power over another, in this 
case LB’s employees. Power in the episodic circuit usually “calls forth resistance because of 
the power/knowledge nature of agency” (Clegg 1989, p. 208). The resistance offered by Kirk 
and Gelband was overcome by Fuld’s authority as CEO. This position of authority continued 
as long as Fuld’s perceived superior knowledge was able to convince the wider firm and at-
tract the continued support of the Board of Directors who ultimately dictated whether Fuld 
continued in his role as CEO. “Kirk, Gelband and Lindsay had sounded warnings…and you 
can never fix stupid” (McDonald & Robinson 2009, p. 202).  
6.2.3 Effect on share price 
Figure 83 plots LB’s split-adjusted share price from 1994 when the firm was spun off by 




from USD 78.12 on December 29, 2006 to USD 19.12 on June 30, 2008 and to USD 3.65 on 
12 September 2008 (the last trading day before the bankruptcy announcement) reflected an 
increasingly pessimistic assessment of LB’s viability. This period also reflects the steepest 
decline in LB’s share price history. 
Figure 83 - Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. Adjusted Closing Share Price*, 1994 – 2008 
 
Note: The share price indicated above is quoted as an adjusted share price, reflecting the 
stock split which occurred in April 2006. 
Source: Data for graph obtained from share price databse, (Investorpoint Investor 
Information Systems 2016). 
Selling and Shorting LB shares as Mimetic Isomorphism  
In CHAPTER 2, two accounts were postulated as explanations for a financial crisis, exoge-
nous and endogenous approaches. The exogenous approach supports the assumption that 
information sourced from outside the market is absorbed by the market, and trading based 
on this information is reflected in the price of a security. Alternatively, under the endoge-
nous approach, the price of a security is influenced by the behaviour of other traders in the 
market. This emphasises that social interaction within markets can precipitate a crisis. 
Therefore, the markets are subject to the ‘herd mentality’.  
Dyer et al. (2008) discovered in scientific experiments that it takes a minority of just five per 
cent of a group to influence a crowd’s direction and that the other 95 per cent follow with-
out realising it. That is, where information is ambiguous, individuals are prone to making 
decisions based upon the actions of others. Swedberg (2010, p. 71) finds that “confidence 
plays a key role in financial panics and that confidence can be conceptualised as a belief that 
action can be based on proxy signs, rather than on direct information about the situation 
















ness press about a firm, or gossip from an acquaintance. Unobtrusive proxy signs belong to 
the category of unofficial signs and are often viewed as valuable, because they are thought 
to be difficult to manipulate (Swedberg 2010). This, of course, is also what makes them so 
attractive to manipulate.  
According to Labaree (1961), Benjamin Franklin, in a Letter to a Young Salesman, 21 July 
1748, gives the new owner of a carpentry business the following advice: “The sound of your 
hammer at five in the morning, or eight at night, heard by a creditor, makes him easy six 
months longer” (Labaree 1961). The proxy sign in LB’s instance, unlike the sound of the 
hammer, was a negative sign and included the rumours and press speculation that spread 
throughout the market. The rumours and actions of other traders in shorting LB’s stock per-
petuated an already declining share value, almost self-fulfilling an eventual demise of the 
firm. Platt (2002, p. 8) observed “quite a substantial amount of short selling activity takes 
place when companies face bankruptcy…Shorting the stock of a distressed company puts 
extra financial pressure on it by devaluing its equity and pushes it to the verge of a fall”.  
The activity of the market participants in selling LB shares was driven from limited infor-
mation such as the credit rating downgrades, press reports and rumours. These relatively 
uninformed trades (uninformed at the time of trading) support the endogenous approach to 
understanding markets, which is consistent with an institutional view. It provides a rationale 
for selling a stock in the absence of explicit detailed financial information. When other trad-
ers are executing similar trades, this is interpreted as legitimate for no other reason than 
there being safety in following the herd. This according to DiMaggio and Powell (1983) and 
Schacter et al. (2011), is a form of mimetic pressure. The mimicking of trades gives comfort 
to traders, supporting their own decision-making as being consistent with others in the 
market. 
6.3 Importance of Transparency 
6.3.1 Telephone Conference of 14 March 2007 
On 14 March 2007, in response to a demand for information by analysts on progress with 
the first quarter’s results, LB organised a conference call for interested institutional inves-
tors and securities analysts. The LB representative on the call was the Chief Financial Officer, 
Chris O’Meara. It was clear from O’Meara’s initial presentation that his objective was to ob-
fuscate the details of LB’s exposure to the subprime market. O’Meara briefly passed over 
LB’s holdings of subprime mortgage securitisations by mentioning they only comprised less 
than 3% of LB’s total revenues (McDonald & Robinson 2009, p. 221). This response is more 




any analysis of the relevant exposure as a percentage of equity or assets, which would have 
represented a more meaningful ratio relevant to the assessment of LB’s financial position.  
An excerpt of this conference call between Michael Mayo, an analyst from the Prudential 
Equity Group and O’Meara follows: 
Michael Mayo - Prudential Equity Group 
Then, a separate question; subprime revenues are under 3% with your characterization, but if 
we are not talking about a housing crash or a recession but still a possible domino effect 
from subprime to other areas, what other exposure do you have to the subprime mortgage 
market? 
Christopher M. O' Meara - CFO Lehman Brothers 
To the subprime mortgage? Okay, so there are situations -- are you talking about warehouse 
lending or -- 
Michael Mayo - Prudential Equity Group 
More generally, what is your total balance sheet exposure to subprime mortgage, either di-
rect or indirect? 
Christopher M. O' Meara 
We have a fair amount of exposure. We talked about the residual interests which represent a 
levered exposure. We also have whole loans, but all of it is subject to the same hedging prin-
cipals that we talked about earlier and it has been working quite effectively. 
Michael Mayo - Prudential Equity Group 
But when you said that the hedging offset the losses, the hedging offset the losses in which 
areas? 
Christopher M. O' Meara 
Essentially everything. Our objective is to try to offset the risks that sit in the business as we 
are moving these instruments and holding the instruments in what we will call our client 
warehouse as we are moving them from raw product into securitization, and then if we are 
making secondary markets and taking positions that we are distributing and sponsoring cli-
ent activity, while that is in this warehouse and on the balance sheet, we are trying to hedge 
the components of risk that exist -- the interest rate risk, the pre-payment risk, the various 
risks that exist. We are actively, dynamically trying to risk mitigate. (Seeking Alpha 2007) 
Exercise of Power in the Dispositional Circuit 
The above exchange can be interpreted as a means of limiting information disclosure by 




to obscure the severity of the problems being faced by LB. This interaction between Mayo, a 
representative of a stakeholder group of investors and O’Meara, the representative of the 
firm and of Fuld, the Chairman and CEO, can be analysed by Clegg’s (1989) dispositional cir-
cuit. In this circuit, the rules of practice are constituted by the typical verbal presentation 
followed by the question and answer pattern of communication between the listed entity 
(LB) and stakeholders. The call was the arena in which O’Meara decided to control the dis-
semination of vital information. If the information was not convincing, it could potentially 
have severe consequences on the firm’s critical relationships and ultimately its share price.  
O’Meara’s evasiveness in the ‘us and them’ exchange was an attempt for O’Meara to influ-
ence Mayo and others listening to the call. The obligatory passage point in Clegg’s (1989) 
framework is represented by the conference call, whereby the agency, in this case Mayo, 
contests O’Meara’s responses, the tone of which is in turn refixed to disarm the agent. 
O’Meara had the benefit of a final response to each question and therefore had the ulti-
mate ability to shape opinion. Further obfuscation was practiced in the release of LB’s third 
quarter results as reported by the media (Ellis 2008; Hamilton 2007). O’Meara was defend-
ing the accuracy of the financial results and sought to allay concerns that investment banks 
might be moving too slowly to write off potentially large amounts of troubled mortgage se-
curities. O'Meara was content that the firm had a robust accounting process to produce ac-
curate and reasonable financial statements (Hamilton 2007). Securities analysts weren’t 
convinced however and a securities analyst, Schiff commented: 
In any case … the future isn't bright for Wall Street banks… They're not going to be making all 
these profits in their hedge funds ... They're not going to be making all these [merger] deals 
and private equity deals. They're not going to get all those tremendous fees and commissions 
(Hamilton 2007). 
It is clear that O’Meara’s assertions to the firm’s robust process in checking its accounting of 
the mortgage securities was meant to divert attention from the actual results and instead 
focus on process, that is to provide comfort to analysts that a conservative approach had 
been followed. Unfortunately for LB, Schiff and others were not convinced. 
6.3.2 Fuld’s Response to Market Disquiet 
First Leg of Strategy - Expansion 
In response to market rumours, which were particularly rampant following the March tele-
phone conference call, Fuld pursued a new strategy of globalisation and undertook acquisi-
tions of hedge funds internationally to convince the market that LB had other options to re-
verse its performance. “The foreign purchases were inspired by the avowed belief of 
Fuld…that globalisation meant decoupling from the US market because it was no longer all-




large mortgage origination business, supplemented by a meaningful securities issuance and 
distribution business and a strong underwriting business. The strategy had been to originate 
and distribute securities as it had done during Philip and Bobbie Lehman’s reign. Following 
its March 2006, Global Strategy Offsite, Lehman Brothers Holdings (2006) announced that 
LB’s strategy had evolved. Rather than originating mortgage assets for eventual packaging 
and disposal to investors, LB would retain those assets on its balance sheet. LB effectively 
shifted its strategy from focusing on securitisation to a business of accumulating assets 
(Financial Crisis Enquiry Commission 2011, p. 177). This aggressive growth strategy also in-
volved greater leverage and risk. The combination of the warehousing strategy supported by 
greater leverage would come to punish LB when the values of the underlying assets being 
stored plummeted. 
Shortly thereafter in 2007, LB acquired Europe’s largest hedge fund, GLG Partners (London), 
based in London. By mid-year 2007 LB acquired 20% interest in New York-based D.E. Shaw, a 
global investment and technology development firm, and a further 20% of the USD 5 billion 
London based hedge fund Spinnaker Capital, specialists in emerging markets. As well as 
Spinnaker Capital, LB continued to expand in the UK and acquired a 5% stake in Blue Bay 
Asset Management which had assets under management of USD 8 billion. Later it acquired 
Grange Securities, one of the largest sellers of CDOs in Australia. These hedge funds were in 
addition to a previous acquisition of a major US commodity hedge fund, Ospraie which 
managed about USD 2 billion of assets (McDonald & Robinson 2009).  
Fuld was envious of the Blackstone Group, a private equity firm co-founded by Pete Pe-
tersen, following Petersen’s exit from LB (McDonald & Robinson 2009; Reingold 2009). One 
of the main reasons for Fuld’s envy was the fact that Peterson as one of two co-founders of 
Blackstone Group, benefited enormously from the 2007 initial public offering of Blackstone, 
valuing the firm at USD 4 billion. The listing enabled Blackstone to become one of the first 
major private equity firms to list shares in its management company on a public exchange 
(Anderson 2007). Fuld was aware that the Blackstone group completed a USD 39 billion buy-
out of Equity Office Properties Trust earlier in 2007 and viewed this transaction as a justifi-




that Blackstone’s own strategy involved flipping52 the properties within the trust in the short 
term (Pristin 2008). LB instead was investing for the long term which represented quite a 
different strategy. 
Mimetic Pressure a Solution to Financial Difficulties 
Given Blackstone Group’s strong reputation in the market, which was primarily due to the 
standing, character and experience of its co-founders, Fuld succumbed to a mimetic pres-
sure of replicating a strategy undertaken by a competitor in order to achieve commensurate 
rewards. If the market was interpreting the Blackstone Group strategy as sound, then why 
wouldn’t the market ascribe the same supposition to LB? Blackstone’s practice as a hedge 
fund was to use high levels of leverage to make acquisitions of underperforming corpora-
tions or assets, turn around the performance, and dispose of the investment at a profit 
(Pristin 2008). Fuld’s mistake was to ignore the short term nature of the Blackstone group 
strategy and instead according to Lehman Brothers Holdings (2006), pursued a flawed long 
term hold strategy. LB continued to compound its property exposure during June 2007.  
It [LB] partnered with Thomas Partners, a real estate investment trust based in Los Angeles, 
and the California State Teachers Retirement System in a USD 1.15 billion deal to purchase 
10 office buildings that Blackstone was selling from its Equity Office Properties acquisition 
(Pristin 2008). 
In July 2007, just as the global credit crisis began, LB acquired, in partnership with Prologis, a 
publicly listed logistics company, which owned a group of warehouses located throughout 
the US for USD 1.85 billion. LB financed the bulk of the transaction on its own balance sheet 
in order to accelerate the closure of the transaction (Pristin 2008). Normally such a large 
funding requirement would have been syndicated amongst several banks. Not only was LB 
caught with the debt but was unable to securitise the asset (Pristin 2008). Consequently the 
asset and the corresponding debt remained on its balance sheet, further weakening the lev-
erage of the firm.  




 Flipping is a term used primarily in the US to describe purchasing a revenue-generating asset and quickly 




LB had a strong appetite for real estate investments, as Fuld believed the real estate asset 
bubble would continue indefinitely and in mid-June 2007 added high value commercial real 
estate assets from Texas to the portfolio. “One real estate investment broker described 
Lehman as the real estate ATM” (Pristin 2008). The expansion of the firm’s investment port-
folio featured prominently in the firm’s strategy (Lehman Brothers Holdings 2006). 
Rubinstein (2008) notes that LB’s appetite for real estate assets encouraged the firm to use 
off balance sheet structures to house them and its comparative exposure to real estate 
outweighed those of its competitors. “You talk to Morgan Stanley, they have $3 billion 
worth of [commercial mortgage-backed securities] exposure in the States. Lehman had $30 
billion” (Rubinstein 2008). Direct investments in real estate were supplemented by indirect 
exposures by way of extending loans against property mortgage security. LB’s search for op-
portunities in this sector was aggressive as it turned to riskier loans to fulfil its strategy. “The 
firm, according to one developer, became known as the lender of last resort on Wall Street, 
willing to loan money to just about anyone” (Rubinstein 2008). 
The real estate binge continued in October 2007, when LB acquired a portfolio of almost 
400 apartment buildings across the US in partnership with Tishman Speyer. LB invested eq-
uity of USD 250 million and led a syndicate of lenders, together with  Fannie Mae and Fred-
die Mac, that contributed USD 4.6 billion in bridge equity for the USD 22.2 billion transac-
tion (Pristin 2008). The deal represented the largest listed to private merger and acquisition 
transaction in the Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT)53 sector (Pristin 2008; Trainor 2007). 
This transaction was completed shortly after Standard & Poors and Moodys issued warnings 
on a weakening rental market and deterioration in mortgage lending standards (Pristin 
2008; Wilcox 2012). Fuld’s rejection of the credit rating agencies’ warning was another ex-
ample of hubris and a determination to solve the firm’s problems by pursuing a flawed 
strategy of expanding through an asset class which was at the top of its price cycle.  




 A tradeable security listed on the major exchanges and invests in real estate directly, either through proper-
ties or mortgages. REITs receive special tax considerations and typically offer investors high yields, as well as a 





Fuld wasn’t content with investing in hedge funds alone. Hubris led him to invest in other 
unrelated businesses through the firm’s Private equity54 Division. In August, LB was in nego-
tiations to purchase 66% of Eagle Energy Partners, a Houston-based energy services corpo-
ration for USD 400 million; in addition LB was involved in multi-billion dollar commitments 
with TXU, Claires Stores, First Data Corporation, Home Depot and International House of 
Pancakes. “Both men [Fuld and Gregory] were devotees, apparently of the very suspect 
maxim that it’s always possible to spend your way out of trouble”  (McDonald & Robinson 
2009, p. 262). 
Second leg of strategy – Share Repurchase 
The second leg of LB’s strategy was to repurchase its own shares to counteract the rumours 
of LB’s potential on-balance sheet problems. In creating the appearance of a strong balance 
sheet which could withstand share repurchases and payment of high dividends, LB acquired 
USD 2.6 billion worth of its own shares and paid dividends of USD 418 million during the fi-
nancial year ended 30 November 2007. The issuance of new shares during this period to-
talled a meagre USD 84 million (Lehman Brothers Holdings 2008j). By increasing the demand 
for LB shares on the market, Fuld was hoping the share price would increase. This caused 
much discord amongst senior executives including Gelband who on hearing of the repur-
chase exclaimed “Buying it? … he should be fucking selling it to raise capital” (McDonald & 
Robinson 2009, p. 224).  
The share repurchase strategy is an example of misplaced hubris and an abuse of power. 
The act of repurchasing shares with borrowed funds has a compounding effect on leverage. 
The leverage ratio which is a measure of risk of a firm may be calculated as a ratio of total 
debt to total stockholders’ funds. A higher ratio indicates more risk. Buying back the number 
of shares outstanding reduces the balance sheet value of stockholders funds (on the basis 
that the same shares are subsequently cancelled). The combination of a reduction in stock-
holders funds whilst borrowing to effect the repurchase amplifies the increase of the ratio. 
See to section 7.3 for a financial analysis of LB and its increasing leverage ratio. 




 In finance, private equity is an asset class consisting of equity securities and debt in operating companies 
that are not publicly traded on a stock exchange. A private equity investment will generally be made by a pri-




Abuse of Power in the Facilitative Circuit 
In extending leverage, Fuld elevated the risk profile of the firm. In the process he further 
jeopardised the survival of the firm and therefore the job security of its employees and safe-
ty of the financial claims of stakeholders such as stockholders and lenders. Fuld attempted 
to fix perspectives about the firm, despite overt objections from other senior executives 
who deemed the action of share repurchase irrational but nonetheless were powerless to 
change Fuld’s actions.  
The position of Chairman and CEO had the authority to fix the standards of ‘leverage ac-
ceptability’ within the firm in response to the prevailing exogenous environmental stimulus. 
This environment was characterised by the market rumours which prompted Fuld’s action. 
The Chairman’s authority was further strengthened as Fuld’s decisions occurred during a 
time of crisis when decisive action is an accepted practice in corporate management as a 
means of appeasing stakeholders. Subordinates felt powerless to contest Fuld’s authority 
through any communication or obligatory passage points available within the firm, such as 
the executive committee over which Fuld held a strong influence.  
Ultimately the disagreement between Gelband (a rationalist) and Fuld resulted in Gelband’s 
and his subordinate, Kirk’s removal from the firm (Fishman 2008). Fuld would not have sen-
ior executives question his actions, and therefore simply removed them from their posi-
tions. In removing such obstacles, Fuld refixed the relations of membership within the firm 
as depicted in Clegg’s dispositional circuit. Gelband attempted to change the system of deci-
sion-making. But changing institutional life is not simple. “To change social relations in the 
facilitative circuit means mobilising change in fields at the dispositional and episodic lev-
els”(Boje & Rosile 2001, p. 95). Gelband was unable to achieve this given his lower status in 
the power hierarchy of the firm and therefore succumbed to the authoritative power of 
Fuld.  
Following the announcement of the 31 May 2008 second-quarter earnings - a USD 2.8 bil-
lion loss, Fuld finally capitulated to the need for additional capital (Lehman Brothers 
Holdings 2008c). He reversed his previous tactic and accepted that a rational response was 
required for the market and announced “the firm was raising USD 6 billion in new capital 
from blue-chip investors” (Lehman Brothers Holdings 2008g). The press statement quoting 
Fuld, read as follows: 
Since we announced our expected second quarter earnings last week, we have begun to take 
the necessary steps to restore the credibility of our great franchise and ensure that this quar-
ter's unacceptable performance is not repeated. We have raised an additional USD 6 billion 
of capital. I have asked Bart McDade, our best operator, to serve as the Firm's president and 
chief operating officer. I have also asked Ian Lowitt, our co-chief administrative officer, to be 




driven franchise, we are positioned to take advantage of opportunities that lie ahead, and 
we are focused on maximizing shareholder value (Lehman Brothers Holdings 2008g). 
Again this was an attempt to manage perceptions. It suggested that there was investor ap-
petite for LB equity. Further the statement that Fuld was appointing a new COO (replacing 
long time COO Gregory) and CFO was intended to portray that the desperate situation 
would be turned around. Notably there is no mention that Fuld would be stepping aside 
partially or fully or that he accepted personal responsibility for the results. Again the reluc-
tance to accept responsibility is a form of power over subordinates. This power is evidenced 
by the differential treatment of his immediate subordinates whose employment was termi-
nated whilst he retained his own position.  
The conference call to investors on 16 June 2008 was led by Fuld who was normally absent 
from such calls announced the second quarter results. At the beginning of the conference 
call Fuld stated:  
Now let me discuss our current asset valuation on those remaining positions. I am the one 
who ultimately signs off and I am comfortable with our valuations at the end of our second 
quarter, because we have always had a rigorous internal process (Seeking Alpha 2008).  
Fuld started the conference call with a relatively unimportant comment on the valuation of 
a portion of the balance sheet, instead of commencing with a discussion on the headline 
poor performance. This was an effort to diminish the relevance or importance of the shock-
ing profit result, and thereby an attempt to manipulate perceptions, again an exercise of 
power over any potential reaction of stakeholders. 
LB’s share price of USD 27.20 as at 16 June 2008 (the date of the second quarter results’ 
conference call), was down 104% since 1 January 2008. This drop would have placed many 
other CEOs in jeopardy of termination. However Fuld was able to survive given his influence 
over the Board of Directors, “Lehman's Board of Directors, which included retired CEOs like 
Vodafone's Christopher Gent and IBM's John Akers were reluctant to challenge Fuld as the 
firm's share price spiralled lower” (Plumb & Wilchins 2008a). See section 10.3 for a discus-
sion of Fuld’s power over the Board.  
Fuld had steered Lehman through the 1997/98 Asian Financial Crisis, a period where the 
firm's share price dropped to USD 22 in 1998, but kept his job as the subprime mortgage cri-
sis took hold, while CEOs of rivals like Bear Stearns, Merrill Lynch, and Citigroup were forced 
to resign (Plumb & Wilchins 2008a).  
Power Usurps Coercive Isomorphism in CEO Accountability. 
As Plumb and Wilchins (2008a) notes, it was not uncommon in the midst of the global credit 
crisis for investment banking firms to sacrifice their CEOs following dire results. These organ-




government agencies and the media generally. This pressure, a form of coercive pressure is 
a consequence of an expectation of an organisation to act in a certain manner. The act in 
these cases involves retrenching the leader who is expected to take responsibility for the 
poor performance of the firm. Oliver (1990, p. 152) describes this as “conscious obedience 
to the incorporation of values, norms or institutional requirements”. The pressure to replace 
CEOs for the failing fortunes of a company had affected Bear Stearns, Merrill Lynch, and 
Citigroup. However Fuld managed to retain his position of Chairman and CEO. How did Fuld 
achieve this? This is a case where DiMaggio & Powell’s (1983) New Institutional Theory in-
tersects with Clegg’s (1989) Theory of Power.  
Although LB succumbed to the coercive isomorphic pressures in appointing a new COO (in 
the process removing Gregory) and CFO (in the process removing O’Meara), Fuld managed 
to prevent his own removal through power sourced from an atypical influence over the 
firm’s Board of Directors. See section 10.3 for further analysis. This power can be placed in 
Clegg’s dispositional circuit where Fuld’s historic influence over the board and expectation 
that his every decision would be ratified, was created within the socially constructed envi-
ronment of board meetings. Within this setting, where relations between members of the 
board and the chairperson are formal by way of a board charter and informal by way of ex-
pected rules of behaviour, it was customary for the board to follow the chairperson’s rec-
ommendation. The board’s habitual acquiescence to Fuld’s wishes legitimised his authority. 
Therefore through the obligatory passage point of the regular meetings, Fuld was able to 
control the board to generate his desired outcomes. As the board possessed the formal au-
thority to remove the CEO, Fuld’s exercise of power over the board limited the coercive 
isomorphic pressure within LB of removing him in the face of a financial crisis. 
Although Fuld engineered his survival as CEO and Chairman, he started to lose control over 
LB after a prolonged process of unsuccessfully attempting to turn around the fortunes of the 
firm. In his role as COO, McDade had begun to assert some authority in view of the firm’s 
continuing financial crisis. McDade decided to reinstate his colleagues, Gelband and Kirk 
who had previously warned Fuld of the impending disaster, in an attempt to rescue the firm. 
“I’m here because of Bart”, Gelband pointedly told Fuld’ (Fishman 2008). This was an exam-
ple of the first and one of only a few direct challenges to Fuld’s authority, simply because 
Fuld was perceived as losing his power. 
The facilitative circuit is where power and also disempowerment can occur. Fuld continued 
to hold his CEO and Chairman title and the authority it carries, governed by the hierarchical 
rules of organisational membership held within the dispositional circuit. However, this be-
came increasingly superficial and was overridden by a process of disempowerment through 
the facilitative circuit. The desperate financial position of the firm required a new approach 
as all other attempts to stave off bankruptcy was failing. McDade filled the vacuum of 




his ability to convince his team and the market that he had the ‘knowhow’ to save LB had 
evaporated. This development is consistent with the notion of disempowerment in the facil-
itative circuit. The perceived knowhow that conferred power to Fuld was no longer evident.  
Bear Stearns – Failure of the Hedge Funds and then the Firm 
The failure and subsequent rescue of Bear Stearns, the fifth largest investment bank in the 
US in 2007 based on total revenue – refer Figure 89 for a comparison of total revenue of the 
five largest investment banks, signalled the beginning of the liquidity crisis which immedi-
ately preceded the GFC. It conducted similar business to LB and possessed a similar financial 
structure especially in a key measure of financial risk - leverage. Bear Stearns was also one 
of the pioneers in securitising CDOs (Ryback n.d.). Through its subsidiary, Bear Stearns Asset 
Management (BSAM), it managed two hedge funds which invested in structured CDOs. 
These funds were managed on behalf of third party investors, however Bear Stearns had 
also invested approximately USD 25 million into the funds and had loaned the funds approx-
imately USD 1.6 billion (Financial Crisis Enquiry Commission 2011, pp. 240-1).  
By April 2007, BSAM’s internal risk exposure reports showed that one of the funds: ‘High-
Grade Structured Credit Strategies Fund’ (High-Grade) comprised approximately 60% of 
subprime mortgaged backed CDOs, assets that were beginning to deteriorate quickly in val-
ue (Bear Stearns Asset Management 2007; Ryback 2010). The second fund: ‘Enhanced 
Fund’, which was similarly structured, had even more leverage and hence was deemed of 
higher risk. These funds could only be valued on the basis of a valuation of the underlying 
assets which comprised subprime mortgage CDOs, and were difficult to value when the 
market for CDOs became illiquid.  
A common practice of tracking the values of such assets was to monitor the ABX Index, de-
scribed as: “a Dow Jones-like index for credit default swaps on BBB- tranches of mortgage 
backed securities” (Financial Crisis Enquiry Commission 2011, p. 233). The value of these 
funds came under pressure as the ABX Index fell 3% in the last quarter of 2006, followed by 
a 8% drop in January 2007 and a 25% drop in February 2007 (Financial Crisis Enquiry 




both funds. In June 2007, the funds’ ‘Repo lenders’55 declined to renew their funding. De-
spite the abovementioned equity and debt support provided by Bear Stearns, BSAM’s par-
ent had no legal obligation to rescue either the funds or the Repo lenders. By July, the two 
hedge funds had shrunk to negligible value with the High Grade Fund having reduced by 91 
and the Enhanced Leverage Fund, down by 100% (Financial Crisis Enquiry Commission 2011, 
p. 241). On 31 July both funds filed for bankruptcy. The bankruptcy of the BSAM funds 
would be viewed as a seminal point in the chronology of events of the last days of LB and 
the GFC generally. In an internal email in June 2007, Bill Jamison of Federated Investors, one 
of the largest mutual funds in the US, referred to the BSAM hedge funds as the “canary in 
the mineshaft” (Financial Crisis Enquiry Commission 2011, p. 241). That is, given most of the 
CDOs in the funds were originally assigned ‘AAA’ ratings by the credit rating agencies, trust 
in the ratings and in the safety of similar assets was shattered. 
Bear Stearns decided to take responsibility for the Repo contracts originated by the High-
Grade Fund. It transferred approximately USD 1.6 billion of the liabilities and respective 
subprime loans onto its own balance sheet and repaid the lenders. In November 2007, the 
firm recorded USD 1.9 billion write-down on the subprime assets which prompted investors 
to examine Bear Stearns’ financial statements more closely. Following the release of Bear 
Stearns’ fourth quarter loss of USD 379 million, the firm’s lenders progressively required 
Bear Stearns to lodge a higher percentage value and better quality securities as collateral 
against their Repo loans, and also charged higher interest rates (Financial Crisis Enquiry 
Commission 2011, p. 280). On 13 March 2008 a liquidity crisis generated by rapid claims for 
repayment by lenders forced Bear Stearns to inform the SEC that it would be unable to op-
erate normally the following business day. On 14 March 2008, in response to the elevated of 
systemic risk arising from Bear Stearns financial difficulties, the Federal Reserve funded a 
USD 12.9 billion loan channelled through JP Morgan to Bear Stearns. Upon publication of 
this loan, Bear Stearns’ S&P credit rating dropped from ‘A’ to ‘BBB’. At the close of business, 
Bear Stearns’ liquidity had evaporated and its stock price declined by 47% (Financial Crisis 
Enquiry Commission 2011, p. 289) 




 A Repo lender is a lender to a dealer or other holder of securities who sells the securities to the lender (Repo 
lender) and agrees to repurchase them at an agreed future date at an agreed price, thereby receiving tempo-




Ultimately the Federal Reserve structured a deal involving JP Morgan Chase whereby the 
Federal Reserve purchased USD 29.9 billion of Bear Stearns’ assets via a special purpose ve-
hicle owned by the Federal Reserve, thus removing the bulk of the toxic assets from the 
firm’s balance sheet. To fund the purchase, the Federal Reserve and JP Morgan Chase 
loaned USD 28.82 billion and USD 1.15 billion to the SPV respectively. The second leg of the 
deal involved JP Morgan Chase acquiring the shares of Bear Stearns at a price of USD 10 per 
share (Financial Crisis Enquiry Commission 2011, p. 290). The deal was so structured as “The 
Federal Reserve and the Treasury Department would not support a transaction where Bear 
Stearns’ stockholders received any significant consideration because of the moral hazard of 
the federal government using taxpayer money to ‘bail out’ the investment bank stockhold-
ers” (Financial Crisis Enquiry Commission 2011, p. 290). It was clear that Bear Stearns’ failure 
was precipitated from a liquidity shortage driven by the abovementioned run by creditors. 
According to Cox (2008b, p. 1), in a letter to the Basel Committee of Banking Supervision 
relating to ‘Sound Practices for Managing Liquidity in Banking Organizations’ the Chairman 
of the SEC, Christopher Cox wrote:  
Even at the time of its sale on Sunday, Bear Stearns’ capital, and its broker-dealers’ capital, 
exceeded supervisory standards. Counterparty withdrawals and credit denials, resulting in a 
loss of liquidity, not inadequate capital, caused Bear’s demise (Cox 2008b).  
The recognition of the importance of liquidity would be a lesson unheeded by LB’s leader-
ship team. In response to this concern, the Federal Reserve announced the creation of the 
Primary Dealer Credit Facility56 – a program allowing investment banks for the first time to 
borrow money directly from the Federal Reserve, which up until then provided liquidity fa-
cilities only to registered banks. 
Investment banks had been relying on high levels of leverage to raise funds on their balance 
sheets. This practice was soon highlighted to the stockholders of investment banks and 
share prices of all the major investment banks began to decline during 2008 (Masood 2009). 
The problems mentioned above were not only limited to the investment banking industry as 
any financial institution holding mortgage-related assets, in particular subprime mortgages, 




 The Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF) was an emergency credit facility established on 17 March 2008, 
provided by the Federal Reserve to primary securities dealers whereby the emergency funding was collateral-




was negatively impacted. Two government sponsored institutions that faced similar chal-
lenges were Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.  
6.4 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s Rescue 
On 7 September 2008, a week before LB’s bankruptcy, the Federal National Mortgage Asso-
ciation, (Fannie Mae)57, and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac)58 
were taken over by the government and placed in a conservatorship which is the equiva-
lence of a managed bankruptcy. Fannie Mae’s losses for the full year in 2008, were estimat-
ed at between USD 18 billion and USD 50 billion, whilst Freddie Mac’s losses were estimated 
at between USD 11 billion and USD 32 billion by the end of the year (Financial Crisis Enquiry 
Commission 2011, p. 320). Fannie and Freddie were considered ‘too big to fail’. Although 
privately owned prior to their takeover, these institutions were known as government spon-
sored enterprises (GSEs) as they purportedly undertook activities supported by the govern-
ment in supporting the supply of new mortgages to the US public. These GSEs were highly 
leveraged, with mortgage exposures of USD 5.3 trillion backed by capital of under 2% 
(Financial Crisis Enquiry Commission 2011, p. 309).   
The rescue of the GSEs involved a complex arrangement. Firstly, the Treasury would buy 
USD 200 billion of senior preferred stock issued by the GSEs and extend them short term 
secured loans. In addition, it pledged to buy GSE mortgage backed securities from the in-
vestment banking industry and others until the end of 2009. Immediately, Treasury bought 
USD 1 billion in preferred stock with a 10% dividend. The deal also involved the issuance of 
warrants over common stock to the Treasury representing 79.9% of the stock outstanding 
(Financial Crisis Enquiry Commission 2011, p. 320). In effect this rescue effort resulted in the 
government owning a majority of the GSE’s ordinary stock and all of their preferred stock. 




 Fannie Mae was created following the Great Depression as a government instrument to securitise mortgag-
es, thereby creating capacity on bank balance sheets allowing the to undertake further lending. 
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 Freddie Mac was founded in 1970 as another government instrument to expand on the same functions as 




Notwithstanding the loss to equity investors, Treasury had once again managed to stave off 
a major crisis by direct intervention and the use of taxpayers’ funds. 
6.5 Lehman Brothers’ Last Weekend  
As mentioned above, investment banks relied heavily on short-term debt in order to oper-
ate. Given their businesses mostly involved dealing with counterparties who would neces-
sarily incur risk to the firm, the continuing rolling over of short term debt depended on 
counterparties’ faith in the firm’s ability to honour their obligations. As soon as the custom-
ers and creditors began to query the sustainability of the firm they became less willing to 
lend or trade and either reduced their credit and/or trading limits or even worse, sought full 
repayment of outstanding loans (Financial Crisis Enquiry Commission 2011).  
Within weeks of LB’s second quarter earnings release on 16 June 2008, several major finan-
cial institutions had reduced their exposure to the firm. These included “Natixis, a French 
investment bank that cut all activity with LB; Federated Investors - a large money market 
fund and one of LB’s largest Repo lenders which had frozen all new transactions; other large 
pension funds and some smaller Asian central banks” (Financial Crisis Enquiry Commission 
2011, p. 328). The perception of weakness exacerbates the reality of weakness within an 
industry that relies on confidence between counterparties. Importantly, one of the most 
visible measures of a firm’s weakness is a declining share price. As mentioned above, LB’s 
share price of USD 27.20 as at 16 June 2008 (the date of the second quarter results’ confer-
ence call), was down 104% since 1 January 2008. By 29 August, 2008, LB’s share price had 
declined further to USD 15.20 (Investorpoint Investor Information Systems 2016). During 
this month, Fuld finally realised that the firm required a rescue plan and proceeded to 
search for a buyer for the firm. “We contacted virtually every financial institution in the 
world with the interest and capacity to deal, says a person close to the process” (Fishman 
2008). Despite several attempts to find a buyer, the most serious of which was Barclays 
Bank in the UK, there were no institutions willing to invest in a less than transparent entity 
where asset values were obscure at best.  
In a speech in April 2008 David Einhorn of Greenlight Capital, which was then shorting LB’s 
shares, and was an analyst who closely investigated LB’s accounting practices commented 
on LB’s real estate loans:  
Lehman does not provide enough transparency … There is good reason to question Lehman’s 
fair value calculation. Lehman responds to greater transparency begrudgingly. I suspect that 
greater transparency on these valuations would not inspire market confidence (Einhorn 




In a foreboding presentation, Einhorn’s discovery of accounting discrepancies also led him 
to comment as follows: 
My hope is that Mr. Cox and Mr. Bernanke and Mr. Paulson will pay heed to the risks to the 
financial system that Lehman is creating and that they will guide Lehman toward a recapital-
ization and recognition of its losses – hopefully before federal taxpayer assistance is re-
quired…I think that there is enough evidence to show how Lehman answered the difficult 
question as to whether to tell the truth and suffer the consequences or not. This raises the 
question, though, of what incentive do corporate managers have to fully acknowledge bad 
news in a truthful fashion? For the capital markets to function, companies need to provide 
investors with accurate information rather than whatever numbers add up to a smooth re-
turn. If there is no penalty for misbehaviour- and, in fact, such behaviour is rewarded with 
flattering stories in the mainstream press about how to handle a crisis - we will all bear the 
negative consequences over time. At a minimum, what message does this send to some of 
Lehman's competitors that probably didn't have problems quite as acute as Lehman, but who 
took sizable write downs, and diluted their shareholders with significant equity raises? 
(Einhorn 2008a, p. 9). 
JP Morgan Chase was LB’s clearing bank and in this capacity acted as the banking intermedi-
ary between LB and its Repo lenders. As well as providing credit from time to time, JP Mor-
gan Chase ran overnight exposures in the day to day activity of settling the firm’s Repo 
transactions. On Tuesday September 9, 2008 JP Morgan Chase requested USD 5 billion in 
extra collateral. Instead, LB offered USD 3.6 billion which allowed it to operate for at least 
some time longer (Financial Crisis Enquiry Commission 2011). It was obvious that if LB did 
not lodge the extra collateral, JP Morgan Chase would essentially freeze its accounts and LB 
would cease trading. JP Morgan Chase had clients (the Repo lenders and other counterpar-
ties relying on it as LB’s clearing bank) whose interests it had to defend.  
Fuld continued to deflect responsibility for LB’s difficulties claiming Jamie Dimon, JP Morgan 
Chase CEO, “was doing whatever was in his own personal interest. He knew the conse-
quence was a huge blow to us, and he didn’t give a shit…they drained us of cash…They 
fucked us” (Fishman 2008). This quote reveals Fuld’s focus on personalities instead of the 
institutional relationship between JP Morgan Chase and LB. Fuld had resorted to personalise 
LB’s problem making Dimon the source of LB’s crisis instead of rationally examining LB’s cul-
pability and the underlying reasons for the firm’s financial crisis. This emotional irrationality 
can be seen as an example of Fuld’s state of mind at the time and his propensity to blame 
individuals who didn’t conform to his own expectations of practice. Fuld’s power had been 
challenged and he didn’t like it. 
On Wednesday, September 10, 2008, LB reported a third quarter loss of USD 4.09 billion for 
the quarter ending 31 August 2008. This loss together with the previous second quarter loss 
of USD 2.87 billion for the quarter ending 31 May 2008, was accounted for after applying 




157, (FAS 157). FAS 157 which applied to corporations after November 15, 2007, essentially 
required financial assets to be brought to account at ‘fair value’59 which was interpreted by 
the finance industry as market value. As a result of this new definition, and given the deteri-
oration in the market value of LB’s assets, it brought to account the accompanying devalua-
tion losses in the profit and loss statement (Financial Accounting Standards Board 2006a).  
Simultaneously, in an effort to generate cash, Fuld developed a strategy to dispose of both 
the Investment Management Division and its distressed real estate portfolio. In an attempt 
to calm market sentiment, and in a tone of confidence and control, he announced to the 
market that the firm would recover: “We have a long track record of pulling together when 
times are tough…we are on the right track to put these last two quarters behind us” 
(Fishman 2008). More bad news was released to the market as potential investors in the 
firm retreated. When negotiations for an investment from the Korea Development Bank 
ceased, the market became increasingly wary of Fuld’s ability to execute a survival strategy 
(Financial Crisis Enquiry Commission 2011, p. 330). 
On Thursday 11 September, 2008, JP Morgan Chase once again demanded LB post another 
USD 5 billion in cash collateral. In an internal email circulated on Friday, 12 September, 
2008, LB executives were informed that “If we don’t provide the cash [to JP Morgan Chase], 
they refuse to clear, we fail” (Financial Crisis Enquiry Commission 2011, p. 333). In a desper-
ate attempt to stave off a default claim by JP Morgan Chase, LB undertook a fire sale of as-
sets. It posted the USD 5 billion cash by selling virtually all remaining unencumbered finan-
cial asset it owned (Financial Crisis Enquiry Commission 2011, p. 333). 
Starting Friday night, September 12, 2008 and continuing throughout the ensuing weekend, 
a series of meetings were convened at the Federal Reserve offices. These meetings involved 
US Treasury Secretary, Hank Paulson, the President of the New York Federal Reserve, Timo-
thy Geithner, a number of government and regulatory officials and CEOs of the major US 
commercial and investment banks. Also attending some of the meetings representing LB 
were McDade and Kirk. Fuld was not invited to the meetings (Financial Crisis Enquiry 
Commission 2011, p. 334).  




   FAS 157 altered the meaning of fair value. “Fair value measurement should be determined based on the 
assumptions that market participants would use in pricing the asset or liability” (Financial Accounting 




Various options to rescue LB were discussed, including plans for sovereign wealth funds, 
Bank of America (BoA) and Barclays Bank to absorb LB in one form or another. However all 
negotiations failed due to potential rescuers requiring a government guarantee or invest-
ment (as occurred in the Bear Stearns rescue package), protecting them from the potential 
losses resulting from the toxic assets. It became clear that the government’s position as rep-
resented by Paulson and Geitner was not to inject any capital or provide other support by 
way of a guarantee to potential investors. According to Paulson, the assistance for LB:  
should be done in a way that requires minimal temporary support. . . no equity position by 
[the] Fed. Moral hazard and reputation cost is too high. If the Fed agrees to another equity 
investment, it signals that everything [the Fed] did in March in terms of temporary liquidity 
backstops is useless. Horrible precedent… bankruptcy, would be a mess on every level, but 
fixes the moral hazard problem (Mosser 2008).  
Further for Paulson, “such a guarantee by the Fed was unequivocally out of the question” 
(Paulson 2011, pp. 209-10). During the weekend, news spread of the financial difficulties of 
another major investment bank, Merrill Lynch. Further to a meeting between John Thain, 
CEO of Merrill Lynch and Ken Lewis, CEO of BoA, an agreement was reached whereby BoA 
would acquire Merrill Lynch by paying USD 29 a share. The payment to Merrill Lynch share-
holders was to be made in BoA shares  (Financial Crisis Enquiry Commission 2011, p. 335). 
Having participated in the weekend’s meetings relating to LB, Thain was concerned that 
Merrill Lynch would soon follow LB into  bankruptcy and therefore sought a rescue and 
agreed to the terms offered by BoA. 
At the conclusion of meetings on Sunday night 14 September 2008, McDade returned to 
LB’s head office with feedback to Fuld and the board that Geitner and Paulson had recom-
mended the firm file for bankruptcy given that no rescue package had come to fruition. This 
news surprised the executives as the hubris which enveloped Fuld and others had blinded 
them to the ultimate possibilities of a bankruptcy. “Dick never believed zero was an option. 
He believed at the end of the day, good guys win” (Fishman 2008). Fuld’s denial of the se-
verity of the problem persisted until the very end as he was convinced he was one of the 




6.6 The shifting Nature of Power and Institu-
tional Influence 
A combination of ‘exogenous environmental’60 and endogenous factors conspired to shift 
the direction of power away from Fuld and his senior executive team and heightened an in-
stitutional shift away from the neoliberalist approach adopted by the government and regu-
lators towards an increasingly interventionist approach with some incongruous conse-
quences for LB.  
6.6.1 Endogenous Factors 
Endogenously, the deteriorating performance of LB during 2007 and 2008 resulted in two 
significant outcomes. Firstly, the deteriorating performance of LB led to greater scrutiny of 
the firm, which precipitated increased market pressure to become more transparent. The 
resulting scrutiny in turn prompted the market to sell LB shares, adversely affecting the val-
ue of the firm.  
Secondly, an inconsistent bonus outcome for a segment of LB’s staff caused a degree of re-
sentment which disrupted the historically resilient loyal relationship between employees 
and Fuld. These endogenous factors contributed to the shift of power between the two 
groups. The power previously held by Fuld and his well-compensated senior executive team 
had shifted to the firm’s other stakeholders, including its lower level employees. 
Poor Performance Increases Scrutiny 
The poorer performance during 2007 and 2008 created an atmosphere of disappointment, 
uncertainty and even scepticism amongst stakeholders including creditors, stockholders and 
their securities analysts. The actions of LB and its key executives experienced greater scruti-
ny by external observers especially the security analysts, such as Einhorn. The common per-









ception that the longest serving CEO on Wall Street, ‘could do no wrong’ gradually disap-
peared. Fuld’s ability to make uncontested decisions was diminishing.  
A study by Petukh (2009), found a reversal in broker recommendations from a positive stock 
‘buy’ recommendation before the release of LB’s 2008 second quarter results to either a 
neutral ‘hold’ or negative ‘sell’ recommendation afterwards. As analysts grew wary of LB’s 
financial position their level of scrutiny over the firm increased. “They tracked every deci-
sion made by management and reported on positive and negative effects” (Petukh 2009, p. 
32). 
Fuld Loses Power over Commentators 
Fuld’s social relations within and outside the firm (the agencies in Clegg’s circuits of power) 
were weakening thereby reducing his means of directing outcomes. The increasing vigilance 
of securities analysts and the media demonstrated through their respective actions of short-
ing LB’s shares and increasing negative media reporting, transformed the rules within which 
LB was accustomed to operate.  
The pressure for enhanced transparency is interpreted as a refixing of the rules contained in 
Clegg’s dispositional circuit. Transparency was required in the release of the third quarter 
financial results. The USD 4.09 billion loss represented the outcome of a newly refixed 
‘transparency’ rule transmitted through the obligatory passage point of the newly released 
accounting standard on ‘fair market value’. The social relations between analysts and LB’s 
financial control executives had changed and trust in LB’s financial reporting had lessened.  
Pursuant to the new accounting standard FSAS 157, LB was pressured to disclose more de-
tails than usual, resulting in a clearer picture of their true financial predicament. In the pro-
cess of disclosing financial statements with greater transparency, a shift of power occurred 
from Fuld and his team to the external agencies comprising LB’s stakeholders and the me-
dia. The new holders of power were finally able to make informed decisions based on a true 
and fair position of the firm. 
Reduction of Bonuses Causes Resentment 
The second endogenous factor is associated with the first and relates to bonus compensa-
tion. The declining performance of LB involved a commensurate decrease in compensation 
paid to employees. Throughout his tenure at LB, Fuld was admired by his employees 
(McDonald & Robinson 2009). Even from a distance Paulson observed that Fuld “was direct 
and personable, a strong leader who inspired and demanded loyalty, but like many founders 
his ego was entwined with the firm’s. Any criticism of Lehman was a criticism of Dick Fuld” 




Fuld engendered gratitude and loyalty. Since the firm’s listing, LB produced profits in each 
year until 2008, thereby perpetuating the strong loyalty held by Fuld.  
Once the firm began experiencing financial distress in 2007, from a share price and balance 
sheet perspective, there were signs of dissention within the ranks of LB. This was exempli-
fied by Gelband’s and Kirk’s attitudes towards LB’s elevated risk profile and their willingness 
to confront Fuld with their concerns. The dissention, although only acted upon by very few 
such as Gelband and Kirk who were pressured to leave the firm, was affecting numerous 
employees.  
Despite the dramatic share price decline in the second half of 2007, the year was deemed 
successful from a financial reporting perspective. LB reported a record net profit after tax 
for the year ended 30 November 2007 of USD 4.13 billion (up by 5% from the previous year) 
and total revenue of USD 59 billion (up by 26% over the previous year). 2007 represented 
the fifth consecutive year of record profits. When the bonus pool was announced for 2007, 
many employees were left dissatisfied. Lawrence McDonald, the Vice President of Dis-
tressed Debt and Convertible Securities at LB during 2007 commented on Fuld and Gregory 
as follows: 
It was however perfectly obvious that the two leaders had nothing but contempt for us. And 
when they sat down to work out the bonuses, they screwed us all. The traders’ standard 
agreement on Wall Street had been a USD 20 million profit to earn a USD 1 million bonus. 
That went straight out the window. My bonus, after my second straight USD 30 million a 
year was way down, nowhere near my expectations. It was the same all through the de-
partment. Dick [Fluld] and Joe [Gregory] just cut us all back- Beggans, Gramins, Schellbach, 
Stafford, Castle. And now we had no one to fight for us (McDonald & Robinson 2009, p. 274).  
Although the Total Annual Compensation Report dated 28 January 2008 shows a number of 
executives with increased bonuses, a degree of resentment such as that displayed by Law-
rence MacDonald persisted from some quarters within LB. The resentment would have 
been amplified once staff discovered that Fuld and Gregory had received record bonuses in 
2007 of USD 40 million and USD 34 million respectively (Lehman Brothers Holdings 2008f). 
Dissatisfaction at this disparity in compensation levels between Fuld and Gregory and the 
rest of the staff prompted further challenges to Fuld’s authority. Consequently the power 
that Fuld exercised by virtue of being the principal largely responsible for fixing the rules re-
lating to compensation arrangements, had begun to diminish as disaffected staff viewed the 
exercise of this power as being inequitable and unfair. 
6.6.2 Exogenous Factors 
The exogenous environment influencing Fuld’s power base included the political atmos-
phere, the social relations between the investment banking industry, key regulators, politi-




interaction as external exigencies through either the dispositional or facilitative circuits as 
explained below. 
Economic Climate 
Despite experiencing a cyclical downturn in 2001, the US economic climate from 1994 to 
2007 had been positive without recording any negative Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
growth rates (Figure 84). 
Figure 84 - US Economic Growth 1994 - 2008 
 
Source: The data used for the graph was extracted from World Bank, International Compari-
son Program database, (World Bank 2016). 
This pattern of prosperity is confirmed as measured by Gross National Income (GNI) per cap-
















Figure 85 - US GNI per Capita 1994 – 2008 
 
Source: The data used for the graph was extracted from World Bank, International Compari-
son Program database, (World Bank 2016). 
From 2001 onwards, a credit bubble started to appear in the US. Significant amounts of cap-
ital moved into the US in search of higher returns. Much of the imported capital was di-
rected to the financial institutions sector and used to fund home mortgage lending. A hous-
ing bubble was in the making, and through the process of securitisation, financial institu-
tions replenished their balance sheet borrowing capacities and poured further money into 
the housing market. Refer CHAPTER 2 for a more detailed description of the economic envi-
ronment leading to the GFC.  
The positive economic climate prevailing at the time of Fuld’s leadership had convinced the 
various successive federal governments in the US to continue to pursue a neo-liberal ap-
proach spurred by its champion, Ronald Reagan who was the 40th President of the US from 
1981 to 1989. This approach was characterised by a ‘low regulatory touch’ and whilst the 
investment banking industry was thriving, a laissez faire attitude towards regulation allowed 
the markets to virtually self-regulate. See section 2.1 discussing the SEC capital rule applying 
to US investment banks which was voluntary in nature (Financial Crisis Enquiry Commission 
2011; Swedberg 2010). This political environment known as ‘Reaganomics’ at its inception, 
provided relative autonomy to the industry and as shown in section 8.2.2, allowed the pow-
erful lobby group to successfully prosecute the industry’s objective of influencing the regu-
latory framework.   
Further, Alan Greenspan, the Federal Reserve Chairman during the period between 1987 





















markets. The resultant lower interest rates permitted a cheaper financing of asset purchases 
including property contributing to the abovementioned property bubble of 2008. Refer Fig-
ure 86 for a graph charting the declining trend of the Federal Reserve Funds Rate (Fed Funds 
Rate)61 during this period. 
Figure 86 - Fed Funds Rate 1987 to 2008 
 
* For detailed changes in the Fed Funds Rate refer to Appendix D. 
Source: Data for graph sourced from Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis FRED Economic Data, 
(Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis 2016). 




 The Fed Funds Rate is a target interest rate set by the Federal Reserve System at which, through open mar-
ket operations, The Federal Reserve influences the interest rate at which US depositary institutions lend USD 
to each other from their reserve balances on an unsecured basis. This interbank rate is known as the effective 
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Economic Climate as an Exogenous Factor in the Facilitative Circuit 
The economic climate, an exogenous factor, as depicted in Clegg’s (1989) facilitative circuit 
was the external stimulus to empower the industry. The power to influence regulation by 
the investment banking lobby group met little resistance in the laissez-faire environment 
and the lobbyists who carried out the wishes of the industry represented the obligatory pas-
sage point between the facilitative circuit and the episodic circuit where the influence on 
legislators was exerted. Since Fuld, as Chairman of one of the largest firms on Wall Street, 
represented a key player in the industry, power facilitated by the economic climate, also 
flowed to him.  
However as soon as the positive US economic climate began to turn during 2007/2008, the 
liberal approach previously adopted by regulators and legislators reversed. The Treasury 
and Federal Reserve were attempting to update the regulatory framework to ensure the 
activities and leverage of investment banks were effectively supervised and to attempt to 
rein in the expanding risk profile of participants. These actions were an acknowledgement 
that regulators had lagged the changing practices and progress of innovation within the in-
dustry (Johnson & Kwak 2011; Paulson 2011). The regulatory structure, based on traditional 
lines had not kept up with the evolution of the markets, which was acknowleded by Paulson 
as follows: “As a result, the country had a patchwork system of state and federal supervisors 
dating back 75 years…which had led to counterproductive competition among regulators, 
wasteful duplication in some areas and gaping holes in others” (Paulson 2011, p. 125).  
Accordingly, in March 2008, Paulson unveiled the ‘Blueprint for a Modernised Financial Reg-
ulatory System’ (Paulson et al. 2008). This document proposed a new regulatory structure, 
not new regulations, though Paulson admitted that “we clearly needed some” (Paulson 
2011, p. 126). Despite the efforts in preparing this report, Paulson emphasised that “no ma-
jor regulatory changes should be enacted while the financial system was under strain” 
(Paulson 2011, p. 126). 
Political Atmosphere 
Following the government’s bailout of Bear Stearns earlier in 2008, the government detect-
ed a backlash from the public to the use of taxpayer funds to bailout private industry. 
Moreover, an investment bank whose employees were remunerated far in excess of the US 
average wage represented the worst aspect of greed and avarice. See sections 6.6.1 and 
10.5 for a detailed analysis of investment banking remuneration. This perception was 
heightened after the taxpayer funded rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and the ex-
pansion of industry assistance provided by way of the PDCF. Treasury’s major concern at 
this time was the moral hazard created following these government assisted bailouts. On 10 




All of us were well aware that after Fannie and Freddie, the country, Congress, and both par-
ties were fed up with the bailouts. Obama and McCain, neck and neck in the national polls, 
each spoke out against them on the campaign trail. The previous day in fact McCain and Pal-
in had published an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal entitled ‘We’ll Protect Taxpayers from 
More Bailouts’. And just before our conference call had begun I’d spoken with Chris Dodd62 
who told me, Fuld is a friend. Try to help, but don’t bail Lehman out (Paulson 2011, p. 181). 
Being spurred and influenced by politics, Paulson and Geithner heeded Dodd’s advice. Paul-
son had also agreed with Cox from the SEC and Bernanke from the Federal Reserve that as 
representatives of the key regulatory authorities involved in the US financial system, they 
should keep close communication, and co-ordinate and seek consensus on all meaningful 
decisions and actions (Paulson 2011). Therefore any legislative initiative by any one of them 
is deemed to have tacit approval from all three authorities before enactment.  
Dodd as Chairman of the Senate Banking Committee was perceived within and outside of 
government as the political thought leader in the financial system. Therefore he possessed 
authority within the dispositional circuit given his ability to influence rule making and the 
meaning of those rules, and fixing relations of membership between government and regu-
lators. Ultimately, Dodd’s power was facilitated by his influence over the US President’s ap-
pointment of The Secretary of the Treasury, the two Under Secretaries, an Under Secretary 
for Enforcement, and two Deputy Under-Secretaries. The President relies on the Senate for 
his recommendations and the Senate was strongly guided by the Chairman of the Senate 
Banking Committee who at the time was Dodd (U.S. Code - Department of the Treasury  
1947). 
Changes in Social Relations between Industry and Government within the Ep-
isodic Circuit 
Changes of social relations between agencies at the episodic level have the potential to im-
pact on the degree and direction of power to generate a different outcome. The social rela-
tions between LB and the regulatory community had changed during the onset of the crisis, 
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resulting in outcomes detrimental to LB. Paulson had known Fuld for many years, given 
Paulson was ex-CEO of Goldman Sachs prior to his appointment as the Treasury Secretary. 
Paulson (2011, p. 155) expressed concerned about LB and claims that he “kept an eye on 
Lehman’s travails, speaking regularly with Dick about his options. The best of these were to 
sell his firm”. Paulson’s call log would show nearly fifty discussions with Fuld in the six 
months between Bear Stearns’ failure and LB’s collapse, and his staff would have had at 
least as many calls (Paulson 2011, p. 137). On 9 September, Paulson expressed his frustra-
tion with Fuld in a conversation with Ken Wilson63: 
Does he [referring to Fuld] know how serious the problem is? I asked? He’s still clinging to the 
view that somehow or other the Fed has the power to inject capital. Ken answered. I felt a 
wave of frustration. Tim Geithner and I had repeatedly told Dick that the government had no 
legal authority to inject capital in an investment bank. That was one reason I had been push-
ing him to find a buyer since Bear Stearns failed in March. Fuld had replaced Lehman’s top 
management, laid-off thousands of employees, and pitched restructured ideas, but the firm’s 
heavy exposure to mortgage-backed securities had discouraged suitors and had left him un-
able to make a deal. Ken had been telling Dick [Fuld] with increasing urgency that he needed 
to be ready to sell, but Dick did not want to consider any offer below USD 10 per share. Bear 
Stearns had gotten that, and he would accept nothing less for Lehman (Paulson 2011, p. 
173).  
Despite Paulson’s repeated efforts at attempting to convince Fuld to sell LB, a sale was nev-
er consummated. This thesis argues that the personal antipathy and frustration towards 
Fuld by Paulson over this inaction promoted an increasing indifference towards the survival 
of LB. After all, Fuld was placing the financial system at risk – a financial system over which 
Paulson had stewardship. Fuld had unsuccessfully negotiated with several potential suitors 
including Berkshire Hathaway, General Electric, Bank of America, Korea Development Bank, 
the Chinese government owned Citic Securities, Deutsche Bank, Morgan Stanley, HSBC and 
some middle eastern sovereign wealth funds, however most negotiations failed as a result 
of Fuld wanting too high a price (Johnson & Kwak 2011; McDonald & Robinson 2009; 
Paulson 2011). Paulson’s frustration and possible antipathy towards Fuld was clear: “It was 
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clear to Ken and me [Paulson] that Dick [Fuld] was looking for an unrealistic price” (Paulson 
2011, p. 158). This attitude could be considered as contributing factors to Paulson’s attitude 
towards allowing LB to fail.  
As the Treasury Secretary, Paulson had significant powers under legislation to protect the 
financial system. Within the facilitative circuit, the legislation constitutes an exogenous 
stimulus. Paulson’s power differed between that available to enforce legislation and to in-
fluence any change in legislation. The power to enforce is afforded within the dispositional 
circuit given his role as head of the Treasury department and his intimate knowledge of the 
applicable laws. The power could flow through to the episodic circuit where the implemen-
tation and enforcement of the existing legislation could direct the behaviours of the industry 
participants. 
Paulson was however seeking to introduce new legislation to deal with the new financial 
industry environment, particularly with entities dealing in derivatives. His power to change 
legislation, however, was limited. This power is generated within the facilitative circuit and 
requires agreement by both houses of Congress. To channel power to the episodic circuit, 
Congress would need to exercise its dispositional power inherent in its authority to enact 
legislation. The power would then need to pass through the facilitative circuit to empower 
the external government agencies to enforce the applicable legislation. Paulson realised 
that to push for any new legislation, he would need political support within both houses of 
Congress. This power was concentrated within two committees, the House Financial Ser-
vices Committee and the Senate Banking Committee. Paulson acknowledged the lagging 
regulatory response: 
The financial world had changed – with investment banks and hedge funds playing increas-
ingly critical roles – but our [Treasury Department] powers and authorities had not kept up to 




In his attempt in July 2008 to establish new legislation to deal with troubled investment 
banks, Paulson sought the advice of Barney Frank,64 Chairman of the House Financial Ser-
vices Committee: 
Barney Frank was supportive but cautioned us against trying to push legislation that was so 
complex substantively and politically. We concluded that there was no way we could get 
what we needed passed… We knew it wasn’t going to be easy to work with the authorities 
we had… Instead Barney encouraged the Fed [Federal Reserve] and Treasury to interpret our 
existing powers broadly to protect the system, saying: If you do so, I’m not going to raise le-
gal issues (Paulson 2011, p. 139). 
Furthermore, Paulson complained: “I’m being called Mr. Bailout. I can’t do it again” (Wessel 
2010, p. 14). Geithner added: “There is no political will for a federal bailout” (Wessel 2010, 
p. 16). The lack of political will through either of the government’s representative bodies, 
the House Financial Services Committee and the Senate Banking Committee, to introduce 
new legislation specifically to deal with LB’s difficulties without necessitating bankruptcy 
signalled a change of attitude. This attitude had the effect of disempowering the investment 
banking industry, by limiting its options to survive a crisis. 
6.7 The Wash-up 
Following LB’s declaration of bankruptcy, liquidity in the financial markets had evaporated 
and securities began to trade at heavy discounts. The Treasury department realised it need-
ed to secure funding to buy the toxic securities held in the market to prevent a wider melt-
down. This was enabled by new legislation known as the Emergency Economic Stabilisation 
Act which was passed on 3 October 2008.  
In addition, the Federal Reserve committed trillions of dollars to an expanding list of liquidi-
ty programs intended to support the financial system. These included the Term Auction Fa-
cility, the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility, The Money Market Investor Funding 
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Facility, and the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facil-
ity. The considerable government assistance would become the largest industry support 
package in US history. The US government realised the dire consequences to the larger 
economy if it was not prepared to act. The ultimate irony of this turn of events was that the 
support was directed to an industry which had for decades rejected and lobbied against 
government intervention. Policymakers who once espoused a minimalist approach to indus-
try supervision were encouraging intervention. 
6.8 Summary 
This chapter analyses the contributing factors immediately preceding LB’s collapse such as 
the role played by innovation which included the use of CDOs and their credit downgrading; 
the practice of warehousing mortgage related assets, which left LB overexposed to this as-
set class and placed them in a precarious financial position; the lack of sufficient transparen-
cy by LB, considered important to maintain investor confidence; and the effect on LB’s share 
price once confidence in them was lost. This chapter further reveals evidence of the behav-
iour of some LB employees and Fuld himself towards external partners in their attempts to 
stave off a crisis. Fuld’s reaction to the firm’s difficulties was subject to institutional influ-
ence and his attempts at an expansion strategy and denial of his own accountability is 
shown as an exercise power. The regulator’s contrasting attitude towards other troubled 
financial institutions and LB reflected the shifting nature of power between LB (including the 
industry) and the regulators to reveal why LB was allowed to fail whilst other contemporary 
institutions were saved. The dysfunctional behavioural and cultural influences on LB had es-
tablished the foundation for a series of decisions which led to a deterioration of its risk pro-
file which ultimately caused its bankruptcy. The impact of these decisions, are manifested in 





 OVERVIEW OF ORGANISATIONAL CHAPTER 7
AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE 
7.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter covered the period prior to LB’s collapse, analysing the institutional 
influences on it and the dysfunctional exercise of power and how these informed manage-
ment decisions which affected the firm’s ongoing operations. This chapter examines the in-
vestment banking industry’s shared business model, analysing it through the lens of DiMag-
gio & Powell’s (1983) New Institutional Theory. Together with a financial overview of LB and 
its peer group, the chapter identifies mimetic pressure as the key influence on LB’s business 
activities and financial structure. The mimetic influence explains why all the major US in-
vestment banks experienced similar financial difficulties albeit to various degrees. Further, 
this chapter argues that the excessive leverage LB accumulated was a root cause of its fail-
ure.      
This chapter illustrates the extent to which LB and some of its peers reached a critical level 
of risk. In an effort not to underperform relative to their peers, the investment banks largely 
gravitated towards a common business model and financial structure. Any underperfor-
mance would jeopardise access to capital, new customers and potential employees with 
valuable skills. As a result, and in the common pursuit of growth, the peer group pursued 
the leverage effect as an easy mechanism to increase profitability. The institutional influ-
ence on the industry is reinforced by the common consequence of a weakening of their fi-
nancial position where the investment banks pushed their leverage to unsustainable levels.    
Section 7.2 describes LB’s business model as a one stop shop servicing the needs of a full 
array of clients from the corporate, governmental, institutional and retail sectors. It argues 
that the business model was subject to a mimetic influence which resulted in a very similar 
business model and activities adopted by the other large US investment banks. Section 7.3 
provides an overview of the financial structure of LB, which focuses on the firm’s trend in 
profitability, which increased from 2004 until 2007, culminating in significant losses in the 
last two fiscal quarters in 2008 preceding its collapse. The losses coincided with an increas-
ing reliance on the firm’s risky business of securities trading. This section also reveals LB’s 
increasing leverage ratio during the period based on a capital structure which included some 
items of capital which, in nature, resembled debt. If this capital was reclassified as debt, a 
higher leverage ratio would have resulted. Finally, it is argued that the combination of in-




maximising profits amongst all investment banks. This common approach to exploiting the 
leverage effect is reflected in a range of similar returns generated by the peer group and 
supports the notion of a mimetic pressure amongst the banks to pursue similar strategies in 
their profit maximisation objectives. 
7.2 LB’s Business Model  
This section outlines LB’s business model and finds similar business models operating within 
the industry. The financial structure of LB is a consequence of its business model, strategy, 
activities and financial transactions. Business models adopted by the investment banks were 
found to be subjected to a mimetic influence. In their efforts to compete for valuable re-
sources such as capital, reputation, prestige, skills and gain new customers, they attempted 
to avoid a negative perception associated with an underperforming firm. This is consistent 
with the notion supported by Hasse and Krücken (2008) that firms examine and mimic the 
practices of peer group participants in attempts not to be perceived overtly different. . This 
strong desire not to be perceived as a low ranking firm spawned a practice of replicating 
product and services offered by competitors, which resulted in similar divisional organisa-
tional structures between firms. However under financial pressure towards the end of its 
corporate existence, Fuld deviated slightly from the traditional model by expanding a riskier 
segment of its business in the hope of generating superior returns in an uncertain environ-
ment. 
By 2006, like many of its peers, LB operated in three major business segments. Firstly, it op-
erated a division principally involved in investment management which included depart-
ments such as: Private Investment Management, which targeted products particularly to-
wards the retail market such as high net worth individuals; Institutional Asset Management 
which involved the management of portfolio investments on behalf of institutional, corpo-
rate and individual clients; Private Equity where the firm invested in the equity of businesses 
on behalf of, and alongside its customers; and Securities Services which involved brokerage 
activities on behalf of clients (Lehman Brothers Holdings 2008j, p. 8). 
The second major business segment was the Investment Banking Division which comprised: 
Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A); Global Finance; and Corporate Services departments. The 
M&A department included the Advisory and Restructuring Services sections. The Advisory 
section was focused on providing advisory services which supported LB’s clients’ mergers 
and acquisitions activities, whilst the Restructuring section assisted corporations in distress 
to overcome financial difficulties. The Global Finance department generally supported the 
fund-raising activities of LB’s clients. The Risk Solutions section within the Global Finance 




of clients including interest rates, inflation, commodities and currency risks. The Private Cap-
ital Markets section assisted clients by raising private equity and financing through the debt 
markets to optimise their capital structures. The Leverage Finance, Equity Capital Markets, 
and Debt Capital Markets sections were involved in client fund-raising, often with under-
writing commitments. The major risk carried by LB in these sections involved the price risk 
associated with variations in a securities price (either debt or equity) during the underwrit-
ing period. The remaining department within the Investment Banking Division included: the 
Corporate Finance department which was organised into global industry groups such as the 
Communications, Consumer/Retail, Financial Institutions, Financial Sponsors, Healthcare, 
Industrial, Media, Middle Markets, Natural Resources, Power, Real Estate and Technology 
groups (Lehman Brothers Holdings 2008j, pp. 7-8). These groups incorporated coverage 
bankers who were experts in their respective industry specialisation and who were the cen-
tral point of contact to meet the financial objectives of clients (Lehman Brothers Holdings 
2008j).  
The third major division was known as the Capital Markets Division. Through this division, LB 
operated a number of departments: the Equity and Fixed Income Brokerage department 
which offered brokerage and research capabilities to its clients; the Proprietary Investments 
and Trading department where the firm entered into proprietary securities and derivatives 
positions, thereby creating risks for its own balance sheet; the Mortgage Origination and 
Securitisation department which was the department which caused LB’s major financial dis-
tress prior to its collapse (refer section 6.2 for a discussion of LB’s balance sheet problems 
arising from its CDO warehousing), and where LB accumulated significant volumes of mort-
gage related assets with the intention of removing them from its balance sheet through the 
securitisation process. This area relied on the distribution expertise contained in the Capital 
Markets Global Distribution department which was involved in: the sales of securities in the 
primary and secondary markets and; the Capital Markets Prime Services department which 
covered the Secured Financing, Prime Broker, Futures and Clearing and Execution business-
es (Lehman Brothers Holdings 2008j, pp. 4-7).  
The Capital Markets Division, specifically, the fixed income section of the proprietary in-
vestments department is the division where Fuld and most of his senior management team 
began their careers and developed their trading culture. Refer to Figure 87 for an opera-
tional structure of LB. This chart is developed from data obtained from detailed descriptions 
of LB’s activities included as part of its prospectus published for a German bond issue 
planned in 2008, and therefore represents the last formal comprehensive description of the 





Figure 87 - Operational Structure of LB 
 
Source: The data used for the chart was extracted from Lehman Brothers Holdings (2008j, pp. 3-10).  
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LB serviced a full array of clients and their global headquarters was located in New York with 
other major offices in London and Tokyo. Other satellite offices were positioned in the US, 
Europe, the Middle East, Latin America and the Asia Pacific region. As a large investment 
bank, LB was a significant participant and market-maker in all fixed income and equity mar-
kets (Lehman Brothers Holdings 2008j, p. 3). LB’s public trading activities were conducted 
through most of the major securities and commodities exchanges of which it was a member. 
These included the NYSE, and other exchanges in London, Tokyo, Hong Kong, Frankfurt, Par-
is, Milan, Singapore and Australia. LB alo held a membership with the Financial Industry 
Regulatory Authority – FINRA (Lehman Brothers Holdings 2008j).  
As mentioned in section 5.2.6, Russo, LB’s Chief Legal Officer, was a member of the Regula-
tory Policy Committee of the Board of Governors of the Financial Industry Regulatory Au-
thority, which regulates securities firms and US exchange markets on behalf of the NYSE in 
accordance with SEC requirements. Therefore by having an employee as a member of the 
policy committee responsible for regulating the activities of the securities industry, LB pos-
sessed the potential to influence policy debate relating to its own activities. This enabled an 
insider to participate in the coercive influence usually found exerted by regulator to the 
regulated as explained by Milstein et al. (2002) and (Oliver 1990). FINRA is an independent 
not-for-profit organisation authorised by Congress to protect US investors by ensuring the 
securities industry: operates fairly and honestly; examines firms for compliance to rules re-
lating to securities dealing; fosters market transparency; educates investors; resolves securi-
ties disputes; and deters misconduct by enforcing the rules by either imposing fines, sus-
pending or barring firms from operating in the industry. An examination of Financial 
Industry Regulatory Authority (2017) database of adjudications and decisions relating to 
non-compliance of regulations by securities firms which extends back to 1997 revealed no 
actions against LB. 
Apart from its proprietary trading activities, LB conducted business with its clients through a 
client centric model where a team of coverage bankers maintained relationships with clients 
based on their industry. This entailed the allocation to clients of industry-expert coverage 
bankers so that an intimate knowledge of the challenges, opportunities, risks and strengths 
of the client and its industry could provide helpful insights in providing advisory services and 
generate fund raising opportunities for LB. Product specialists were called in for assistance 
as required. LB’s strategy was to be a one stop shop for its clients and to diversify its range 
of activities in an attempt to withstand downturns in the global and domestic economic cy-
cles (Lehman Brothers Holdings 2008j).  
7.2.1 Similarities in the Peer Group’s Business Model 
The large investment banks in LB’s peer group included Bear Stearns, Morgan Stanley, 




ness models and activities. Although JP Morgan Chase undertook investment banking activi-
ties, the majority of its business comprised commercial banking activities. Therefore any 
balance sheet or profit and loss comparisons within LB’s peer group included in this section 
needs to account for the nature of JP Morgan Chase’s different activities and allow for a sig-
nificant portion of its balance sheet to comprise loan receivables normally associated with 
commercial banking operations. Operational descriptions of JP Morgan Chase in this section 
however specifically relate to its investment banking operations.  
US Investment banks operate in a competitive and ambiguous environment where econom-
ic cycles, and evolving technology and innovation are constant features and challenges. As 
discussed in section 4.4, firms rely heavily on valuable resources such as capital, reputation, 
prestige, and skills of employees to deal with the competitive nature of the industry. Firms 
are challenged to enhance performance, generate future revenue and portray compliance 
to industry standards and regulation, whether it be voluntary or imposed. Therefore in-
vestment banks compete for the abovementioned valuable resources to provide them with 
any advantage. In order to compete effectively, firms also try to ensure they stay up-to-date 
on technology and product development. Not offering a similar innovative product suite as 
those of its competitors may indicate a business has not embraced best practice in its cus-
tomer service proposition and therefore risks becoming a marketing disadvantage. Mimick-
ing a new product development or customer service strategy of a competitor would reduce 
this risk (Boxenbaum & Jonsson 2008).  
Analysts, on whom stockholders regularly rely for stock selection recommendations, natu-
rally analyse peer group performance as part of their overall assessment of an investment 
bank. Often included in their assessments, are the access an investment bank has to the 
abovementioned valuable resources. If an investment bank significantly underperforms rel-
ative to its peer group, the underperformance would be reflected in the analyst’s recom-
mendation, whose normal practice is to apply a sell recommendation if the underperfor-
mance was considered material. This practice, which particularly affects access to capital, 
places significant pressure on firms to publish accounts showing strong performance. Addi-
tionally, according to section 10.5, employees prefer to be associated with a market-leading 
employer not only because it would impact favourably on their bonuses, but because it 
would enhance their staff mobility and in turn the potential opportunities of joining another 
firm on a higher compensation arrangement.  
For these reasons, investment banks are motivated to replicate each other’s business mod-
els in an effort to reduce any comparative peer group underperformance. The process of 
replication of a business model is explained by DiMaggio & Powell’s (1983) mimetic isomor-
phism. This arm of DiMaggio & Powell’s (1983) theory, and supported by Boxenbaum and 
Jonsson (2008) and Hasse and Krücken (2008),argues that businesses pursue a similarity 




practice is perceived as risk averse. The conformity follows a process of ‘reverse observa-
tion’ whereby firms observe each other’s behaviours and practices to identify those that 
have the potential to minimise the cost of human capital, and enhance prestige and reputa-
tion – the major features on which firms compete. The focus on comparing themselves to 
competitors is evidenced in their annual reports and strategy documents as analysed in sec-
tion 10.6.1. Furthermore the practice adds legitimacy in the eyes of stakeholders, in this 
case stockholders and employees. 
Although each investment bank named and described each of their operating divisions 
slightly differently, for example using different business segment titles in their annual re-
ports, this section has summarised their activities into three segments for comparison pur-
poses. The process undertaken involved classifying the various business activities identified 
in the business segment reporting contained in the Form 10-K65 annual reports for each in-
vestment bank and categorising them into three broad segments: ‘Wealth Management, 
Asset Management and Securities Services’; ‘Investment Banking’ and ‘Total Principal Trans-
actions and Trading’ as shown in Figure 88. The categorisation process involved allocating 
business segments to the broad categories which more closely resembled their activity. The 
classifications in Figure 88 summarises the segments used and their allocation into three 
broad categories. The investment banks all offered a similar one stop shop business model 
focused on providing a comprehensive suite of services to their clients across all investment 
banking activities. Additionally within each division, there are the administrative areas 
known as the middle and back offices, which support the revenue raising departments 
known as the front offices.  
Figure 88 - Business Segment Classifications Used in Investment Bank Annual Reports 
Business Segment Classification  
Used in Figure 89 
Businesses Descriptions  
Used in Annual Reports 
Wealth Management, Asset Management 
and Securities Services 
Private Client Services 
Institutional Asset Management 
Private Equity 
Account Administration 




 Form 10-K reports are the annual financial statements which are lodged with the SEC. They are publicly 




Business Segment Classification  
Used in Figure 89 
Businesses Descriptions  
Used in Annual Reports 
 




Total Principal Transactions and Trading, or 
Similar 
Equity Trading 








Figure 89 outlines reported net revenue66 attributed to the three broad business segments 
of each of the five selected peer group investment banks. Data is taken from the segment 
reporting sections of their annual reports for latest full year reporting period prior to LB’s 
bankruptcy67. Businesses excluded from the segment reporting include: retail banking, 
commercial banking, and card services, all of which related to segments included in JP Mor-
gan Chase’s annual report. These segments specifically relate to commercial banking opera-
tions which were not carried out by the other members of the peer group.  
 
 




 Net Revenue is defined as Total Revenue (fees, commissions, revenue from asset sales, interest income, and 
dividends) less Financial Asset Devaluation and Interest Expense. It is likened to the notion of ‘gross profit’ as it 
represents a profit calculated after subtracting from gross revenue, direct input costs, which for a financial 
institution includes interest expense and devaluations on financial assets held. It is therefore before overheads 
and tax. 
67
 Merrill Lynch is normally included in the peer group however has been excluded from the peer group com-
parison as it grouped results in only two segments: Global Markets and Investment Banking; and Global 











































830  3,097  6,519  7,206  12,880   





3,849  3,903  6,368  7,555  13,761   








1,323  12,257  11,150  31,226  11,354 
 
  




6,002  19,257  24,037  45,987  37,995  100 
Source: Data was extracted from 2007 Form 10-K Annual Reports for each corporation: 
(Bear Stearns 2006, p. 109; Goldman Sachs Group 2008a, p. 3; JP Morgan Chase 2007, p. 41; 
Lehman Brothers Holdings 2007, p. 47; Morgan Stanley 2008a, p. 49). 
Notes: 
1. NR = Net Revenue 
2. JP Morgan Chase has been included in the comparison even though it had merged 
with the bank, Chase Manhattan Corporation in 2000, thereby, not officially classi-
fied as a non-bank financial institution. However, as it did carry out investment bank-




Figure 90 - Average Business Segment Size Based on Consolidated Net Revenue for LB and 
Peer Group - 200768 
 
Source: Data was extracted from 2007 Form 10-K Annual Reports for each corporation: 
(Bear Stearns 2006, p. 109; Goldman Sachs Group 2008a, p. 3; JP Morgan Chase 2007, p. 41; 
Lehman Brothers Holdings 2007, p. 47; Morgan Stanley 2008a, p. 49). 
Business segments were common for each investment bank (refer Figure 90) even though 
the proportion of net revenue generated by each respective segment differs (refer Figure 
89). The slightly differing proportions of segment net revenue reflect the subtle differing 























Business Segment Revenue as % of Consolidated Net 





strategic objectives of each investment bank at the time. These strategic objectives may also 
indicate the differing comparative advantages of each firm. For example, LB’s traditional 
strengths in trading and appetite for the risks associated with that activity are reflected in 
the larger proportion of their net revenue generated by the Total Principal Transactions and 
Trading Division. Rhee (2010) argues that the business models of investment banks remain 
stable during prosperous economic cycles. This is explained by the lack of pressure to 
change strategy due to an ongoing recording of superior returns in such a growth environ-
ment. This was the case during the period between 1996 and 2000 when returns on equity 
for the major investment banks averaged 25% (Rhee 2010, p. 181). Refer section 7.3 below 
for a peer group financial analysis. 
The discussion of the historical context of the economic cycle during the decade prior to the 
GFC is relevant. A major impetus to growth for the industry arose from The Gramm-Bleach-
Bliley Act of 1999, which removed the barriers to cross-selling of investment banking and 
commercial banking products (Mayer et al. 2009). As a result investment banks could seek 
banking licences or merge with bank holding companies, and therefore offer a wider range 
of products and services. However, after the 2001/2002 stock market collapse which was 
precipitated by the ‘Tech Bubble’,69 and the 11 September 2001 terrorist attack, the conse-
quent drop in overall US investment activity negatively impacted the business segments 
most susceptible to economic downturns. These included the Wealth Management, Asset 
Management and Securities Services and Investment Banking segments, whose proportion 
of the combined industry’s net revenue declined. In response, most of the industry diverted 
its focus towards the Total Principal Transactions and Trading Divisions, which contributed 
69% of Net Revenue by 2006 compared to 15% for investment banking and 16% for asset 
management (Rhee 2010, pp. 81-2). Contributions from the Total Principal Transactions and 
Trading Divisions in 1997 were much lower - approximately 40% (Rhee 2010, p. 85). 
Section 7.3 provides a financial analysis of LB highlighting the escalating on-balance sheet 
risks during the period 2007 to 2008 and resulting reduction in profitability prior to LB’s 
bankruptcy. The section also presents evidence that the abovementioned mimetic influ-




 The ‘Tech Bubble’ is a term describing the significant growth in stock prices of corporations involved in the 




ences which affected the peer group business models also extended to the financial struc-
ture of the other large investment banks.  
7.3 Financial Structure Overview 
This section presents a financial analysis of LB and the US investment banking industry. It 
commences with a trend analysis of LB’s financial position based on a financial data sum-
mary and a time series of financial ratios including balance sheet and performance ratios, to 
understand the evolution of the firm’s risk profile. The time series covers a term of four 
years concluding in 2007, representing the last full year that audited financial statements 
were published by LB. This term provides a meaningful period to analyse management’s 
medium term decision-making leading up to 2008. Interim quarterly financial statements for 
February, May and August 2008 were also analysed to show a continuing deterioration of 
the firm’s financial position in the immediate period prior to bankruptcy on 15 September 
2008. 
Secondly the financial structure of each investment bank in the peer group for their respec-
tive financial year ending in 2007 is analysed to identify the differences between those 
banks that survived in their own right and those that effectively failed. Finally, a discussion 
of the mimetic influences affecting the financial structure of the participants in the industry 
explains why more than one bank effectively failed. 
7.3.1 Financial Ratios of LB  
This section presents a trend analysis of LB’s financial position showing fluctuations in LB’s 











Figure 91 - Selected Financial Ratios for LB for the Financial Years 2004 to  2007 
 Year Ended 30 November  
LB Key Financial Ratios 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Current Ratio  
(Current Assets/Current Liabilities)  
0.93x 1.01x 0.99x 0.91x 
Liquid Asset Ratio  
(Liquid Assets/Total Assets)  
0.38x 0.41x 0.43x 0.42x 
Capital Ratio  
(Equity/Total Assets) (%) 
4.18 4.10 3.81 3.25 
Long Term Debt Ratio  
(Long-term Debt/Total Assets) (%) 
14 13 16 18 
Debt to Equity  
(Total Liabilities/Total Equity less Intangible Assets)  
29x 29x 31x 36x 
Warehoused Mortgages and other invest-
ments/Total Assets (%) 
10.81 10.69 11.46 12.89 
Warehoused Mortgages and other invest-
ments/Total Equity (%) 
258.69 260.99 300.80 396.20 
Return on Equity 
(Net Profit before taxation / Equity)  (%) 23.58 28.75 30.77 26.74 
Return on Assets 
(Net Profit before taxation / Total Assets) (%) 
0.98 1.18 1.17 0.87 
Source: Ratios calculated from data contained in (Lehman Brothers Holdings 2005a, pp. 71-
3; 2007, pp. 85-7). 
Figure 92 - Key Financial Data for LB for the Financial Years 2004 to 2007 
 
Year Ended 30 November 
LB Summary  
Financial Data 2004 2005 2006 2007 
 
(USD Millions) (USD Millions) (USD Millions) (USD Millions) 
Total Revenue  21,250 32,420 46,709 59,003 
Net Profit After Tax 
(NPAT) 2,297 3,191 3,941 4,125 
Net Profit Before Tax 
(NPBT) 3,518 4,829 5,905 6,013 
 Total Equity 14,920 16,794 19,191 22,490 
Total Assets 357,168 410,063 503,545 691,063 
Total Liabilities 342,248 393,269 484,354 668,573 
Long Term Borrowings 49,365 53,899 81,178 123,150 
Warehoused Mortgag-
es and other Invest-
ments 38,597 43,831 57,726 89,106 




LB’s Balance Sheet Structure – 2004 to 2007 
Figure 92 depicts a deteriorating trend of LB’s balance sheet structure. The firm’s liquidity 
ratios appear stable up until 2007 however more recent data necessary for an analysis of 
liquidity ratios in 2008 was not included in the LB quarterly financial reports which provided 
summary balance sheet data only. CHAPTER 6 however, discusses how a loss of confidence 
pulled much of LB’s liquidity lines and available liquid assets to meet the demands of credi-
tors towards the latter part of 2008, thereby allowing for a reasonable assumption that li-
quidity ratios would have been impacted.  
The critical ratio representing a proxy for the risk profile of LB is the Debt to Equity ratio – an 
indication of leverage. As shown by Figure 91, this ratio climbed from 29:1 in 2004 to 36:1 in 
2007. A commensurate increase in the long term debt ratio shows the increase in leverage 
was not limited to short term debt as the Long Term Debt ratio climbed from 14% in 2004 to 
18% in 2007. Given the trend of increasing long term debt occurred over several years, it 
indicates a conscious management decision to increase the firm’s leverage as part of an 
overall medium-term strategy. The capital ratio, effectively an inverse of the leverage ratio, 
exhibits a gradual decrease from 2004 to 2007, again reflecting an increased reliance on 
debt as opposed to equity in financing the firm’s investments. Despite LB’s high and increas-
ing leverage it claimed to comply with all capital regulations explicitly in its latest 2007 Form 
10-K Annual Report (Lehman Brothers Holdings 2007, p. 134). LB noted the regulatory 
framework under which it operated as follows: 
The SEC has granted us permission to operate under its CSE rule, a voluntary framework for 
comprehensive, group-wide risk management procedures and consolidated supervision of 
certain financial services holding companies. The rule allows LBI [broker-dealer subsidiary] to 
use an alternative method, based on internal models, to calculate net capital charges for 
market and derivative-related credit risk. Under this rule, Lehman Brothers is subject to 
group-wide supervision and examination by the SEC and is subject to minimum capital re-
quirements on a consolidated basis consistent with the Basel II Accord published by the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision. The CSE Rules are designed to minimize the duplicative 
regulatory requirements on U.S. securities firms resulting from the EU Directive (2002/87/EC) 
concerning the supplementary supervision of financial conglomerates active in the EU. This 
Directive permits non-EU financial groups that conduct business through regulated financial 
entities in the EU to demonstrate that they are subject to equivalent consolidated supervision 
at the ultimate holding company level; the FSA has determined that the SEC undertakes 
equivalent consolidated supervision for Lehman Brothers (Lehman Brothers Holdings 2007, p. 
13).  
Certain other subsidiaries are subject to various securities, commodities and banking regula-
tions and capital adequacy requirements promulgated by the regulatory and exchange au-




ies were in compliance with their applicable local capital adequacy requirements (Lehman 
Brothers Holdings 2007, p. 134). 
In line with Fuld’s strategy of warehousing mortgaged assets and CDOs as discussed in sec-
tion 6.2.2, the amount of mortgage assets and other investments swelled from USD 38.6 
billion in 2004 to USD 89.1 billion in 2007 (Figure 92). As a percentage of total equity, this 
portfolio of risky assets increased consistently from 259% in 2004 to 396% in 2007.  As a 
percentage of total assets the increase was from 10.8% in 2004 to 12.9% in 2007 - refer to 
Figure 92. A detailed discussion of the CDO market and LB’s exposure to this asset class is 
included in Section 6.2. 
In summary, LB’s balance sheet structure weakened over the period 2004 to 2007 as evi-
denced by an increasing reliance on leverage, and maintaining an asset composition con-
taining an increasing proportion of low quality assets. Section 7.3.10 argues that increasing 
the risk profile of the balance sheet was a practice that all US investment banks followed 
from 2003 until 2007, further supporting the notion that they were subjected to a mimetic 
influence which is discussed below. Section 7.3.1 0 discusses the financial performance of LB 
over the same period. 
LB’s Performance – 2004 to 2007 
LB’s profitability increased year on year from 2004 to 2007. NPAT increased significantly, 
rising by 39%, 24%, and 5% for the years to 2005, 2006 and 2007 respectively. This perfor-
mance was based on increases in total revenue of 53%, 44%, and 26% for the same respec-
tive periods. 2007 was a record year for LB in terms of total revenue and NPAT. Refer to Fig-




Figure 93 - LB NPAT and Total Revenue for Period 2004 – 2007 
  
Source: (Lehman Brothers Holdings 2005a, pp. 71-3; 2007, pp. 85-7). 
However the year on year percentage increase in NPAT declined significantly from 2006 to 
2007 due predominantly to a decreased contribution from the Fixed Income Division which 
recorded a decline in net revenue of 29% to USD 6.0 billion in 2007 from USD 8.4 billion in 
2006. Division contributions to NPAT however, are not available. This deterioration in per-
formance parallels the weakening of the US residential mortgage market and the associated 
fall in value of the wider credit derivatives market during 2007. See section 6.2.2 for a de-
tailed discussion of the deterioration during 2007 of these markets.  
LB’s Interim Results – 2008 
An analysis of LB’s results for the quarters ending February, May and August 2008 is set out 
in Figure 94. Results presented are derived from unaudited accounts that were sourced 
from LB’s Form 10-Q Quarterly reports (Lehman Brothers Holdings 2008b, pp. 4-6; 2008c, 
pp. 3-6; 2008d, p. 10). 
Figure 94 - LB Quarterly Financial Data - 2008 
 For Quarter Ended 
Summary Financial Data 29-Feb-08 31-May-08 31-Aug-08 
  (USD Millions) (USD Millions) (USD Millions) 
Balance Sheet Structure 
Total Equity 24,832 26,276 28,443 
Total Assets 786,033 639,432 600,000 
















LB Net Profit After Tax  



















LB Total Revenue  





 For Quarter Ended 
Summary Financial Data 29-Feb-08 31-May-08 31-Aug-08 
  (USD Millions) (USD Millions) (USD Millions) 
Capital Ratio  3.16% 4.11% 4.74% 
Debt to Equity Ratio 31x 23x 20x 
 
Performance 
Net Revenue  3,507 - 668 - 2,903 
Net Profit After Tax 465 - 2,873 - 4,090 
NPBT 663 - 4,087 - 5,824 
ROE 2.67% (15.55)% (20.48)% 
ROA 0.08% (0.64)% (0.97)% 
% increase (decrease) in NPAT  (718)% (242)% 
% increase (decrease) in Net Revenue  (119)% (535)% 
Source: (Lehman Brothers Holdings 2008b, pp. 4-6; 2008c, pp. 3-6; 2008d, p. 10). 
According to Figure 94, LB’s balance sheet structure at first glance exhibits an improvement 
during 2008. In support of this perceived strengthening, the capital and leverage ratios both 
improved from 3.16% and 31 times to 4.74% and 21 times respectively from 29 February 
2008 to 31 August 2008. The improvements resulted from a combination of several instanc-
es of raising capital in the form of debt and equity securities totalling USD 11.5 billion during 
2008 (refer discussion below) and a drastic reduction in total assets as shown in Figure 94. 
However the fund-raising was predominantly in the form of securities which included a re-
deemable feature in their terms and conditions and therefore could be considered as debt 
securities. Refer to Figure 95 for details of the securities’ classification between debt and 
equity dependent on redemption criteria. Furthermore, the assets as at the interim report-
ing dates represented a portfolio whose value was in a continual decline during 2008 as 
shown in Figure 94. 
Although the US investment banking industry was not subject to compulsory capital stand-
ards as discussed in section 2.1, it is noteworthy that LB’s capital ratios for all three quarters 
in 2008 which ranged from 3.16% to 4.74% were significantly lower than the minimum capi-
tal adequacy ratio guideline of 8% issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
which applied to commercial banks globally at that time (Review of Regulatory Proposals on 
Basel Capital and Commercial Real Estate  2006). This deficiency in capital (as measured 
against the Basel minimum capital guidelines), occurred despite LB’s classification of the 
whole amount of the new securities issued of USD 11.5 billion as equity (Lehman Brothers 
Holdings 2008c, pp. 3-6; 2008d, p. 10). Figure 95 describes some key terms of the securities 
issued. If the security included a redemption requirement or potential for redemption, it is 
classified as debt in the table below. Otherwise the security is classified as equity. The classi-




tion as debt is consistent with a conservative approach which is intended to potentially 
overstate debt than understate it and therefore offer a worst case scenario.  
Figure 95 - LB Securities Issues in 2008 
Date of Issue Amount  
USD Millions 
Nature of Issue Debt/ 
Equity 
Term of Issue  
Years 
30 April 2008 1,000 Senior Notes Debt 10 
2 May 2008 2,000 Subordinated Notes Debt 30 
2 May 2008 2,500 Senior Notes Debt 10 
12 June 2008 2,000 Convertible Stock Debt Potential to convert 
to equity 
12 June 2008 4,000 Common Stock  Equity Permanent capital 
Total Debt 7,500    
Total Equity 4,000    
Total Amount 11,500    
Source: (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 2011, p. 2; Valukas 2010, pp. 639-40). 
Given the securities issued comprised mostly senior notes, subordinated debt and converti-
ble stock, the permanency of most of this capital is questionable. As issues totalling USD 5.5 
billion possessed expiry dates and therefore redeemable at some point in the future, and a 
further amount of USD 2 billion had only a potential, and not a guarantee of convertibility 
into equity, they possessed some critical characteristics of debt. That is, the amounts raised 
were eventually required, or potentially required, to be repaid. A recalculation of the capital 
ratio by treating USD 7.5 billion as debt whilst retaining the common stock as equity, results 
in a lower capital ratio of 3.49% instead of 4.74% as at 31 August 2008. Using this revised 
ratio, LB’s leverage shows very little improvement during 2008. These calculations do not 
include the effect of accounting for Repo 105 transactions as sales as opposed to debt which 
again would further worsen the capital ratio. Repo 105 transactions are discussed in detail 
in CHAPTER 9. 
The reduction in assets during 2008 was mostly attributable to a sale of liquid assets to 
meet creditor claims and the devaluation brought about by the implementation of the new 
accounting standard FAS 157. As discussed in section 6.5, this standard required LB to mark-
to-market the firm’s financial instruments, which mostly comprised commercial and resi-
dential mortgage related assets and CDOs, and to bring to account any related loss to the 
profit and loss account. The reduction in asset value amounted to USD 7.8 billion comprising 
USD 5.3 billion in home mortgage assets, USD 1.7 billion in commercial property assets, and 
USD 800 million of other asset backed instruments and acquisition finance exposures. The 
trend of devaluations had continued from 2007 and progressed throughout 2008 (Lehman 





LB’s performance in the quarters prior to its bankruptcy deteriorated at an increasing rate 
with consecutive reductions in ROE and ROA. LB recorded a ROE for the quarter ending 31 
August 2008 of negative 20.48%, reflecting a net loss of USD 4.90 billion. The ROE recorded 
in the previous quarter was a negative 15.55%. These results signified the turning point for 
investor sentiment towards LB. Therefore, 2008 represented a continuing deterioration of 
LB’s financial structure and downward trend in performance which commenced in 2007. 
LB Resorts to Risky Business 
Figure 96 - Trend of LB’s Principal Transactions and Trading Revenue 
Source: The data used for the graph was extracted from Rhee (2010, p. 88). 
Figure 96 plots LB’s increased reliance on trading activity to generate a larger proportion of 
total revenues from 2001 until the end of 2006. This activity generated various risks includ-
ing credit risk, price risk on financial instruments including equities and commodities, for-
eign exchange risk, and interest rate risk. With increasing volatility in the prices of the un-
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potential losses if positions remained unhedged. Figure 97 outlines measure of volatility for 
these risks. 
Figure 97 - Revenue Volatility of LB’s Trading Division 
  Trading Division Revenue Volatility 
  Average Revenue Volatility Three Months Ended 
Risk 31-May-08 29-Feb-08 30-Nov-07 
  USDm USDm USDm 
 
Interest Rate Risk 129 77 58 
Equity Price Risk 49 47 41 
Foreign Exchange Risk 8 6 6 
Commodity Risk 6 5 4 
Diversification Benefit -50 -32 -34 
  
Total Revenue Volatility 142 103 75 
Source: (Lehman Brothers Holdings 2008j, p. 33). 
The amounts in Figure 97 represent the net revenue volatility of the various trading activi-
ties arising over a period of one day for LB. Data for the quarter ending 31 August was not 
available. The calculations are based on variations around a rolling 250 day mean, measured 
at a 95% confidence level. The amounts in the table above represent the potential loss to 
net revenue from trading activities in one day over a 250 day period. 
Figure 97 also shows LB’s willingness to incur an increasing daily loss level over the 6 month 
period since 30 November 2007. Trading net revenue volatility measured using this ap-
proach amounted to USD 142 million for the three months ended 31 May 2008. This level of 
volatility represents a 38% increase from the previous quarter ending 29 February 2008, 
which itself represented an increase over the quarter ending 30 November 2007 of 37%. 
The period covered above coincides with the mounting asset devaluation problems experi-
enced during 2008. Therefore the increased level of risky trading transactions which were 
expected to generate commensurate higher returns represents an attempt by LB to offset 
the losses associated with the valuation problems.  
Trading represents a risky activity where large sums can be gained or lost due to small varia-
tions in underlying prices or rates. Variations of this magnitude do not normally exist in ei-
ther the Asset Management or Investment Banking segments of the business, which gener-
ate income streams predominantly from fees and commissions (Lehman Brothers Holdings 
2008j). It is no surprise therefore, that two of the three banks that technically failed, Mor-
gan Stanley and LB, focused heavily on the risky business of trading as depicted in Figure 89. 
The following section outlines a comparison of the financial position of LB’s peer group 


















Balance Sheet Ratios 
Current Ratio 
(times) 
0.91x 0.98x 0.58x 1.41x 0.8x 
Liquid Asset Ratio 
(times) 
0.42x 0.39x 0.30x 0.43x 0.5x 
Capital Ratio % 3.25% 2.98% 3.00% 4.47% 2.99% 
Long-term Debt  
Ratio % 
18% 15% 20% 15% 15% 
 
Debt to Equity Ratio 
(times) 
36x 35x 37x 24x 32x 
 
Performance Ratios 
ROE (%) 26.74 5.49 -42.88 35.16 8.88 
ROA (%) 0.87 0.16 -1.34 1.57 0.27 
Source: Data used in calculations was extracted from Form 10-K reports for each corpora-
tion (Bear Stearns 2007a, pp. 80-2; Goldman Sachs Group 2007a, pp. 107-10; JP Morgan 
Chase 2007, pp. 104-5; Lehman Brothers Holdings 2007, p. 29; Morgan Stanley 2007, pp. 
101-4). 
Mimetic pressure in Financial Structure 
 
 
Figure 98 sets out a comparison of key financial indicators for US investment banks for the 
year ended 2007. This ratio analysis reveals the peer group shared a similar financial struc-
ture as most balance sheet ratios lie within a narrow range. The most revealing feature in 
the financial structures is the common use of high levels of leverage as illustrated in Figure 
99. The combination of increased debt and the use of securitisation and credit derivatives 
was a popular means of maximising profits amongst commercial banks and investment 
banks alike. The process of using debt to finance additional income generating activities is 
known as the ‘leverage effect’. As the US investment banks realised they could increase prof-




warehouses, portfolios of credit derivatives, and trading activities, their balance sheets and 
leverage levels swelled along with their levels of profitability.  
Important to CEOs was the return on equity measure, which constituted a key metric in their 
bonus calculations (Bebchuk et al. 2010). Activities which produced a higher margin than the 
interest expense incurred on additional debt were pursued by all banks. As long as the equi-
ty levels remained at least relatively constant (not increased), return on equity would in-
crease. The increase in return on equity encouraged all investment banks to maximise bor-
rowings in the absence of mandatory capital regulations. This mimetic pressure to maximise 
returns was driven by a common desire to maximise stockholder wealth and CEO compensa-
tion. This common approach to maximising revenue at the expense of additional risk was 
copied throughout the industry and consistent with the mimetic influence described by  and 
Galaskiewicz and Wasserman (1989). In turn employees would benefit from the cascading 
bonus structures and employee satisfaction would be maintained, thereby safeguarding the 
positions of the firms’ leadership. 
As investment banks observed from each other that returns could be enhanced from the 
implementation of the leverage effect, the maximisation of borrowing capacity by each bank 
was replicated. This is evident in the escalation of leverage by a constant rate for all invest-
ment banks from 2003 to 2007. Figure 99 clearly shows the ramping up of leverage since 
2003 with LB, Bear Stearns and Merrill Lynch recording the highest increases. The com-
pounding leverage was incurred regardless of the additional risk to the firm that was being 
incurred. The higher levels of firm risk were justified on the grounds that all other large in-
vestment banks were following the same strategy. This mimetic process legitimised the pur-
suit of the leverage effect in the eyes of other investment banks, regulators and stakehold-




Figure 99 - US Investment Banks’ Leverage Ratios (Debt to Equity) 
 
Source: The data used for the graph was extracted from Bankscope database, (Bankscope 
2014). 
As well as financial structures, the investment banks shared similar returns. Figure 100 sets 
out the return on equity for each investment bank. In the 10 years to 2007, all banks gener-
ated positive returns except for 2007 when Merrill Lynch recorded a significant loss. The in-
dustry average returns on equity during this period (excluding 2007 due to the outlying re-
turn recorded by Merrill Lynch) ranged from a low of 14.56% in 2002 to a high of 32.35% in 
2000. The lower returns for 2002 were a result of the lower market activity in the aftermath 
of the ‘Tech Bubble’ crisis and the September 11 2001 terrorist attack. Refer to Figure 100 
for trends in US investment bank returns on equity for the period 1998 to 2007.  
More interesting is the narrow band of returns between the members of the peer group. 
Excluding 2007 and 1998, the standard deviation of returns for the group ranged from a low 
of 1.26 in 2003 to a high of 9.10 in 1999. This range of returns supports the notion that the 
firms pursued a similar level of returns and attempted to replicate each other’s operations. 
As discussed in section 7.2.1, the investment banks were motivated to reduce any compara-
tive peer group underperformance to prevent backlash from stockholders and employees 
and therefore attempted to mimic each other’s activities.  
Figure 100 - Return on Equity of Investment Banks 1998 to 2007 
Investment 
Bank Return on Equity % 










1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007











19.43 23.92 29.20 18.45 11.68 17.01 23.42 28.75 31.01 26.74 
Bear 
Stearns 
19.43 23.92 29.20 18.45 11.68 17.01 23.42 28.75 31.01 5.49 
Merrill 
Lynch 
15.49 25.01 26.27 6.36 12.31 17.03 18.06 20.31 26.71 -42.88 
Goldman 
Sachs 
45.76 19.64 33.88 20.27 17.12 19.40 24.83 26.54 35.91 35.16 
Morgan 
Stanley 
26.63 42.94 43.19 25.44 20.00 19.23 22.19 25.37 31.62 8.88 
Peer Group 
Mean  




of Returns 12.10 9.10 6.65 7.00 3.80 1.26 2.59 3.47 3.26 30.31 
Source: The data used for the calculations was extracted from Bankscope database,  
(Bankscope 2014). 
According to the key ratios, Goldman Sachs is the standout investment bank with the lowest 
debt to equity ratio and highest capital ratio, indicating a relative position of strength. Mor-
gan Stanley follows with the second lowest debt to equity ratio. Similarly, Goldman Sachs 
and Morgan Stanley recorded the highest liquid asset ratio of the peer group. These two 
banks were the only members of the peer group that survived the GFC even though survival 
was predicated by major investments from ‘White Knights’70 and government funding. 
Therefore it could be argued that the mimetic pressure which affected the rest of the peer 
group had a relatively lower impact on the surviving investment banks. The investment 
banks that failed comprised: Bear Stearns, which was forced to merge with JP Morgan 
Chase; Merrill Lynch & Co., which was sold to Bank of America Corp. and, LB which entered 
bankruptcy. The undoing of LB together with the other failed investment banks related to 
their exploitation of the ‘leverage effect’. The many years of pursuing a risky growth agenda 
was crystallised in the last days of LB as creditors and investors awoke to the strategy and 




 A white knight, usually a corporation in a strong financial position, is a potential "saviour" of a corporation 





punished the firm by selling its shares and recalling credit lines. Refer CHAPTER 6 for a de-
tailed discussion on the last days of LB. The ratio analysis provided above, provides evidence 
that measures of leverage and liquidity were key determinants of investment bank failure. 
As such, questions relating to the prevailing lack of a mandatory regulatory constraint on 
leverage and liquidity arose in the aftermath of the GFC and have since been considered a 
major weakness of the regulatory framework at the time. 
7.4 Summary 
This chapter examines the business model adopted by the US investment banks and provid-
ed an overview of the financial structure of LB which was compared to its peer group. The 
investment banking business model is analysed through the lens of DiMaggio & Powell’s 
(1983) New Institutional Theory and found to be subject to a mimetic influence which led to 
divisional units undertaking similar lines of business. US Investment banks operate in a 
competitive and ambiguous environment where economic cycles, evolving technology and 
innovation are constant features and challenges. In their efforts to compete for valuable re-
sources such as capital, reputation, prestige, skills and gain new customers, they attempted 
to avoid a negative perception associated with an underperforming firm. This strong desire 
not to be perceived as a low ranking firm spawned a practice of replicating product and ser-
vices offered by competitors, which resulted in similar divisional organisational structures 
between firms. An outdated product suite or service offering could have exposed a firm that 
had not embraced innovation and best practice, important features for an industry in a rap-
idly evolving environment. Mimicking competitor practices and business models therefore 
reduced the risk of portraying a negative perception to the market. Submission to mimetic 
influence often occurs when the correct course of action is ambiguous. The fast paced busi-
ness environment created the need for urgent management decisions which would avoid 
criticism if they replicated those of successful firms. Time was critical as any delay in the 
launching of a new product or service could impact negatively on market share. In this envi-
ronment, mimicking behaviour of another firm perceived to be successful was time and cost 
efficient.  
In LB’s attempt to pursue an aggressive growth strategy, it departed slightly from conform-
ing to the standard business model by expanding the activities of its Trading Department 
which represented the riskiest part of the firm. This strategy was undertaken in the expecta-
tion that the additional risk would generate commensurate high returns in an attempt to 
mitigate the effects of other divisional underperformance. Fuld’s hubris associated with a 
denial that the economic cycle would turn downward and an optimistic view that the value 




decade preceding LB’s bankruptcy. The combination of increased debt and the use of secu-
ritisation and credit derivatives was a popular means of maximising profits amongst all in-
vestment banks. This common approach to exploiting the leverage effect is reflected in a 
range of similar returns generated by the peer group. Fuld’s strategies were validated by the 
similar strategies adopted by most of the peer group and reinforced the hubris which char-
acterised his leadership. Higher leverage was pursued regardless of the risk impact on the 
firm. As long as LB’s creditors abstained from recalling credit, the strategy was sustainable. 
Those banks which replicated the aggressive leverage effect strategy suffered a similar fate. 
Succumbing to a mimetic influence was supposed to replicate the practices of  firms that 
were successful, but instead led to disastrous consequences for most of the investment 
banking peer group. The exceptions - Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, maintained more 
moderate levels of leverage and higher levels of liquidity. Despite the potential opportunity 
cost of pursuing a less risky strategy, these banks survived. The following chapter relates the 
role that connections and influential forces assisted the industry to maintain conditions 
conducive to their objectives. The chapter therefore examines the relationships between 
the investment banking industry and other players that had an impact on their business 
such as regulators, politicians, standard setters and credit rating agencies. 
 CONNECTIONS AND INFLUENCE CHAPTER 8
8.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter described the investment banking model as one influenced by institu-
tional forces, steering the firms to mimic each other in various ways from organisational to 
financial structures. The major investment banks’ organisational structures converged to 
operate in similarly structured business units, which in aggregate, served as one stop shops 




league tables71 for each specialisation, and the need to be perceived as one of the best in-
vestment banks to the outside world including customers, shareholders and regulators, cre-
ated a fear of underperformance. The aspiration to extend financial performance year on 
year also fuelled the pursuit of the leverage effect which resulted in unsustainable levels of 
debt for most firms. The theme of DiMaggio & Powell’s (1983) institutional influence of the 
previous chapter as it affected the business model and financial structure of the US invest-
ment banks continues to be explored in this chapter. New Institutional theory assists with 
our understanding of how investment banks co-opted legislators, regulators, CRAs and ac-
counting standard setters, in accepting a stance extolled by the investment banking indus-
try. The liberal stance created a business environment relatively free of obstacles and con-
ducive to aspirations of producing ever-increasing profits.  
This chapter commences with an identification of the participants in the ‘financial network’ 
which is outlined in section 8.2. The sections that follow discuss the influences applied to 
the political process and regulatory framework by the use of political contributions and lob-
bying which produced a type of ‘regulatory capture’. Political contributions are argued to 
have resulted in coercive pressure being applied to the politicians involved in the legislative 
process to produce the regulatory outcomes desired by the industry. The environment 
which allowed the application of coercive pressure through political contributions was also 
constructed by the investment banking industry as a quid pro quo for fulfilling the need by 
politicians to be seen as wise decision-makers, thereby creating an aura of legitimacy. Re-
petitive contributions to the same politicians would be interpreted as legitimising their deci-
sion-making which was important for election and re-election prospects. 
Further section 8.2 asserts that mimetic pressure fuelled the industry’s attempts to influ-
ence the political process by its common use of lobbying. The unified behaviour of partici-
pants in the investment banking industry follows a mimetic pressure to adopt the practice 
of lobbying, which in turn supported the normative influence of spreading an acceptance of 




 League tables are published tables ranking investment banks by deal number, revenue, or other market 
share indicator. As well as ranking overall investment banks, they are used to rank particular divisions such as 
the mergers and acquisition or capital markets divisions. League tables are published in a variety of media in-






the ‘laissez-faire’ attitude towards regulation. The benefits of a united front, using a combi-
nation of influential industry associations, established lobbyists and their own firms’ re-
sources, led to an intensive attempt to sway political opinion in favour of the industry. Sec-
tion 8.2 further asserts that normative pressure was applied to align beliefs and values be-
tween the investment banking industry and the regulatory and legislative communities 
through the ‘revolving door’ practice. This practice involving professionals switching posi-
tions between different employers such as investment banks, regulatory agencies and the 
executive branch of government was found to be common practice. The consequent inter-
mingling of values and beliefs between various ‘revolving door’ participants, tended to per-
meate a popular view that a ‘light touch’ to regulation was good for the investment banking 
industry.   
Lobbying by the industry is argued in section 8.2 also to be a normative practice, accepted 
as a norm by the users of lobbyists, the recipients of the lobbying efforts and the public at 
large who accept it as a legitimate way of persuading points of view in public policy debate. 
Therefore politicians allowed themselves to accommodate the opinions of industry in their 
deliberations of bills related to the finance industry. The existence of a knowledge asym-
metry between the investment banking industry and the regulators also exerted a norma-
tive pressure on regulators to allow a general ‘laissez faire’ approach to regulating the in-
dustry. In the absence of superior knowledge of the complex and innovative derivative 
products, financial structures and their resultant risks, the regulatory community presup-
posed that the investment banking industry ‘knew best’ and would therefore self-regulate.  
The modus operandi of the CRAs and the coercive pressure to which they were subjected by 
the investment banking industry are discussed in section 8.3. This section finds that the in-
vestment banking industry’s commercial support of the CRAs and their direct input to the 
credit rating models, helped to drive an increasing number of investment grade ratings for 
borrowing vehicles which then ultimately failed. As discussed in section 8.3.2, the influence 
exerted over CRAs to supply investment grade ratings, which were later discovered to be 
flawed, was also inadvertently supported by the regulatory framework at the time.  
Section 8.4 concludes the chapter with a content analysis of comment letters submitted to 
the FASB regarding two important draft exposures for accounting standards – FAS 125 and 
FAS 140, which were to apply to the important financing technique known as Repos. This 
analysis finds the investment banking industry, as a concerned interest group, were intent 
on retaining their ability to interpret, at their discretion, the applicable accounting stand-
ards. The resulting institutional influence over the FASB produced a final standard, FAS 140 
which permitted the ‘window dressing’ of LB’s financial statements, thereby concealing im-
portant information from stakeholders. LB’s process of ‘window dressing’ is discussed in 




8.2 The US Financial Network 
The major participants within the frame termed the ‘financial network’ include: the invest-
ment banking industry; other financial institutions (such as hedge funds, commercial banks, 
money market corporations and other financial institutions); the regulators; the govern-
ment (including individual politicians); CRAs; and lobby groups representing the investment 
banking industry. This section examines how the investment banking industry through their 
connections and interactions with the ‘financial network’ attempted to influence policies, 
regulations and credit ratings. Influence over regulations through a ‘regulatory capture’ was 
particularly important to the industry to ensure a regulatory framework which was condu-
cive to generating stronger financial performance. The notion of regulatory capture is fur-
ther explained in section 8.2.2.  
The prosperous years enjoyed by the investment banking industry prior to the GFC coincid-
ed with a period when regulations, accounting standards and the approach to credit ratings 
minimised constraints on the industry. The theme of ‘connections’ is used in this chapter to 
identify and analyse the interactions of the investment banking industry with the ‘financial 
network’. The liberal conditions created through the legislature are detailed in CHAPTER 2. 
This chapter discusses the enactment of key legislation which encouraged lending and home 
ownership. The most significant legislation included: The Community Reinvestment Act 
1977; The Alternative Mortgage Transactions Parity Act 1982; and the Community Rein-
vestment Act 1995 (amended) also known as the Community Reinvestment Expansion Act 
1995. The Gramm Leach Bliley Act 1999, which is also considered an important milestone in 
the legislative timeline, offered opportunities for the investment banking industry to expand 
into other areas such as direct lending. This Act repealed The Glass-Steagall Act, which came 
into force following the Great Depression of the 1930s and prevented commercial banks, 
investment banks, securities firms and insurance companies from merging. The final im-
portant liberal legislation affecting the investment banking industry prior to 2008 included 
The Commodity Futures Modernization Act 2000 which excluded derivatives from regula-
tion, supervision, trading on exchanges and most significantly exempted these instruments 
from capital adequacy requirements. Therefore it provided an unrestricted environment for 
US investment banks to pursue derivate transactions such as CDOs which, as discussed in 
section 6.2 played an important role in the lead up to the GFC.  
Following the corporate scandals of Enron and WorldCom as outlined in section 4.4.6, the 
previous liberal approach to regulation was largely reversed with the enactment of the 
Sarbannes Oxley Act of 2002 which is discussed in section 10.2.2. However, shortly thereaf-
ter, political pressure to generally support financial institutions during the period spanning 
2001 to 2009 was led by President George W. Bush who encouraged the adoption of neo-




overseen by the Federal Reserve at the time, coincided with a cycle where US house prices 
and lending increased significantly and created the housing bubble. This would eventually 
initiate a series of asset write-downs for financial institutions generally - See section 2.2 for 
a discussion.  
In a speech at the Risk Management Association Conference in Oct 2008 Randall Kroszner, 
who was a member of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve and Chairman of its 
Committee on Supervision and Regulation of Banking Institutions at the time, acknowledged 
the interconnectedness of the banking industry and financial markets as contributing to the 
severity of the GFC and the collapse of LB:  
At the heart of that transformation lays a much more intense emphasis on funding and li-
quidity. Additionally, we are all witnessing the extent to which banking and financial markets 
are interconnected (Kroszner 2008). 
Kroszner (2008) was referring to the interconnectedness of financial institutions operating in 
the financial markets. The GFC highlighted the importance of the role of financial institu-
tional networks in providing liquidity within the market. Many liquidity lines provided on an 
interbank basis, and on which the banks relied for their day to day business, froze during the 
crisis period. Kroszner (2008) suggests these financial networks have far-reaching ramifica-
tions for the financial markets and the economy. He argues this aspect of the industry needs 
to be tackled so that appropriate risk management frameworks are established in the global 
marketplace.  
As shown in CHAPTER 4, historically strong personal and institutional networks were consid-
ered beneficial in the investment banking industry. However Kroszner (2008) highlights the 
dangers of a global marketplace entrenched in a convoluted web of connections:  
Since banking and financial markets are so interconnected, the fundamental transformation 
in financial services is affecting all types of financial institutions, even those less directly af-
fected by recent events. Importantly, in developing strategic risk management frameworks, 
institutions must not only understand the direct consequences to their own firms of such 
shifts, but must also recognize that consequences to other firms can have effects on the 
broader market (Kroszner 2008, p. 6).  





Figure 101 - The Interrelationships within the US Financial Network 
 
Figure 101 represents the intersecting relationships between various groups in the financial 
network. The principal lobby groups which represented the investment banking industry 
included the various industry associations such as: the Securities Industry Association which 
merged with the Bond Market Association to form the Securities Industry and Financial 
Markets Association in 2006; the Investment Company Institute; the Security Traders Asso-
ciation; the American Bankers Association; and, the International Swaps & Derivatives Asso-
ciation. A specific industry lobby group based in Washington known as The Financial Ser-
vices Roundtable (FSR), formerly known as the Bankers Roundtable prior to 2000, had ac-
cess to all participants in the ‘financial network’ and played an active role as an institutional 
force (Froomkin & Blumenthal 2012). The CRAs were also central to the relationships be-
tween participants as their credit ratings were relied upon by investors, regulators and issu-
ers (and their sponsoring/underwriting investment banks). The largest credit rating agencies 
were Standard & Poor's (S&P), Moody's, and Fitch. All three are privately owned corpora-
tions and whilst S&P and Moody's are both US-based corporations, Fitch operates from both 
the US and the UK. Their influence originates from their role in collectively assigning credit 
ratings to over 90% of global corporations, governments (including state governments), 
state owned enterprises, and structured finance SPV’s (Coffee et al. 2010, p. 1). These rat-
ings have an influence on the demand for securities as they are purported to be a measure 
of the issuer’s financial strength. Furthermore, the pricing of securities is generally aligned 
to the ratings, rewarding stronger rated issuers with lower pricing on their financing trans-
actions (Coffee 2011). Methodologies employed by CRAs in determining a credit rating are 
therefore considered to be an important component of their intellectual capital. The result-
ant ratings are also important to government and regulators who want to ensure that inves-












tors and the market are well informed. A background of the CRAs, including the influence on 
their rating methodology is provided in section 8.3. 
The principal regulators within the ‘financial network’ include the Federal Reserve and the 
Securities Exchange Commission. Other regulators include the Office of the Comptroller of 
the Currency, the Office of Thrift Supervision, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 
and Federal Financial Institution Examination Council. The following sections discuss the 
types of influence and the conduits through which such influence was exerted by the in-
vestment banking industry on the members of the ‘financial network’. The discussion com-
mences with the role that political contributions played in the creation of a liberal attitude 
towards the regulatory framework within which the investment banking industry operated. 
8.2.1 Political Contributions 
Politicians require funding to contest their first election as well as for re-election. A seat in 
the House of Congress costs an average of approximately USD 1 million, and Senate seats 
often require funding of tens of millions (Senate Office of Public Records Government of the 
USA 2011). The cost of running the 2016 US Federal election for example is shown in Figure 
102. 
Figure 102 - Cost of Running the US Federal Election in the 2016 Election Cycle as represent-
ed by Total Contributions  
Type of Group Total Spent USD % of Total 
Super Political Action Committees (Super PACs)              1,104,481,088  66% 
Political Parties                  246,159,843  15% 
Social Welfare Groups                  147,333,276  9% 
Other (corporations, individual people, other groups)                128,863,700  8% 
Trade Associations                    33,912,224  2% 
Unions                    21,621,827  1% 
Total              1,682,371,958  100% 





Campaign contributions to a politician may oblige the recipient to support the contributor 
by either support for its regulatory agenda, friendly political appointments, lucrative gov-
ernment procurement contracts, or tax concessions (Centre for Responsible Politics 2017). 
In the US, statistics relating to political contributions and industries’ lobbying expenditures 
are collected by an independent organisation known as the Centre for Responsive Politics 
(CFRP)72 which began recording data in 1974. The CFRP is funded by individual contributions 
and institutional grants. Major donors contributing over USD 100,000 each in 2016 included: 
Carnegie Corporation of New York, Ford Foundation, William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, 
John S. and James L. Knight Foundation, John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, 
and the Open Society Foundation (Centre for Responsible Politics 2017). Statistics used in 
the following figures 102 to 108 and 110 to 117 are sourced from the CFRP database. 
Amounts included in the statistics represent the historic value of USD dollars and do not 
represent constant dollars adjusted for the time value of money. 
Figure 103 shows a growth in political contributions made by the investment banking indus-
try from 1998 to 2008 representing the 10 year period prior to the GFC, and which reached 
a peak of USD 178 million in the calendar year 2008. A calculation of the data supplied by 
CFRP reveals aggregate contributions by the investment banking industry for the period 
1998 to 2008 exceeded USD 575 million (Centre for Responsible Politics 2008). LB’s political 
contribution to George W. Bush’s 2004 election campaign is detailed in Figure 108. Addi-
tionally, evidence of LB’s political lobbying spending is shown in Figure 111. 




 The Centre for Responsive Politics is a not-for-profit, independent, US organisation which follows the trail of 
political contributions and their impact on election outcomes and public policy. The organisation’s aim is to 




Figure 103 - Total Political Contributions from Investment Banking Industry 1998 – 2008 
 
Source: The data used for the graph was extracted from Centre for Responsible Politics da-
tabase, (Centre for Responsible Politics 2008). 
The top 10 recipients of these contributions are included in Figure 104, which also includes 
each politician’s special roles within government and private industry. The roles have been 
split between those that are finance related and those that are not. In some instances, poli-
ticians held roles in consulting firms and/or financial institutions. This is provided to estab-
lish those donor recipients who may have a closer relationship with the ‘financial network’.  
Prior to the GFC, the preferred party for contributions from the investment banking industry 
was often the incumbent majority party, swinging between the democrats and republicans 
as leadership in Congress switched. This pattern of supporting influential politicians is a cor-
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1998 to 2008 
Special Government 
Roles 
(not related to 
Financial Services)  
Special  Government 
and Private Roles 
(related to 
Financial Services) 
Sen. John McCain  
(R-Ariz)                             
14,562,427 Chairman of the Senate 
Commerce Committee, 
Presidential Candidate 
2000,  Sponsor of the 
McCain-Feingold Act in 
2002, Chairman of the 
Senate Armed Services 
Committee, Chairman of 
the Senate Indian Affairs 
Committee 
 
Sen. Charles E. 
Schumer  
(D-NY)                        
10,543,147 Chairman of the Senate 
Rules Committee, Chair-
man of the Democratic 
Senatorial Campaign 
Committee, Vice Chair-
man of the Democratic 
Caucus, Joint Committee 
on the Library, Vice 
Chairman, Joint Commit-
tee on Printing, Interna-
tional Narcotics Control 
Caucus, Select Commit-





Sen. John Kerry  
(D-Mass)                              
8,178,389 US Secretary of State,  





Sen. Chris Dodd  
(D-Conn)                              
7,961,570 Chairman of 
the Democratic National 
Committee, , Chairman of 
the Senate Committee on 
Rules and Administration, 
Committee on Foreign 
Relations, Joint Commit-
tee on the Library, Com-
mission on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe 
Chairman of Commit-
tee on Banking, 
















1998 to 2008 
Special Government 
Roles 
(not related to 
Financial Services)  
Special  Government 
and Private Roles 
(related to 
Financial Services) 
Sen. Joe Lieberman  
(I-Conn)                           
4,775,168 Attorney General of Con-
necticut,  Chairman of 
the Senate Committee on 
Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs, 
Committee on Armed 
Services, Committee on 
Small Business and En-
trepreneurship 
 
Sen. Richard C. 
Shelby  
(R-Ala)                        
3,384,175 Chairman of the Senate 
Intelligence Committee, 
Senate Committee on 
Appropriations, Senate 
Committee on Rules and 
Administration 
Chairman of Senate 
Committee on Bank-
ing, Housing & Urban 
Affairs from 2003–
2007 and 2015-2017 
Rep. John Boehner  
(R-Ohio)                            
3,334,661 Speaker of the US House 
of Representatives, 
House Minority Leader, 
House Majority Leader, 
Chairman of the House 
Education Committee 
 
Sen. Evan Bayh  
(D-Ind)                                
3,224,911 Committee on Armed 
Services, Committee on 
Energy and Natural Re-
sources, Committee on 










ties, Insurance, and 
InvestmentSenior 
adviser Apollo Global 
Management (Asset 
management), Part-
ner at Law and lobby-
ing firm McGuire-














1998 to 2008 
Special Government 
Roles 
(not related to 
Financial Services)  
Special  Government 
and Private Roles 
(related to 
Financial Services) 
Rep. Eric Cantor  
(R-Va)                               
3,181,842 House Majority Leader, 
House Republican Chief 
Deputy Whip, Chairman 
of the Congressional Task 
Force on Terrorism and 
Unconventional Warfare, 
House International Rela-
tions Committee and the 




Vice Chairman of in-
vestment bank 
Moelis & Company 
Sen. Mitch 
McConnell  
(R-Ky)                           
2,818,657 Majority and minority 
Leader of the Senate, 
Senate, Senate Majority 
Whip, Committee on Ag-
riculture, Nutrition, and 
Forestry, Committee on 
Appropriations, Commit-
tee on Rules and Admin-
istration, Select Commit-
tee on Intelligence. 
 
Note: D = Democrat; R = Republican; I = Independent 
Source: The data used for the table was extracted from Centre for Responsible Politics 
(2008). 
A number of the top 10 donor recipients had close relationships with the financial network. 
An example of some of the political views held by some of the top 10 donor recipients is set 
out in Figure 105. 
Figure 105 - Political Views of Selected US Recipients of Large Political Donations 
Name (party/state) Political View Reference 
Sen. Charles E. Schumer  
(D-New York) 
In favour of bailouts for US invest-
ment banks. 
(Lipton 2008) 
 A proponent of a deregulatory 
agenda for the banking industry. In 
particular led initiatives to deregu-
late derivatives and to lower capital 
reserves for the banking industry. 





Name (party/state) Political View Reference 
 Attempted to limit efforts to regu-
late CRAs in favour of self-
regulation.  
 Advocated revisions to regulations 
intended to improve transparency of 
corporate financial statements. 
 Opposed a bill that proposed to in-
crease personal income taxes for 
executives at hedge funds and pri-
vate equity firms. 
   
Sen. Richard C. Shelby  
(R-Alabama) 
Prioritised regulatory relief for the 
finance industry. 
(Flaherty 2015) 
 Objected to the Government Office 
of Financial Research collecting fi-
nancial data necessary to regulate 
the banking industry. 
(Cover 2010) 
Rep. John Boehner  
(R-Ohio) 
Maintained close relationships with 
lobbyists and former employees rep-
resenting large corporations such as 
Goldman Sachs, Google, Citigroup, 
R.J. Reynolds, Miller Coors and UPS. 
Was in favour of light regulations on 




Political Contributions during the 2004 Election Cycle 
The 2004 election cycle was the last before the onset of the GFC. The period between 2004 
and the next election cycle in 2008 represented a period of significant profitability for the 
investment banking industry, which thrived under positive economic conditions. See section 
6.6.2 and Figure 100 for a depiction of the economic environment and the positive returns 
on equity of the US investment banks respectively during this period. Given the strong per-
formance of the industry and accommodating policy settings during these four years as out-
lined in sections 2.2, 4.4 and 6.6.2, an analysis of political contributions made for the 2004 
election cycle is warranted. 
Figure 106 lists the top 10 donors (excluding lobby groups) of political contributions to both 
major parties in the US – the Republicans and the Democrats. Interestingly five of the top 10 
list of contributors to the 2004 elections consisted of individuals involved in the finance in-
dustry (including funds management, insurance and financial services), whilst owners of 




would benefit from government favouritism towards the housing sector, whilst the four 
funds management corporations featured in the top 10 list would generally benefit from 
lighter finance related regulation. 
Figure 106 - top 10 Donors (excluding lobby groups) of Political Contributions in 2004 US 
Election 
Rank Donor Name 
City / State 




Herb & Marion 
Sandler 
Sandler Foundation / 
Golden West Financial 
Corporation 
Charity / Funds 
Management 
   11,050,944 




Perry, Robert J. & 
Doylene 
Perry Homes Home  
Construction 
     8,050,000  




Arnall, Roland E. & 
Dawn L. 
Ameriquest Capital Subprime  
Mortgage Lender 
     5,000,000 




Spanos, Alex G. & 
Faye 
AG Spanos Companies 
San Diego Chargers 
Home  
Construction 
     5,000,000 






BP Capital Fund Manager      4,600,000 





Jerrold & Margaret 
Chartwell Partners Executive Search       4,000,000 




Simmons, H. C. & 
A. C. 
Contran Corp Diversified  
Industrial 
     3,500,000 




McHale, J. F. & 
Mattson, C. L. 




     3,000,000 




Lewis, Peter B. Progressive Corp Insurance      2,985,000 




Rank Donor Name 
City / State 









     2,950,000 
New York, NY     
* Specialising in finance industry 
 
Source: The data used for the table was extracted from Centre for Responsible Politics 
(2008). 
As expected, the incumbent government (the Republicans), obtained the most donations for 
the 2004 election cycle as shown in Figure 107. The Republicans who already displayed a 
preference for less regulation towards the finance sector (refer section 2.2 and section 
8.2.6) accounted for 75% of total donations over USD 100,000.  
Figure 107 - Political Contributions per Political Party over USD 100,000 in 2004 Election 








USD USD % of Total USD % of Total 
114,752,979 86,379,491 75% 28,373,488 25% 
Source: The data used for the table was extracted from Centre for Responsible Politics 
(2008). 
According to the Centre for Responsible Politics (2008), George W. Bush personally received 
approximately USD 6,623,961 from the top 20 donors to his second presidential election 
campaign in 2004. Featuring prominently in this list are all four major US investment banks, 
and a number of other banks and financial institutions which, in aggregate, constitute 13 of 
the top 20 contributors. The amount contributed by financial institutions in the 2004 elec-
tion cycle was triple that made in the 2000 cycle (Becker et al. 2008). This indicates a strong 
preference of the investment banking and wider financial services community for another 
term of a Republican government led by George W. Bush so encouraging the party to con-
tinue its neo-liberal policies (Becker et al. 2008). 
Figure 108 - Top 20 Donors of Political Contributions to George W. Bush in 2004 US Election 
Rank Donor Name Industry Contribution Amount 
   USD 
1 Morgan Stanley Investment Banking 604,280 
2 Merrill Lynch Investment Banking 558,804 
3 PricewaterhouseCoopers Accounting 508,500 




Rank Donor Name Industry Contribution Amount 
5 Goldman Sachs Investment Banking 396,350 
6 Lehman Brothers Investment Banking 355,525 
7 US Government Government 334,611 
8 Citigroup Inc. Bank / Investment Banking 317,375 
9 MBNA Corp Bank 313,600 
10 Ernst & Young Accounting 304,340 
11 Bear Stearns Investment Banking 302,850 
12 Deloitte LLP Accounting 293,050 
13 Credit Suisse Group Bank / Investment Banking 279,590 
14 Wachovia Corp Non-Bank Financial Institution                          273,760  
15 Bank of America Bank / Investment Banking                          258,361  
16 JPMorgan Chase & Co Investment Banking                          228,005  
17 Blank Rome LLP Law Firm                          225,150  
18 US Department of State Government                          220,280  
19 Ameriquest Capital Non-Bank Financial Institution                          208,130  





Source: The data used for the table was extracted from Centre for Responsible Politics 
(2008). 
8.2.2 The Influence of Lobbying 
Skeel (2005) summarises the interaction between business leaders and regulators succinctly 
as “an ongoing cat-and-mouse game between regulators, whose job is to rein in excesses… 
and business leaders, who push back against regulatory strictures in order to promote flexi-
bility and innovation” (Skeel 2005a, p. 157). This section discusses the institutional influence 
exerted by the investment banking industry over politicians (legislators) through the lobby-
ing process to either prevent problematic legislation, or to promote legislation favouring 
their industry. As an increasing volume of important legislation affecting the investment 
banking industry entered the political debate in the pre-GFC era, the analysis finds that the 
investment banking industry increased its spending commitment on lobbying. This trend 
was replicated by LB whose lobbying expenditure increased markedly from 2001 to 2007.  
US Industry participants are well organised, through groups such as industry associations, 
the Chamber of Commerce, the Business Roundtable and specific lobby groups whose role is 
to provide resistance to unwanted legislation, and to steer public policy, ideologies and stra-
tegic initiatives which benefit an industry, or a particular organisation. Comparing the indus-
trial sector and the public at large, Skeel (2005a) suggests that an industry representative 
usually possesses greater influence than groups of individuals, due to the efforts of lobby 
groups. Although the US public are valid participants who are potentially affected by out-




lise. Mobilisation is costly, and ordinary US citizens generally do not have enough at stake to 
justify a campaign for reform (Skeel 2005a).  
Lobbying leading to Regulatory Capture 
Regulatory capture involves winning a regulatory agency’s support by influential and often 
large commercial or political interest groups whose industry or activities the agency is 
charged to regulate. The support is usually at the expense of the public in whose interests 
the regulatory agency is supposed to act, and may take the form of regulations which are 
advantageous to the interest group. This process leads to the notion that the regulatory 
agency is being ‘captured’ or allowing itself to be influenced by the interest group and 
therefore represents a failure of the regulatory agency (Stigler 1971). 
Engstrom (2013) proposes two forms of capture: materialist and non-materialist. The mate-
rialist type is defined by the regulator’s motive being driven by material gain either through 
the ‘revolving door’ (explained in section 8.2.5), political contributions, concealed payments, 
or need for continuing government funding. Non-materialist capture is likened to a norma-
tive influence affecting the regulator whereby the regulator behaves in a similar manner to 
the regulated industry and inherits some of its values and culture. The normative influence 
can arise from a knowledge asymmetry between the regulatory environment and industry 
(Boxenbaum & Jonsson 2008). Engstrom (2013) suggests that this form of regulatory cap-
ture is often linked to lobbying. This concept is further explored in section 8.2.7.  
The failure of regulations to provide adequate discipline to the finance industry is often 
linked to political influence (Acemoglu 2009; Calomiris 2009a; Johnson & Kwak 2011). It has 
been cited as being one of the key contributors to the GFC (Dagher & Fu 2011; Obstfeld & 
Rogoff 2009). Stiglitz, a Noble Prize winning economist stated in 2009, “But I think that 
mindsets can be shaped by people you associate with, and you come to think that what’s 
good for Wall Street is good for America ” (Veltrop & de Haan 2014, p. 2).  
Igan et al. (2012, p. 5) defines lobbying as “a legal activity aimed at changing existing rules or 
policies or procuring individual benefits”. Literature on lobbying focuses on two forms. The 
first category examines the impact of lobbying on specific policies which impact on indus-
tries generally (Facchini et al. 2011; Goldberg & Maggi 1999; Grossman & Helpman 1994). In 
the banking sector, Kroszner and Stratmann (1998) found a pattern of specialised standing 
committees being formed in government to deal with interest groups when considering 
proposed finance legislation. These dealings often result in high levels of political contribu-
tions which equally contribute to high levels of political effort in furthering interest group 
causes. An example cited by Kroszner and Stratmann (1998, p. 1163) found that the level of 
contributions by the banking lobby group were instrumental in garnering legislative support 




lobbying efforts by individual firms seeking favourable outcomes related to their own corpo-
rate performance (Bertrand et al. 2004; Claessens et al. 2008).  
In the US, lobbyists and interest groups are mostly represented in Washington, close to the 
legislators and policymakers. The finance industry is one such interest group which employs 
a number of lobbyists. Igan et al. (2012) cites a number of reasons for the finance industry’s 
use of lobbyists. Firstly, it may signal to regulators that they are vulnerable to financial 
shocks in view of their limited capacity to absorb risks and therefore require preferential 
treatment. Preferential treatment may not only come in legislative terms but also in eco-
nomic ones. For example there was continual pressure applied to the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem by investment banks to maintain loose monetary policy in the US to continue support-
ing financial and property related asset prices:  
Cognitive regulatory capture of the Fed by Wall Street resulted in excess sensitivity of the Fed 
not just to asset prices (the ‘Greenspan-Bernanke put’) but also to the concerns and fears of 
Wall Street more generally (Buiter 2008, p. 4). 
The second reason for financial institutions’ use of lobbying is to rally against regulations 
which would restrict their lending activities and impact on financial performance  (Igan et al. 
2012). This would especially apply to publicly-listed financial institutions which are focused 
on short term profit maximisation strategies. Specialist bankers, who operate in specialised 
market segments with higher risk, may use lobbyists to convey their superior knowledge to 
regulators of a market, financial instrument, financial process or risk. In this instance, the 
uncertainty created in the minds of regulators of their knowledge may convince them to ab-
stain from regulating a complex market such as the derivatives market (Burger 2006; 2011). 
The knowledge asymmetry can persuade regulators to adopt the investment banking indus-
try view of a regulatory approach to certain innovative practices. The conduits which trans-
fer the industry’s norms are discussed in detail in 8.2.7. Financial institutions may also wish 
to create barriers to entry in their market segment, with the aim of limiting competition. 
Lobbyists could also be used in this regard to encourage tighter regulation for new entrants.  
The influence of corporations and their lobbyists is reflected both in the legislative process 




leaders pushed through two separate federal reforms73 that were designed to make it hard-
er to bring securities law claims against companies that were alleged to have made mis-
statements to the markets (Armour & McCahery 2006). Another example which had im-
portant implications to the investment banking industry was the passing of The Commodity 
Futures Modernization Act of 2000 (CFMA) which is discussed in greater detail in sections 
2.2 and 8.1. This Act effectively protected OTC derivatives transactions from regulation and 
oversight. Following its enactment, derivatives trading expanded dramatically – refer to Fig-
ure 78 for an indication of the growth of CDOs. Apart from legislators, a judge ruling on 
complaints by investors at the CFTC - the regulatory agency charged with overseeing the de-
rivatives industry - was also found to be in support of the same industry by protecting it 
against investor complaints: 
In a notice recently released by the CFTC, Judge Bruce Levine…had a secret agreement with 
Wendy Gramm, [then Chairwoman] of the agency [CTFC] to stand in the way of investors fil-
ing complaints with the agency...Gramm, wife of former Senator Phil Gramm, was accused of 
helping Goldman Sachs, Enron and other large firms gain influence over the commodity mar-
kets. After leaving the CFTC, Wendy Gramm joined the board of Enron (Hilzenrath 2010). 
Other examples of effective lobbying by the financial sector involved the defeat of proposed 
bills relating to mortgage lending which would otherwise impose restrictions on the finan-
cial sector (Igan et al. 2012). The consequent lack of protection for mortgage borrowers con-
tributed to the creation of the property bubble referred to in section 2.2 and the growth in 
subprime lending. Examples of bills related to mortgage lending and which were defeated 
are set out in Figure 109. 




 These reforms were the Private Litigation Reform Act 1995, imposing enhanced pleading requirements and 
providing more protection for forward looking information; and the Securities Uniform Standards Act Litigation 




Figure 109 - Examples of Defeated US Government Bills 2000 - 2008 
Bill Num-
ber 
Bill Name Topic Outcome 
H.R. 3901 Anti-
Predatory 
Lending Act of 
2000 
Adds the following disclosure re-
quirement to the Home Mortgage 
Disclosure Act of 1975: ‘the annu-
al percentage rate of mortgage 
loans and home improvement 
loans originated by the institution 
grouped according to census tract, 
income level, racial characteris-
tics, and gender’. The bill restricts 
certain rates and fees and man-
dates that any borrower who 
would like to obtain a high-cost 
mortgage complete home owner-
ship counselling. Prepayment 
penalties, negative amortization, 
flipping home loans, extending 
credit without regard to ability to 
repay, encouraging default, pay-
ments to appraisers by creditors, 
and creditor-financing of credit 
insurance are disallowed. 
Introduced March 9, 2000; 
Never passed by House or 
Senate; Never signed 
into law. 
H.R. 3915 Mortgage Re-
form and An-
ti-Predatory 
Lending Act of 
2007 
Introduces licensing and training 
requirements for individuals wish-
ing to become loan originators. In 
addition, the bill stipulates that 
certain federal agencies are to 
regulate mortgage lenders so that 
they do not encourage borrowers 
from taking on loans that they do 
not have the ability to repay. 
Good faith estimates must include 
the total loan amount, the type 
and length of the loan, the annual 
percentage rate, the total esti-
mated monthly payment, the per-
centage the monthly payment is 
of the borrower’s monthly in-
come, and other disclosures. 
Introduced October 22, 
2007; Passed by House 
November 15, 2007; Nev-
er passed by Senate; Nev-
er signed into law. 
H.R. 1461 Federal Hous-
ing Finance 
Reform Act of 
2005 
The Federal Housing Finance Re-
form Act of 2005 creates the Fed-
eral Housing Finance Agency 
(FHFA) which would have over-
Introduced April 5, 2005; 
Passed by House October 
26, 2005; Never passed 






Bill Name Topic Outcome 
sight of Freddie Mac, Fannie Mae, 
and Federal Home Loan Banks. 
FHFA would become the single 
regulator for Freddie Mac and 
Fannie Mae; the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development 
would no longer have oversight. 
The bill requires Freddie Mac and 
Fannie Mae to set aside funds di-
rected at increasing home owner-
ship among low-income individu-
als or in low-income areas. 
into law. 
H.R. 1295 Responsible 
Lending Act 
Defines ‘higher-cost mortgage’ 
and includes requirements for 
mortgage product evaluation 
software and appraisals for prop-
erties secured by higher-cost 
mortgages. In addition, mortgage 
pamphlets distributed to consum-
ers are to be updated and simpli-
fied and explain topics such as bal-
loon payments, escrow accounts, 
and consumer responsibilities; 
furthermore, information should 
be provided in multiple languages 
and formats to reach vulnerable 
populations. 
Introduced March 15, 
2005; Never passed by 
House or Senate; Never 
signed into law. 
Source: The data used for the table was extracted from Igan et al. (2012, pp. 57-64).  
8.2.3 Normative influence, fuelled by mimetic behaviour, 
rallies the troops 
The combination of an increased industry spending, and an expanding use of lobbying firms 
by an increasing number of industry participants is indicative of a normative pressure, 
fuelled by mimetic behaviour amongst industry participants, to rally against regulatory stric-
tures affecting their businesses. Refer Figure 110 for the total lobbying expenditure by the 
investment banking industry (including all investment banks, investment management com-
panies and securities firms) for years 1998 to 2008. Figure 110 shows that lobbying expendi-
ture by the investment banking industry had grown by 300% for the ten-year period from 
1998 to 2008, an average of 20% per annum. This growth however accelerated significantly 
in the two years prior to the LB collapse, recording an average annual increase between 




Figure 110 - Total Lobbying Expenditure by the Investment Banking Industry 
 
Source: The data used for the graph was extracted from Centre for Responsible Politics 
(2008). 
LB’s contribution to various lobby groups also increased in the decade prior to 2008 as 
shown by Figure 111, declining after 2006 once the deterioration in its financial perfor-
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Figure 111 - LB Lobbying Spending from 1998 to 2008 
 
Source: The data used for the graph was extracted from Centre for Responsible Politics 
(2008). 
According to the Centre for Responsible Politics (2017), the lobby firm mostly used by LB 
was DLA Piper, a global law firm with an office in Washington. This firm was used by various 
interested parties from several industries. DLA Piper was particularly active and in addition 
to LB, in 2007 represented investment banks and securities firms such as Goldman Sachs, 
Merrill Lynch Charles Schwab Corp, Parkwood Group, and Stanford Financial Group (Centre 
for Responsible Politics 2008). Therefore DLA Piper would have been familiar with the topics 
of interest to the ‘financial network’. 
In order to ascertain the major US investment banks’ and related industry associations’ lob-
bying spending during the decade prior to the GFC, data was extracted from the Centre of 
Responsible Politics database for each major investment bank and major industry associa-
tion for the years 1998 to 2008. Figure 112 shows that the lobbying spending for the US in-
vestment banks followed the same increasing trend until 2006/2007 as shown in Figure 110. 
A similar pattern of lobbying spending is also evidenced by the main associations represent-
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Figure 112 - Lobbying Spending of Major US Investment Banks 1998 - 2008 
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Figure 113 - Lobbying Spending of Major Industry Associations 1998 - 2008 
 
Source: The data used for the graph was extracted from Centre for Responsible Politics 
(2008).  
As the investment banking industry expanded and the number of political issues affecting 
the industry increased in the pre-GFC period, the number of investment banks and securi-
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Figure 114 - Number of Investment Banking Clients of the Lobby Groups 
 Source: The data used for the graph was extracted from Centre for Responsible Politics 
(2008). 
Figure 115 shows a commensurate growth in the number of lobby groups servicing the in-
vestment banking industry. This growth in the number of lobby groups was driven by the 
increased demand for lobbyists and the growth in the number of political issues being faced 
by the industry (Centre for Responsible Politics 2011). 
Figure 115 - Number of Lobbyists Working for the Investment Banking Industry 
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According to Centre for Responsible Politics (2011), the investment banking industry's pri-
mary issue for lobbying was market trading business activities such as stockbroking and 
bond dealing. In this case the industry attempted to either postpone or prevent interven-
tionist legislation. Additionally, given the focus on expanding the investment banks’ business 
of securitising pools of mortgages, a concerted effort was made to engender demand in the 
mortgage market, including the freedom to operate within the market which is exemplified 
by the defeated bills noted in Figure 109.  
Normative Influence 
Given that the preservation of favourable business conditions advantaged financial perfor-
mance of the finance industry, the practice of lobbying became a social norm, affected by a 
normative influence in the industry’s attempt to achieve its objectives. The practice of lob-
bying had been an historic practice enshrined in the US by various interest groups. Its adop-
tion by the investment banking industry was a continuation of this trend in the US political 
arena. It was not only sustained for a long period, but intensified in the decade preceding 
the GFC. A social acceptance permeated the industry that a sustained lobbying effort was 
necessary to ensure growth at best and survival at worst by ensuring a regulatory frame-
work which was favourable to the industry.  
Legislators also came to accept this practice as socially acceptable and therefore normal, 
just as political contributions were deemed acceptable as a systemic way of funding elec-
tions. The view on both sides of the lobbying fence reflected a common understanding 
amongst professionals, that a constructive debate should take into account a diversity of 
views. Politicians were receptive to lobbying efforts as they desired to be viewed as open to 
all special interest groups wanting to convey a message, and therefore appear as legitimate 
political representatives in the eyes of constituents. As with many debates, however, those 
with the loudest voice and greatest resources could often put forward the most compelling 
point of view (Skeel 2005a). 
The investment in lobbying could be likened to a moral obligation to support the common 
effort of maintaining trading conditions sympathetic to the industry. Given that lobbying 
was successful in preventing certain bills being passed as outlined in Figure 109, it is deemed 
a successful instrument in the arsenal of the investment banking industry and an acceptable 
form of communicating a point of view. The receptive nature of the legislative and regulato-
ry communities to lobbying suggests that a normative influence was exerted on the ‘finan-
cial network’ whereby the practice of lobbying was an accepted norm. 
Mimetic Influence 
The mimicking behaviour of the industry in using lobbyists is also explained by DiMaggio & 




ganisations which they deem successful and legitimate. As the larger investment banks in-
creased their commitment to lobbying spending, the rest of the industry followed suit as 
they sought direction for the best course of action from their professional network - a con-
cept proposed by Galaskiewicz (1985).  
The increase in industry lobbying spending, and the increasing number of lobby firms en-
gaged by an increasing number of investment banks provides evidence that industry partici-
pants were responding similarly and with greater intensity to regulatory issues as an interest 
group. Industry associations championed the same efforts and carried the weight of an or-
ganised representative group with deeper resources to commit to the lobbying effort as 
shown by Figure 113 and presumably this enhanced their access to policymakers. The com-
mon push to preserve the relatively liberal operating environment supports the notion of a 
mimetic behavioural pattern amongst investment banks. 
The transfer between firms of the norm associated with lobbying spending usurped any in-
ternal preference to behave differently and spawned mimetic behaviour. Conformity to the 
practice of lobbying therefore became institutionalised and accepted by many industry par-
ticipants and is consistent with the notion supported by (Zanna 1991) of the adoption by a 
group of a practice where there is a commonality of purpose. It became a practice of con-
ventional wisdom which would assist in providing standardised conditions favourable to the 
individual firm as much as to the industry at large. 
Igan et al. (2012) also suggests that underperforming financial institutions may use the same 
lobbyists to lobby on the same issues as successful financial institutions so as to persuade 
regulators that they should also be regarded as successful. Through the application of politi-
cal pressure as a unified group, the investment banking industry was able to reinforce the 
communication of its positions on policy to the relevant regulatory agencies and legislators. 
This behaviour is particularly found in organisations in the same field where underperform-
ing organisations wish to enhance prestige and reputation, both attributes critical elements 
for an investment bank. 
8.2.4 Political Contributions and Lobbying as Coercive 
Pressure  
The US process of enacting legislation involves a prior review by specific Congress commit-
tees  prior to being submitted for voting. As committee members hold important positions 
in this process, they are subject to special attention and offers of contributions from lobby 
groups representing industries over which they have a regulatory influence. Figure 104 
shows that most of the top 10 recipients of political contributions are members of either a 
congressional or senate committee related to the finance industry. Members of Congress 




soliciting funds from wealthy donors. This is a normal practice in the US. However, it brings 
with it the risk of undue influence in the legislative making process. Moreover, committee 
members and other politicians are subject to a barrage of competing petitions from interest 
groups. 
As mentioned in CHAPTER 3, Dobbin and Sutton (1998) Edelman (1992) and Edelman et al. 
(1999) noted that organisations are active in influencing the content of legislation. Often 
this occurs when legislation covers complex matters and the intention of organisations is to 
ensure the proposed legislation reflects best practice. This thesis is supported by the notion 
that New Institutional Theory involves “a political process, and the success of the process 
and the form it takes depends on the relative power of the actors who strive to steer it” 
(Powell 2008, p. 5). This notion of New Institutional Theory reflects the way the investment 
banking industry sought to influence the regulatory and legislative process through coercive 
pressure. Sahlin-Andersson and Engwall (2002) also suggest that institutionalisation is sub-
ject to political forces. The same study argued that management consultants, accounting 
standard setters and the media are important transmitters of opinions to encourage institu-
tional change.  
Political groups and house committees - part of government, are claimed to be subject to 
the coercive pressures associated with the abovementioned political contributions and lob-
bying. The government subjects may succumb to this pressure from a threat of a reduction, 
or at worst a cancellation of future re-election support. The support is mainly in the form of 
political contributions or in a more subtle method, by way of negative campaigning against 
the committee, group or politician being lobbied. Given the political contributions of the in-
vestment banking community had been substantial as mentioned in section 8.2.1, any with-
holding of future contributions upon which politicians relied, would have exerted significant 
financial pressure on the chances for election or re-election as funds are needed for a varie-
ty of reasons in the election process, such as advertising.  
This pressure was directed to individuals in the relevant committees and to those in senior 
executive positions within the respective political parties. Compliance to the wishes of the 
donors and the lobby groups would have improved the probability of securing ongoing fu-
ture funding, hence long term political survival. A tenet of DiMaggio & Powell’s (1983) coer-
cive pressure involves an organisation acting in a certain manner to impose its will, whether 
subtly or directly, on another organisation to comply with certain actions or behaviours in 
return for legitimacy and its subsequent benefits. Investment bankers imposed their will on 
the political system through their lobbying efforts and increasing levels of political contribu-
tions. In return, politicians gained legitimacy through the repetitive practice of attracting 
and accepting political contributions. As long as donors continued to offer contributions, 
and directed them to their preferred political party, they held certain power over election 




vital to the well-being of the financial community. A continuance of contributions sent sig-
nals to the wider community that certain politicians were pursued by large industry players 
and therefore validated their worth. As donors from the investment banking industry gen-
erally comprise educated professionals with expertise in economics and the financial mar-
kets, their support for Bush in 2004 was viewed by many voters as a validation of his neo-
liberal economic approach.  
8.2.5 Influence through the ‘Revolving Door’ 
Influence in the legislative process is not only achieved through political contributions and 
well-orchestrated lobbying, but also through a practice of revolving personnel between the 
key participants in the financial network and government offices. In the US the term ‘revolv-
ing door’74 refers to this practice. The most successful university graduates seeking em-
ployment with investment banks often seek out those investment banks leading the pub-
lished industry league tables. The reverse of this is also the case where leading investment 
banks prefer to recruit high achieving students (McDowell 1997). Consequently, investment 
banks are staffed with high quality individuals who are keenly sought within the finance and 
commercial sectors, as well as in senior government positions. Given the vast opportunities 
available to the pool of high achieving investment bankers, staff mobility amongst the pro-
fession is considered high, leading to an industry which is subject to the ‘revolving door’ 
(Rajan 2010). As Rajan (2010) noted, “an investment banker’s view of the world is unlikely 
to change. This phenomena leads to cognitive capture”75.  
Lobby groups gain personal access and exert influence through strong connections with 
public servants. The latter group consists of politicians and regulators formed by former 
federal employees who are later employed in industry or as lobbyists, consultants and strat-




 In politics, the ‘revolving door’ concept refers to the switching of an individual’s employment between gov-
ernment, regulatory authorities and the industries they supervise. A danger to this practice is the undue influ-
ence that can be exerted on regulators and government to establish biased public policy in favour of the pri-
vate sector. This notion is known as regulatory capture. 
75
 Regulatory capture has two forms consisting of cognitive capture or materialist capture. Materialist capture 
occurs when the regulator's motive is based on material self-interest. This can result from bribery, political 
donations, or the regulator's desire to maintain its government funding. Cognitive capture occurs when regula-
tors views and beliefs are shaped by the regulated industry. The process of industry lobbying is often a con-




egists. The opposite also applies as industry participants switch between private and public 
sectors. As connections are developed, so too does privilege, power, access and funding 
(Senate Office of Public Records Government of the USA 2011). Investment banking profes-
sionals and their lobbyists are considered useful employees for government and regulators 
given their knowledge and experience in the financial and commercial sectors and their 
connections and influence within industry. These attributes are desired by government as it 
attempts to develop the knowhow to initiate relevant regulations affecting the finance in-
dustry or to gain political support in the form of validation of policy or donations from the 
private sector. On the hand, the investment banking industry has an appetite for hiring gov-
ernment employees to facilitate personal access to key regulators and policymakers, in an 
attempt to influence regulatory outcomes. The regulators have been accused of using a 
‘light touch’ with investment banking regulation as they hope to seek more lucrative remu-
neration with those they regulate in later life after their public service employment (Tammy 
2014). Additionally (Burger 2006) and (Tammy 2014) suggest that Federal Reserve regula-
tors avoid complex regulation as they recognise a divergence between the skill levels of pro-
fessionals in the industry and the regulators. The appointment of an ex-government official 
can also assist in winning lucrative government contracts such as major financing or advisory 
mandates for clients of the lobby groups. 
An examination of the Centre For Responsible Politics database reveals that since data col-
lection commenced in 1974, between the three key regulatory agencies (the Department of 
the Treasury; the Federal Reserve System; and the Securities & Exchange Commission) 
which interacted with the investment banking industry, a total of 353 officers had also 
worked either in the investment banking industry or for an associated lobby group (Centre 
for Responsible Politics 2011). Figure 116 sets out the number of staff who have been 
through the ‘revolving door’ where their current or former place of employment was with 
one of the three agencies. 
Figure 116 - ‘Revolving door’ Staff of Regulatory Agencies 
Government Agency Number of Staff % of Total 
Department of the Treasury 203 57 
Securities & Exchange Commission 116 33 
Federal Reserve System 34 10 
Total 353 100 
Source: The data used for the table was extracted from Centre for Responsible Politics 
(2008). 
Hilzenrath (2010) conducted an empirical study examining the SEC’s track record of en-
forcement against investment banks and brokerage houses before 2007, and found indirect 




agency employees were employed in the finance industry at higher salaries (Hilzenrath 
2010, p. 725). The finding indicated a systemic pattern of the ‘revolving door’ practice be-
tween SEC employees and industry. The Project on Government Oversight (POGO) which is 
a US non-partisan independent watchdog that advocates good government reforms investi-
gated some impacts of the ‘revolving door’ on the SEC and produced a report for use by the 
US Congress. POGO specifically examined former SEC employees who after leaving the SEC 
were employed by organisations overseen by the SEC. Its findings included that:  
between 2006 and 2010, 219 former SEC employees sought to represent clients before the 
SEC. Former employees filed 789 statements notifying the SEC of their intent to represent 
outside clients before the commission, some filing within days of leaving the SEC (Smallberg 
2011, p. 2).  
A case was made by (Smallberg 2011) that implicated SEC employees as subjects of a con-
flict of interest between the SEC and industry:  
The SEC Office of Inspector General has identified cases in which the revolving door appeared 
to be a factor in staving off SEC enforcement actions and other types of SEC oversight, includ-
ing cases involving Bear Stearns (Smallberg 2011, p. 2). 
The ‘revolving door’ practice was entrenched in the investment banking industry for some 
time. Refer Figure 117 for the employment history of a sample of recent US Treasury Secre-
taries such as Tim Geithner, Henry Paulson, Robert Rubin, and Lawrence Summers which 
shows them passing through the ‘revolving door’.  
Figure 117 - Selection of US Treasury Secretaries Passing through the ‘Revolving Door’ 
Tim Geithner 
Period of  
Employment 
Employer Title 
2014-present EM Warburg, Pincus & Co 
(Investment Bank) 
President and Managing Director 
2009-2013 Department of the Treasury Secretary of the Treasury 
2003-2009 Federal Reserve System President, Fed Reserve Bank of New 
York 
2001-2003 International Monetary Fund Director, Policy Development & Re-
view 





1988-2001 Department of the Treasury Undersecretary for International Af-
fairs 




Period Employer Title 
2009-present Johns Hopkins University Distinguished Visiting Scholar 
2006-2009 Department of the Treasury Secretary of the Treasury 
1974-2005 Goldman Sachs 
(Investment Bank) 
CEO 
1972-1973 White House Employee/Staff 
1970-1972 Department of Defence Staff Assistant 
 
Robert Rubin  
Period Employer Title 












Department of the  
Treasury 
















Lawrence Summers  
Period Employer Title 
2009-present National Economic Council Director 
2006-2008 DE Shaw & Co 
(Investment Bank) 
Managing Director 
2002- present Brookings Institution Board of Trustees 
2002- present Committee for Economic 
Development 
Board of Trustees 
2001- present Council on  
Competitiveness 
Member 
2001-2001 Brookings Institution Senior Fellow 
2001- present Centre for Global  
Development 
Board of Directors 
2001-2005 Global Fund for Children's  
Vaccines 
Board of Directors 
2001-2006 Harvard University President 
2001- present Partnership for  
Public Service 
Board of Governors 




2001- present Bretton Woods  
Committee 
Member 
2001- present Institute for International 
Economics 
Board of Directors 
2001-present Inter-American Dialogue Member 
1999-2001 Department of the  
Treasury 
Secretary of the Treasury 
1997- present Group of 30 Member 
1995-1999 Department of the  
Treasury 
Deputy Secretary 
1993-1995 Department of the  
Treasury 
Undersecretary 
1991-1993 World Bank Group VP of Development Economics 
1989-1992 American Economic  
Association 
Executive Committee 
1989- present Council on Foreign  
Relations 
Member 
1988-1990 American Economic  
Association Commission 
on Graduate Education 
Member 




1986-1990 Congressional  
Budget Office 
Board of Advisors 
1983-1987 Harvard University Professor of Economics 
1982-1983 Council of Economic  
Advisers 
Domestic Policy Economist 
1982-1982 Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology 
Associate Professor of Economics 
Source: The data used for the table was extracted from Centre for Responsible Politics 
(2008). 
Other notable Secretaries of the Treasury passing through the ‘revolving door’ include: Rob-
ert Kimmit, ex-Managing Director of LB;  Douglas Dillon and Nicholas Brady of Dillon Read 
and William Simon of Salomon Brothers (Inside Gov 2017). Even Pete Peterson former CEO 
of LB served as Secretary of Commerce before joining LB. Historically, the relationship be-
tween investment banks and government has been important since government has also 
relied heavily on the industry to finance a large part of their borrowings, even as far back as 
the Revolution, refer CHAPTER 4. 
Apart from the Treasury department key leaders from the Federal Reserve System also 
worked in the investment banking industry prior to and after ascending to their influential 
government positions. Alan Greenspan was one of the key regulators during the critical pre-
GFC period as Chairman of the Federal Reserve from 1987 to 2006. The normative influence 
affecting the Federal Reserve was also evident in the loose monetary policy it intiated dur-
ing this period which was considered dangerous: 
Both the 1998 LTCM and the January 21/22, 2008 episodes suggest that the Fed has been co-
opted by Wall Street - that the Fed has effectively internalised the objectives, concerns, world 
view and fears of the financial community. This socialisation into a partial and often distort-
ed perception of reality is unhealthy and dangerous (Buiter 2008, p. 106). 
The intensive lobbying efforts of the investment banking industry had ‘co-opted’ the Federal 
Reserve into a culture of continued growth for the financial markets. This culture as ex-
plained throughout this thesis was consistent with the strategy driving the industry (refer 
CHAPTER 7) and that of LB (refer CHAPTER 10). The actions of the Federal Reserve were so-




ciety who had an interest in escalating asset prices. The Federal Reserve complied with the 
expectations of industry as it considered the adopted policies were socially sanctioned and a 
proper course of action for the good of society generally. Support for the Federal Reserve’s 
actions came from professionals with a wide industry representation, especially the financial 
markets. As well-educated, professional individuals, the financial market experts validated 
the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy stance.  This wider group of beneficiaries of the loose 
monetary policy settings only reinforced the Reserve Bank’s resolve and belief that lower 
interest rates were good for the economy and therefore continued to promote them for al-
most a decade. The term associated with this policy was the ‘Greenspan-put’ or later re-
ferred to as the Greenspan-Bernanke put’76. The view that a continuation of low interest 
rates would benefit the financial markets by buoying asset prices, particularly in the equity 
and debt securities and property markets was founded on the belief that these markets 
were essential to the continued prosperity of the financial network which was essential to a 
healthy economy: 
… it seems pretty evident to me, that the Fed under both Greenspan and Bernanke has cut 
rates more vigorously in response to sharp falls in stock prices than can be rationalised with 
the causal effects of stock prices on household spending and on private investment, or with 
the predictive content of unexpected changes in stock prices (Buiter 2008, p. 106).  
Refer section 6.6.20 for a discussion of the prevailing economic climate during this period 
and Figure 86 for a graph displaying the decreasing trend of the Fed Funds Rate in line with 
Greenspan’s accommodative monetary policy stance. Greenspan had a long association with 
the finance industry. Following his studies, Greenspan worked with Brown Brothers Harri-
man, in the firm's equity research department (Greenspan 2007, p. 41). Greenspan had a 
high regard for the firm which had a history of participating in the ‘revolving door’: 
Brown Brothers Harriman was among New York's oldest, largest, most prestigious invest-
ment banks - W. Averell Harriman, the legendary statesman, had been a general partner be-
fore going to work for President Roosevelt and Prescott Bush, father of President George H. 
W. Bush and grandfather of President George W. Bush, served there as a partner both before 
and after his tenure in the U.S. Senate From 1948 to 1953 (Greenspan 2007, p. 31).  
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Greenspan also worked for a finance industry consultancy and ‘think tank’ known as The 
Conference Board from 1955 to 1987 (Greenspan 2007). During his tenure with the Federal 
Reserve, Greenspan concurrently held the position of Chairman and President of another 
economics consultancy firm, Townsend-Greenspan & Co which also provided services to the 
finance industry (Greenspan 2007). Greenspan’s involvement with industry extended to 
Board memberships on corporations such as Aluminium Company of America (Alcoa); Au-
tomatic Data Processing; Capital Cities ABC Inc.; General Foods; J.P. Morgan & Co; Morgan 
Guaranty Trust Company; Mobil Corporation; and the Pittston Company (Pottruck 2005). 
Ben Bernanke was Chairman of the Federal Reserve during the height of the GFC, between 
2006 and 2014. Although Bernanke’s career prior to commencing in his role at the Federal 
Reserve was in academia, he succumbed to the temptation of working in industry after retir-
ing from the Federal Reserve. In 2015, Bernanke joined a hedge fund known as Citadel as a 
senior advisor. The fund managed USD 25 billion in assets and is considered one of the larg-
est funds of its type in the US (Sorkin & Stevenson 2015). 
Other recent president and chief executive officers of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
who immediately preceded Geithner, included Gerald Corrigan who served in that capacity 
from 1985 until 1993 and William McDonough who served from 1993 to 2003. Immediately 
following his career at the Federal Reserve, Corrigan was appointed Managing Director at 
Goldman Sachs in 1994 and soon became Chairman, retiring in 2016 (Federal Reserve Bank 
New York 2017a).  Prior to joining the Federal Reserve, William McDonough worked for US 
bank, First Chicago Corporation and its subsidiary bank, First National Bank of Chicago for 22 
years. McDonough retired from First Chicago Corporation in 1989. Upon his retirement from 
the Federal Reserve, McDonough was appointed to serve as the first chairperson of the Pub-
lic Company Accounting Oversight Board (established by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002) in 
Washington, DC. He served in that post until 2005. McDonough eventually returned to the 
investment banking industry as Vice-Chairman and special advisor to the Chairman at Merrill 
Lynch & Co. until his retirement in 2009 (Federal Reserve Bank New York 2017b). 
As mentioned in section 5.2.1, Fuld also carried a degree of influence. In addition to his oth-
er roles, Fuld was a member on the Board of Directors of the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York. He held this position from March 2005 and was re-elected in January 2008, resigning a 
short time before the failure of LB (Federal Reserve Bank New York 2007). Further, LB was 
able to maintain a connection with regulators through its Chief Legal Officer, Russo, whose 
influential connections are documented in section 5.2.6. 
8.2.6  Empirical Evidence that Connections Count 
Using an empirical analysis, Igan and Mishra (2011) found that political contributions, the 




process. Their findings confirm the proposition that firstly lobbying expenditures by financial 
firms, including investment banks, influenced the votes within government on industry re-
lated legislation proposed in the years prior to the crisis. As lobbying on proposed financial 
legislation intensified, Igan and Mishra (2011) found that a legislator would alter their posi-
tion to favour a more liberal legislative stance in a subsequent reintroduction of the related 
piece of legislation to the House of Representatives. This link was found to be statistically 
significant. Secondly, Igan and Mishra (2011) found that the stronger the connection be-
tween lobbyists and legislators, the greater the probability of a legislator changing their vote 
in favour of the lobbyists position. The strength of the connection was associated with the 
amount of political contribution donated by the lobbyist to the legislator. Thirdly, Igan and 
Mishra (2011) found that a politician’s party affiliation influenced  whether a legislator was 
in favour of deregulation. The propensity to support deregulation was higher for a Republi-
can legislator than for a Democrat and greater still if the legislator had previously worked in 
the investment banking industry. This empirical analysis is supplemented by other studies 
on this phenomenon. Malmendier and Schmidt (2011), for example, in a study using an ex-
perimental methodology, found that the giving of a donation or gift is able to persuade the 
decisions of the recipient in a way that benefits the giver. The favourable response by the 
recipient is achieved despite knowing that the intention of the giver is to influence the recip-
ient.  
The culture of an organisation also has an impact on whether they engage in lobbying to af-
fect a regulatory stance. Igan et al. (2012) found that those financial institutions whose lend-
ing policies supported riskier credits and processes during the period between 2000 and 
2006 were more inclined to use lobbyists. These same more credit risk-aggressive financial 
institutions experienced a higher level of financial distress from the GFC. Igan and Mishra 
(2011) and Igan et al. (2012) therefore established an empirical foundation for the link be-
tween lobbying by the finance industry to the establishment of a lenient regulatory envi-
ronment, permitting a less conservative lending culture. Stratmann (2002) with an empirical 
study, established that campaign contributions affected voting choices by legislators on bills 
related to financial regulation. Mian et al. (2013) in a study of six bills introduced prior to the 
GFC, also found that subprime mortgage lenders influenced government policy toward sub-
prime mortgage credit expansion. Bertrand et al. (2014) found that lobbyists form connec-
tions with particular politicians and follow their various committee roles in government in 
order to influence their respective committee’s decisions. Therefore, the case for the influ-
ence over the regulatory and legislative process is confirmed by previous literature. 
8.2.7  Knowledge Asymmetry as Normative Pressure 
As mentioned in section 6.2 the pace of financial innovation which emerged in the 1980s 
had accelerated during the 1990s and 2000s. This particularly affected the securitisation 




These structures were even found to be too complex for the CRAs to fully comprehend and 
assign appropriate credit risk ratings as was later revealed in the financial crisis enquiry 
(Financial Crisis Enquiry Commission 2011). In this environment, where rampant innovation 
was created by the investment banking industry, a natural knowledge asymmetry developed 
between industry participants and the regulators. After all, in the absence of a formal con-
sultative process between industry and regulators, how could the regulators understand the 
complex financial products prior to their distribution? The notion that ‘industry knows best’ 
in a fast-paced environment where no immediate risks were discerned was adopted by reg-
ulators. This approach was consistent with the neo-liberal political atmosphere at the time 
as described in section 2.2.  
The professionals employed by the regulatory agencies were expected to have a knowledge 
and skill base commensurate with those in the industry they were supposed to regulate. 
However a knowledge asymmetry existed which gave rise to normative pressures being ex-
erted upon the regulators. As mentioned in section 3.1.30, normative pressures are present 
as a consequence of professionalism. As the formal qualifications (consisting of tertiary edu-
cation in the business, economic and finance fields) required for individuals in the two 
groups consisting of regulators and the ‘financial network’ are largely similar, it is suggested 
that employees of both groups were members of the same professions in a broader tech-
nical sense. Whilst the finance industry originally developed complex products and struc-
tures for financial transactions, the accounting profession was involved in their accounting 
and auditing; the legal profession was concerned with their documentation; and the CRAs 
developed methodologies to apply the respective ratings. In the meantime, regulators were 
responsible for overseeing their regulatory compliance. All groups therefore were required 
to share the same professional knowledge necessary to fully understand these innovations. 
The condition for normative pressure to exist accepts the concept that individuals within 
certain professions exhibit norms and cultural behaviours that are linked to their occupa-
tion.  
The complex derivative products and financial structures deployed in the marketplace found 
acceptance by industry and their customers generally. The pressure was on the profession-
als within the regulatory agencies to accept these practices as information about them fil-
tered through the professional networks, the same networks that were affected by the ‘re-
volving door’. As the financing practices became norms amongst professionals within the 
private enterprise groups, the normative pressure exerted resulted in these ‘practice’ norms 
being adopted by the same professionals within the regulatory agencies which included the 
Securities Exchange Commission, Federal Reserve, NYSE, Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency, Office of Thrift Supervision, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal Finan-
cial Institution Examination Council. For a list of the responsibilities of each agency, refer to 




The resultant adoption of these practices challenges the principle that regulators have a re-
sponsibility to act in the public interest, given society bears the cost of regulation. This no-
tion is consistent with public interest theory which proposes that regulation is necessary to 
protect the public interest (Deegan 2009).  The regulator has a responsibility to balance the 
costs of regulation with its social benefits with regards to more effective financial markets 
(Scott 2003, p. 448). The responsibility to the public can be viewed from a number of per-
spectives. Deegan (2009) suggests that regulation is necessary due to the following reasons: 
markets are inefficient and without comprehensive information available to the markets, 
individual investors could be negatively impacted from relying on insufficient disclosures; 
there are power imbalances between investors which may affect their relative access to re-
liable information; investors can be affected by fraudulent organisations publishing mislead-
ing information; and regulation encourages comparability between organisations due to re-
quirements to produce information  using uniform methods. These responsibilities entail 
‘professional’ conduct, a hallmark of which encompasses ethical considerations. Key fea-
tures of the expected professional conduct by regulators include transparency and inde-
pendence in their everyday activities (Dellaportas et al. 2005). 
Not only were the investment bankers innovative with products and financial structures, 
they also introduced new concepts in corporate finance. An example of the contribution of 
new knowledge from the investment banking industry include the concept of value at risk 
(VaR), which provides a measure of expected loss on a financial instrument resulting from 
the variation of an underlying price or rate. JP Morgan Chase was responsible for the devel-
opment of the VaR concept which has since been commonly applied by the finance industry. 
It is also used by the peak bank supervisory body, the Bank of International Settlements in 
its Basel guidelines governing market risk (Ferguson). Further examples of investment bank-
ing influence on institutional practices include: the classification by Goldman Sachs of an 
emerging economic grouping known as ‘BRIC’ (acronym for Brazil, Russia, India and China). 
Additionally, Morgan Stanley developed a set of indices used to categorise and provide a 
measure for equity markets known as MSCI77 indices. Investment banks have also been in-
volved in introducing and developing the corporate finance concept of economic value, and 




 Morgan Stanley developed the Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) indexes. MSCI indexes are wide-




using stock prices as an essential forward looking measure of the valuation of a corporation 
(Ho 2009). 
The attitude whereby professionals within the investment banking industry were viewed as 
thought leaders within their profession fostered a lax approach to the regulatory process. 
Regulators deferred the development of intellectual capital to the industry they were sup-
posed to be supervising. The regulators obviously did not fully understand the consequenc-
es or implications of such innovation as was proved with the subsequent corporate and 
banking failures. In the modern era, the emergence of CRAs in the ‘financial network’ intro-
duced another party potentially subject to normative influence. As CRAs became an essen-
tial conduit for investment banks to successfully execute their securities transactions, any 
influence over their activities would become advantageous. The following sections explore 
the means by which this influence was exercised.    
8.3 Credit Rating Agencies – Under the Influ-
ence 
This section explains how through their commercial support of the CRAs and by providing 
them direct feedback on the rating models employed, investment banks were able to exert 
influence to achieve their desired outcomes. Section 8.3.2 shows that regulator agenicies 
also acted to influence the ratings process. Coffee et al. (2010, p. 1) define credit ratings as 
symbols that “provide an opinion on the relative ability and willingness of parties with debt 
obligations to meet financial commitments”. They claim that credit ratings have three func-
tions: “to measure the credit risk of the issuer; to provide a means of comparison; and to 
provide a common standard” (Coffee et al. 2010, p. 1). The international credit rating mar-
ket is dominated by three major agencies, S&P, Moodys and Fitch which together constitute 
a natural oligopoly, representing more than 90% of the market (Coffee et al. 2010, p. 1). The 
ratings provided by CRAs are designed to inform investors with independent and well re-




these responsibilities, exacerbating the 2007/2008 financial crisis78. Their contributory role 
extended from publishing inflated ratings of financial institutions and more significantly se-
curitisation vehicles holding risky mortgage-related products such as subprime mortgages. 
This indictment, is promoted by a view that CRAs are fundamentally subject to conflicts of 
interest (Coffee 2011, p. 232). This allegation came to a head in a case filed by the US De-
partment of Justice and subsequently settled by S&P (the defendant): 
 Department of Justice and 19 states and the District of Columbia have entered into a USD 
1.375 billion settlement agreement with the rating agency Standard & Poor’s Financial Ser-
vices LLC, along with its parent corporation McGraw Hill Financial Inc., to resolve allegations 
that S&P had engaged in a scheme to defraud investors in structured financial products 
known as Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities (RMBS) and Collateralized Debt Obliga-
tions (CDOs).  The agreement resolves the department’s 2013 lawsuit against S&P, along 
with the suits of 19 states and the District of Columbia.  Each of the lawsuits allege that in-
vestors incurred substantial losses on RMBS and CDOs for which S&P issued inflated ratings 
that misrepresented the securities’ true credit risks.  Other allegations assert that S&P falsely 
represented that its ratings were objective, independent and uninfluenced by S&P’s business 
relationships with the investment banks that issued the securities (US Office of Public Affairs 
2015). 
In the process of settling the lawsuit, S&P admitted facts demonstrating that it misrepre-
sented itself to investors and the public, by issuing bias ratings in its attempts to maximise 
profits (US Office of Public Affairs 2015). The above statement issued by the US Department 
of Justice alludes to the complicity of the CRAs in disseminating misleading ratings on CDOs 
arranged by various investment banks prior to the GFC. Although the lawsuit focused on 
S&P as the defendant, the assertions mentioned therein are relevant to other major CRAs 
operating in the industry (Coffee et al. 2010; Leaders of The G20 2009; US Office of Public 
Affairs 2015).  
The major criticism of the CRAs’ approach revolves around the ‘issuer-pays’ model used pri-
or to the GFC (Coffee et al. 2010). The model involves an issuer of securities paying the CRA 




 The contribution of the CRAs to the cause of the GFC was confirmed by the Group of Twenty (G20) which in 
April, 2009 declared there was a requirement for “more effective oversight of the activities of Credit Rating 





for their rating. The ratings, once published are made available to the investors without 
fees. During the 1970s, CRAs used a ‘subscriber pays’ model, whereby they generated in-
come by charging the users of the ratings. However, as the issuance of debt securities ex-
panded, the demand for ratings grew commensurately and CRAs discovered it increasingly 
profitable to charge a fee directly to issuers. “This practice grew to the point where, by 
1987, nearly 80% of S&P’s revenues came from issuer fees. The balance came from selling 
research and ratings information to large institutional investors, corporations, and libraries” 
(Coffee et al. 2010, p. 7).  
There are two major reasons for issuers using credit ratings to support their debt securities 
issues.  Firstly, issuers can access a wider investor base as the credit assessment is portrayed 
as independent and reliable given the assessment is carried out by a third party. Therefore 
the resultant confidence generated amongst investors, maximises the potential for a fully 
subscribed issue. Secondly, through the access to the public markets, the issuer may benefit 
from an improved cost of capital as public debt issues are traditionally less expensive than 
bank loans. These reasons for using CRAs sustained a continuation of the issuer pays model 
and contributed to the CRAs ongoing profitability. There was little incentive for CRAs to 
change business model as observed by Coffee et al. (2010, p.39):  
For a variety of reasons, including the shared oligopoly that the major rating agencies enjoy, 
their virtual immunity from liability, and the conflicts of interest surrounding their common 
‘issuer pays’ business model – the major credit rating agencies simply had too little incentive 
to get it right. 
The question remains then, how did the investment banks that relied on the inflated credit 
ratings to successfully distribute their securities influence the CRAs to do their bidding? 
8.3.1 Coercive Pressure over CRAs from Industry 
As arrangers of securities issues, investment banks are often instructed by issuers to negoti-
ate with CRAs on their behalf and arrange for the rating. In this position of influence, and 
given that ratings agencies often compete with each other for an issuer’s rating, there exists 
a natural arena for influence to be exerted. This influence by an investment bank could be 
exerted by refusing to contract with a particular CRA unless the investment bank’s expecta-
tions are met. These expectations could include the price of the rating, the timing of its pub-
lication or the level of the rating itself. The investment banking industry is motivated to pur-
sue the highest possible rating for their clients for various reasons. Firstly, there is the repu-
tation factor. If an investment bank is routinely perceived as achieving a higher rating for its 
client than was expected, this skill would enhance its reputation in the market and therefore 
potentially attract a greater number of clients seeking to minimise their cost of capital. Sec-
ondly, as returns from a security are inextricably linked to the risk and therefore the rating 




with the ‘true’ risk of a security. This infers that the market’s view of the risk of a security 
could differ from the CRAs’ view at any given point in time. This can occur as a result of the 
infrequent and irregular publication of ratings compared to the timely absorption of infor-
mation by the market in a security’s price or the inaccurate rating being issued in the first 
place.  
A rational investor would therefore be motivated to invest in any security whose credit rat-
ing is expected to be upgraded within an acceptable time horizon. As the credit rating is up-
graded, the return offered in the market is adjusted by way of a price adjustment to reflect 
the improved credit profile as judged by the CRA. This usually translates into an increase in 
price, reflecting a premium for a stock or the narrowing of the credit spread for a bond. An 
investor holding the security would benefit by the instruments price rise in either case. The 
rational investor would therefore purchase the security in anticipation that the market will 
adjust its price to the risk commensurate with the CRAs’ upgrade of a rating. This behaviour 
by investors would therefore predispose a preference from the investment community to 
encourage CRAs to rerate issuers at the top end of the arbitrary band established by the 
CRAs’ rating framework. As investment banks constitute a significant part of the investment 
community, there is a natural motivation for them to push for these higher re-ratings.  
In search of commercial success, S&P was motivated to soliciting feedback from the invest-
ment banking industry. The importance placed on feedback from investment banks is illus-
trated when S&P was developing a new ratings model. S&P had relied on a model known as 
CDO Evaluator Version 2.4.3 for its rating process involving CDOs. During 2004/2005, this 
model was subject to review with the intention of improving its functionality and accuracy 
and the new model was to be known as CDO Evaluator Version 3.0 (E3). The newer model 
would have produced lower ratings for CDOs and was therefore resisted by senior manag-
meent at S&P due to the affect it would have on revenue and market share: 
The initial update efforts, throughout 2004, were directed in part by the then head of S&P’s 
Global CDO group, whose experience was that the risk of losing transaction revenue was a 
factor that affected updates of CDO Evaluator … during the initial update efforts, he and, ac-
cording to him the then Managing Director in charge of the Cash CDO group, pushed back 
against updates to CDO Evaluator proposed by one of S&P’s senior analysts because they be-
lieved these changes would have had a significant negative effect on S&P's market share and 
ratings business (US Government Department of Justice Office Public Affairs 2015, p. 2).  
According to US Government Department of Justice Office Public Affairs (2015), ultimately, 
given the potential negative impact on existing ratings, the E3 model was postponed. Prior 
to the intended release of a revised E3 model, S&P sought feedback from investment banks. 
Emails forwarded internally to senior executives within S&P dated 18th and 19th July 2005,  




in the ‘Statement of Facts’ forming part of the documents in the case initiated by the US 
Department of Justice against S&P: 
S&P’s ratings generated by using CDO Evaluator Version 2.4.3 [this version preceded the pro-
posed new version: E3] had been the ‘best’ (by comparison to Moody’s and Fitch) with re-
spect to CDOs comprised of certain ‘more lowly rated’ asset pools; S&P would be giving up its 
market advantage with respect to these CDOs by moving to E3; and S&P would not make up 
for this with any increase in business in ‘the high quality sector’ because with respect to this 
sector Moody’s and Fitch can do better than E3 already (US Government Department of 
Justice Office Public Affairs 2015, p. 2).  
Following the opposition to the new model from the investment banking industry, an S&P 
senior executive stated that:  
the roll out of E3 to the market had been ‘toned down and slowed down’ … pending further 
measures to deal with such negative feedback (US Government Department of Justice Office 
Public Affairs 2015, p. 2).  
The investment banks had effectively coerced S&P to cease development of the new version 
of E3 under the threat of the industry refusing to seek ratings from the CRA given that the 
new version would result in lower ratings. These sentiments are noted as follows: 
the basis for this decision, noting in particular one investment bank’s comments that E3 
would result in S&P missing potential business opportunities (US Government Department of 
Justice Office Public Affairs 2015, p. 2). 
The above evidence in the ‘Statement of Facts’ issued by the US Department of Justice 
demonstrates the coercive institutional influence exerted by the investment banking indus-
try in its feedback relating to the development of a revised ratings model. In effect the pres-
sure from the investment banks ensured that ratings downgrades were kept to a minimum 
or avoided altogether during that period.   
The instinct for generating greater profits at the expense of issuing accurate ratings was also 
expressed by David Tesher, a Managing Director of S&P, who in March 2007 addressed rat-
ings analysts in directing their approach to future ratings:  
Wall Street clients were under pressure to move souring mortgages into new securities called 
CDOs before the market crashed. Issuers needed the highest grades on the repackaged bonds 
to sell them to pension funds, banks and other investors (Smith & Ivry 2013).  
This message, an example of the pressure placed on ratings analysts to inflate their ratings, 
is a consequence of coercive pressure. Coercive pressure is more likely and effective on or-
ganisations which are financially dependent on one another. For example, sporting organi-




sures applied by the state to accept change in organisational practice (DiMaggio & Powell 
1983; Slack & Hinings 1994). 
CRAs relied on investment banks to issue significant volumes of debt securities to sustain 
their business model. As discussed in section 6.2.1, CDOs and MBS represented a significant 
amount of total debt securities issued in the pre-GFC period. Representatives from the in-
vestment banking industry comprised the major underwriters of these securities and re-
quired credit ratings in order to effectively distribute them to their customers. Figure 118 
shows the top 12 underwriters of US MBS in 2007. Interestingly LB is the top ranked under-
writer based on market share and as a group, the investment banking industry accounted 
for over 80% of the market share. The industry and LB in particular as the leading under-
writer, would have possessed an influential voice in their dealings with the CRAs which helps 
explain comments by David Tesher. 
Figure 118 - Top 12 US Mortgage Backed Securities (including CDOs) Underwriters in 2007 






Market Share Based 
on Amount Issued* 
Amount Issued 
USD Millions 
1 Lehman Brothers 120 10.80% 100,109 
2 Bear Stearns 128 9.90% 91,696 
3 Morgan Stanley 92 8.20% 75,627 
4 JP Morgan Chase 95 7.90% 73,214 
5 Credit Suisse 109 7.50% 69,503 
6 Bank of America 101 6.80% 62,776 
7 Deutsche Bank 85 6.20% 57,337 
8 Royal Bank of Scot-
land Group 
74 5.80% 53,352 
9 Merrill Lynch 81 5.20% 48,407 
10 Goldman Sachs 60 5.10% 47,696 
11 Citigroup 95 5.00% 46,754 
12 UBS 74 4.30% 39,832 
*Note: As other securities firms were involved in arranging MBS issues, the total of market 
share data does not equal 100%. 
Source: The data used for the table was extracted from Coffee et al. (2010, p. 9). 
In support of the evidence of undue pressure being exerted internally within S&P, the exec-
utive in charge of S&P’s RMBS Surveillance Group frequently protested:  
that she was prevented by S&P executives from downgrading subprime RMBS as she and the 
surveillance group wanted because of concern that S&P’s rating business would be negative-
ly affected if S&P were to announce severe downgrades (US Government Department of 




The investment banking industry had successfully exerted its influence over the CRAs and as 
a result extended the favourable perceptions of the credit profiles of client issuers, thereby 
facilitating continuing fee generating activity for both the investment banks and the CRAs. 
8.3.2 Coercive Pressure over CRAs from Regulatory Re-
quirements 
There are numerous examples where credit ratings are included in regulations to guide gov-
ernment authorities in their assessment of an organisation or to restrict investments, in par-
ticular investments made by government authorities - these are known as ‘regulatory rat-
ings’. Langohr and Langohr (2008) noted that the use of ‘regulatory ratings’ damages market 
discipline as there is an artificial bias established by regulation to invest in higher rated is-
sues. Coffee et al. (2010) have criticised the prevalence of regulatory ratings as they tend to 
defer the responsibility of credit decisions to a third party. “Ratings have become so em-
bedded in guidelines and regulations that the safety judgement of an investment has de fac-
to been outsourced to the CRAs” (Coffee et al. 2010, p. 7). Refer Appendix G for examples of 
regulations from 1931 to 2000 which required the adoption by US organisations of mini-
mum credit rating thresholds for their investment activities. An example of such a restriction 
involves the 1991 SEC amendment to rule 2a-7 under the investment company act of 1940 
which required US Money Market Mutual Funds to restrict their investments of debt securi-
ties to those with a minimum rating of A1 (Coffee et al. 2010).  
The minimum rating thresholds indicated in Appendix G had been set by regulators. There-
fore, for many investors who were required to invest in rated securities and were bound by 
the minimum rating standards, their investment universe became limited. An investment 
universe for these investors needs to meet the regulatory minimum standards and be suffi-
ciently diverse and with a market depth to meet their investment criteria. This creates a 
natural and skewed demand for higher rated issues - at least equal to or higher than the 
minimum ‘investment grade’ band of ‘BBB’ which is the lowest rating for many of the rele-
vant regulations (Coffee et al. 2010, p. 8).  
For an underwritten issue to be successfully placed, the underwriting investment bank’s job 
is made easier if the credit rating of its issuer meets the minimum levels described above. 
This scenario provides a potential arena for investment banks to exert coercive pressure on 
the CRAs described in section 8.3.1 to rate an issue which meets the minimum threshold. 
The CRAs are also under pressure to ensure there is an acceptable volume of issues that 
meet the minimum, so as to meet the market demand and thereby support their own sur-
vival. 
The investment banking industry’s influence over the CRAs was symptomatic of the self-




achieve advantageous outcomes. This influence also extended to the successful lobbying of 
the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) in the development of a key accounting 
standard - FAS 125 and its successor FAS 140 which was instrumental in the accounting for 
Repos - a financing tool frequently used by financial institutions and particularly investment 
banks to assist with their short term liquidity management.  
8.4 Institutional Influence over the Accounting 
Standard Setting Process  
This section addresses the influence the investment banking industry applied in the stand-
ard setting process for a key accounting standard relating to the accounting of Repos, which 
are important financing transactions for financial institutions. The influence was analysed 
using a content analysis which concludes that the accounting standards enabled LB’s finan-
cial ‘window dressing’ discussed in CHAPTER 9. The FASB adopts a thorough and independ-
ent process for the development and updating of US accounting standards. This process fos-
ters extensive public participation, incorporates views from various stakeholders and is con-
ducted under the supervision of the Financial Accounting Foundation’s Board of Trustees. 
The US accounting standard setting process is outlined in Figure 119.  
Figure 119 - Process for Establishment of US Accounting Standards 
 
Source: Information was extracted from Financial Accounting Standards Board (2017). 
10. Implementation 
9. Education 
8. Issue Final Standard 
7. Re-deliberate Based on Comments and Research 
6. Host Public Hearings or Round Tables 
5. Issue Document for Public Comment 
4. Deliberate at Public Meeting 
3. Make Agenda Decision 
2. Conduct Pre-agenda Research 




The consultation stage of the accounting standard setting process may be considered from 
two main viewpoints. It could be viewed from a technical process, or a political process or 
both (Larson 2007). Whilst the technical interpretation generally focuses on selecting the 
most appropriate accounting practice for purpose, the political perspective implies that sub-
jectives choices of practices are made between conflicting interests (Larson 2007, p. 214). 
The consultation process can also be interpreted as an important step in an organisation’s 
attempt in seeking legitimacy (Larson 2007, p. 207). This concept is consistent with Riaz’s 
(2009) notion of reverse legitimisation discussed in section 3.1.3 and again in section 8.4.2 
as it relates to the FASB. 
Key accounting standards for financial institutions during the decade preceding the GFC in-
cluded FAS 125 and FAS 140 which both dealt with accounting for transfers and servicing of 
financial assets and extinguishment of liabilities. FAS 140 which was the accounting stand-
ard prevailing at the time of LB’s collapse, was adopted by the FASB in September 1999, and 
effectively replaced FAS 125, however carried over most of its provisions without reconsid-
eration (Financial Accounting Standards Board 2000, p. 4). This standard was important be-
cause it guided the accounting treatment for Repos which was of one of the main instru-
ments used by LB and the investment banking and securities dealer industries generally. Re-
pos involve a short-term assignment of assets (normally a debt security) to the counterparty 
in return for cash, thereby creating a funding source for the assignor. The contract also in-
cludes a clause requiring the assignor to repurchase the asset at a pre-negotiated price at a 
pre-determined date in the future (usually between one and two weeks). At that later date 
(that is at expiry) the counterparty returns the securities to the borrower who repays the 
cash loan with interest. Refer to CHAPTER 9 which provides a detailed explanation of Repos 
and describes the relative size and importance of the market. 
The differences between FAS 125 and FAS 140 arose principally in the application of the 
structural tests relating to control over a financial asset and therefore a determination 
whether a financial asset transfer is deemed a sale (off-balance sheet) or a financing trans-
action (on-balance sheet). The major difference involved the control criteria over the securi-
ty being transferred and the rules to determine whether an entity is a Qualifying Special 
Purpose Entity (QSPE) which is relevant for securitisations and not for Repos. The core pro-
vision in FAS 140, which in principle was similar in FAS 125, states that a transferor may only 
derecognise a financial asset, or a component of a financial asset, if it has surrendered 'con-
trol' over it. Under FAS 140: 
A transfer of financial assets … in which the transferor surrenders control over those financial 
assets shall be accounted for as a sale to the extent that consideration other than beneficial 
interests in the transferred assets is received in exchange (Financial Accounting Standards 




The main difference between FAS 125 and FAS 140 relates to the meaning of control. Refer 
Figure 120 for a list of criteria to satisfy the ‘surrender of control’ requirement under both 
standards.   
Figure 120 - Differences between FAS 125 and FAS 140 Regarding ‘Surrender of Control’ 
FAS 125 
Criteria for ‘Surrender of Control’ 
FAS 140 
Criteria for ‘Surrender of Control’ 
  
a. The transferred assets have been iso-
lated from the transferor – put presumptive-
ly beyond the reach of the transferor and its 
creditors, even in bankruptcy or other re-
ceivership. 
a. The transferred assets have been iso-
lated from the transferor—put presumptive-
ly beyond the reach of the transferor and its 
creditors, even in bankruptcy or other re-
ceivership. 
b. Either (1) each transferee obtains the 
right—free of conditions that constrain it 
from taking advantage of that right - to 
pledge or exchange the transferred assets or 
(2) the transferee is a qualifying special-
purpose entity and the holders of beneficial 
interests in that entity have the right- free of 
conditions that constrain them from taking 
advantage of that right- to pledge or ex-
change those interests. 
b. Each transferee (or, if the transferee 
is a qualifying SPE, each holder of its benefi-
cial interests) has the right to pledge or ex-
change the assets (or beneficial interests) it 
received, and no condition both constrains 
the transferee (or holder) from taking ad-
vantage of its right to pledge or exchange 
and provides more than a trivial benefit to 
the transferor. 
c. The transferor does not maintain ef-
fective control over the transferred assets 
through (1) an agreement that both entitles 
and obligates the transferor to repurchase or 
redeem them before their maturity or (2) an 
agreement that entitles the transferor to re-
purchase or redeem transferred assets that 
are not readily obtainable. (Financial Ac-
counting Standards Board 1996a). 
c. The transferor does not maintain ef-
fective control over the transferred assets 
through either (1) an agreement that both 
entitles and obligates the transferor to re-
purchase or redeem them before their ma-
turity or (2) the ability to unilaterally cause 
the holder to return specific assets, other 
than through a clean-up call. 
Source: (Financial Accounting Standards Board 1996a, pp. 7-8; 2000, p. 4).  
If a Repo transaction fulfils the criteria in both standards then:  
the Repo transferor is deemed to have surrendered control of the transferred collateral, and 
consequently, the respective standards permit the transferor to account for the transaction 
as a ‘sale’ of financial assets and a forward purchase commitment (Financial Accounting 
Standards Board 2000, p. 4). 
In FAS 140, the control criteria necessary to classify the transaction as a financing, needed 




protected by obtaining collateral sufficient to fund substantially all of the cost of purchasing 
identical replacement securities during the term of the contract so that it has received the 
means to replace the assets even if the transferee defaults (Financial Accounting Standards 
Board 2000, p. 91).  
This criteria in FAS 140, is only slightly tighter than that contained in FAS 125 which states 
that “a loss of control applies if there is no agreement that entitles the transferor to repur-
chase or redeem the transferred assets that are not readily obtainable” (Financial 
Accounting Standards Board 1996a, pp. 7-8). The meaning of ‘readily obtainable’ in this in-
stance relates to the accessibility to similar assets for repurchase as those that were origi-
nally transferred, and relies on the judgement of what is ‘readily obtainable’ or not. For ex-
ample discretion would be required as to a time frame which would classify an asset as 
‘readily’ available for purchase. Although there is a similarity between the definitions in FAS 
125 and FAS 140 as they both require ability to transfer and subsequently repurchase similar 
assets, FAS 140 goes further to require the value of the assets to be repurchased to be sub-
stantially equal to the original assets transferred. FAS 140 however, like FAS 125 allows 
some judgement for the user in determining the quantum of the sufficient value between 
the transferred asset and that which is subsequently repurchased (Financial Accounting 
Standards Board 2000, p. 4). An analysis of the influencing factors which came to bear in the 
formation of FAS 125 which originally allowed flexibility in the interpretation of the account-
ing treatment of Repos and which was followed by a similar flexibility of interpretation in 
FAS 140 follows in this chapter. 
Section 8.4.10 promotes the case that the investment banking industry and the financial 
markets industry more generally were strong influential forces in the development of the 
abovementioned accounting standards. Moreover, LB is found to be an instrumental partic-
ipant in this process. The influence exerted was intended to create greater flexibility for 
preparers of financial statements in the accounting and recording of financial asset trans-
fers, and specifically Repos.  
The development of FAS 140 is best examined in the context of the FASB's financial instru-
ments project which was initiated in May 1986. Since this project commenced there have 
been other attempts at refining accounting standards for financial instruments (Financial 
Accounting Standards Board 2000, pp. 6-9). These recurrent attempts indicate the difficul-
ties and controversies surrounding the fair and reasonable accounting of such instruments. 
Demand for reform in this area is exemplified, by a Letter from SEC Chief Accountant to the 
FASB and Accounting Standards Executive Committee (AcSEC) dated May 11, 2001 ‘regard-
ing fair value accounting for the securities industry’ (Securities and Exchange Commission - 
Office of the Chief Accountant 2001). This letter endorsed the Financial Accounting Stand-
ards Board undertaking a project to require the securities industry to adopt fair value ac-




Office of the Chief Accountant 2001). A chronological outline of the development of signifi-
cant accounting standards dealing with financial instruments is provided in Figure 121. This 
chronology highlights the development of FAS 125 and its successor, FAS 140 as important 
standards dealing with the transfers of financial assets. 
Figure 121 - Timeline of US Accounting Standards Dealing with Financial Instruments up to 
2000 (Introduction of FAS 140) 
Accounting Standard Implementation 
Date 
Comment 
a) FAS 105 
b) FAS 107 
a) March 1990 
b) December 1991 
A cursory attempt to address fair value and 
impairment issues. 
a) FAS 114 
b) FAS118 
a) May 1993 
b) October 1994 
Required some consistency in assessing 
and measuring loan impairment. These 
standards however excluded a market-
based valuation method. 
FAS 115 May 1993 Recognition that some financial assets 
should be measured at market values. Es-
tablished the concept of 'held-to-maturity' 
important in a financial asset’s valuation 
calculation. It also accepted that some fi-
nancial assets experienced a temporary 
decline in value which impacted on the ba-
sis of valuation.  
FAS 122  
(superseded by FAS 140) 
May 1995  Required a fair value assessment of capital-
ised mortgage servicing rights in order to 
establish an impairment value.  
FAS 123 October 1995 Allowed the fair value of stock options is-
sued for executive compensation to be re-
ported as a note to the accounts. 
FAS 125 June 1996 Preceded FAS 140 relating to accounting 
for transfers and servicing of financial as-
sets and extinguishments of liabilities. Spe-
cifically covered repurchase agreements. 
FAS 133 June 1998 Derivative financial instruments required 
to be accounted at fair value. Accounting 
for hedges was allowed to incorporate a 
smoothing methodology.  
FAS 140 September 2000 Superseded FAS I25 and refined the ac-
counting for transfers and servicing of fi-
nancial assets and extinguishment of liabil-
ities. Specifically covered repurchase 
agreements. 





The FASB issued FAS 125 ‘Accounting for Transfers and Servicing of Financial Assets and Ex-
tinguishments of Liabilities’ in June 1996. Its intention was to provide a consistent standard 
for distinguishing transfers of financial assets between those that are sales and those that 
are secured borrowings (Financial Accounting Standards Board 1996a). Examples of these 
types of transactions include transactions with recourse, Repos, servicing agreements to re-
acquire, options, and lodgements of security. FASB was specifically concerned about:  
the circumstances under which the transfers of financial assets with continuing involvement 
should be considered as sales of all or part of the assets or as secured borrowings and about 
how transferors and transferees should account for sales and secured borrowings (Financial 
Accounting Standards Board 2006a, p. 6).  
Prior to FAS 125, standards for financial assets transferred were generally required to be 
accounted for by the transferor as “an inseparable unit that had been either entirely sold or 
entirely retained” (Financial Accounting Standards Board 2006a, p. 8). Those standards 
caused inconsistencies, were considered to be difficult to implement and provided prepar-
ers of financial statements with a significant amount of flexibility in their interpretation 
(Financial Accounting Standards Board 1996a, p. 7). See below for an explanation of this 
flexibility. Following the growth in innovative financial products in the 1990s, the FASB con-
cluded:  
Previous approaches that viewed each financial asset as an indivisible unit do not provide an 
appropriate basis for developing consistent and operational standards for dealing with trans-
fers and servicing of financial assets and extinguishments of liabilities. To address those is-
sues adequately and consistently, the Board decided to adopt as the basis for this Statement 
[FAS 125] a financial-components approach that focuses on control and recognizes that fi-
nancial assets and liabilities can be divided into a variety of components (Financial 
Accounting Standards Board 1996a, p. 8).  
As mentioned above, previous to FAS 125, the accounting treatment for Repos provided al-
ternative accounting treatments at the discretion of the user (Financial Accounting 
Standards Board 1996a, pp. 6-7):  
For example, whether a transfer purported to be a sale was sufficient to determine whether 
the transfer was accounted for and reported as a sale of receivables under one accounting 
standard or as a secured borrowing under another (Financial Accounting Standards Board 
1996a, p. 7).  
For preparers of financial statements, it could be advantageous to record the transactions as 
sales and avoid their inclusion in liabilities which would affect leverage ratios. LB’s manipu-
lation of its leverage ratios by using the flexibility of interpreting FAS 140 (predecessor to 





8.4.1 Analysis of Submissions to FASB for FAS 125 and 140 
As shown by Figure 119, the process of issuing standards by the FASB involves a consultation 
process where interested parties invited by the FASB are able to make submissions on the 
exposure drafts. The key criteria of control featured prominently amongst the submissions 
(comment letters) within the consultation process for both FAS 125 and FAS 140.  
Submissions received by the FASB originated from several different broad interest groups 
including: representative organisations such as associations (representing the accounting 
and financial markets industries in particular); participants in the financial markets industry 
(of which the investment banking industry was prominent); corporations; insurance groups; 
law firms and academia. Refer Figure 122 and Figure 123 for a breakdown of the industry 
responses. 
Masocha and Weetman (2007) claim attention to the content of documents such as pub-
lished submissions to exposure drafts, increases the explanatory power of an analysis. An 
examination of submissions received by the FASB is therefore useful in locating those inter-
ested parties who would benefit from having an influence in the standard setting process. 
Grinyer and Russell (1992) found that parties involved in writing submissions are interested 
in furthering their economic welfare and that such lobbying influence is able to mitigate the 
intended purpose of designing accounting standards consistent with accounting concepts. 
Larson (2007) found that parties lobbying the International Accounting Standards Commit-
tee overwhelmingly included large corporations and multinational organisations from de-
veloped countries, thereby allowing more powerful organisations that are in a stronger eco-
nomic position to exert influence. Therefore, categorising authors of submissions and their 
positions within industry groups is a useful way of identifying any inherent biases introduced 
into the standard setting process. Section 8.2.2 linked lobbying of regulators and policymak-
ers to favourable outcomes for interest groups such as the investment banking industry. The 
submission stage in the accounting standard setting process can be considered as a type of 
lobbying of the FASB in that certain points of view are communicated to decision makers 
(Georgiou 2004). The following sections use content analysis as a tool to examine two com-
ponents of the submission process. Firstly, this section analyses the number and weight (as 
measured by number of pages per industry group) of submissions from the various interest-
ed parties grouped by industry. Secondly it addresses the positions taken by the various in-
dustry groups on the critical provision within the exposure draft relating to the structural 





Analysis of Number and Length of Submissions to Exposure Drafts for FAS 
125 and FAS 140 by Interest Group 
This section undertakes a content analysis of the submissions made by interested parties to 
the exposure drafts for FAS 125 and FAS 140. The content analysis is conducted on com-
ment letters in response to both exposure drafts which involved analysing 193 submissions 
containing a total of 1,083 pages. According to Duriau et al. (2007, p. 6), a number of theo-
retical frameworks, methods and analytical techniques claim to use content analysis in ex-
plaining phenomena in the social sciences. A helpful definition of content analysis used in 
this analysis can be described as : “any methodological measurement applied to text (or 
other symbolic materials) for social science purposes” (Duriau et al. 2007, p. 6). In their 
analysis of 98 academic articles using content analysis, Duriau et al. (2007) concluded that 
this type of analysis is a useful qualitative research tool “in studying both manifest and la-
tent constructs that would be more difficult to access using alternative techniques” (Duriau 
et al. 2007, p. 26). Content analysis is also used by Holder et al. (2013) to analyse 369 com-
ment letters written in response to exposure drafts issued by the IASB and the FASB's expo-
sure draft relating to FASB Statement No. 5. The content analysis approach used in this sec-
tion, helps with an understanding of the influences on the accounting standard setting pro-
cess for the relevant standards and includes an analysis of the submission input as meas-
ured by number of submissions and number of pages per submission made by various inter-
est groups and an analysis of the positions taken by various interest groups in their submis-
sions.   
As implemented by Larson (2007), when assessing constituent participation in the consulta-
tion process adopted by the International Financial Reporting Interpretations Committee 
(IFRIC) pursuant to its intention to converge international accounting and reporting stand-
ards, the proxy used for weight of influence in the standard setting process includes the 
number of submissions per interest group and the number of pages per submission which 
indicates the level of consideration assigned by the respective respondent. Submission of 
comment letters requires significant investment of intellectual capacity, time, and technical 
resources (Larson 2007; Standish 2003). Analysing the respective percentage of total sub-
missions and percentage of the number of pages submitted by each interest group leads to 
an understanding of this investment in resources devoted to the relevant topic. The greater 
the detail incorporated in the submissions as reflected in the number of pages written, gen-
erally translates to a greater investment in resources. The greater the number of submis-
sions from a particular interest group is also an indication of the level of interest and ap-
plicability of the subject matter contained in the exposure draft to that interest group. The 
relative importance of the subject matter to each interest group provides an indication of 
the level of commitment to influencing the process. An analysis of the written content of 




standard being proposed. Aggregating these positions by interest group, reveals a common-
ality in the thinking around the proposed standard and signals a self-interest in influencing 
an outcome beneficial to the interest group (Guenther & Hussein 1995; Kenny & Larson 
1993; Kwok & Sharp 2005). The common points of view expressed in the submission letters 
were sufficient to generate an outcome beneficial to the investment banking industry as 
discussed in section 8.4.2 and is consistent with a normative influence over a group as to 
how to behave and adopt a common world view within an industry (Schacter et al. 2011). 
An analysis of the industry participation of the submission process for the exposure drafts to 
FAS 125 and 140 is summarised in Figure 122 and Figure 123 respectively. The method used 
in compiling this data involved counting the number of submissions per interest group 
which provided a relative contribution to the total number of submissions received. Addi-
tionally the number of pages per author were calculated, which were aggregated by interest 
group to provide another measure of the weight of each interest groups’ submissions. The 
data in each figure is set out in descending order of percentage of submissions received by 
the FASB. All publicly available comment letters in response to FASB’s consultation request 
were examined.  
A number of law firms’ submissions were made on behalf of clients which were in all cases 
financial institutions. To accurately reflect the number of submissions, each party repre-
sented by a law firm’s submission has been included separately in the statistics even though 
the view of all parties included in the law firms’ submission letters was the same. The simi-
larity of views in the one submission can be explained by all interested parties sharing a 
common law firm or by the parties forming a lobby group with the intention of reinforcing a 
united common position in the hope that it would carry greater weight. The drafting of 
submissions by a professional law firm, which is governed by its own professional code of 
conduct, would also convey greater legitimacy to the FASB and therefore represent an at-
tempt to convey a concentrated degree of influence. This manifestation of lobbying consti-
tutes the same type of normative pressures described by DiMaggio and Powell (1983) as a 
type of social influence leading to commonality. This influence is further discussed in section 








Figure 122 - Industry Analysis of Submissions to Exposure Draft to FAS 125 
Submissions to Exposure Draft for FAS 125 dated 13 January 1997 
Interest Group % of Total 
Submissions 
% of Total 
Pages in all 
Submissions 
Average Number of 
Pages per Submission 
Banks and Investment 
Banks 36% 38% 5.0 
Industry Associations 22% 23% 4.7 
Non-Bank Financial Insti-
tutions 11% 8% 3.2 
Other* 9% 11% 20.3 
Accounting Firms 8% 11% 6.8 
Insurance Companies 7% 5% 3.2 
Corporations 7% 4% 2.6 
Totals 100% 100% 4.3 
 Total Number of 
Submissions 
Total Number of 
Pages 
 
 152 719  
*Note: The group titled ‘Other’ includes law firms, academia, CRAs, and individuals. 
Source: The data used for the table was extracted from Financial Accounting Standard Board 
– Index to submissions for Exposure Draft to FASB Statement Number FAS No. 125, 
(Financial Accounting Standards Board 1997b). 
Figure 123 - Industry Analysis of Submissions to Exposure Draft to FAS 140 
Submissions to Exposure Draft for FAS 140 dated 7 December 1999 
        
Interest Group % of Total 
Submissions 
% of Total 
Pages in all 
Submissions 
Average Number 
of Pages per 
Submission 
Banks and Investment Banks 39% 26% 6.4 
Industry Associations 32% 27% 7.5 
Accounting Firms 12% 30% 21.6 
Non-Bank Financial Institutions 2% 1% 3.0 
Corporations 10% 9% 8.5 




Submissions to Exposure Draft for FAS 140 dated 7 December 1999 
        
Interest Group % of Total 
Submissions 
% of Total 
Pages in all 
Submissions 
Average Number 
of Pages per 
Submission 
Other 2% 6% 21.0 





of Pages  
 41 363  
Source: The data used for the table was extracted from Financial Accounting Standard Board 
– Index to submissions for Exposure Draft to FASB Statement Number FAS No. 140, 
(Financial Accounting Standards Board 1999a).  
Figure 122 and Figure 123 categorise respondents to the exposure drafts by interest group. 
This is intended to gauge the weight of influence on the standard setting process by the dif-
ferent groups. Although banks and investment banks, and non-bank financial institutions are 
separate categories, they represent the financial market community which are the largest 
combined group that uses Repos. The following analysis therefore combines these two cat-
egories under one group, ‘financial institutions’. As Figure 122 and Figure 123 clearly show, 
the financial institutions group as a whole submitted the greatest number of submissions for 
exposure drafts on FAS 125 and FAS 140 representing 47% and 41% respectively of all sub-
missions. The volume of submissions as measured by number of pages was also dominated 
by the financial institutions group for FAS 125 representing 46% of total number of pages 
received. However for FAS 140, the same group accounted for 27% of total pages ranking 
equally second (with industry associations) slightly behind accounting firms, which submit-
ted 30% of total pages. (Financial Accounting Standards Board 1997b, 1999a). It is notable 
according to Figure 122 and Figure 123, that FAS 125 attracted a larger number of submis-
sions than FAS 140. The attention from industry towards FAS 125 may be due to it being the 
first standard introducing a more prescriptive treatment of accounting for all transfers and 
servicing of financial assets and extinguishments of liabilities. FAS 140 merely represented a 
minor revision of the same standard, without significantly altering the notion of ‘control’ 
(Financial Accounting Standards Board 2000). 
As the industry group mostly affected by FAS 125 and FAS 140, it is not surprising that the 
financial institutions group in aggregate for both exposure drafts, accounted for the greatest 
number of submissions (44%) which also contained the most content (37%) from submis-
sions made by any other group. Through their representation in the process, the financial 
institutions group were clearly interested in the formulation of the standards and desired to 




Analysis of Positions Taken by Respondents to Exposure Draft to FAS 125  
This section analyses the positions taken by interest groups regarding the content of FAS 
125. The analysis conducted relates to the exposure draft for FAS 125 only as it diverged 
significantly from the previous accounting standard, FAS 115 dealing with transactions simi-
lar to Repos. Commentary on the exposure draft for FAS 140 is therefore excluded as the 
fundamental accounting treatment for Repos under both FAS 125 and FAS 140 remained 
largely unchanged. The analysis on FAS 125 focuses on the component of the exposure draft 
dealing with Repos. FAS 125 also covered related topics dealing with securitisations and 
other derivatives which are excluded from this content analysis in view of their irrelevance 
to the subject of Repos. This approach isolates the influence over the standard affecting Re-
pos consistent with the argument in this section that certain financial institutions preferred 
a greater flexibility in interpreting the accounting treatment as either an on-balance sheet 
liability or a sale.   
























Number of  
Submissions    
Banks and  
Investment Banks 22 0 3 11 36 
Non-Bank Finan-
cial Institutions 6 0 12 6 24 
Industry  
Associations 12 1 1 5 19 
Industrial  
Corporations 0 2 7 1 10 
Insurance  
Companies 4 2 0 4 10 
Accounting Firms 2 1 0 4 7 
Other 3 1 2 1 7 
            
Total 49 7 25 32 113 
Source: Financial Accounting Standard Board – Submission Letters to Exposure Draft to FAS 
No. 125, (Financial Accounting Standards Board 1996b). 
An analysis of the positions taken by interest groups in relation to the exposure draft for FAS 
125 appears in Figure 124. The list is organised in ranking by ‘total by group’ column. This 
analysis identifies four categories of responses: (a) a rejection of the exposure draft, with 




draft; (c) no comments relating to the Repo component of the exposure draft; and (d) a re-
jection of the exposure draft with recommendations for an alternative approach. Column (d) 
combines two main alternative approaches: a risk reward approach which allocates ac-
counting treatments for transactions according to the risks and rewards assigned to each 
party to the transaction; and an approach which accounts for transactions based on their 
economic substance. The latter recommendation is similar to the risk reward approach as 
the economic approach entails an accounting treatment commensurate to the financial 
benefits which accrue to the respective parties in the transaction and is justification for ag-
gregating responses which support the two approaches in the one column. 
The main focus by respondents to the exposure draft relating to Repos contained in FAS 125 
involved their preference for the classification of Repo transactions as either borrowings – in 
which case responses would be included in column (b) or an acceptance of the ’90-day 
bright-line test’ (refer below) which inferred either a borrowing or sales treatment – in 
which cases responses were included in column (a). The prevailing accounting standards 
dealing with these types of transactions allowed classification based on the intent of the 
parties. This allowed a high degree of discretion for participants in Repo transactions to in-
terpret the accounting treatment. Refer to CHAPTER 9 which discusses in detail the inter-
pretation issue relating to FAS 125 and FAS 140 which both allowed entities to account for 
Repos as sales as opposed to borrowings.   
The exposure draft attempted to change the notion of intent to a structural test known as 
the ‘90-day bright-line test’. This prescriptive test defined whether a Repo would be classi-
fied as either a sale or a borrowing based on the maturity of the Repo. Repos which had ma-
turities over 90 days were classified as a sale whilst Repos which had maturities less than 90 
days were categorised as ‘assuredly temporary’ and classified as a secured borrowing. 
(Financial Accounting Standards Board 1997a). Figure 124 clearly shows that 94% of submis-
sions received rejected the prescriptive nature of the ‘90-day bright-line test’. It is clear that 
preparers of financial statements including financial institutions and their representative 
bodies (mostly comprising associations of financial institutions and accounting firms) fa-
voured a non-prescriptive approach to classifying Repos and to preserve their freedom to 
use a subjective measure under the prevailing accounting standards. Further, no banks and 




LB’s Influence in the Accounting Standard Setting Process 
The submissions for FAS 125 included a letter submitted by LB and signed by its CFO, David 
Goldfarb. LB acknowledges in its submission that it also worked with the Public Securities 
Association (PSA)79 in drafting its response to the exposure draft and fully supported the as-
sociation’s position (Goldfarb 1996, p. 1).  
The PSA is the predecessor association to The Bond Market Association (TBMA), which sub-
sequently merged with the Securities Industry Association (SIA) to form the Securities Indus-
try and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA). The PSA was the professional representative 
body for the international bond market industry, accounting for 44% of the global securities 
market (The Association for Financial Markets in Europe 2015). The merged PSA/TBMA80 
which was headquartered in New York and had offices in London and Washington repre-
sented a diverse mix of securities firms and banks. The merged PSA/TBMA was considered 
one of the most important lobby groups representing the investment banking industry and 
regularly participated in debates relating to the development of the bond industry on behalf 
of issuers and traders. (Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association 2015). 
An analysis of the submission letters to the Exposure Draft for FAS 125 was conducted to 
discover any joint submissions and in particular whether comment letters which were sub-
mitted by industry associations and investment banks were co-authored or acknowledged a 
joint approach. The analysis revealed no other investment banks acknowledged they had 
worked with an industry association or the PSA in the preparation of the PSA submission 
(DeRoma & Guba 1995; Financial Accounting Standards Board 1996b). Therefore LB was in a 
unique position to influence the PSA’s view on the exposure draft. In fact, submissions for 




 The Public Securities Association was incorporated in 1976, and underwent a name change to the Bond 
Market Association in 1997 to better reflect its broadened constituency and membership. 
 
80
 “The Bond Market Association, previously Public Securities Association or PSA until 1997 was the interna-
tional trade association for the bond market industry. It had headquarters in New York City and offices in Lon-
don and Washington, D.C. Twenty per cent of the membership was located outside the US, while 70 per cent 
was located outside New York City. TBMA acted as a global voice for bond issuers and traders, and worked 
with governments, corporations, and investors. It also had a code of ethics, which required members to be-
have in a fashion of fairness. On November 1, 2006, The Bond Market Association merged with the Securities 
Industry Association to form the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association” (Securities Industry and 




both LB and PSA appear similar and proffer the same arguments relating to Repos (DeRoma 
& Guba 1995; Financial Accounting Standards Board 1996b; Goldfarb 1996). This suggests 
that LB was either in agreement with the PSA, or one of the parties had an influence over 
the other’s position on the exposure draft. If LB was influencing the PSA, it was in a position 
to exert an even greater power over the standard setting process than had it relied on its 
own submission without collaborating with the PSA. As the representative body of the glob-
al bond markets, the PSA’s view would have been interpreted as representing the views of 
the bond market in general and therefore carried added weight. 
LB’s essential objection to the exposure draft for FAS 125 related to the 90-day bright-line 
test’. LB claimed in its submission to the FASB that the 90-day bright-line test does not …  
… Reflect the economic substance of these transactions. The 90-day bright-line test of assur-
edly temporary is an arbitrary distinction with no underlying basis in either the structure or 
intent of the transaction. We are not aware of shortcomings in how secured financings are 
currently reported or treated in the accounting literature from either a financial statement 
preparer’s or user’s perspective, and hence we do not see any logical reason to change the 
present accounting model (Goldfarb 1996, p. 1). 
The strong prescriptive nature of the exposure draft for FAS 125 did not allow preparers of 
financial statements to have the arbitrary benefits and flexibility of alternative accounting 
treatments afforded by the previous accounting standard which was predicated on intent 
rather than a list of prescriptive criteria. The artificial distinction based on time period for a 
Repo being classified as either a sale or a financing was the key prescriptive criteria pro-
posed by the exposure draft and was objectionable to many other parties who made sub-
missions to the FASB. Refer above for an analysis of the positions of respondents to the ex-
posure draft. LB (and the PSA in its submission) clearly favoured the previously existing 
standard advising in their submission that they “are not aware of shortcomings in how se-
cured financings are currently reported” and “do not see any logical reason to change pre-
sent accounting model” (Goldfarb 1996, p.1). 
Ultimately the FASB succumbed to the recommendations contained in the submissions - 
predominantly from financial market industry participants - and removed the 90-day bright-
line test of ‘assuredly temporary’ from the final accounting standard FAS 125 leaving pre-
parers of financial statements to interpret the accounting treatment of Repos dependent on 
the notion whether control of the securities had passed or not.  In its background discussion 
contained in FAS 140, the FASB outlined its rationale of omitting the ‘90-day Bright-line test’ 
as a response to the overwhelming position held by respondents to the exposure draft for 
FAS 125. The FASB supported its reversal from the intitial draft as follows: 
Respondents generally disagreed with that provision of the Exposure Draft of Statement 125. 
They argued that the arbitrary three-month limit would not be effective and that entities 




the term of the agreement. While some offered other arbitrary time limits, many respond-
ents argued that all transfers accompanied by a forward contract to repurchase the trans-
ferred assets before maturity should be accounted for as secured borrowings. In their view, 
most repurchase agreements represent a temporary transfer of only some elements of con-
trol over the transferred assets. 
After considering those comments, the Board decided to remove the proposed requirement 
that the period until repurchase be less than three months. Board members concluded that 
any distinction based on the specified time until repurchase would not be workable. As out-
lined in paragraph 207, the elements of control by the transferee over assets obtained in a 
typical securities lending or repurchase agreement are both temporary and limited. The 
Board concluded that the contractual obligation and right to repurchase an asset before its 
maturity effectively bind the asset transferred back to the transferor (Financial Accounting 
Standards Board 2000, p. 89). 
Instead of the ‘90-day Bright-line test’ the FASB established the ‘surrender of control’ re-
quirement for a Repo to constitute a sale, and listed three key criteria for its determination 
including:  
a) The transferred asset being isolated from the transferor;  
b) The transferee obtaining a right (free of conditions) to pledge or exchange the transferred 
asset or exchange the transferred asset; and  
c) The transferor does not maintain effective control over the transferred assets through (1) 
an agreement that both entitles and obligates the transferor to repurchase or redeem them 
before their maturity or (2) an agreement that entitles the transferor to repurchase or re-
deem transferred assets that are not readily obtainable (Financial Accounting Standards 
Board 1996a, p. 4).   
The industry participants were ultimately successful in lobbying the FASB to change the ex-
posure draft so as to improve the flexibility of the accounting standard for preparers of fi-
nancial statements. The implications were that LB acquired greater power to interpret the 
standard, thereby allowing it to interpret the standard to the advantage of the firm. 
8.4.2 Objection to Exposure Draft an Exercise of Institu-
tional Influence 
The proposal presented in the exposure draft to FAS 125 of limiting the flexibility of options 
in the accounting treatment for Repos may be perceived by LB and other financial institu-
tions as placing a limitation on their power to represent the firm through their financial 
statements to external stakeholders. Bradbury (2007) acknowledges that accounting stand-
ards subject to interpretations signal a weakness and have the potential to undermine a 




process and participation in the standard setting process. Therefore, in accordance with the 
findings of Georgiou (2004), submissions can be viewed as a representation of lobbying ef-
forts to which the standard setter is subjected. Westbrook (2013, p. 58) claims that in mod-
ern society, “we have a financial culture that consists largely of communications about rela-
tive social standing defined by a dubious system of accounting”. If we measure the status of 
an organisation by the strength of its financial statements then there is an inherent motiva-
tion for the same organisations to influence the system of accounting in their favour. The 
ability to influence the accounting standard setting process is made easier by a cultural bias 
which naturally affects the standard setters. As standard setters need to know a lot about 
accounting, and in most cases employed by the accounting and finance industry, they are by 
definition “within the culture they seek to regulate” Westbrook (2013, p. 58).  
Young and Mouck (1996, p. 133) argue that:  
the close mirroring of the FASB processes with those of administrative agencies may be in-
terpreted as an effort to construct these processes as rational and objective and thereby to 
reduce the politics surrounding the accounting standard setting process.  
In the course of pursuing its rules and procedures in the accounting standard setting pro-
cess, the FASB attempts to avoid critique and claims of bias. The carefully constructed con-
sultation and review process adopted by the FASB is purposefully followed to emphasise the 
appearance of independence and objectivity and to distance itself from any perception that 
the FASB establishes public policy or is in any way political. This is because being categorised 
as political infers that decisions are made as a “manipulative and emotional process in 
which favours were [are] traded” (Young & Mouck 1996, p. 134). Excessive claims of objec-
tivity may be intended by the FASB to manage perceptions that its decision-making repre-
sent a universal perspective (Young 2003; Young & Mouck 1996). Having established in the 
previous section that the financial markets industry would be motivated to influence the 
accounting standard setting process in its favour, and the fallibility of the process itself 
where the accounting standards guardians, the FASB, are susceptible to possible political 
influence and bias, then how is this industry influence conveyed? 
New Institutional Theory is helpful in explaining the exertion by industry and submission by 
the FASB to the influence in the accounting standard setting process.  Three concepts are at 
play in this process: firstly the normative pressures exerted on the FASB by industry in gen-
eral; secondly the reverse legitimisation sought by the FASB and thirdly a subtle coercive 
pressure exerted by the industry over the FASB. The FASB and the accounting industry (in-
cluding organisations which are compelled to apply accounting standards) need to be un-
derstood in terms of one another, mutually rather than confrontationally. A suitable meta-
phor used by Westbrook (2013) to describe this notion is that of a referee of a game who 
represents the institution. In this analogy the referee is the FASB. “A referee does not exist 




termine the bounds of the field, what counts as a point and the like” (Westbrook 2013, p. 
58). Similarly, the FASB cannot exist without the practitioners and corporations who apply 
the rules. Conversely, those relying on financial statements, whether they are users or pre-
parers, without a ‘referee’ cannot benefit from consistencies, rigour and discipline provided 
by the application of those standards. This mutual reliance between the standard setter and 
the practitioner is an important aspect of the relationship which incubates a culture of simi-
larity and commonality. As mentioned in section 3.1 of this thesis, the normative pressures 
described by DiMaggio and Powell (1983) is a type of social influence leading to commonali-
ty. The notion described earlier that the FASB is “within the culture they seek to regulate” 
(Westbrook 2013, p. 58) and therefore subject to a natural bias, supports the contention of 
a common world view within a profession. This common view construes professionalism by 
members collectively and defines the appropriate ways in which to behave and act.  
The FASB, the members of which originate from the accounting and finance profession, is 
subject to these same pressures of accepting institutional norms, which can be conveyed 
through the instrument of the submission letters. Since the standard setters and the practi-
tioners are members of the same professional community, they are able to collectively de-
termine a set of practices and cognitive frameworks in which organisational routines are 
shaped. This type of normative pressure is heightened particularly if a large volume of sub-
missions are conveying the same recommendation. 
The second concept which allows the conveyance of influence is that of reverse legitimisa-
tion. As discussed in section 3.1.3, Riaz (2009) contends that if organisations such as invest-
ment banks are successful, the institutions such as the FASB from which organisations and 
practitioners sought legitimacy, are endorsed as the responsible entities which supported 
those successful organisations and practitioners under their authority. For reverse legitimi-
sation to exist, industry participants would be expected to support the FASB as long as its 
standards are valuable to those participants. This is consistent with the concept that the in-
volvement of industry participants in the consultation process through the writing of com-
ment letters is an important factor in imparting legitimacy on the standard setting process 
and in turn the supervisors of this process – the FASB (Durocher et al. 2007; Fogarty 1992; 
Larson 2002; Olusegun Wallace 1990). The case for reverse legitimisation is also contingent 
on the power of the industry participants and their willingness to manipulate enities and 
processes that interfere with their primary objectives. Riaz (2009, p. 28) recognises this la-
tent power of financial institutions: 
Business and financial organizations today are powerful beyond imagination, and have a role 
in influencing, shaping and manipulating anything that happens to be in the way of their sur-
vival and success. And what else could be more ‘in their way’ than institutions? While institu-
tions attempt to impose their constraints on organizations, organizations are busy twisting 




The interdependence between institutions such as the FASB and the organisations and prac-
titioners who rely on accounting standards allows for the transferral of influence both ways. 
The perception of power held by practioners which is used to influence the institutions that 
oversee them is influenced by which side of the ‘iron mesh’ the power is viewed  (Riaz 2009, 
p. 28). 
The FASB was keen to deeply and carefully consult the financial markets industry, given the 
subject of the proposed accounting standard was considered highly technical. Without a 
thorough consultation process, the new standard may have had unintended consequences. 
The FASB therefore canvassed a high number of industry participants as evidenced by the 
number of organisations invited by the FASB to comment on the exposure drafts. The num-
ber of responses to direct invitations totalled 152 (including several respondents represent-
ed by single law firms who were counted separately) and 41 for FAS 125 and FAS 140 re-
spectively. Submissions highlighted some unintended consequences from the 90-day bright-
line test. The main problems identified by industry practitioners related to the artificiality of 
the 90-day Bright-line test. The 90-day Bright-line test was to determine whether a financial 
instrument transfer could be deemed a sale or a financing simply by its term to maturity. 
This was a misalignment of the planned recording of the transaction with its intention or its 
economic substance. 
The third concept of a subtle coercive pressure is demonstrated through the enthusiasm of 
the financial institutions to appear in front of the FASB during direct hearings over the expo-
sure draft to FAS 125 to declare their views and recommendations. According to Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (1996b), there were 60 respondents (representing almost 40% 
out of a total of 152 parties who made submissions), who spoke at public hearings for the 
exposure draft to FAS 125. There were no respondents  (out of a total of 41 parties who 
made submissions) for the exposure draft to FAS 140 (Financial Accounting Standards Board 
1999a). As mentioned previously the relative disinterest in FAS 140 was due to the relatively 
minor amendments it incorporated. 
As discussed in section 3.1.3, coercive pressures may take various forms and be disguised or 
restrained. Although it may resemble exercise of force or persuasion, it may also be more 
subtle (Devin & Bartlett 2011, p. 5). Further, coercive pressures may result from power rela-
tions that come in various forms, formally or informally, directly or indirectly, from external-
ly codified rules, norms or laws, from political influence and from a variety of external enti-
ties.  
The subtle coercive pressure over the FASB to follow the wishes of the financial markets in-
dustry in their opposition to the 90-day Bright-line test can be interpreted as a political in-
fluence. The influence was derived from the overwhelming number of participants who in 
addition to forwarding documentary submissions, contributed in the direct hearings that 




attendance was successful in extending their influence even further given the omission of 
the 90-day Bright-line test from FAS 125. 
Tolbert and Zucker (1983, p. 25) suggest that an indicator of institutionalised practice in-
cludes a “practice that is widely followed, without debate, and exhibits permanence”. The 
actions of the financial markets industry represented a concerted and largely unified effort 
to influence the FASB and in this regard resembled a widely followed view. The respondent 
presentations at the FASB hearings were seemingly accepted without a significant debate 
given the absence of further documented commentary by the FASB on the exposure draft to 
FASB 125. Finally, given the recommended compliance required by accounting standards in 
general and the acceptance by practitioners that they represent the rules that govern their 
practice, there appears a sense of permanency to the resolutions of the FASB. Therefore 
Tolbert & Zucker’s (1983) indicators of institutionalised practice seem to have been satis-
fied. In meeting Tolbert & Zucker’s (1983) indicators of institutionalised practice, as well as 
representing DiMaggio & Powell’s (1983) normative pressures and subtle coercive influence 
over the FASB, and finally fulfilling Riaz’s (2009) characterisation of reverse legitimacy, the 
financial markets industry, in dealing with the exposure draft to FAS 125 exerted influence 
over the FASB in shaping a critical accounting standard to the advantage of the industry as a 
whole during the pre-GFC period.  
8.5 Summary 
This chapter is concerned with the role of connections and relationships in influencing out-
comes favourable to the investment banking industry. It commenced with a discussion of 
the ‘financial network’ that existed which encompassed the investment banking industry, 
the political and regulatory fields, CRAs, lobby groups, and other financial institutions. It is 
argued that the connections with these participants in the ‘financial network’ led to: a ‘regu-
latory capture’ by the investment banking industry which influenced the regulatory process 
to produce an environment conducive to generating stronger financial performance; influ-
ence over the CRAs which published favourable yet flawed credit ratings for customers of 
the investment banks and the firm sponsored securitisation vehicles; and influence over the 
accounting standard setters which through a consultation process involving the investment 
banking industry issued an accounting standard – FAS 140 which allowed LB the flexibility to 
avoid the accounting of Repos as debt, thereby allowing a ‘window dressing’ of its financial 
statements.  
The investment banking industry was found to have exerted coercive pressure on legislators 
which was facilitated through a combination of their political contributions which are part of 




in shifting public policy. It was used to either defeat unwanted bills which would have oth-
erwise further restricted the activities of investment banks or the passing of bills which af-
forded further protection or greater liberalisation in their operating environment. The ‘regu-
latory capture’ of legislators and regulators by the investment banking industry was also fa-
cilitated by a normative influence found to exist due to knowledge asymmetry. The posses-
sion of superior technical capability exerted a normative influence over the regulatory 
framework by the investment banking industry. The subjugation by regulators to industry 
professionals of the expertise required to understand innovations in product, process and 
complex risk, led to a regulator’s perception that ‘industry knows best’. This perception al-
lowed a continuation of a ‘light touch’ approach to financial regulation. A further normative 
influence was exerted over the regulatory framework due to the practice of the ‘revolving 
door’. As members of professions employed in the financial network switched between reg-
ulatory agencies, legislative bodies and industry, a common view of the world which includ-
ed the regulatory framework ensued. Common values and beliefs permeated an increasingly 
intertwined financial network so that a common understanding and attitude existed to sus-
tain a regulatory environment and economic policy setting conducive to favourable business 
conditions in the investment banking industry. A common desire for strong financial per-
formance by investment banks spurred a common approach to the employment of lobbyists 
to push a shared agenda. Mimetic pressure also spurred investment banks to pursue rela-
tionships with government with the intent of a continued stream of large and lucrative gov-
ernment funding and advisory transactions. These connections were useful for future busi-
ness and as an instrument in pushing a point of view with government and regulators.  
The investment banking industry was also found to exert coercive influence over the CRAs 
by way of their commercial support. The CRAs preference for an issuer pays model intro-
duced inherent conflicts of interest. The influence was principally exerted by an investment 
bank’s threat of withdrawing the commercial support from the CRAs which operated in a 
competitive environment. A loss of market share, particularly for securitisation vehicles ar-
ranged by their sponsoring investment banks would mean a loss of potential income for the 
CRAs.  The relationship between the two groups also involved a consultation process as in-
vestment banks were sought to provide direct feedback to CRAs on the credit rating models 
employed. The industry feedback enabled investment banks to influence the model devel-
opment process which ultimately produced the most desirable outcomes for the issuers 
they represented. However inadvertently the regulatory framework was structured, it also 
influenced inflated ratings. 
Finally the chapter explored the influences the investment banking industry applied over the 
FASB in attempts to generate accounting standards favourable to preparers of financial 
statements involved in accounting for Repos. A content analysis was conducted of comment 
letters covering exposure drafts for FAS 125 and FAS 140 which involved analysing 193 sub-




investment banking industry to exert an institutional influence over the FASB by objecting to 
the original exposure draft resulting in an accounting standard favoured by the industry. The 
benefits of avoiding a highly prescriptive accounting standard as originally proposed by the 
FASB in the exposure draft allowed for greater flexibility in the treatment of Repo transac-
tions. LB was able to capitalise on this flexibility by accounting for Repos as sale transactions 
instead of borrowings. This accounting treatment led to an understatement of the firm’s 
leverage ratio and ensured the continued supply of credit during a period of financial dis-
tress. CHAPTER 9 further explains Repo 105 in detail and analyses the power exerted by LB’s 
senior management in ensuring the interpretative use of accounting for this financial in-





 FINANCIAL ‘WINDOW DRESSING’ CHAPTER 9
AS AN EXERCISE OF POWER 
This chapter includes a discussion of the ‘window dressing’ practiced by LB to conceal a sub-
stantial level of debt from external stakeholders. This deceptive practice, identified as a 
symptom of the firm’s culture, is exposed as an exercise of power to ensure the continued 
survival of the firm. This strategy was considered important to maintain the perception that 
LB was financially sound which was necessary to secure continued funding for the firm. Suf-
ficient capital was also necessary to meet compliance with financial covenants contained 
within debt agreements and capital based regulations. Additionally capital and an accepta-
ble balance sheet structure was necessary to maintain an acceptable credit rating from the 
CRA’s which is also important for future fundraising.  
A key to satisfying financial stakeholders, was to ensure the firm’s financial statements re-
flected an ongoing financially sound position. An immediate concern was the firm’s liquidity 
and financial leverage – key metrics popularly used in financial covenants within debt 
agreements and used by the credit rating agencies as important determinants of financial 
strength. Generally finance was sourced directly from banks, a high proportion of which was 
short term in nature including short term money market instruments mostly comprising of 
Repos. Refer 7.3.1 for a discussion on the financing arrangements of LB. A soundly struc-
tured balance sheet was crucial to avoid concerns by creditors who could otherwise decline 
additional credit, cancel unused credit facilities, refuse to roll-over existing lines of credit or 
ultimately, demand repayment of outstanding debt. Given financial institutions typically rely 
on relatively high levels of leverage, any such consequence would be catastrophic and po-
tentially lead to severe financial difficulties.  
Therefore LB’s management desperately believed they needed to present an acceptable fi-
nancial structure. This would pressure senior management to consider a ‘window dressing’ 
of the financial statements if there were concerns of a weak financial position. Valukas 
(2010) acknowledged management’s focus on leverage and identified a number of staff who 
confirmed that LB management was actively engaged in managing the firm’s leverage to-
wards the end of 2007 and early 2008:  
Tonucci recalled that McDade wanted to bring down Lehman’s firm‐wide balance 
sheet by a few turns … McDade, who was named balance sheet czar, said that delev-
eraging was ‘absolutely’ a critical issue to Lehman in early 2008 … Ed Grieb, Leh-
man’s former Global Financial Controller, stated that ‘the focus on balance sheet and 
net leverage gained much more importance’ beginning in mid‐2007 … Murtaza Bhal-




beginning in 2007, there was a ‘squeeze’ on Lehman’s balance sheet, and that Leh-
man personnel were worried about reporting the level of Lehman’s assets against 
Lehman’s equity (i.e., leverage ratio) … Anuraj Bismal, a former Senior Vice President 
in Lehman’s Balance Sheet Group, said that Lehman’s meeting of its leverage ratio 
target was the most critical piece (a very hot topic) for senior management by the 
end of 2007. Bismal said that balance sheet targets and leverage ratio targets were 
absolutely about how rating agencies would view Lehman, and also creditors and the 
investing public … John Feraca, the former head of the Secured Funding Desk in Leh-
man’s Prime Services group, said that in late 2007, as the industry was changing and 
entering a crisis period, Lehman made certain commitments to deleverage … Marie 
Stewart, Lehman’s former Global Head of Accounting Policy, confirmed that Lehman 
set balance sheet targets with any eye to reaching certain leverage ratios that rating 
agencies used to measure and gauge Lehman’s performance (Valukas 2010, pp. 808-
9). 
An analysis of the relatively high and increasing levels of leverage of the investment banking 
industry and LB is included in section 7.3.1. This chapter delves further however, and ex-
plains one of the techniques used by LB in creating its excessive leverage leading to the 
benefits accrued under the ‘leverage effect’. Section 8.4 discussed the influence exerted on 
accounting standard setters by the investment banking industry to preserve the flexibility in 
their accounting treatment of Repos. FAS 140, the applicable accounting standard for Repos 
allowed investment banks to employ divergent interpretations of the standard which per-
mitted LB’s ‘window dressing’ of its financial statements. More importantly this chapter 
questions why and how Fuld and his management team made the decisions to use these 
accounting techniques. 
9.1 Repo 105 Transactions 
A Repo 105 transaction is a variety of a Repo transaction. The added term of ‘105’ in a Repo 
105 is explained in detail in section 9.1.2. Repos generally involve a short-term assignment 
of assets (normally a debt security) to the counterparty in return for cash, thereby creating a 
funding source for the assignor. The contract also includes a clause requiring the assignor to 
repurchase the asset at a pre-negotiated price at a pre-determined date in the future (usual-
ly between one and two weeks). At that later date (that is at expiry) the counterparty re-
turns the securities to the borrower who repays the cash loan with interest. Refer Figure 
125 for a diagrammatical representation of a Repo 105. 
In the lead up to its collapse, LB attempted to stave off a liquidity crisis and became increas-
ingly reliant on the use of Repos for its short term borrowings. Repos are an important fi-




banks and commercial banks. “The ability of Repos to provide parties with secured short-
term funding has resulted in such transactions becoming an essential part of the global fi-
nancial system” (Chircop et al. 2012, p. 657). Much of the Repo market uses US Treasury se-
curities as the preferred form of collateral, as they represent government obligations and 
are therefore one of the most secure and liquid security instruments in the market. Other 
instruments are used in a Repo transaction such as corporate debt securities and stocks. The 
Repo market is also the most important financing market of the short term money market 
for dealers, the main participants of which are securities firms and investment banks. The 
Repo market represented approximately 54% of the pre-GFC inter-dealer short term money 
market using US Treasury instruments (Fleming & Garbade 2003, p. 1). The reliance on the 
Repo market for short term financing is reflected by its volume of transactions of approxi-
mately USD 14 trillion in 2008 (Chircop et al. 2012, p. 661). This represents a significant in-
crease from 2002 when the volume was USD 2.48 trillion (Fleming & Garbade 2003, p. 1).  
According to the bankruptcy examiner, LB understated its leverage through the use of a par-
ticular type of Repo referred to as ‘Repo 105’ transaction, an accounting exercise to tempo-
rarily reduce liabilities from the balance sheet before each reporting period. Refer below in 
this section and section 9.1.2 for a detailed explanation of a Repo 105 transaction and the 
method employed to reduce balance sheet liabilities. LB’s global financial controller, de-
scribed the transactions as possessing “no substance - their only purpose or motive … was 
reduction in the balance sheet” (Financial Crisis Enquiry Commission 2011, p. 177).  
Repo 105 transactions were also portrayed as an “accounting gimmick … a lazy way of man-
aging the balance sheet as opposed to legitimately meeting balance sheet targets at quar-
ter-end” (Financial Crisis Enquiry Commission 2011, p. 177). Bart McDade, LB President and 
COO in June 2008, described Repo 105 transactions as “another drug we R on” (Financial 
Crisis Enquiry Commission 2011, p. 177). This comment related to the increasing reliance LB 
had on the continuing use of Repo 105 transactions to decrease liabilities in turn reducing 
the leverage ratio for each successive quarter end. Furthermore “McDade had recommend-
ed to LB’s Executive Committee that the firm set a cap on the use of Repo 105 transactions” 
(Financial Crisis Enquiry Commission 2011, pp. 3-4). A senior member of LB’s Finance Group 
also believed that LB’s Repo 105 transactions were designed for “window‐dressing that was 
based on legal technicalities” (Financial Crisis Enquiry Commission 2011, p. 2). 
9.1.1 Offshoring and impact of LB’s Repo 105 Transactions 
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In Figure 125 the assignor, or commonly known as the transferor or borrower, is depicted as 
Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (LBIE UK). LB used a European subsidiary to conduct 
Repo 105 transactions as legal opinions for the accounting treatment adopted by LB were 
only able to be obtained under English law in the UK. LB was unable to find a US law firm 
prepared to grant a ‘true sale’ opinion under US law. See section 9.2 titled ‘Linklater’s True 
Sale Opinion Letter’ for a discussion on the legal opinion. Repo 105 transactions were essen-
tially equal in nature to standard Repo’s, however the accounting treatment for the former 
was decisively different. Despite the different accounting treatment used for Repo 105 
transactions, LB executed the same documentation as that used for ordinary Repos.  
LB applied a sales treatment to the assets assigned under a Repo 105 transaction under FAS 
140. This is contrary to the typical accounting treatment for an ordinary Repo transaction 
which raises a liability on account of the transferor (borrower) for the amount of the trans-
action, collateralised by the inventory of securities pledged to the Repo lender with the se-
curities which were used as collateral remaining on the transferor’s (borrower’s) balance 
sheet. This liability would be subsequently extinguished on expiry when the transferor (bor-
rower)  repays the loan and the transferee (lender) returns the collateral.  
Repo 105 transactions on the other hand effectively enabled LB (the transferor/borrower) 
to remove the loan off-balance sheet during the term of the Repo 105 transaction. This was 
achieved by applying the incoming cash from the transferee (lender) to repay liabilities on 
LB’s balance sheet and applying the transfer of securities to the transferee as a reduction of 
on-balance sheet assets, and recording the asset transfer as a sale. Under this treatment 
there would be an equal reduction in both total liabilities and total assets. This ‘typical’ prac-
tice by LB resulted in obfuscating additional debt sourced through the Repo 105 transaction, 
and the equal reduction in total assets and liabilities had the effect of improving the lever-
age and capital ratios. The accounting entries for a Repo 105 transaction are set out in Fig-
ure 126. 
Figure 126 - Accounting Entries for a Repo 105 Transaction 1 
Accounting Entries for Repo 105 
At Start (pre-balance date) 
  Debit Credit 
Sale of Securities     
Cash (received from sale) 100 
 Future Purchase Account- Inventory (Derivative Asset) 5 
 Securities Inventory (reduction) 
 
105
Net 105 105 
Use of Proceeds     
Liabilities (repayment) 100   
Cash   100 





At Expiry (post-balance date) 
  Debit Credit 
Raising Cash to Repay Repo 105     
Liabilities (new borrowings)   105 
Cash (to repay transferee/lender) 105   
Net 105 105 
Repaying Repo 105     
Securities Inventory (repurchase of securities) 105   
Future Purchase Account- Inventory Derivative (asset)   5 
Profit and Loss 2 0.5  
Cash   100.5 
Net 105.5 105.5 
Notes: 
1. The accounting treatment used in Figure 126 is confirmed by examples used in (Ra-
jan 2010). 
2. Assumed equivalent to interest expense for period of transaction. 
A demonstration of the impact of Repo 105 is set out in Figure 127. Two key financial ratios 
(leverage and capital ratios) are calculated using the two accounting treatments available, 
that is, ‘with’ and ‘without’ the Repo 105 accounting application. The results are shown for 
the 2007 annual balance sheet date and the quarterly balance sheet dates, 29 February 
2008 and 31 May 2008. 
Figure 127 - Comparison of LB’s key balance sheet ratios ‘With’ and ‘Without’ Repo 105 
30-Nov-07 
  
    Without Repo 105   With Repo 105   
    USD Billions %   USD Billions % 
Total Assets   729.2 100%   691.1 100% 
Total Liabilities   707.2 97%   668.6 97% 
Total Stockholders’ Funds   22.5 3%   22.5 3% 
Leverage Ratio (times)   31.4     29.7   















    Without Repo 105   With Repo 105   
    USD Billions %   USD Billions % 
Total Assets   835.1 100%   786 100% 
Total Liabilities   810.3 97%   761.2 97% 
Total Stockholders’ Funds   24.8 3%   24.8 3% 
Leverage Ratio (times)   32.7     30.7   
Capital Ratio (%)   2.97%     3.16%   
       31-May-08 
  
    Without Repo 105   With Repo 105   
    USD Billions %   USD Billions % 
Total Assets   689.8 100%   639.4 100% 
Total Liabilities   663.5 96%   613.1 96% 
Total Stockholders’ Funds   26.3 4%   26.3 4% 
Leverage Ratio (times)   25.2     23.3   
Capital Ratio (%)   3.81%     4.11%   
Note:  
      Leverage Ratio = Total Liabilities / Total Stockholders’ Funds 
 Capital Ratio  = Total Stockholders’ Funds / Total Assets 
  LB reported the figures in the 'With Repo 105' column. 
  Source: The data used for the table was extracted from LB’s annual and quarterly financial 
statements and information contained in the Chapter 11 Proceedings Examiner Report, 
(Lehman Brothers Holdings 2007, 2008b, 2008c; Valukas 2010). 
Figure 127 shows there is no material difference in Total Stockholders’ Funds and Total Lia-
bilities in proportion to Total Assets in either accounting applications. The leverage and capi-
tal ratios however vary depending on the accounting treatment used. The use of the Repo 
105 accounting treatment consistently produced more favourable ratios for each of the bal-
ance sheet dates shown above. LB did not include any detailed disclosure of the accounting 
impact of using Repo 105 in its financial reporting. A key consideration for LB as to whether 
it would disclose this accounting treatment would have been whether the Repo 105 applica-
tion would materially affect the financial statements. If the use of the Repo 105 accounting 
treatment was considered immaterial, then detailed disclosure would not be needed in ac-
cordance with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). It could be argued that 
there was no change in the proportion of total liabilities to total assets between accounting 
treatments, both recording 96% for the balance sheet dates of 30 November, 2007 and 29 
February 2008, increasing slightly to 97% as at 31 May 2008. In any case interim financial 
statements are not audited.  However, the impact of the Repo 105 accounting treatment 




point borrowed up to USD 50 billion in Repo 105 transactions just prior to its collapse. Refer 
below for details of the amounts involved in Repo 105 transactions. 
Although the differences in key ratios between the ‘with’ and ‘without’ repo 105 accounting 
treatment appear small, they are deemed meaningful due to the very low capitalisation of 
LB. The relatively low capitalisation of the investment banking industry in general magnifies 
the net impact on capital when compared to other industrial corporations whose capitalisa-
tion rates are generally higher. Additionally, the capital and leverage ratios are commonly 
used measures in credit assessments of borrowing entities. It would have been advanta-
geous for LB to use the Repo 105 accounting treatment in order to present a more favoura-
ble financial profile to its creditors.    
As mentioned in section 8.4 the core provision of FAS 125 and later FAS 140 states that a 
transferor may only derecognise a financial asset, or a component of a financial asset, if it 
has surrendered 'control' over it. Under FAS 140:  
A transfer of financial assets . . . in which the transferor surrenders control over those finan-
cial assets shall be accounted for as a sale to the extent that consideration other than benefi-
cial interests in the transferred assets is received in exchange (Financial Accounting 
Standards Board 2000, p. 4).  
The conditions to be met for an effective ‘surrender of control’ of the assets under FAS 140, 
is set out in section 8.4. LB interpreted that under FAS 140, it had surrendered control of the 
assets, rendering the exchange of assets for cash as a sale and accordingly removed the as-
set (securities), and the amount exchanged off its balance sheet. However given that the 
securities transferred to the transferee (lender) were effectively used as collateral for fi-
nancing purposes and to be returned to LB (the borrower) at maturity, it is argued in this 
thesis that LB did not relinquish control over the collateral and continued to retain a ‘bene-
ficial interest’.  LB’s reclassification of a Repo 105 transaction as a sale immediately led to an 
understating of LB’s leverage ratio. LB had borrowed, in aggregate, over USD 50 billion by 
using Repo 105  and temporarily reduced its on-balance sheet debt and corresponding as-
sets at quarter end by approximately: USD 38.6 billion in the fourth quarter 2007; USD 49.1 
billion in first quarter 2008; and USD 50.38 billion in the second quarter 2008 (Valukas 2010, 
p. 733). Refer Figure 128 for a graph of the volumes of Repo 105 transactions undertaken in 





Figure 128 - LB use of Repo 105 Transactions 2007 - 2008 
 
Source: The data used for the graph was extracted from Valukas (2010, p. 733).  
Importantly, Figure 128 shows this balance sheet manipulation occurred prior to quarter 
end dates (in particular November 2007, February 2008 and May 2008) in line with the 
firm’s quarterly reporting obligations. As a result, LB’s net leverage was understated by be-
tween 9% and 13% between fourth quarter 2007 and second quarter 2008. 
9.1.2 What does ‘105’ mean? 
The term ‘105’ in a Repo 105 transaction signifies that upon exchange, assets (in the form of 
securities) transferred have a current market value of 105% of the cash received. The term 
‘haircut’ often used in Repo 105 transaction refers to the difference between the amount of 
cash received and the market value of securities assigned. Therefore in a Repo 105 transac-
tion the haircut is 5%. 
The FASB defines effective control as follows:   
to maintain effective control, the transferor must have both the contractual right and the 
contractual obligation to reacquire securities that are identical to or substantially the same 
[in quantum] as those concurrently transferred … the transferor’s right to repurchase is not 
assured unless it is protected by obtaining collateral sufficient to fund substantially all of the 
cost of purchasing identical replacement securities during the term of the contract (Financial 
Accounting Standards Board 2000, p. 91). 
As an example, if the transferor is giving up securities worth USD 105 in return for cash 
worth USD 100 (in ratio terms), LB would be able to argue that it could not meet the re-













same [in quantum] as those concurrently transferred” (Financial Accounting Standards 
Board 2000, p. 91). The discrepancy between the value of securities transferred and the 
amount of cash received (that is, 5%) was the justification used by LB to argue the loss of 
control criteria. Therefore LB was able to argue a ‘loss of control’ over the securities and 
consequently able to record the leg of the transaction involving the assignment of collateral 
as a sales transaction which did not need the raising of a liability. Otherwise, without this 
treatment as a ‘sale’ LB would have been required to treat the assignment of collateral and 
receipt of cash as a loan. Although in its guidance notes, FAS 140 suggests a haircut of 2% 
was sufficient to render loss of control (commonly referred to as the 98%-102% test) 
(Financial Accounting Standards Board 2000, p. 97), LB ensured it qualified for the ‘sale’ in-
terpretation by applying a higher haircut of 5%.  LB offered more collateral in a Repo 105 
transaction than is normally necessary for a standard Repo, to ensure it unequivocally 
achieved the off‐balance sheet treatment for the debt.   
It is interesting to note these sales did not give rise to any losses in LB’s statement of in-
come. It would be common accounting practice for a sale transaction involving exchanging 
USD 105 in bonds for USD 100 in cash to record a USD 5 loss. LB however used a future pur-
chase commitment account in its asset section of its balance sheet equal to the amount of 
over collateralisation, since LB was required to purchase the sold securities back under a 
futures contract. Similar to an ordinary Repo, LB received the interest income (the coupon 
payments) from the securities which were transferred to the counterparty which partly off-
set the interest charged by the counterparty which was paid by LB at expiry of the transac-
tion (Valukas 2010, p. 732). Furthermore LB decided not to disclose the effect of these 
transactions as recognised subsequent events in the notes to the accounts based on their 
view that it represented an immaterial consequence to the firm’s financial statements as 
explained in section 9.1.1. 
Implementation of FAS 140 had been problematic given that it allowed alternative treat-
ments of Repo transactions depending on how loss of control is substantiated. A loss of con-
trol threshold (for example between 2% and 5%) allowed an entity to de-recognise the asset 
and whilst continuing to have ‘beneficial interest’ subsequent to it being transferred. Fur-
ther, allowing de-recognition, while at the same time allowing the transferor to retain an 
effective continuing ‘beneficial interest’ in the transferred financial asset, permitted for var-
ying accounting treatments between the two parties to the transaction.  
9.2 Linklaters’ True Sale Opinion Letter 
LB validated the sale treatment of its Repo 105 transactions by obtaining a legal opinion. 




‘surrender of control’ of the transferred asset included isolating the securities from the 
transferor in the event of the transferor’s bankruptcy.   
The legal opinion is ordinarily referred to as a true sale opinion letter. LB resorted to obtain-
ing its legal opinion from Linklaters, a UK law firm. Linklaters would address the legal opin-
ion to LB’s UK subsidiary – LBIE which was the LB subsidiary that entered into the Repo 105 
transactions. LB resorted to using a UK law firm as it could not find a US law firm prepared 
to issue an opinion to a US entity.  In its accounting policy relating to Repo 105 transactions, 
LB discloses that: “We generally cannot obtain a true sale opinion under US law … Repos 
generally cannot be treated as sales in the US because lawyers cannot provide a true sale 
opinion under US law” (Lehman Brothers Holdings 2008e, p. 1). To avoid any potential 
breach, the Linklaters true sale opinion letter did not refer to US GAAP or FAS 140.    
In practice, the UK subsidiary would carry out a Repo 105 transaction with an external Euro-
pean counterparty (including the haircut) and concurrently carry out a back to back transac-
tion with a LB US subsidiary (excluding the haircut). As LBIE was a fully owned subsidiary of 
LB, the transactions were ultimately consolidated into the group financial statements giving 
effect to the sale treatment at the consolidated group level, thereby ameliorating the group 
leverage ratio.   
In essence LB was able to conduct regulatory arbitrage by exploiting the UK legal environ-
ment which allowed ‘true sale’ opinions and by subsequently consolidating the resultant 
accounting treatment into its US based consolidated financial statements. This was a prac-
tice, which if conducted within the US would have resulted in a less than favourable ac-
counting treatment with regards leverage. Undertaking such an elaborate and pre-
meditated process is an indication of the extent to which LB was motivated to manipulate 
its balance sheet structure to manage the perceptions of stakeholders. Details of Repo 105 
transactions were not disclosed in LB’s Form 10‐K or 10‐Q financial reports resulting in an 
effective window dressing of the net leverage of the firm. Since the collapse of LB, the FASB 
introduced FAS 166, which superseded FAS 140. This revised accounting standard applies a 
test based on the intent behind a Repo in relation to transfers of risk for reward to distin-
guish between a sale or on-balance sheet treatment of a Repo. 
9.3 Concealment as Power 
LB’s concealment of debt from its financial statements withheld critical information with 
which third parties would make important financial decisions, such as to invest or lend to 
LB. An internal email from Anthony Jawad, an LB employee to Keiran Higgins another LB 




105 transactions.  The email revealed that internally, employees questioned the accounting 
treatment adopted: 
Hello mate, sorry to pester you on your time off, but I have to run this by you. In our quest for 
more counterparties for 105, we have lined up Reserve Bank of Australia as a c/party. This is 
good from a credit perspective because credit will obviously be happier giving margin to a 
Central bank than a commercial bank. However, they asked why we are doing this. I spoke to 
Mark Cosaitis about this and he obviously would like us to give a vague reason about getting 
better net down treatment, which isn't a lie. However, if they want a deeper explanation 
then we may have to get down to the nitty gritty of the truth. Do you want us to go down 
this line or want us to just give it a miss. Having more c/parties is obviously good going for-
ward because we both know how liquidity can be pulled, but the more people that know the 
truth, the more dodgy it can be. What is your take on what to do? Thanks (Jawad 2008). 
The routine practice of using the Repo 105 accounting device is governed internally by inclu-
sion in the LB accounting manual.  The power to influence stakeholder decision-making is 
viewed as an exercise of power through Clegg’s (1989) dispositional circuit where rules and 
pre-determined procedures, as contained in the accounting manual, are fixed. The existence 
of the accounting manual as well as the Linklaters’ ‘true sale opinion’ legitimised the ac-
counting treatment of Repo 105 transactions for all employees. The accounting manual rep-
resented the rules of practice which were socially constructed within the firm. Therefore it 
represented the instrument which fixed the relations of meaning, in an accounting sense of 
the Repo transactions. These internally constructed rules [accounting manual] are used to 
affect the accounting entries which are considered the passage point through which the Re-
po transactions were integrated within the financial statements. Once transmitted through 
the passage point, management’s power was exerted over external stakeholders in the epi-
sodic circuit where stakeholders’ perceptions of management and the firm were positively 
influenced through the manipulation of the firm’s risk profile. 
The development of the accounting manual, through the firm’s hierarchy, was the responsi-
bility of the executive management. This responsibility and the associated authority, was 
the source of power for LB’s executive management. The senior team relied on the account-
ing standard, FAS 140 which allowed for alternative accounting interpretations of Repo 105 
transactions resulting in meaningful implications for the balance sheet. The use of the inter-
nal accounting manual, can also be seen as an act of job design found in Clegg’s (1989) facili-
tative circuit. The use of job design was useful in applying power through internal relation-
ships between senior management and those accounting practitioners within the firm 
whose responsibility was to record the Repo transactions. FAS 140 had facilitated senior 
management’s concealment of leverage and the internal technical interpretation of this 




This level of power in the facilitative circuit affected the organisational morality as evi-
denced in the abovementioned email from Anthony Jawad. Any influence over the opera-
tion of the accounting standard translated as an exertion of power over accounting staff 
permitting the distortions in the financial statements. Was the senior management team 
culpable for the concealment? In his statement at the Hearing before the Committee on Fi-
nancial Services, Fuld denied any knowledge of the Repo 105 series of transactions: 
I have absolutely no recollection whatsoever of hearing anything about or seeing documents 
related to Repo 105 transactions while I was the CEO of Lehman (Hearing before the 
Committee on Financial Services U.S. House of Representatives Testatement of Richard Fuld  
2010). 
Fuld’s abovementioned denial contradicted evidence offered by McDade to the Bankruptcy 
Examiner’s proceedings. In his role as COO in the months prior to LB’s bankruptcy, McDade 
had responsibility for the firm’s balance sheet. A report known as the Daily Balance Sheet 
and Disclosure Scorecard which kept senior management abreast of daily balance sheet 
movements was distributed by McDade on a daily basis in the 6 months prior to the bank-
ruptcy. Amongst other data, the report included information on the firm’s Repo 105 trans-
actions (Valukas 2010). According to Valukas (2010), an interview with McDade revealed 
that in June 2008, he reviewed with Fuld, an internal document known as the Balance Sheet 
and Key Disclosures document:  
McDade specifically walked Fuld through the presentation. . . .  McDade discussed page three 
of the presentation with Fuld, which identified that Lehman used USD 38.6 billion, USD 49.1 
billion, and USD 50.3 billion of Repo 105 transactions, at quarters‐end fourth quarter 2007, 
first quarter 2008, and second quarter 2008, respectively. McDade said that, as referenced 
on page three of the Balance Sheet and Key Disclosures document, he also told Fuld that he 
[McDade] recommended that Lehman reduce its firm‐wide Repo 105 usage to USD 25 billion 
in the third quarter 2008. McDade observed that Fuld ‘was familiar with the term ‘Repo 105’. 
McDade recalled that Fuld’s response to the entire document was ‘good, good, good; he was 
nodding approval’ and that Fuld was ‘supportive of reducing the firm’s use of Repo 105.’ 
More specifically, regarding McDade’s recommendation to cut Lehman’s use of Repo 105 in 
half in the third quarter 2008, McDade recalled Fuld asked, ‘Is it doable?  Is it necessary?  If 
so, [Fuld] said, go do it.’  McDade concluded that Fuld knew about the accounting of Repo 
105 (Valukas 2010, pp. 820-1). 
The inconsistency between Fuld’s testimony at the 2010 hearing before the Committee on 
Financial Services and McDade’s detailed record of interview with the Bankruptcy Examiner 
casts significant doubt on the veracity of Fuld’s testimony. The overwhelming evidence ob-
tained by the bankruptcy examiner supported by documentary evidence, suggested that 
Fuld was willing to mislead the Committee on Financial Services in 2010, thereby casting 




9.3.1 The Irony of Power – Disempowerment in the Facilita-
tive Circuit  
Figure 128 shows an increasing volume of Repo 105 transactions at the quarterly reporting 
dates from August 2007 to May 2008. Continuing use of Repo 105 during a period when 
market liquidity is tightening and the firm’s access to internal cash resources is diminishing 
means the firm needed to continue refinancing these transactions at higher volumes each 
successive quarter end to maintain the façade of acceptable leverage. Unless the firm’s per-
formance was going to turn around, eventually its excessive leverage would be discovered 
as interest serviceability would become strained. Reliance on Repo 105 therefore became a 
vital component to LB’s survival during this time. As the actual leverage of the firm in-
creased, there was greater incentive to disguise it.  
Fuld’s resolve in maintaining the firm’s use of Repo 105 during this difficult period which 
involved its unethical interpretation of FAS 140 can be interpreted as a turning point in his 
empowerment. The slippery slope of Repo 105 on which the firm began its concealment 
program could not persist indefinitely. As the risk of discovery approached, Fuld’s capacity 
to ‘fool’ the market diminished. This gradual slide is tantamount to an ongoing disempow-
erment, where Fuld’s economic environment and the firm’s fiscal predicament are consid-
ered changes in Clegg’s (1989) facilitative circuit where power can be created or dissipated 
through changes in environmental contingencies. As the firm’s financial dependency on Re-
po 105 grows, its bankruptcy costs81 grow commensurately. The power to convince credi-
tors to continue refinancing debt is therefore diminished. The passage point needed for the 
disempowerment is represented by the potential discovery of the firm’s real position 
through media such as closer scrutiny of the firm’s financial transactions, analysis of finan-




 Bankruptcy costs are additional costs incurred by the firm as its leverage increases. These costs take two 
major forms. Firstly there is the increased cost of capital as interest costs increase in line with mounting debt.  
This affects the profitability and financial structure of the balance sheet of the firm thereby perpetuating an 
increase in the risk premium paid as the debt is now riskier to the lender. Secondly as management attention is 
drawn away from the day to day operational matters of the business to managing the survival of the firm, per-







cial reports, or media speculation. The irony of the creation of power is that in certain envi-
ronmental contingencies it can also be taken away through the same circuit of power. 
9.4 SUMMARY 
The concealment of a significant level of debt from the firm’s balance sheet is shown to be 
an unethical practice of ‘window dressing’ which violates an ethical stewardship of the firm 
and disguised a ‘true and fair’ economic view of LB’s financial position. The firm adopted 
extreme measures to achieve the debt concealment by its interpretation of accounting 
standard FAS 140 to its benefit which understated its leverage. The measures involved the 
conducting of Repo 105 transactions through offshore subsidiaries and obtaining the associ-
ated legal opinions from an offshore jurisdiction, when they were unavailable domestically.  
The act of debt concealment is argued as an exercise of power found in Clegg’s (1989) facili-
tative and dispositional circuits. The accounting rules which were authorised by manage-
ment were fixed in the dispositional circuit, transmitted through the passage points consti-
tuting the accounting function to the episodic circuit where external perceptions of man-
agement and the firm were influenced. The development of the accounting manual, an ul-
timate responsibility of management conferred power to Fuld by way of defining the ac-
counting staff’s job design thereby creating power in Clegg’s (1989) facilitative circuit which 
affected organisational morality. The same passage point of the accounting function served 
to transmit power to the episodic circuit where accounting staff were pressured to adopt 
the ‘sale’ interpretation of FAS 140. LB’s interpretation and application of FAS 140 to ac-
count for and report Repo 105 transactions was authorised and perpetuated by LB’s senior 
management and was used to legitimise the firm as creditworthy, a going concern and com-
pliant with applicable contractual covenants and capital based regulations. In summary, LB’s 
senior management exercised power to influence the growth strategy of the firm involving 
an elevation of its risk profile in expectation of greater individual rewards in the form of in-
centive compensation. The following chapter analyses the management style adopted by 
Richard Fuld in his day to day stewardship of LB. The chapter will also draw on a theme of 
power to explain Fuld’s motivation of self-interest. Ultimately Fuld’s objectives to grow the 






 MANAGEMENT STYLE AND FIRM CHAPTER 10
CULTURE 
10.1 Introduction 
This chapter addresses the research question regarding the extent to which the culture 
within LB and the investment banking industry contributed to the failure of many firms at 
the height of the GFC. It analyses LB’s CEO, Richard Fuld’s management style, the actions of 
the board and the organisational culture which emanated from the top. The methods used 
to explain these factors include an examination of the rhetoric used in the communications 
of the firm and a critical analysis of: the corporate governance framework; the firm’s man-
agement processes, organisational policies; key internal relationships and; the CEOs and 
board’s decisions and behavioural patterns. 
Section 10.2 discusses the impact on corporate culture of corporate governance with a fo-
cus on board structure, including the difficulty of defining it. Corporate governance is an im-
portant aspect of ensuring appropriate behaviour is exhibited throughout the organisation – 
an attribute this chapter will show to be lacking at LB. Literature covering the benefits of the 
features traditionally considered as corporate governance good practice82, have offered 
some mixed views. Therefore an analysis against all the benchmarks offered by traditional 
conventions of good practice to measure LB’s governance practices may prove incomplete. 
Instead, this section selects the factors considered relevant in LB’s case and focuses on the 
leadership of the firm. This section also covers the adoption by the US of a regulatory ap-
proach as a minimum standard for corporate governance, following a series of corporate 
failures in the early part of the 2000s. The minimum standards set by the regulations be-




 Traditional features of corporate governance best practice focusing on board structure, as summarised to 
include: “director qualification standards; director responsibilities; director access to management and, as 
necessary, appropriate, independent advisors; director compensation; director orientation and continuing 
education; management succession; annual performance evaluation of the Board” (New York Stock Exchange 




came the framework by which LB portrayed to the outside its adoption of good practice, re-
gardless of its effectiveness.  
Section 10.2.4 deals with LB’s board structure and compares it to that of Goldman Sachs, 
one of the more successful investment banks83. The comparison suggests that investment 
banks attempted to comply with regulations and official guidelines to represent proper con-
duct to the market. This approach of uniform compliance is also augmented by some com-
monality in certain board structure features, which suggests a normative institutional influ-
ence applied between certain investment banks. Despite the similarity in Board structure, 
the two firms performed quite differently. That is, whilst LB collapsed, Goldman Sachs sur-
vived. This incongruity reveals the existence of other underlying influence(s) apart from the 
superficial Board structure which affected the performance of LB.  
Section 10.3 examines features of board structure as key factors influencing LB’s culture and 
performance. These features include the relationship between Fuld and the Board of Direc-
tors, which was typified by the exercise of intermittent power. This power was exerted 
through: the process of Board member appointment, in which Fuld had an influence; the 
Board composition which was structured to minimise confrontation with Fuld’s aspirations; 
the background and experience of some Board members which lacked specific exposure to 
complex investment banking products and services; a deficient level of director engagement 
reflected by the composition of the various Board committees and the relative input from 
each committee to the decision-making at Board level; and, a generous Board compensation 
structure which was influenced by Fuld and exceeded the national average of members of 
US publicly listed Boards and ranked above most of the other major US investment banks.  
Section 10.4 investigates Fuld’s relationships with employees. It draws on the early influ-
ences on Fuld’s management style which is described as one driven by his motivation to 
generate growth for the firm and succeed at all costs. As demonstrated by examples, any 
employee who offered obstacles or resistance to this objective would suffer his scorn, or 




 Goldman Sachs is selected as a comparison as it was the only investment bank surviving the GFC in its origi-
nal form. As mentioned in CHAPTER 2, Bear Sterns was forced to merge with JP Morgan Chase given both 
firms’ financial difficulties, and Merrill Lynch & Co. which encountered similar difficulties was sold to Bank of 
America Corp. Morgan Stanley survived in its corporate form, however it closed its trading division because it  




worse still, dismissal. Fuld’s influence in overcoming these impediments is shown to be gen-
erated in Clegg’s (1989) dispositional and episodic circuits. The resulting culture also affect-
ed the families of employees, which served to entrench employees’ behaviours to fall within 
the CEO’s expectations. LB’s compensation arrangements discussed in section 10.5 are also 
scrutinised to reveal a ‘greed-centric’ attitude amongst many executives who were subject 
to LB’s incentive schemes. It explains the role of compensation as a motivation for employee 
behaviour and as a mechanism to maximise the wealth of senior management including 
Fuld. This section proposes that the CEO used financial incentives as a means of generating 
loyalty to pursue his own growth agenda. 
A further insight into the firm’s culture included in section 10.6 is achieved through a rhetor-
ical analysis of internal communications. Key documents such as the firm’s Global Strategy 
document and various internal emails are analysed to reveal a management style reliant on 
the centralisation of power, a siege mentality, hubris regarding the risks faced by the firm, 
and a perpetuation of the ‘greed centric’ culture. Finally section 10.7 questions whether the 
firm followed its published code of ethics. 
10.2 Corporate Governance 
The lack of effective corporate governance has been linked as a causal factor of the GFC 
(Aluchna 2013; Isaksson & Woodside 2016; Kennedy 2014; Yeoh 2010). Yeoh (2010) relies 
on observations of relevant banking practices to support this contention. Therefore this sec-
tion provides a critique of relevant factors of corporate governance in the context of the 
pre-GFC period in the US, and the impact it had on the failure of LB. A large component of 
CEOs and a Board’s role is to practice, oversee and engender good corporate governance. In 
a general sense, good governance can be thought of as how individuals, groups, organisa-
tions, societies, and governments are responsible for outcomes and ethical behaviours 
(Pitsis et al. 2014, p. 1287). Cadbury (1992 p. 15) defines corporate governance as “the sys-
tem by which companies are directed and controlled”. This latter definition aligns responsi-
bility for corporate outcomes closer to the leadership of the firm. However corporate gov-
ernance is difficult to define as the associated literature adopts different theoretical per-
spectives. These include for example agency, stewardship, resource dependency and stake-
holder theories (Chambers et al. 2012). 
Corporate governance can be viewed from an agency perspective (Cadbury 1992 ; Denis 
2001; Fama & Jensen 1983; Jensen & Meckling 1976; Shleifer & Vishny 1997). That is, “effec-
tive separation between ownership and control” (Shleifer & Vishny 1997, p. 738). The basis 
of agency theory is maximisation of stockholder wealth. This longstanding theory traces its 




soon after the onset of the financial crisis of the 1930s. Berle and Means (1934) evaluated 
the financial crisis in the context of the evolution of the modern corporation and the con-
cept of “the twin phenomenon of ownership of wealth without appreciable control and con-
trol of wealth without appreciable ownership” (Lewis 1935, p. 548). Fama and Jensen (1983) 
argue that the process of operational decision-making is the responsibility of senior man-
agement and should be separated from the process of consent and monitoring which is un-
dertaken by Boards of Directors. This separation, according to Fama and Jensen (1983), en-
sures an effective monitoring of the organisation’s decision-making process. As Boards have 
the ability to structure the compensation arrangements of a CEO, and limit his or her ten-
ure, they possess the ultimate power in the decision-making process.  
Jensen and Meckling (1976) claim that tension exists between management and stockhold-
ers and view management as being opportunistic. Referred to as the ‘agency problem’84, 
management are motivated by self-interest as they don’t always make decisions based on 
the economic interests of stockholders (Deegan 2009; Jensen & Meckling 1976).  The agency 
approach supported by Fama and Jensen (1983) who maintain that a key to solving this 
agency problem and creating an effective monitoring process is the inclusion of non-
executive directors on  boards and board committees to protect the interests of stockhold-
ers. This is achieved through the impartiality of non-executive directors who can provide an 
independent check on management decision-making and behaviour. Apart from their im-
partiality, non-executive directors can offer specific expertise that is not available within the 
organisation and arbitrate in cases of internal conflict. The alternative approaches to under-
standing corporate governance are listed in the following section, including a brief critique 
of the agency theory approach. 
10.2.1 Alternative Approaches to Corporate Governance 
Most research attempting to understand the motivational forces influencing the range of 
decisions within the corporate sector have used agency theory and the role played by CEO 
compensation structures (Jensen & Meckling 1976; Haugen & Senbet 1981; Smith & Stulz 




 An agency problem exists when the interests of management and / or Board members are not aligned with 





1985; and Guay 1999). Agency theory describes the conflicts that arise under conditions of 
incomplete and asymmetric information when a principal hires an agent, such as the prob-
lem that the principal and the agent may not have their interests aligned. Literature ad-
dressing agency theory is mostly shareholder-centric, addressing potential adverse impacts 
on shareholders from management decision making. It therefore ignores other key relation-
ships, both internal and external to the firm. Shareholder interest is the paramount concern 
of agency theory. 
Critics of agency theory also claim that it understates the complexity of individual motiva-
tions and organisations. Agency theory, which focuses on self-interested human behaviour 
has come under challenge (Perrow 1986; Weidenbaum & Jensen 1992). Weidenbaum and 
Jensen (1992) supported by Shughart (1996), concur that “it is foolish to believe that owners 
of valuable resources systematically relinquish control to managers who are not guided to 
serve their interest” (Weidenbaum & Jensen 1992, p. 102). Weidenbaum and Jensen (1992) 
offer a critique of Berle and Means (1934) and argue that the concept of conflicts of interest 
that arise in agency theory ignores the following factors: discipline imposed on managers to 
fairly represent the interests of stockholders by potential mergers and acquisitions which 
often displace incumbent underperforming management; the latent powers and activism of 
institutional investors which often possess voting power to eject directors who support the 
management direction adopted; management incentives linked to stockholder returns are 
often sufficient to align the interests of management and stockholders; and the power of 
bondholders, bankers and other creditors of a corporation who impose management ac-
countability through regular meetings with management. Where creditor influence can be 
exerted, imposition of financial covenants in debt agreements and a requirement by the 
corporation for a fixed return of interest and repayment of principal encourages a minimum 
level of financial performance to generate the necessary liquidity to service the debt. 
Weidenbaum and Jensen (1992) also argue that agency theory ignores the corporate re-
sponsibility as espoused by stakeholder theory explained below.  
The approach adopted in this study doesn’t necessarily devalue the relevance of agency 
theory, rather, it focuses on other relevant qualitative factors which have impact inside and 
outside the firm. This is provided by examining events surrounding LB’s bankruptcy through 
the lens of New Institutional Theory and a Clegg’s (1989) Theory of Power. 
Stewardship theory provides an alternative view and purports that the executive manager 
performs a custodianship for social standards (Davis et al. 1997; Donaldson & Davis 1991). 
“The manager far from being an opportunistic shirker essentially wants to do a good job, to 
be a good steward of the corporate assets” (Donaldson & Davis 1991, p. 51). Consistent with 
this approach is the notion that executive management should be represented on the Board 
of Directors. Executive management are perceived as possessing superior technical 




and support accountability (Muth & Donaldson 1998). Consequently stockholders could ex-
pect a superior organisational performance from their inclusion on the Board than that of a 
non-executive director, due to the associated knowledge asymmetry which exists between 
executive and non-executive directors. However Nicholson and Kiel (2007) suggest the 
adoption of a stewardship approach can result in governance failure, strategic drift or iner-
tia. The kind of inertia of the board in addressing Fuld’s flawed strategy and self-interest is 
evidence of a clear limitiation of a potential application of this theory. The key limitation of 
using stewardship theory in this study is that it ignores the potential conflict of interest from 
the duality of role of chairman and CEO as existed in LB. This conflict of interest is revealed 
in detail in section 10.3.  
Stakeholder theory, supported by Mitroff (1983) and Solomon (2007), can also explain cor-
porate governance. It involves a social responsibility which includes social and environmen-
tal issues in addition to the maximisation of stockholder wealth as important factors in cor-
porate governance. This theory accepts that stakeholders are both inside and outside the 
organisation. Examples of stakeholders include governments, the community, suppliers, 
customers and employees, all of whom can be impacted by organisational decision-making. 
Stakeholder theory argues that the organisation should be accountable to all such stake-
holders (Freeman 1984). Ultimately, these stakeholders can affect the corporation. For ex-
ample: customers could cease purchasing goods if they or their environment is treated ad-
versely by the corporation; employees could strike and therefore cease production if their 
working conditions do not meet acceptable standards; a government which relies on taxa-
tion revenue could impose penalties due to the corporation’s potential taxation evasion; 
and, suppliers’ could cease delivery of essential goods if the corporation excessively delays 
creditor payments. This theory is criticised for promoting innocuous decision making which 
panders to a variety of stakeholders and therefore fails to exploit sensible risk taking and 
maximisie firm value. There is also a lack of clarity as to the degree to which a board should 
take into account stakeholder interests, or at an extreme level, be accountable to stake-
holders rather than be responsible to them. Application of this approach can result in un-
wieldy board structures which attempt to represent a variety of stakeholders, and thereby 
risk ignoring requisite board level skills necessary for effective decision making. As this theo-
ry focuses on the interests of stakeholders, it fails to adequately explain the complex power 
interactions between non-board member individuals within the organisation which impact 
on firm culture. It also largely ignores external influences on organisational culture as a 
background element to board decision making which is handled by New Institutional Theo-
ry. Resource dependency theory as espoused by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) and supported 
by Nicholson and Kiel (2007) provides a framework which takes into account ambiguity 
caused by events outside the control of the organisation such as external environmental 
factors and reliance on external entities, and proposes that these factors can be minimised. 




access to resources and legitimacy. In this context, the board is considered as a facilitator 
between the organisation and external entities. As survival and operational performance of 
organisations are dependent on other organisations, this theory proposes that the major 
role of the board is to attract the necessary resources through the management of external 
relationships. According to Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) board structure is therefore influ-
enced by the ability of board members in engendering and influencing such relationships. 
The limitations of this theory is its mostly outwardly focused lens which diminishes the im-
portance of internal power relationships. As shown in this chapter, the LB board was domi-
nated by its CEO. The CEO’s power over fellow board members and employees was instru-
mental in achieving an organisational strategy which facilitated his own personal objectives. 
Clegg’s (1989) Theory of Power overcomes this limitation whilst New Institutional Theory is 
able to account for the external influences important in organisational culture and perfor-
mance. 
The use of both New Institutional Theory and Clegg’s (1989) Theory of Power overcomes the 
various limitations mentioned above in addressing the corporate governance failure of LB. A 
key distinction between the abovementioned group of theories and the ones used in this 
thesis is that the former theories are premised on agency where the focus is on traditional 
accounting concepts of shareholder wealth. They relatively ignore the role of organisational 
culture and individual power relationships in effective corporate governance which is ac-
commodated by the latter theories respectively.  
Despite the various alternative theoretical frameworks mentioned above there is no conclu-
sive evidence that one framework is more effective than the others in explaining corporate 
governance. Alina and Bogdan (2015, p. 682) asserts that “the best practices refer to those 
methods, techniques and instruments adopted by the company which ensures success and 
avoids failure in the future”. Given that LB eventually failed, an examination of corporate 
governance practiced at LB is required to assess whether it did indeed reflect good practice 
or was impacted by either institutional forces and/or the exercise of power by the leader-
ship of the organisation. Overriding all frameworks however, is the concept that profession-
alism encompasses consideration of all ethical matters. Was there a divergence between 
the appearance of corporate governance best practice and professional behaviour within 
LB? 
Section 10.3 includes a critique of LB’s Board and its committees, including their composi-
tion, size, specific knowledge, experience and frequency of meetings. These factors are con-
sidered important as they offer an indication of the effectiveness of a board’s monitoring 
function (Abbott et al. 2004; Abbott et al. 2003; Carcello et al. 2002; Chen & Jian 2007; 
Krishnan & Jong Eun 2009).  Zahra and Pearce (1989) emphasise the importance of the ef-
fective monitoring function of Boards in general. Zahra and Pearce (1989, p. 291) propose 




position, structure and process and three critical board roles such as service, strategy and 
control.  They find these links, specifically board size, board member attributes, the number 
and type of committees and elements of board meetings such as communication, agendas 
and documentation, affect the efficiency of the board monitoring role. This is particularly 
relevant to corporate performance. Walker (2004) also identifies the importance of board 
member attributes to corporate performance in the context of board committee member-
ship. He noted that: “the performance of audit committees necessarily depends on the peo-
ple involved, their knowledge, skills, critical capacities, scepticism and determination” 
(Walker 2004, p. 158). 
Agency theory which Shleifer and Vishny (1997) applied in  their assessment of corporate 
governance, claims that the only ethical action is the maximisation of shareholder wealth. 
This traditional approach offers a limited perspective to examine LB’s attempts at practicing 
good corporate governance. This chapter extends Schleifer & Vishney’s (1997) approach by 
explaining the practice of corporate governance as a social practice that reflects broader 
influences other than an agent / principal relationship. The analysis draws upon New Institu-
tional Theory and Clegg’s (1989) Theory of Power to explain firstly, the institutional influ-
ences that spurred LB to approach governance in a particular way and secondly, the power 
exerted by the CEO in shaping the governance structure to achieve his personal ambitions. 
The standards of corporate governance vary from country to country. However Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997, pp. 737-8) acknowledge that the corporate governance systems applied in the 
US, Germany, Japan and UK are amongst the best in the world. Although LB was based in 
the US where high standards for corporate governance were claimed to have existed, the 
GFC exposed certain failures of corporate governance systems as evidenced by the corpo-
rate failures referred to in CHAPTER 2.  
The adoption of corporate governance principles by US corporations has been influenced by 
a regulatory approach. As mentioned above, there is a vast amount of literature that identi-
fies the organisational factors necessary for good corporate governance. From a political 
perspective, the approaches could be separated into two groups along a regulatory versus 
neo-liberal spectrum. Some studies draw on the notion that market competition substitutes 
for a formal corporate governance system (Alchian 1950; Stigler 1958). An opposing view, 
suggests a prescriptive approach where legal systems which confer voting rights on stock-
holders are sufficient to protect stakeholders including minority interests (Easterbrook 
1991; Hart 1995; Manne 1965). Protection is needed from mismanagement and manager 
self-dealing such as fraud, excessive compensation, or issues of equity to management. 
Consistent with this latter notion, the US has embraced a regulatory response to corporate 
governance to ensure at least a minimum level of governance is achieved. The implementa-
tion of these standards has largely entailed a combination of a statutory approach repre-
sented by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) and an industry supervisory approach rep-




Exchange 2012, 2014; Securities and Exchange Commission 2002). In addition to the 
abovementioned statutory and supervisory approach, US financial institutions have corpo-
rate governance responsibilities stemming from other government agencies listed in Figure 
129. 
Figure 129 - Corporate Governance Responsibilities for U.S. Financial Institutions 
Organisation Corporate Governance Document 
  
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
(OCC) 
OCC’s Manual of Examination Procedures, in 
addition to the bank director guide. 
  
Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) OTS’s Thrift Activities Handbook and Thrift 
Holding Company Handbook. 
  
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC) 
FDIC’s Division of Supervision Manual of Ex-
amination Policies. 
  
Federal Financial Institution Examination 
Council (FFIEC) 
Information handbooks on individual topics 
related to Information Technology. 
  
Federal Reserve Bank Holding Company Examination Manual. 
 
 Trading and Capital Markets Activities Ma 
nual. 
 Federal Reserve SR Letter 04-18, ‘Bank Hold-
ing Company Rating System’, December 6, 
2004 (stating that the board's involvement 
will factor into the overall risk and composite 
ratings). 
 Federal Reserve SR Letter 95-15, ‘Rating the 
Adequacy of Risk Management Processes 
and Internal Controls at State Member Banks 
and Bank Holding Companies’, November 
14, 1995. 
Source: (Baret et al. 2009, p. 6). 
The following sections outline the main US regulatory and supervisory guidance which ap-






10.2.2 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) 
Following the collapse of major US corporations such as WorldCom and Enron, the US gov-
ernment acknowledged the failure of corporate governance in certain corporations and 
sought to introduce legislation to cover perceived gaps in governance practice. An analysis 
of corporate failures signal corporate governance issues which need to be addressed. This 
resulted in the enactment of the SOX (Securities and Exchange Commission 2002). This act 
represented a pivotal event in the development of good corporate governance in the US 
(Baulkaran 2014). The sections incorporated within the act are briefly outlined in the follow-
ing table: 
Figure 130 - Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Summary of Provisions 
Section Heading Description 
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
(PCAOB) 
The PCAOB provides independent supervi-
sion of public accounting firms which con-
duct audits. It is also responsible for register-
ing auditors and outlines various require-
ments for audits.  
Auditor Independence This section deals with acceptable standards 
for external auditor independence, including 
the need for rotation of partners and report-
ing requirements.  
Corporate Responsibility Outlines the concept of individual responsi-
bility by senior executives and their role in 
ensuring the publication of accurate and 
complete financial statements. 
Enhanced Financial Disclosures Specifically covers financial transactions, 
transactions of corporate officers, and timely 
reporting of material changes. It also covers 
a requirement for audits of internal controls 
and the ability for SEC reviews. 
Analyst Conflicts of Interest This section requires securities analysts to 
disclose conflicts of interest and lists their 
codes of conduct.  
Commission Resources and Authority  The Commission Resources and Authority 
deals with the SEC's authority to bar or cen-
sure individuals including brokers, advisors, 
or dealers. 
Studies and Reports Requires the SEC and Comptroller General to 
conduct studies and reports covering the 
effects of consolidation of public accounting 
firms, the role of credit rating agencies in the 
operation of securities markets, securities 




Section Heading Description 
Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability Outlines penalties for manipulation, destruc-
tion or alteration of financial records or per-
verting the course of official investigations. It 
also provides protection for whistle-blowers. 
White Collar Crime Penalty Enhancement Represented by the White Collar Crime Pen-
alty Enhancement Act of 2002, this section 
highlights the penalties associated with 
white-collar crimes incorporating tougher 
sentencing guidelines. 
Corporate Tax Returns Requires the CEO to sign the corporate tax 
return. 
Corporate Fraud Accountability Represented by the Corporate Fraud Ac-
countability Act of 2002, this section identi-
fies corporate fraud and deems certain types 
of manipulation as a criminal offence which 
attract more severe penalties.  
Source: A summary of Securities and Exchange Commission (2002).  
Figure 130 offers a broad view of corporate governance from the perspective of the regula-
tors. This chapter, however, focuses on the social practice of corporate governance, in par-
ticular that practiced by LB. As explained in the following sections, the LB approach to cor-
porate governance entailed a tick-a-box approach to regulatory compliance instead of an 
overall system which encompasses a combination of values consistent with a social respon-
sibility approach and actions reflecting fiduciary obligations. 
10.2.3 NYSE Response to Corporate Governance 
The US regulatory response is contained in The NYSE Listed Company Manual, and in SOX. In 
addition to the manual - New York Stock Exchange (2012), the NYSE has published a detailed 
NYSE Corporate Governance Guide for the creation of an effective corporate governance 
system (New York Stock Exchange 2014). The provisions contained in New York Stock 
Exchange (2012) as opposed to the NYSE Corporate Governance Guide, are mandatory (re-
fer below for details).  
New York Stock Exchange (2012) represents the NYSE's critical collection of policies, practic-
es and procedures for US listed corporations (New York Stock Exchange 2012, p. 1). These 
regulations specifically cover various compliance requirements with matters relating to cor-
porate governance contained in section 303A.09 (New York Stock Exchange 2012). In addi-
tion to requiring listed companies to adopt and disclose corporate governance guidelines, it 
provides a detailed listing of compliance provisions. An excerpt from New York Stock 
Exchange (2012) which outlines the mandatory subjects in a corporation’s governance 




Figure 131 - NYSE Corporate Governance Standards 
Subject Description 
Director qualification standards These standards should, at minimum, reflect the inde-
pendence requirements set forth in Sections 303A.01 and 
303A.02. Companies may also address other substantive 
qualification requirements, including policies limiting the 
number of Boards, on which a director may sit, and direc-
tor tenure, retirement and succession. 
Director responsibilities These responsibilities should clearly articulate what is ex-
pected from a director, including basic duties and respon-
sibilities with respect to attendance at Board meetings 
and advance review of meeting materials. 
Director access to management 
and, as necessary, appropriate, 
independent advisors. 
N/A 
Director compensation. Director compensation guidelines should include general 
principles for determining the form and amount of direc-
tor compensation (and for reviewing those principles, as 
appropriate). The Board should be aware that questions 
as to directors' independence may be raised when direc-
tors' fees and emoluments exceed what is customary. 
Similar concerns may be raised when the listed company 
makes substantial charitable contributions to organiza-
tions in which a director is affiliated, or enters into con-
sulting contracts with (or provides other indirect forms of 
compensation to) a director. The Board should critically 
evaluate each of these matters when determining the 
form and amount of director compensation, and the in-
dependence of a director. 
Director orientation and con-
tinuing education 
N/A 
Management succession Succession planning should include policies and principles 
for CEO selection and performance review, as well as pol-
icies regarding succession in the event of an emergency 
or the retirement of the CEO. 
Annual performance evaluation 
of the Board 
The Board should conduct a self-evaluation at least annu-
ally to determine whether it and its committees are func-
tioning effectively. 
Source: A summary of New York Stock Exchange (2012 - section 303A.09). 
The NYSE acknowledges the existence of various systems of corporate governance, and the 
potential confusion this may cause the corporate community (New York Stock Exchange 
2014, p. 7). In response, it analysed a body of literature on the subject and incorporated its 




principles in the guide are not mandatory, however it simply provides a best practice 
framework for the voluntary adoption by US corporations. It outlines the NYSE view of aspi-
rational best practices. The NYSE states that the aim of Boards should be to:  
Oversee the successful, profitable, and sustainable operations of their companies. But the 
pressures that confront directors, from activism and short-termism, to ongoing shifts in gov-
ernance, to global risks and competition, are many (New York Stock Exchange 2014, p. iiii). 
The New York Stock Exchange (2014) identified issues based on its review and noted that 
out of the 15 Board attributes analysed, 10 had either mixed results from the literature, or 
were determined to have no impact on the Board feature. A summary of the NYSE’s review 
is presented in Figure 132. 
Figure 132 - NYSE Summary of Corporate Governance Literature 
Board Attribute   Explanation Findings from NYSE  
Research 
      
Independent 
chairperson 
The chairman of the board meets NYSE 
standards for independence. 
No evidence that this mat-
ters. 
      
Lead independent 
director 
The board has designated an independ-
ent director as the ‘lead’ person to rep-
resent the independent directors in con-
versation with management, stockhold-
ers, and other stakeholders. 
Modest evidence that this 
improves performance. 
      
Number of outside 
directors  
Number of directors who come from 
outside the company (non-executive). 
Mixed evidence that this 
can improve performance 
and reduce agency costs. 
Depends primarily on how 
difficult it is for outsiders 
to acquire expert 
knowledge of the company 
and its operations. 
      
Number of inde-
pendent directors 
Number of directors who meet NYSE 
standards for independence. 
No evidence that this mat-
ters beyond a simple ma-
jority. 
      
Independence of 
committees 
Board committees are entirely made up 
of directors who meet NYSE standards 
for  
Positive impact on earnings 
quality for audit commit-
tee only. No evidence for 
other committees. 




Board Attribute   Explanation Findings from NYSE  
Research 
Bankers  Directors with experience in commercial 
or investment banking. 
Negative impact on com-
pany performance. 
      
Financial experts  Directors with experience either as pub-
lic accountant, auditor, principal financial 
officer, comptroller, or principle account-
ing officer. 
Positive impact for ac-
counting professionals on-
ly. No impact for other fi-
nancial experts. 
      
Politically con-
nected directors 
Directors with previous experience with 
the federal government or regulatory 
agency. 
No evidence that this mat-
ters. 
      
Employees  Employee or labour union representa-
tives serve on the board. 
Mixed evidence on per-
formance. 
      
‘Busy’ boards  A ‘busy’ director is one who serves on 
multiple outside boards (typically three 
or more). A busy board is one that has a 
majority of busy directors. 
Negative impact on per-
formance and monitoring. 
      
Interlocked boards  An executive from Company A sits on the 
board of Company B, while an executive 
from Company B sits on the board of 
Company A. 
Positive impact on perfor-
mance, negative impact on 
monitoring. 
      
Board size  The total number of directors on the 
board. 
Positive impact on perfor-
mance to have smaller 
board if company is ‘sim-
ple,’ larger board if com-
pany is ‘complex’. 
      
Diversity  The board has directors that are diverse 
in background, ethnicity, or gender. 
Mixed evidence on per-
formance and monitoring. 
      
Classified (or stag-
gered) boards 
A board structure in which directors are 
elected to multiple-year terms, with only 
a subset standing for re-election each 
year. 
Mixed evidence on per-
formance and monitoring. 
      
Director compen-
sation 
The mix of cash and stock with which di-
rectors are compensated. 
Mixed evidence on per-
formance and monitoring 




Following its review, the NYSE noted a disparity in the literature relating to corporate gov-
ernance whereby the traditional notions of best practice had been challenged. An assess-
ment by van den Berghe (1999) of global codes of corporate governance revealed a lack of 
consistency amongst countries and inconclusive evidence of a ‘single’ best practice ap-
proach. In commenting on the available literature they concluded that “the research results, 
as well as opinions on the subject, are by no means unanimous” (van den Berghe 1999, p. 
14). A more recent study by van Essen et al. (2013) supports van den Berghe (1999) and 
found that there is no universal prescription for good corporate governance and that “the 
efficacy of governance mechanisms may be contingent upon organisational and environ-
mental circumstances” (van Essen et al. 2013) p.201. There is inconclusive evidence in the 
literature for any one approach to establish a checklist for effective corporate governance. 
The problem with much of the literature relates to several factors (Zahra & Pearce 1989). 
Firstly there is the tendency to universally relate board attributes and roles to corporate 
performance. Secondly, there is the relatively scant attention to the impact on board varia-
bles from contextual forces such as the size of the corporation or its life cycle. Thirdly, there 
is disagreement on what constitutes best practice for board processes and structure, and 
acceptable board objectives. Many variables play a part in determining “when boards exer-
cise their power, how their actions may influence the direction the firm takes, and how di-
rectors bring about changes in the strategic initiatives advanced or implemented by senior 
executives” (Zahra & Pearce 1989, p. 325). Fourthly, there has been an over-reliance on uni-
variate analytical approaches which ignore the antecedents and after effects of the variables 
chosen. This leads to the risk that the causal effects are not adequately identified and there-
fore any reliance on previous findings may extend the probability of diverse results. Fifthly, 
as the study of corporate governance covers a broad range of subsidiary topics, the range of 
samples used to conduct empirical analysis has been inadequate. Most studies relate to the 
US Fortune 500 corporations, whilst ignoring smaller and non-profit corporations. Sixthly, 
the definition of Board structure variables has been inconsistent. For example, the definition 
of an outside director still differs amongst researchers. Further, questions such as the dif-
ferentiation between the roles of the CEO to that of the board and the extent of the board’s 
expected strategic contribution to the corporation remain unresolved. Lastly, Zahra and 
Pearce (1989) identify the problem of a common tendency to measure corporate perfor-
mance in a financial sense. Moreover common measures ignore other perspectives such as 
the social and systemic responsibilities of the corporation. 
According to the New York Stock Exchange (2014, p. 8), there are certain contexts in which 
corporate governance may be considered favourable. Taking its review into account, the 
(New York Stock Exchange 2014) reached four broad recommendations in applying best 
practice corporate governance. Firstly, it recommends that Boards should adopt governance 
practices where there exists sufficient empirical evidence that those practices benefit the 




incumbent Boards could be excused for being confused as to which practice to adopt. The 
New York Stock Exchange (2014) attempts to accommodate this difficulty by outlining board 
attributes that are supported by academic studies and their findings.  
Secondly, the New York Stock Exchange (2014) advises that the context in which corporate 
governance systems are applied should be considered. It could be detrimental to an organi-
sation applying a completely standardised governance system as a system’s design should 
correlate to its setting. For example, a non-executive chairperson may be preferred upon 
the appointment of a new CEO, particularly when the appointee has no experience at CEO 
level and is internal. An independent chairperson can also benefit the organisation when a 
significant overhaul in strategy, culture or operations is required following a severe deterio-
ration in performance. In this case major decisions such as a change in the leadership or a 
sale of the organisation can be undertaken without undue influence, and management dis-
traction of strategic matters can be minimised.  
However, on the other hand, according to (New York Stock Exchange 2014), a non-executive 
chairperson may be disadvantageous when an effective CEO/chairperson is already in place. 
The recruitment of a new CEO can be difficult when the incumbent holds both titles. Fur-
ther, an independent chairperson could lead to inefficient strategic decisions especially 
when technical expertise is required and such knowledge is not easily transferrable from the 
CEO to the chairperson. Finally,  seperate CEOs and chairpersons can undermine leadership 
during a crisis (New York Stock Exchange 2014, p. 10). In addition to applying to the issue of 
appointing an independent chairperson, consideration of context is also valid for the majori-
ty of corporate governance policies (Millstein Center for Corporate Governance and 
Performance Yale School of Management 2009 ). 
Thirdly, the New York Stock Exchange (2014) suggests that the functions of a governance 
system should take priority over its features. This avoids the superficial notion that the mere 
presence of a diverse, independent board with a standard set of board committees is suffi-
cient for a corporate governance system to function. Similarly, the feature of a documented 
succession plan may be based on an assumption that it is a good one; and if the board has a 
risk committee, an assumption could be made that the organisation exercises careful risk 
management. Likewise it may be assumed that an optimal compensation structure for direc-
tors and management includes forms of equity as it provides appropriate incentives. As out-
lined in Figure 132, the research is not so definitive and boards should therefore avoid simp-
ly applying a standard governance system or feature and instead adopt a governance sys-
tem that will indeed add value. 
Lastly the New York Stock Exchange (2014) encourages directors to adopt an organisational 
perspective. This involves the acceptance that groups of individuals require adaptive and 
relevant monitoring. This oversight should take into account “personal and interpersonal 




Stock Exchange 2014, p. 11). Specific areas to be considered include organisational design, 
organisational culture, CEO personality, and Board quality (New York Stock Exchange 2014). 
As discussed in section 10.3, these factors are particularly relevant in assessing LB’s corpo-
rate governance framework. 
In a case study covering four major US financial institutions (LB, Bear Stearns, Goldman 
Sachs, AIG), and one large US industrial corporation (General Motors) which encountered 
difficulties during the GFC, Aluchna (2013) compared the institutions’ stated corporate gov-
ernance and ethical pronouncements and documents to the their actual practices. The study 
focused on the Board of Directors’ role in overseeing the corporate governance implemen-
tation and monitoring functions. The deficiencies identified in Figure 133 were found to ap-
ply in varying degrees to all the subjects of the case study including the US investment banks 
(Aluchna 2013). The overarching problem was twofold.  
Firstly the agency problem resulted from a short-term proclivity by senior executives for the 
maximisation of short term results at the expense of an overall responsibility to maximise 
stockholders’ wealth over the long term – a core principle of agency theory. The Boards’ 
monitoring role failed to identify this ‘short-termism’.  
Secondly, despite the existence of well documented corporate governance and ethical con-
duct policies amongst all case study subjects, the corporations failed to implement the core 
values contained in the policies into the corporations’ everyday operations. The values es-
poused in the policy documents were largely ignored by senior executives and employees 
(Aluchna 2013, p. 128). Therefore the existence of the corporate governance and ethical 
conduct policies were seen to be more of an exercise in box ticking compliance than a 
meaningful implementation of the underlying objectives and values of such policies.  A gap 
existed between the corporate governance system that corporations portrayed publicly and 
that which was practiced. The responsibility for establishing an effective corporate govern-
ance framework and an environment which sustains ethical behaviour is commonly regard-
ed as the responsibility of the Board of Directors. The abovementioned gap may therefore 
be construed as a deficiency in the implementation of the Board’s responsibilities. This defi-
ciency could have arisen from a lack of understanding of the policies or as a consequence of 
undue pressure from other sources to disregard their importance:  
The messages included in the code of ethics and the declaration of responsibility and integri-
ty expressed by Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers and Goldman Sachs proved to be empty dec-
larations formulated solely for the purpose of formal compliance to satisfy shareholders and 
stakeholders expectations  (Aluchna 2013, pp. 128-9). 
Aluchna (2013, p. 128) conducted a study of three investment banks: Bear Stearns, Goldman 
Sachs and LB, and refers to four elements of corporate governance failures. In particular, 




compensation structures; inadequate risk management procedures and policies; and inter-
mediary inefficiencies.” An adaptation of Aluchna’s (2013) corporate governance deficien-
cies is set out in Figure 133. 
Figure 133 - Main Corporate Governance Inadequacies of Failed Corporations in the GFC 
Corporate Governance 
Area 
Main Deficiency Reference 
Board of Directors Insufficient management information sys-
tem 
(Gillespie & Zweig 
2011) 
 Overpowering CEO 
 Inefficient leadership team 
 Negative social perception 
 Questionable board composition 
 Lack of expertise on financial innovation 
such as derivatives 
 Inadequate financial skills 




Ineffectively structured to motivate execu-
tives to perform in the best interests of 
stockholders – ‘agency problem’ 
(Bebchuk & Fried 
2005; Clarke & 
Chanlat 2009; 
Gillespie & Zweig 
2011; Kennedy 2014; 
Rost & Osterloh 
2009) 
 Executives motivated by maximising finan-
cial outcomes. 
 Motivated high risk transactions resulting 
in short term payoffs 
 Increasing gap between CEO compensa-
tion and average employee. Gap extended 
from 280 times of average employee sala-
ry in 2004 to 520 times in 2008 
 Weak performance of Board Compensa-
tion Committees 
   
Risk Management Inappropriate Board and management 
procedures. For example flawed value at 
risk systems 
(Clarke & Chanlat 
2009; Isaksson & 
Woodside 2016; 
Kennedy 2014)  Use of poor quality information systems 
   
Relationship with  
Intermediaries 
Flawed practices of CRA’s, securities ana-
lysts and investment managers 
(Boerner 2008; 
Clapman 2007; 
Clarke & Chanlat 
2009) 
 Conflicts of interest and undue pressure 
from corporate relationships 
Source: Adapted from Aluchna (2013, p. 129). 
There is no evidence of any regulatory breach by LB of the New York Governance Standards, 




practice. Of interest to this thesis is the impact that institutional forces and/or the undue 
influence of power in relationships had on the performance of LB. As stated by Alina and 
Bogdan (2015, p. 682) “the best practices refer to those methods, techniques and instru-
ments adopted by the company which ensure success and avoid failure in the future”. This 
broad definition linking corporate governance to the future failure of a business is appropri-
ate in the LB case study in view of the role played by LB’s Board in the lead up to its bank-
ruptcy. In summary, an important function of an effective corporate governance system is 
an effective mechanism for the oversight and monitoring of management to avoid a future 
failure. This function is ordinarily carried out by a Board of Directors and therefore the struc-
ture of a Board is a vital component in the implementation of this objective. The following 
section analyses the influences which shaped the board structure of LB. 
10.2.4 Board Structure 
This section discusses the influences affecting LB’s Board structure. There is evidence to 
suggest that attributes of LB’s Board structure were influenced by normative pressure which 
is discussed below. Larcker and Tayan (2010) suggest that an ideal Board structure should 
start with a Board containing the following three characteristics. Firstly, a chairperson inde-
pendent from management and preferably not concurrently acting as the CEO. This separa-
tion of dualities is commonly preferred as part of best practice corporate governance in 
view of the different responsibilities for each position. Another attribute includes a Board 
representation of sufficient size as to cover the requisite skills, knowledge and diversity of 
perspectives necessary to promote balanced and informed discussion. The diversity should 
cover professional expertise, ethnicity, age and gender. The Board should also comprise a 
number of independent directors who can serve the best interests of stockholders. Finally, 
Larcker and Tayan (2010) suggest that an ideal Board structure should include a compensa-
tion structure designed to avoid any agency problem. This is often achieved by including a 
significant portion of Board members’ compensation with corporate stock and/or options. 
An examination of these characteristics as they applied to LB is addressed in section 10.3. 
Despite its compliance with the New York Governance Standards and adoption of certain 
features of traditional corporate governance as suggested by Larcker and Tayan (2010), how 
did LB’s Board fail to mitigate the firm’s escalating financial difficulties and disregard a grow-
ing dysfunctional corporate culture? The following section analyses the normative and mi-
metic institutional influences exerted upon LB which led it to ignore the implementation of 







10.2.5 Normative and Mimetic Influence over Board Struc-
ture 
The adoption prior to the GFC of a similar board structure to that of Goldman Sachs, widely 
regarded as a successful US investment bank as was later found by its survival of the GFC in 
its original form (except for its eventual conversion to a bank holding corporation), could be 
viewed as the result of DiMaggio & Powell’s (1983) normative and mimetic influence. This 
section shows that this influence impacted on the majority of US investment banks who 
were more concerned with regulatory compliance than practicing good corporate govern-
ance by instilling appropriate values in the day to day operations of the firms and at the top 
level of supervisory control – the Board of Directors.  
Despite similarities in Board structure, the effectiveness of the corporate governance of two 
organisations may vary considerably (Larcker & Tayan 2010, p. 1). LB’s Board structure was 
not vastly different from that of Goldman Sachs. In analysing LB’s Board structure, on the 
surface, it complied with the New York Governance Standards (New York Stock Exchange 
2012). For example, 10 of the 11 directors on LB’s Board in 2007/2008 were classified as 
non-executive, reflecting an overwhelming number of non-executive directors; LB’s Direc-
tors were a group whose backgrounds and experience were diverse; LB’s Directors’ com-
pensation arrangements, which consisted of a mix of equity (restricted stock units and op-
tions) and cash, provided a level of performance incentive; and the Directors had a moder-
ate workload imposed from membership of other boards which ensured sufficient focus 
could be devoted to the matters of LB – see Figure 134.  
Even-though each of these attributes complied with the relevant regulations, a detailed dis-
cussion of the weaknesses for each attribute as they relate to LB is included in section 10.3. 
Figure 134 compares Board structural attributes of LB with those of Goldman Sachs. It is 
noteworthy that the board structures appear quite similar. A possible explanation for the 






Figure 134 - Board Structural Attribute Comparison between LB and Goldman Sachs as at 
2005 
Structural Attribute   Lehman Brothers  Goldman Sachs  
      
Chairperson   Dual Chairperson/CEO Dual Chairperson/CEO 
Number of Board members   10 (increased to 11 by 2008) 11 
Number of current 
CEOs/Chairmen/President  of other 
corporations 
3 4 
Number of retired CEOs and years 
since their retirement 
3 retired, average 12 years 2 retired, average 3.5 years 
Independent Board members (ac-
cording to NYSE)  
8 9 
Professional background of inde-









Former CEO Sotheby’s Former CEO Sara Lee 
Former Chairman IBM Former Assistant to President of U.S. 
Theatrical Producer Former CEO Medtronic 
CEO American Red Cross CEO Allstate 
Chairman GlaxoSmithKline President Brown University 
Vice Chairman RKO Pictures / 
Actress 
CEO BP 
Former CEO Halliburton Chairman Investor AB 
Principal JDM Financial Vice Chairman Perseus 
  Vice Chairman Colgate-Palmolive 
Average age of Board members   68.4 (increased to 68 years by 
2008) 
59.4 
Number of men vs. women  Men: 8; Women: 2 (2008: 10 
men and 1 woman) 
Men: 9; Women: 2 
Number of other Boards, trustee-
ships, committees and other ap-
pointments they currently serve on. 
Boards: 19; Trusteeships: 12; 
Advisory Committees: 5; Other 
Affiliations: 10 
Boards: 17; Trusteeships: 7; Advisory 
Committees: 4; Other Affiliations: 27 
Average annual cash retainer (does 
not include committee fees) 
USD 55,000 USD 75,000 
Average annual equity compensa-
tion 
USD 195,000 (either restricted 
stock units or options) 
USD 260,000 (either restricted stock 
units or options) 
Number of full Board meetings per 
year   
8 7 
Number of executive sessions (in-
dependent directors only) per year 
3 5 
Committee meetings per year Audit: 7; Compensation and 
Benefits: 8; Nominating and 
Governance: 5; Finance & Risk: 
2; Executive: 11 
Audit: 11; Compensation: 5; Nomi-
nating and Governance: 5 
Source: Data for the table was extracted from each corporations annual reports (Goldman 




As stated by Aluchna (2013), LB’s Board structure mostly superficially resembled a model of 
good practice as defined by the regulatory environment. However from the perspective of 
efficient monitoring and control, it incorporated vital deficiencies in the context of LB’s his-
tory and financial predicament just prior to its collapse. By ticking the regulatory boxes, LB’s 
Board structure resembled that of Goldman Sachs. The fact that the board structures of 
both firms were similar may imply a mimetic pressure in an attempt to seek legitimacy 
amongst the banking, regulatory and investment communities. If LB mimicked the Board 
structure of Goldman Sachs, it sought to imitate an organisation which was deemed to be 
successful, thereby attracting legitimacy. It also generated a sense of security for investors, 
management and the board, supporting a proven tactic for survival. Appearing to adopt a 
similar board structure to its peer group, an investment bank avoids differentiation at this 
level of corporate structure from other investment banks. Any substantially different board 
feature may indicate non-compliance with socially accepted norms and potentially attract 
closer scrutiny by investors and regulators especially in cases of underperformance to a peer 
group. Closer scrutiny relative to the peer group runs the risk of detecting a lack of trans-
parency, unexpected or extraordinary management practices or financial anomalies, which 
in turn could affect stakeholder confidence in the firm. 
Additionally, similarity in Board structure also implies that both firms were intent on com-
plying with regulations. If they breached regulations, then not only would they face the as-
sociated regulatory penalties, they would portray an image to the public and stakeholders, 
of a firm that did not have adequate management control. Such a perception could not only 
damage the firm’s reputation, thereby impacting future business, but could infer to credi-
tors, CRA’s and other financial counterparties on whom the firm was reliant for ongoing 
funding, that the firm’s credit risk profile had worsened. 
A normative influence may have also affected LB and was potentially spurred by Riaz’s 
(2009) concept of ‘reverse legitimisation’ referred to in section 3.1.3. The setting for ‘re-
verse legitimisation’ existed, as prior to the GFC all major investment banks were recording 
healthy profits. Their relative success created an environment whereby the regulatory au-
thorities such as the NYSE and SEC, from which the investment banks sought legitimacy, 
were publicly endorsed for sustaining the development of and legitimising such successful 
organisations. This ‘mutual legitimisation’ perpetuated a perception that corporate govern-
ance practice was effective and proper in the investment banking industry. This perception 
was sustainable providing the corporate governance modus operandi of the investment 
banking peer group was consistent and did not deviate from established practices. 
As Aluchna (2013) suggests, all major US investment banks complied with regulations. 
Therefore their Board features incorporated similar traits thereby creating the appearance 
that they were largely similar. As this thesis is attempting to explain, some of the underlying 




structure and function deficiencies as opposed to Board features in general, would be more 
useful in examining whether an institutional influence existed. If so, the existence of a nor-
mative influence could not only help in understanding the failure of LB, but also the effec-
tive failure of all but one of the major US investment banks.  
Aluchna (2013) identified four common corporate governance weaknesses (as outlined in 
Figure 133) in three major US investment banks, comprising the majority of the peer group. 
These common weaknesses as mentioned in the previous section included: “inefficiencies of 
boards of directors; inappropriate compensation structures; inadequate risk management 
procedures and policies; and intermediary inefficiencies” (Aluchna 2013, p. 128). Aluchna’s 
(2013) identified weaknesses are amongst those which New York Stock Exchange (2014) at-
tempts to overcome. They also represent the weaknesses that Monks and Minow (2011) 
attempt to address. Monks & Minow’s (2011) synthesis of key board features is also con-
sistent with those previously identified by (New York Stock Exchange 2014). These include: 
an efficient Board in which the CEO and Chairperson are different people; a sufficient num-
ber of non-executive directors to protect the interests of stockholders; Board committees 
such as nomination, audit and compensation committees with the necessary experience and 
expertise to cover decisions relating to the organisation; a compensation structure ade-
quate to incentivise directors; and an active stockholder base willing to question the Board. 
In referring to Monks & Minow’s (2011) features, Aluchna (2013) concluded that these key 
features of good corporate governance attributes in general were inadequate for the three 
investment banks examined. In the analysis contained in section 10.3, all but the last of 
Monks & Minow’s (2011) features are critically analysed in the context of LB’s board struc-
ture. The feature involving an active stockholder base was not able to be critically evaluated 
given the lack of data. 
‘Self-interest’ and ‘Short-termism’ 
The normative influence affecting the investment banking industry stems from two overrid-
ing factors. Firstly the inclination for self-interest in preference to a responsibility to stock-
holders, and secondly the tendency for a ‘short-termism’ approach to management deci-
sion-making. See section 10.5 for a discussion on employee compensation including self-
interest as a driver in undertaking risky transactions as a means to increase employee incen-
tive payments. Jensen (1994) argues that economic self-interest is driven by incentives 
which may cause irrational behaviour and is mostly favoured above altruism. Jensen further 
argues that individuals may have other motives. LB’s and in general, the industry’s choice to 
resort to high levels of monetary incentives created a tendency during the pre-GFC period to 
incorrectly discern the appropriate balance between financial incentives driven by self-
interest and the opposing motive of prudential management of risk. This problem, identified 
by Jensen is blamed for system failures leading to large corporate collapses. “This phenom-




to the waste of hundreds of billions of dollars of resources and the failure of many of the 
crown jewels of corporate America over the last several decades” (Jensen 1994, p. 8). 
Secondly, there existed ambitions for each investment bank to practice ‘short-termism’. This 
phenomenon is related to the first factor, as ‘short-termism’ which drives the achievement 
of high short term profits, generally translates to higher executive and director short term 
compensation. Although these factors could relate to employees in an investment bank, the 
responsibility for the behaviours that led to this dysfunctional culture at LB must be at least 
partly ascribed to the Board of Directors which is ultimately responsible for the policies af-
fecting compensation. As the normative pressure affected the organisation as a whole, the 
Board of Directors were not immune to its affects.  
Each major US investment bank, like all US publicly listed corporations, was required to re-
port its financial statements on a quarterly basis in accordance with the Form 10-Q report-
ing requirements of the SEC (Securities and Exchange Act  1934). The Form 10-Q quarterly 
report consists of unaudited financial statements intended to report on the continuing fi-
nancial state of affairs of the corporation during its fiscal year. Stockholders, creditors and 
other stakeholders would be interested in following the progress of the corporation. Most 
importantly, creditors would be interested in the impact the financial statements would 
have on the corporation’s credit risk profile, and stockholders would be interested in the 
impact on returns. Financial results were therefore closely scrutinised by these stakeholders 
including investment managers and securities analysts whose comments were often quoted 
in the media.  
The quarterly scrutiny of financial results generated pressure on each investment bank and 
in turn, their Board of Directors, to produce a higher result in each successive quarter to 
meet investor expectations. The inevitable comparison of each investment bank against its 
peer group’s performance by analysts compounded this pressure. Evidence of the focus on 
peer group comparison especially on key financial metrics by LB is found in the Lehman 
Brothers Global Strategy Offsite Presentation (Lehman Brothers Holdings 2006, pp. 5-7,14-
5,30,4). This focus on peer group comparison represents 8 out of 38 pages of LB’s Corporate 
Strategy Presentation for 2006 (Lehman Brothers Holdings 2006). Goldman Sachs’ peer 
group comparisons focused on a combination of equity performance and divisional perfor-
mance (Goldman Sachs Group 2006, pp. 13-4,5,7,9). Bear Stearns’ comparisons mostly re-
lated to divisional performance in terms of market rankings (Bear Stearns 2006, pp. 9-
12,8,23,112); Morgan Stanley focused on peer group comparisons relating to divisional per-
formance and staff quality (Morgan Stanley 2006); and Merrill Lynch focused on comparing 
its dominance in executing large transactions as well as its equity performance (Merrill 
Lynch 2008a, pp. 5-15,158). In each case, the investment banks were trying to establish a 
perception that they were performing satisfactorily and in line with or better than the peer 




In this competitive environment it was tempting to make management and strategic deci-
sions to facilitate the objective of short term quarterly outperformance. In view of the in-
dustry peer group comparisons, a similarity of approach in dealing with decision-making of 
the business operations would not be unexpected. The consequence for being the lowest 
ranked investment bank in terms of performance could have resulted negatively on the 
firm’s stock value relative to the peer group which would have disappointed stockholders. 
The normative influence driven by a common ‘short-termism’ approach sanctioned the in-
ternal decision-making of the firms. In the absence of any negative commentary from the 
public either in the media,  directly from stakeholders, or through sanctions imposed by 
regulators, the investment banking firms appeared to comply with social norms.  The com-
monality in approach by the peer group was spurred also by the circles, both informal and 
formal, in which the employees, senior executives and Directors mixed. For example it 
would not be unexpected for Directors of different firms to socialise at formal and informal 
events such as conferences or social clubs. The high level of contestability for employees 
mentioned in section 10.5 meant that employees rotated between employers as they 
shopped around for better compensation packages. The intermingling of employees be-
tween different firms, within professional forums and in educational settings resulted in the 
importation of employee values to the same firms (Galaskiewicz & Wasserman 1989; Slack 
& Hinings 1994). Ultimately these values would merge on an industry-wide basis and the 
same values would influence decision-making – leading to a common approach to ‘short-
termism’ and tendency for self-interest.  Other examples where the same normative influ-
ence fed into decision-making included the common pursuit of the ‘leverage effect’ which 
helped boost profitability at the expense of elevated risk levels; the growth in the use of 
credit derivatives which allowed the banks to expand risk exposures to relatively illiquid as-
sets; and the practice of warehousing mortgages and CDOs, often through off-balance sheet 
structures, with the expectation of offloading these assets through securitisation. The latter 
practice generated a concentration of exposures to the real-estate market and in particular, 
the subprime mortgage market. Finally, Directors and employees would be attuned to the 
practices of other major investment banks given the media exposure associated with per-
formance reporting and publicity surrounding major transactions, often involving merger 
and acquisitions and large scale corporate financings. A discussion of each corporate gov-
ernance failure as identified by Aluchna (2013), including other factors considered as inade-
quacies in the LB case, is covered in section 10.3. The discussion includes DiMaggio & Pow-
ell’s (1983) normative influence on Board structure and examines the use of Clegg’s (1989) 




10.3 Relationship between the CEO and the 
Board 
Fuld’s interactions and relationship with the Board reflected Fuld’s management style and 
created a power base from which he was able to influence Board members to implement 
strategic initiatives which were consistent with his own. This section covers the subtle or-
ganisational processes, structures and behaviours which enabled the CEO to influence the 
Board. Specifically, this section examines: the problem of duality of CEO and Chairperson 
roles and how this influenced the appointment process of board members; the risks posed 
to director independence by Board member longevity of tenure; Board composition, and 
questions relating to its suitability for a complex and innovative business; the level of direc-
tor engagement in the decision-making process which devolved matters to a Board Commit-
tee whose priorities as a whole were misplaced; and finally the attractive level and structure 
of Board compensation, and its effect on Board compliance to the CEOs wishes.     
According to New York Stock Exchange (2014, pp. 75-6) it is a common modern day govern-
ance practice to include independent directors on a Board to protect the interests of stock-
holders and other stakeholders. This practice is also included as a requirement of US corpo-
rate governance rules (New York Stock Exchange 2012 - 303A.01). In compliance with the 
NYSE requirement, LB’s Board consisted of 10 independent directors out of a total of eleven 
directors. The only non-independent director was Fuld, who sat on the Board as Chairper-
son. Refer section 10.3.4 for a discussion of Board composition. A further factor considered 
as best practice by the NYSE Corporate Governance regulations, is to incorporate a range of 
Board committees to supervise certain operational aspects of an organisation’s activities 
(New York Stock Exchange 2012 - 303A.04-303A.07). LB also complied with the NYSE Corpo-
rate Governance regulations having a number of such committees including: an executive 
committee; an audit committee; a compensation and benefits committee; a nominating and 
corporate governance committee; and a finance and risk committee (Lehman Brothers 
Holdings 2007, p. 2). In addition, LB was compliant with the New York Stock Exchange (2012 
- 303A.03), as independent directors would regularly meet without the presence of execu-
tive management.  
According to a testimony before the US House of Representatives Financial Services Com-
mittee investigating the role of LB in the GFC, Thomas Cruikshank, a longstanding Board 
member of LB since 1996, described the Board as a competent and involved body of advi-
sors. “Board meetings were an active and dynamic affair. Board members probed manage-
ment, asked numerous questions and demanded and received detailed, cogent answers” 
(Hearing before the Committee on Financial Services U.S. House of Representatives, 




which either attempted to deflect blame from the Board for LB’s collapse, or a true belief 
that the Board performed acceptably in its overseeing role of the corporation. If the latter is 
to be believed, then given LB’s collapse, Cruickshank’s belief in a well-functioning board 
could be considered misplaced.  
However, following an exhaustive examination of the fiduciary duties that Board members 
owed to the firm and their actions, Valukas (2010) found that ‘colorable’ claims85 or actions 
did not exist with respect to their handling of the level of risk that LB had assumed and its 
liquidity issues (Valukas 2010, p. 52). This examination took into account whether the Board 
carried out its fiduciary duties according to the requirements of the regulatory framework 
existing at the time, which principally included compliance to SOX and the requirements un-
der the New York Stock Exchange’s regulations (New York Stock Exchange 2012). Refer sec-
tions 10.2.2 and 10.2.3 for an outline of the requirements of SOX and the NYSE respectively. 
For example, Title III of Securities and Exchange Commission (2002) obliges public corpora-
tions to apply standards for audit committee independence and responsibilities. Further the 
audit committee is required to commission the auditors, agree on the audit fees and over-
see their activities with a final report to be reviewed by the Board. Audit committee mem-
bers were required to be members of the Board of Directors and be independent. Finally, 
the audit committee had a responsibility to establish procedures for the processing of com-
plaints related to financial reporting including those from employees who sought confiden-
tiality. As long as the LB Board complied with its regulatory obligations, which it did accord-
ing to a statement in Lehman Brothers Holdings (2007, p. 9), the bankruptcy examiner could 
not find ‘colorable’ claims against them. 
Although the examination by Valukas (2010) exonerated the board, it found that ‘colorable 
claims’ existed against LB’s executive management including: Fuld; O’Meara; Callan; and 
Lowitt, for decisions regarding the use of Repo 105 (discussed separately in CHAPTER 9) and 
for filing misleading financial statements that did not disclose such usage (Valukas 2010, pp. 
990-1027). 
Despite the findings of Valukas (2010) specifically relating to the board, questions remain 
regarding broader issues which were not examined by Valukas in detail, such as the ap-




 A ‘colorable claim’ is term used in the US legal system to describe a plausible legal claim which has a compel-




pointment process for Board members, the Board composition, longevity of tenure and lev-
el of engagement of directors, their qualifications and relevant experience and whether 
their compensation structure was appropriate. These questions have even greater relevance 
given the increasingly sophisticated and complex business environment and innovative 
products involved in the investment banking industry. The Board’s deficiencies and suscep-
tibility to Fuld’s influence is examined in the following section. 
10.3.1 Duality of CEO/Chairperson Role is Subject to Norma-
tive Influence and Facilitates an Exercise of Power 
As well as holding the position of CEO, Fuld was the Chairman of the Board - thereby con-
travening the first  criterion of a well-functioning Board (Larcker & Tayan 2010). Aluchna 
(2013) is also critical of the duality of roles of CEO and Chairperson, explaining that this rep-
resents a major component of the ‘inadequacies of the Boards of Directors’. The dual title 
not only afforded Fuld operational control of the firm through his role as CEO, but also a 
strong influence over the monitoring of management and strategic decision-making through 
his role as chairperson.  
Fuld assumed the position of CEO and Chairman soon after incorporation in 1994, following 
LB’s spin-off from American Express. As the Co-CEO of the Lehman Brothers division of 
American Express since 1990 up until its public listing, Fuld shared the top executive posi-
tion in the LB organisation prior to the spin-off. As mentioned in section 5.2.1, Fuld ousted J. 
Tomilson Hill, the other Co-CEO in 1993 to assume the sole leadership position of the divi-
sion. It was a natural succession for Fuld to the CEO role of the newly incorporated LB as he 
was the dominant leader of the LB division at that time.  
Fuld was concurrently appointed Chairman presumably as the corporation had only just 
been listed and required a senior executive in the role with the experience and background 
necessary to steer the Board with its early strategic decision-making. At the time of his ap-
pointment as Chairman, LB was confronted with major challenges. As mentioned in section 
5.2.1, immediately after the LB spin-off by American Express, LB was burdened with signifi-
cant financial liabilities, a dysfunctional team where animosity existed between the invest-
ment banking and trading divisions and an economic downturn which affected revenues. In 
this environment, the appointment of an internal chairperson seemed reasonable. As de-
tailed  in section 10.2.3, and supported by the New York Stock Exchange (2014) and Vo 
(2010), there are limited circumstances when a combined CEO and chairperson may be 
beneficial. Most of the criteria set out by Vo (2010) in justifying a combined CEO and chair-
person, applied to LB. These include: the incumbent CEO, Fuld, was already in place as the 
leader of the firm in a situation when there was no chairperson; Fuld possessed technical 




and finally the appointment of a separate chairperson could have destabilised the leader-
ship of LB during the crisis that prevailed during the early 1990s.  
The popularity of duality of CEO and chairperson has waned since the GFC as US corpora-
tions have attempted to implement the notion of good corporate governance by separating 
the two positions. Approximately seventy five percent of the Fortune 500 list of US corpora-
tions had a combined CEO and chairperson in 2004. This proportion has since reduced to 
approximately fifty percent in 2014 (Hodgson 2014).  
However this justification for the dual role of CEO and chairperson can only be defended in 
the absence of duplicity between the operational management of the firm which is shared 
in the role of the CEO, and the effective monitoring role of the Board. That is, the situation 
should be avoided where the chairperson possesses abnormal power in the monitoring pro-
cess of himself or herself in the role of CEO. If such power exists, then a conflict of interest 
arises and the suitability of a duality in the role is inappropriate. A discussion of the abnor-
mal power of the CEO/Chairperson role is discussed in section 10.3.2. The duality of roles 
was tolerated by the investing public as it stemmed from a normative influence where such 
duality was seen as socially acceptable within the investment banking field and wider 
throughout the US corporate domain as mentioned above. Bear Stearns and Goldman Sachs 
were also led by individuals that held the dual title of CEO and Chairperson. The suggestion 
that the normative influence discussed in section 10.2.5 prevailed is supported by the same 
practice of other investment banks within LB’s peer group which generated a social ac-
ceptance of this feature amongst stakeholders. Fuld continued in this dual role until LB’s col-
lapse suggesting that this acceptance by stakeholders continued whilst the firm performed 
strongly, thereby avoiding closer scrutiny of the firm’s organisational structure. 
Possessing the dual title of CEO and Chairman permitted Fuld to exert his influence not only 
over the management and employees of the firm, but also over the Board members. There-
fore the board structure weakness of ‘inefficiencies of boards of directors’ identified by 
Aluchna (2013) was manifested in LB by the potential conflict of interest by the duality prob-
lem. The remaining section 10.3 discusses the influence Fuld exerted in his role as Chairman 
over the board through the lens of Clegg’s (1989) framework of power. 
10.3.2 Appointment of Board Members and Power through 
Social Relations 
As demonstrated by Lehman Brothers Holdings (2008i, p. 6), LB’s corporate governance 
practice relating to the appointment of Board members through an election process was in 
accordance with best practice as dictated by the New York Stock Exchange (2014, p. 72). 




In evaluating any potential candidate, the Nominating Committee considers the extent to 
which the candidate has the personal characteristics and core competencies discussed above, 
and takes into account all other factors it considers appropriate, which may include strength 
of character, mature judgment, career specialization, relevant technical skills, diversity and 
the extent to which a candidate would fill a present need on the Board of Directors. In addi-
tion, the Nominating Committee considers independence and potential conflicts issues with 
respect to Directors standing for re-election and other potential nominees, and whether any 
candidate has special interests that would impair his or her ability to effectively represent the 
interests of all stockholders. The Nominating Committee also takes into account the candi-
dates' current occupations and the number of other boards on which they serve in determin-
ing whether they would have the ability to devote sufficient time to carry out their duties as 
Directors (Lehman Brothers Holdings 2008i, p. 12). 
LB also complied with the (New York Stock Exchange 2012) requirement of an annual rota-
tion:  
All of the company's directors are elected annually for a one-year term expiring at the Annual 
Meeting of Stockholders in the following year. Each Director will hold office until his or her 
successor has been elected and qualified or until the Director's earlier resignation or removal 
(Lehman Brothers Holdings 2008i, p. 6).  
Directors at LB were appointed through a process involving a Nominating and Corporate 
Governance Committee (the Nominating Committee) (Lehman Brothers Holdings 2008i). 
The responsibilities of the Nominating Committee were incorporated within LB’s associated 
committee charter (Lehman Brothers Holdings 2008i, p. 11). Apart from covering the ap-
pointment of Directors, the Nominating Committee was also responsible for the corpora-
tion’s general governance practices: 
The Nominating Committee is responsible for overseeing the Company's corporate govern-
ance and recommending to the Board of Directors corporate governance principles applica-
ble to the Company. The Nominating Committee also considers and makes recommendations 
to the Company's Board of Directors with respect to the size and composition of the Board of 
Directors and its Committees and with respect to potential candidates for membership on the 
Board of Directors (Lehman Brothers Holdings 2008i, p. 11).  
The Nominating Committee was allowed to accept recommendations from the CEO for po-
tential board candidates. This provided the CEO with some power in relation to the nomina-
tion process: 
The Nominating Committee…will consider in a timely fashion potential candidates for direc-
tor that have been recommended by the Company's Directors, Chief Executive Officer and 
other members of senior management  (Lehman Brothers Holdings 2008i, pp. 11-2). 
For example, in 2004, Sir Christopher Gent was initially recommended to the Nominating 




search firm, Spencer Stuart. It was usual practice for LB to employ executive search consult-
ants to assist with the search of Board member candidates. For example, in 2007 LB em-
ployed Ridgeway Partners LLC, in 2005 Russell Reynolds Associates, and in 2004 Spencer 
Stuart (Lehman Brothers Holdings 2004, p. 9; 2005b, p. 10; 2007, p. 6). Ideally the search 
firm would be independent and without any conflicts of interest. However Ridgeway Part-
ners was routinely used by LB as a consultant (Bloomberg 2008). The relationship between 
Fuld (and his senior executives involved in general recruitment) and Ridgeway Partners LLC 
suggests that the independence of this executive search firm may have been compromised. 
As it would be in the interests of the executive search firm to accommodate the needs of its 
client [LB] in its business relationship, a potential motivation existed for Ridgeway Partners 
LLC to be strongly guided by Fuld in the selection of a Board candidate. This layer of influ-
ence over Board nominations was augmented by the power of the CEO and senior man-
agement to conduct interviews of potential director candidates. Baulkaran (2014, p. 459) 
shows that:  
firms with individual director election and detailed disclosure of voting results in director 
elections have a higher firm value or performance. Firms with independent chairman, majori-
ty voting, and detailed disclosure of voting results in director elections have lower idiosyn-
cratic risk.  
There is insufficient evidence of this level of transparency regarding director elections at LB. 
However, Fuld possessed potential influence over the Board to recommend Board candi-
dates for nomination and to be involved in the interview process, the authority being in the 
Nomination and Corporate Governance Committee charter since 1994 (Lehman Brothers 
Holdings 1995, p. 7).  
As evidenced by Lehman Brothers Holdings (1995, p. 7), Fuld was a member of the Nominat-
ing Committee from the beginning. The fact that Fuld was a member of the Nominating 
Committee at time of incorporation allowed him to influence Board nominations from the 
start of the conversion process from a division of American Express to a publicly listed cor-
poration. At that time the Nominating Committee could be considered the most important 
committee as it was responsible for appointing new Board members during the early life of 
LB and therefore influence the long term agenda of the firm. More importantly the newly 
formed Board and committees would set the tone for their ongoing approach to monitoring 
management. Fuld filled this committee with members whom he considered would ap-
proach their role with a strategic view of the firm in a manner consistent with his own.  
The Chairman of the four member Nominating Committee at the time of incorporation in 
1994 was John MacComber, who remained on the committee until LB’s bankruptcy. There-
fore from the four members on the Committee in 1994, one was the CEO and one was a 
long serving Director who largely owed his Board appointment to Fuld. MacComber, who 




considered an ally and able to influence the Nominating Committee in a way that suited 
Fuld for the remaining duration of LB’s independent corporate existence.  
Fuld’s power to nominate Directors is understood within the context of Clegg’s (1989) dis-
positional and episodic circuits. The process of appointing a Board member involved the 
nomination process which started with recommendations from either Board members, ex-
ecutive search consultants or the CEO/senior management to the Nominating Committee 
which would then make its recommendation to the Board. Following a vote approving the 
recommendation, the Board would propose the candidate to stockholders at the annual 
general meeting, where following approval, the director was formally appointed. The key 
steps in the process included the support for the candidate at the Nominating Committee 
and later from the majority of the incumbent Board. Stockholder meetings habitually ap-
proved the Board’s recommendation. As Chairman, Fuld had an influence in both key deci-
sion forums of the Nominating Committee and the Board over which he presided. The nom-
ination and interview process represent a passage point which relayed Fuld’s authority to 
exercise his right to nominate and interview directors and therefore impose his preference 
for a particular type of director. Without this ability, Fuld would have been disempowered.  
The Committee charter defined formalised or fixed relations between the Board and the 
Nominating Committee. The Board merely ratified Board nominations presented by the 
Nominating Committee. The charter granted Fuld the authority to recommend and inter-
view candidates and therefore was the source of the latent power which emanated from 
the dispositional circuit where the relations between Committee members and Fuld were 
established. The Committee members, who were subject to Fuld’s influence, exercised their 
power over Board appointments in the episodic circuit, during their routine deliberation of 
candidates. In their meetings, Committee members would discuss potential candidates 
whose suitability would be assessed. The forum of the Committee meetings therefore rep-
resented the passage point where Fuld’s power to influence the Committee was exercised. 
In turn the Committee forwarded their recommendation to the Board who would normally 
ratify the candidate for election by stockholders.   
The ability granted to Fuld to recommend potential directors would have been tolerated 
given the Board presided over a successful period of superior financial results up until the 
year prior to its bankruptcy. This reflected well on Fuld and his team, who had operational 
control during the period. The crediting by the board of the successful performance to its 
CEO is also recognised by the compensation arrangements under which Fuld was employed. 
The arrangements stipulated the major objectives of the CEO role, and methods to evaluate 
Fuld’s management capabilities against key performance indicators (Lehman Brothers 
Holdings 2008i, pp. 24-7). A consequence of the firm’s ongoing success was the creation of a 




Board’s decision-making to internal and external stakeholders. A well-functioning Board 
therefore implied a well-considered director nomination process.  
10.3.3 Board Tenure – A Facilitator of Power 
An argument exists that a long term Director on a board can offer greater experience, com-
mitment and competence in view of the intimacy they develop of the corporation’s opera-
tions and interest in its continuing survival, either due to loyalty or long term compensation 
arrangements. However studies have found the opposite phenomenon. Katz (1982) finds 
that long term tenure diminishes internal communication effectiveness and engenders 
complacency amongst Directors in seeking out key information sources. Katz (1982) also 
finds that although a new Director’s learnings of a corporation increases in the early years of 
their tenure, which can positively affect firm performance at that time, performance deteri-
orates thereafter. Stobaugh (1996) suggests that to enable new ideas and critical thinking 
which encourage positive performance, the maximum term of a Director’s tenure should be 
approximately 10 years, a term which is shorter than the average tenure of 11 years for LB’s 
Directors (Lehman Brothers Holdings 2008i, pp. 48-52). Lipton and Lorsch (1992, p. 66) also 
support the notion of a limit to a Director’s tenure to avoid relationship issues with the CEO. 
Vafeas (2003) finds that as director tenure lengthens, the potential for a sociable relation-
ship with management increases, which in turn impacts on director independence. He also 
suggests that longer serving directors are more likely to support management decisions, and 
as they become friendlier are less likely to monitor senior management. (Vafeas 2003) fur-
ther suggests this is more likely to occur in firms with more powerful CEOs, especially those 
who have a role in board member nominations. “Independent directors or not, if you’ve 
been on the board for a while, there is a possibility that some of the directors do get closer 
to management” (Goodlad 2014). The tenure of individual members of LB’s Board and the 
Nominating Committee varied, however it was considered lengthy given that Board rotation 
was annual. LB’s longevity of board tenure of 11 years was not unusual for major US invest-
ment banks. For example, the average tenure of directors at Goldman Sachs was 8 years 
(Goldman Sachs Group 2007b, pp. 8-10); and for Bear Stearns it was 13 years (Bear Stearns 
2007b, pp. 3-2). 
The tenure of the Nominating Committee as a group was also lengthy. In 2008 this Commit-
tee consisted of the Committee Chairperson, Ms. Evans, and two other independent Direc-
tors, Cruikshank and MacComber (Lehman Brothers Holdings 2008i, p. 11). Ms Evans, the 
exception, had been a Board member for four years, Cruickshank 12 years and MacComber 
14 years. With an average of 15 years, it was longer than the Board average of 11 years. Re-
fer to Figure 135 for the tenure of all Board members. Another influential committee, the 
Executive Committee, had two members in 2007/2008: Fuld and MacComber. MacComber 




time of incorporation in 1994 (Lehman Brothers Holdings 2008i). Having MacComber on the 
Executive Committee, Fuld potentially captured the Director with the greatest degree of 
loyalty given his longevity of tenure. Further he was a member of the Nominating Commit-
tee which conferred influence over director appointments. The Executive Committee met 
frequently, more than any other Board committee. It convened 16 meetings during fiscal 
2007 and at each meeting during that year unanimously approved all resolutions (refer Fig-
ure 137 for the number of meetings held by each committee). The fact that each Executive 
Committee meeting acted with unanimous consent every time it met implied that Mac-
Comber was in full agreement with Fuld on every decision undertaken by the Committee. 
The Executive Committee possessed significant power given it could exercise the Board’s 
authority on all matters between Board meetings, except for those matters that required 
specific Board approval.  
Therefore given MacComber was the longest serving Board member, his potential to suc-
cumb to Vafeas’ (2003) notion of ‘director friendliness’ was greater than all other Board 
members. Occupying key positons on the Executive and Nominating Committees, Mac-
Comber was the conduit for Fuld’s influence over important committee level decisions. Giv-
en the longevity of tenure of the Board as a whole, all Directors had the opportunity to cre-
ate personal relationships with senior management and employees. These personal rela-
tionships could have been nurtured through various interactions between management and 
the board. For example, during Board presentations, corporate functions, Board dinners, 
external conferences, offsite strategy meetings, seminars and intimate meetings for tech-
nical instruction on specific operational matters relating to the business. This potential fa-
miliarity could have extended to a point where Directors could have acquiesced to requests 
by senior management for action on routine or strategic decisions. 
The Chairman’s dominant role on the Board, and his social relations with board members, 
created  potential power over incumbent Board members. Fuld could have been perceived 
by Board members as the individual largely responsible for their appointment. This percep-
tion would create a sense of obligation by a Board member, to support Fuld’s future Board 
member nomination recommendations. This circuit of behaviour which entailed the crea-
tion of a sense of obligation perpetuated Fuld’s power over the Board.   
The relations between Directors and Fuld and expectations of compliance with Fuld’s wishes 
represent socially constructed rules created within the dispositional circuit. That is, once the 
sense of obligation spurs repetitive compliance, the behaviour is transformed into a socially 
constructed rule which is routinely adhered to by directors. Fuld’s power created from this 
routine behaviour was facilitated by his role in the nomination process which is deemed the 
passage point where power is transmitted. Any action to recommend a Board candidate for 
nomination is an exertion of Clegg’s (1989) power facilitated through the passage point of 




formalised in the normal course of business. In the ongoing stewardship of LB the extent to 
which Fuld was able to influence specific decisions depended on the complicity of Board 
members.  
Under US common law, Directors have a fiduciary duty of care on behalf of stockholders 
(Burt v. Irvine Co  1965) and loyalty to the corporation (Cede & Co. v. Technicolor  1993). 
These duties are intended to discourage any conflicts of interest of the Director which may 
affect the corporation. As the corporation is owned by stockholders, then any conflict of in-
terest is deemed as one against the stockholders as well as the corporation. However, as 
mentioned above, to the extent Directors have more direct and frequent personal contact 
with senior executives than with stockholders, they may tend to develop better social and 
interpersonal relations with the former.  Director contact with stockholders on the other 
hand would be often conducted on an impersonal basis and through indirect channels such 
as through corporate executives, investment or public relations firms and departments, and 
printed documents. A potential conflict therefore arises when a Director establishes a more 
intimate relationship with management, who themselves are the subject of the Board’s 
monitoring, than with the stockholders. As mentioned above the influence over nomination 
of Directors could also be exerted via external search consultants who may be beholden to 
management for future business. The same consultants could also be engaged to provide 
recommendations for the firing of Directors. Consequently, the tenure of Directors, through 
these intermediary business and social relationships, could have been determined by the 
CEO. 
Employees at LB feared to challenge the CEO (refer section 10.4 which includes a detailed 
discussion on the influence exerted by the CEO on employees). Within this culture where 
employees and Board members were relatively powerless against the dominant wishes of 
the CEO, the authoritative role of the Board is transmitted to the CEO – the opposite of 
what is considered good corporate governance practice. “Interaction between board direc-
tors and corporate executives that is markedly supportive and accommodating may signal 
the board’s improper deference to, and mere rubber-stamping of, executive decisions and 
conduct” (Vo 2010, p. 82). Therefore the first of Aluchna’s (2013) board structure weak-
nesses is found to exist in LB given the potential for a conflict of interest between the Direc-
tors acting in the best interests of stockholders and their acquiescence to the CEOs personal 
objectives. 
10.3.4 Board Composition – Appropriate for a leading In-
vestment Bank? 
An analysis of the Directors’ backgrounds (refer Figure 135 for details of directors’ back-




board backgrounds in either banking or financial services. This is despite LB’s statement that 
the Nominating Committee should consider board candidates who will:  
contribute knowledge, expertise or skills in at least one of the following core competencies: a 
record of making good business decisions; an understanding of management best practices; 
relevant industry-specific or other specialized knowledge; business experience in internation-
al markets; a history of motivating high-performing talent; and the skills and experience to 
provide strategic and management oversight, and to help maximize the long-term value of 
the Firm for its stockholders (Lehman Brothers Holdings 2008i, p. 11). 
As confirmed by Lehman Brothers Holdings (2008i, p. 11) An important competency for a 
board member of an investment bank includes relevant ‘industry-specific’ or other ‘special-
ised’ knowledge. As investment banks operate in a fast moving environment where product 
innovation is a key feature, specific knowledge of products and credit exposures and their 
associated risks is considered fundamental. For those directors who had some related expe-
rience, Berman (2008) suggests it was not recent. Until Jerry Grundhofer a former US Ban-
corp CEO, was appointed no other independent director with recent experience specifically 
covering banking and financial market activities and products existed on LB’s board until 
2008 (Lehman Brothers Holdings 2008i). Although some Board members possessed some 
finance industry experience, Berman (2008) suggests it was well outdated, given the rate of 
innovation occurring during the 1990s and 2000s. The currency of knowledge required to 
stay abreast of innovations and related risks of financial products such as securitisations, 
credit-default swaps, or derivatives trading was beyond the mostly retired members of the 
Board.  
The question then arises as to whether directors were actually selected for their lack of ex-
perience in complex investment banking activities, so as to facilitate Fuld’s control. Exam-
ples of Board appointments of unqualified directors include that of Roger Berlind (director 
at the time of collapse) who was a theatrical producer; Dina Merrill (director until 2006), a 
career actress who was 85 years old upon retirement and Marsha Evans, a former head of 
the Red Cross and retired navy admiral (Berman 2008). Although this composition of Direc-
tors meets the diversity criteria of good governance, the inexperience in financial markets 
and products is considered an overriding quality necessary for an investment bank which 
operates in a complex environment. There is no evidence that any of these directors had 
backgrounds with such expertise. 
Another feature of the Board was their age. The average age of LB’s Directors was 68 years 
as at 2008  (see ages of all directors in Figure 135). This exceeded the average of 61 years for 
directors of large US corporations as at 2008 (Spencer Stuart 2012, p. 17). According to 
Alzheimer's Disease Research Centre (2017), certain cognitive abilities deteriorate at varying 
rates, as individuals age, in particular after 60. The cognitive abilities which experience dete-




fluid intelligence or abilities not based on experience or education; recent memory or the 
formation of new memories; paying attention to electronic devices; word retrieval or the 
process of getting words out; problems that have not been encountered during your life; and 
the speed with which cognitive and motor processes are performed (Alzheimer's Disease 
Research Centre 2017). 
Further, five of the 10 independent directors in 2008 were aged over 70 and 6 directors had 
been retired from their previous executive roles, several of whom for an average period of 
over 12 years (Berman 2008). Importantly LB’s Board did not include any members who 
were concurrently in a CEO role elsewhere (Lehman Brothers Holdings 2008i, pp. 6-8). A fi-
nal question over the composition of the Board was the gender imbalance which favoured 
males by a ratio of 10 to 1. Refer Figure 135 for a list of Board members including a brief de-
scription of their experience at the time of the LB bankruptcy.  




Richard Fuld 1990* He was President and Co-Chief Executive Of-
ficer of the Lehman Brothers Division of Shear-
son Lehman Brothers Inc. from August 1990 to 
March 1993. Fuld was a Vice Chairman of 
Shearson Lehman Brothers from August 1984 
until 1990 and has been a Director of LBI since 
1984. Fuld joined Lehman Brothers in 1969. 
Fuld serves on the Board of Directors of the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York and is a 
member of the Executive Committee of the 
Board of Directors of The Partnership for New 
York City. He is a member of the International 
Business Council of the World Economic Forum 
and The Business Council. In addition, he 
serves on the Board of Trustees of Middlebury 
College and New York Presbyterian Hospital, as 
well as on the Board of Directors of the Robin 
Hood Foundation. 
62 
Michael L. Ainslie 1996 Michael Ainsle, a private investor, is the for-
mer 
President, Chief Executive Officer and a Direc-
tor of Sotheby’s Holdings. He was Chief Execu-
tive Officer of Sotheby’s from 1984 to 1994. 
From 1980 to 1984, he was President and 
Chief Executive Officer of the National Trust 
for Historic Preservation. From 1975 to 1980, 








a Cincinnati-based chemical manufacturer. 
From 1971 to 1975, he was President of Pal-
mas Del Mar, a real estate development com-
pany. He began his career as an associate with 
McKinsey & Company. Michael Ainsle is a Di-
rector of The St. Joe Company and Lehman 
Brothers Bank, FSB. He is a Trustee of Vander-
bilt University and a member (and the Chair-
man Emeritus) of the Board of Directors of The 
Posse Foundation, Inc. 
John F. Akers 1996 Akers, a private investor, is the retired 
Chairman of the Board of Directors of Interna-
tional Business Machines Corporation. Akers 
served as Chairman of the Board of Directors 
and Chief Executive Officer of IBM from 1985 
until his retirement in 1993, completing a 33-
year career with IBM. Akers is a Director of W. 
R. Grace & Co. He is a former member of the 
Board of Trustees of the California Institute of 
Technology and The Metropolitan Museum of 
Art, as well as the former Chairman of the 
Board of Governors of United Way of America. 
Akers was also a member of former President 
George Bush’s Education 
Policy Advisory Committee. 
74 
Roger S. Berlind 1985 Berlind, who is also a private investor, has 
been a theatrical producer and principal of 
Berlind Productions since 1981. Berlind is also 
a Governor of the Broadway League and has 
served as a Trustee of Princeton University, 
the Eugene O’Neill Theater Center, the Mac-
Dowell Colony and the American Academy of 
Dramatic Arts. 
77 
Thomas H. Cruikshank 1996 Cruikshank was the Chairman and Chief Execu-
tive Officer of Halliburton Company, a major 
petroleum industry service company, from 
1989 to 1995, was President and Chief Execu-
tive Officer of Halliburton from 1983 to 1989, 
and served as a Director of Halliburton from 
1977 to 1996. He joined Halliburton in 1969, 
and served in various senior accounting and 
finance positions before being named Chief 









Marsha Johnson Evans 2004 Ms. Evans served as President and Chief Exec-
utive Officer of the American Red Cross from 
August 2002 to December 2005. She previous-
ly served as National Executive Director of Girl 
Scouts of the USA from January 1998 until July 
2002. Ms. Evans was a career officer in the 
United States Navy, retiring as a Rear Admiral 
in January 1998. She served as superintendent 
of the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, 
California from 1995 to 1998 and headed the 
Navy’s worldwide recruiting organization from 
1993 to 1995. She is a director of Weight 
Watchers International, Inc., Huntsman Corpo-
ration and Office Depot, Inc. She also serves on 
the Advisory Boards for the Ladies Professional 
Golf Association and the Pew Partnership for 
Civic Change, a project of the Pew Charitable 
Trusts, and is a director of the Naval Academy 
Foundation and America’s Development Foun-
dation. 
60 
Sir Christopher Gent 2003 Sir Christopher Gent has been Non-Executive 
Chairman of GlaxoSmithKline plc since January 
2005. He was Non-Executive Deputy Chairman 
of GlaxoSmithKline plc from June 2004 to Jan-
uary 2005. Prior to his retirement in July 2003, 
he had been a member of the Board of Direc-
tors of Vodafone Group Plc since August 1985 
and its Chief Executive Officer since January 
1997. Sir Christopher joined Vodafone as Man-
aging Director of Vodafone Limited in January 
1985 when the mobile phone service was first 
launched, and held that position until Decem-
ber 1996. Prior to joining Vodafone, Sir Chris-
topher was Director of Network Services for 
ICL. In this role, he was Managing Director of 
Baric, a computer services company owned 
jointly by Barclays and ICL, and was responsi-
ble for ICL’s computer bureau services world-
wide. Sir Christopher was Knighted for his ser-
vices to the mobile telecommunications indus-
try in 2001. He is a Director of Ferrari SpA, a 
Senior Advisor to Bain & Company, Inc. and a 
member of the Advisory Board of Reform. He 








Conservatives from 1977 to 1979, and was 
Vice President of the Computer Services Asso-
ciation Council at the time he left ICL. 
Jerry A. Grundhofer 2008 Grundhofer is the Chairman Emeritus and 
retired Chief Executive Officer of U.S. Bancorp. 
Grundhofer served as the Chairman of U.S. 
Bancorp from December 2002 until December 
2007. Grundhofer also served as President and 
Chief Executive Officer of U.S. Bancorp from 
February 2001 until October 2004 and Decem-
ber 2006, respectively. From 1993 until Febru-
ary 2001, he served as Chairman, President 
and Chief Executive Officer of U.S. Bancorp 
predecessors Firstar Corporation and Star 
Banc Corporation. Grundhofer is a director of 
Ecolab, Inc. and The Midland Company, Inc. 
63 
Roland A. Hernandez 2005 Hernandez is the retired Chairman and Chief 
Executive Officer of Telemundo Group, Inc., a 
Spanish-language television station company, 
where he served from August 1998 to Decem-
ber 2000. From March 1995 to August 1998, 
he served as President and Chief Executive Of-
ficer of Telemundo Group, Inc. Prior to that 
position, Hernandez was founder and Presi-
dent of Interspan Communications, a company 
engaged in a variety of services related to 
Spanish-language media. Hernandez is also a 
Director of MGM Mirage, The Ryland Group, 
Inc., Vail Resorts, Inc. and Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc. In addition, Hernandez serves on advisory 
boards for Harvard University’s David Rocke-
feller Center for Latin American Studies and 
Harvard Law School, as well as the board of 
Yale University’s President’s Council on Inter-
national Activities. 
50 
Henry Kaufman 1995 Dr. Kaufman has been President of Henry 
Kaufman & Company, Inc., an investment 
management and economic and financial con-
sulting firm, since 1988. For the previous 26 
years, he was with Salomon Brothers Inc., 
where he was a Managing Director, Member 
of the Executive Committee, and in charge of 
Salomon’s four research departments. He was 








Salomon Inc. Before joining Salomon Brothers, 
Dr. Kaufman was in commercial banking and 
served as an economist at the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York. He is a Member (and the 
Chairman Emeritus) of the Board of Trustees of 
the Institute of International Education, a 
Member of the Board of Trustees of New York 
University, a Member (and the Chairman 
Emeritus) of the Board of Overseers of the 
Stern School of Business of New York Universi-
ty and a Member of the Board of Trustees of 
the Animal Medical Center. Dr. Kaufman is a 
Member of the International Advisory Com-
mittee of the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York, a Member of the Advisory Committee to 
the Investment Committee of the International 
Monetary Fund Staff Retirement Plan, a Mem-
ber of the Board of Governors of Tel-Aviv Uni-
versity and Treasurer (and former Trustee) of 
The Economic Club of New York. 
John D. Macomber 1994 Macomber has been a Principal of JDM In-
vestment Group, a private investment firm, 
since 1992. He was Chairman and President of 
the Export-Import Bank of the United States 
from 1989 to 1992, Chairman and Chief Execu-
tive Officer of Celanese Corporation from 1973 
to 1986 and a Senior Partner at McKinsey & 
Company from 1954 to 1973. Macomber is a 
Director of Collexis Holdings, Inc., Stem Cell 
Innovations, Inc. and Stewart & Stevenson LLC. 
He is Chairman of the Council for Excellence in 
Government and Vice Chairman of the Atlantic 
Council. He is a Trustee of the Carnegie Institu-
tion of Washington and the Folger Library. 
80 
* Director prior to public listing on NYSE. 
Source: (Lehman Brothers Holdings 2008i, pp. 48-52). 
10.3.5 Director Engagement 
In addition to the lack of appropriate qualifications of the board as a whole and the above 
average age compared to directors of other large corporations, is the issue relating to the 




tative question, it is difficult to assess. Media reports suggest that Fuld was “aggressive, con-
frontational and blunt” (Serwer 2006, p. 1). These characteristics suggest dealings with the 
CEO would have been problematic. Such a character would have required a strong willed 
Board willing to question him. However Serwer (2006, p. 2) suggests that “there is evidence 
the Board was not particularly structured to provide either oversight of management or 
strategic advice. Instead, the responsibilities of independent directorships appeared to be 
perfunctory”.  
As mentioned in section 10.3.4, as a whole the Board should possess core competencies 
which include relevant industry-specific or other specialised knowledge. If this concept is 
extended to the membership of a Board committee, then it would be expected that a Board 
committee should consist of at least one member that is expert in the area for which the 
committee is responsible. The membership of the various Board committees is set out in 
Figure 136. 
Figure 136 - LB’s Board Committees 
Committee Members Committee Function 
Executive Com-
mittee 
Chairman - Richard 
Fuld 
 
John D. Macomber 
Has the authority, in the intervals between meet-
ings of the Board of Directors, to exercise all the 
authority of the Board of Directors, except for 
those matters that the Delaware General Corpora-
tion Law or the Company's Restated Certificate of 
Incorporation reserves to the full Board of Direc-
tors. The Executive Committee acted by unani-
mous written consent 16 times during the fiscal 




















Roger S. Berlind 
 
The Audit Committee assists the Board of Direc-
tors in fulfilling its oversight of the quality and in-
tegrity of LB’s financial statements and its compli-
ance with legal and regulatory requirements. The 
Audit Committee is responsible for retaining (sub-
ject to stockholder ratification) and, as necessary, 
terminating, the independent registered public 
accounting firm. The Audit Committee annually 
reviews the qualifications, performance and inde-
pendence of the independent registered public 
accounting firm and the audit plan, fees and audit 
results, and pre-approves audit and non-audit ser-
vices to be performed by the independent regis-
tered public accounting firm and related fees. The 
Audit Committee also oversees the performance 
of the LB’s corporate audit and compliance func-
tions. The Audit Committee held 11 meetings dur-













and the Internal 
Revenue Code 
rules) 






Marsha J. Evans 
 
John D. Macomber   
The Compensation Committee has general over-
sight responsibility with respect to compensation 
and benefits programs and compensation of the 
LB’s executives, including reviewing and approving 
compensation policies and practices, such as sala-
ry, cash incentive, restricted stock unit awards 
(RSUs), long-term incentive compensation and 
other programs, and grants under such plans. The 
Compensation Committee evaluates the perfor-
mance of the CEOand other members of senior 
management and, based on such evaluation, re-
views and approves the annual salary, bonus, 
share and option awards, other long-term incen-
tives and other benefits to be paid to the CEO and 
such other members of senior management. The 
Compensation Committee also reviews and dis-
cusses the Compensation Discussion and Analysis 
with management and, if appropriate, recom-
mends to the full Board of Directors that it be in-
cluded in the LB’s filings with the SEC. As a part of 
its review and establishment of the performance 
criteria and compensation of senior management, 
the Compensation Committee generally meets 
separately at least annually with the CEO, LB’s 
principal human resources executive and any oth-
er corporate officers as the Compensation Com-
mittee deems appropriate. The CEO and the COO 
provide annual performance reviews and com-
pensation recommendations to the Compensation 
Committee for each of the other executive offic-
ers, and the CEO does so for the COO in the lat-
ter's absence. The Compensation Committee held 
seven meetings and acted by unanimous written 















Chairperson –  
Marsha J. Evans 
 
Thomas H.  
Cruikshank 
 
John D. Macomber 
Is responsible for overseeing LB’s corporate gov-
ernance and recommending to the Board of Direc-
tors corporate governance principles applicable to 
LB. The Nominating Committee also considers and 
makes recommendations to the LB’s Board of Di-
rectors with respect to the size and composition 
of the Board of Directors and its Committees and 
with respect to potential candidates for member-
ship on the Board of Directors. 
Finance and Risk 
Committee 
Chairman - Henry 
Kaufman 
 
Roland A.  
Hernandez 
 
John F. Akers 
 
Roger S. Berlind 
 
Marsha J. Evans 
The Finance Committee reviews and advises the 
Board of Directors on the financial policies and 
practices of LB, including risk management. The 
Finance Committee also periodically reviews, 
among other things, budget, capital and funding 
plans and recommends a dividend policy and 
Common Stock repurchase plan to the Board of 
Directors. The Finance Committee held two meet-
ings during Fiscal 2007. 
Source: (Lehman Brothers Holdings 2008i, pp. 9-11). 
Two of the most important committees in the period preceding the collapse included the 
Audit and the Finance and Risk committees as they were responsible for the firm’s financial 
position and risk profile. These committees were viewed as important in the oversight of the 
firm’s accounting, finance and risk functions and therefore relevant to LB’s eventual bank-
ruptcy. Accordingly members would be expected to possess some experience in at least one 
of these fields of expertise which had also undergone a significant period of innovation. In 
view of the rapidly evolving nature of the investment banking industry a current knowledge 
of the products and activities would be required to fully understand the corresponding risks 
and impacts on the financial position of the firm.  
The Finance and Risk committee consisted of its Chairman, Henry Kaufman, president of 
Henry Kaufman & Company, Inc., an investment management and economic and financial 
consulting firm; John Akers, retired Chairman of International Business Machines Corpora-
tion; Roland Hernandez, retired Chairman CEO of Telemundo Group, Inc; and Roger Berlind, 
and Marsh Evans whose relative inexperience was described above. One of the five commit-
tee members, Dr. Kaufman, possessed relevant financial markets industry experience 
(Lehman Brothers Holdings 2007). Members of both the audit and finance and risk commit-




agement practices were prevalent at LB (Valukas 2010 Vol 8, Tabs 8-22). A Finance and Risk 
committee lacking the necessary expertise and understanding of the complex risks faced by 
a modern investment bank could easily lead to a systemic risk management failure as expe-
rienced by LB. Fuld had a stated objective of growing the firm aggressively, and generating 
increasing profits on a quarterly basis. Any restrictions on this objective posed by the Fi-
nance and Risk Committee would have represented an obstacle to Fuld. Major transactional 
and balance sheet risks would be routinely assessed by the Finance and Risk Committee, 
often accompanied by management recommendations. As CEO, Fuld would have supported 
management recommendations on the proviso they were consistent with his objectives. 
Therefore it was in Fuld’s interest to have the Finance and Risk Committee approve the risks 
he supported. Given the shortage of expertise on the Finance and Risk Committee, the 
knowledge asymmetry, whereby management’s expertise exceeded that of the overseeing 
Committee, represented fertile territory for Fuld to exercise his influence in the Commit-
tee’s decision-making process.  
The possession of superior knowledge and expertise over the Finance and Risk Committee 
enabled management to exercise power generated in Clegg’s (1989) facilitative circuit. For 
the power to exist, the knowledge asymmetry needed to represent technology or innova-
tion necessary in the business operations of the firm. In this scenario, management recom-
mendations relating to risk could be pushed through the Committee, whose potential to 
challenge the technical aspects under consideration were limited. The Finance and Risk 
Committee meetings represented the passage point for decisions to be implemented by 
management as evidenced by the minutes of the committee meetings. The approved rec-
ommendation would pass through the passage point to the episodic circuit where the action 
of implementing the recommendation would be carried out in the normal course of busi-
ness. The authority to act in the episodic circuit was officially granted to the relevant em-
ployees – the agents - by the instrument of the committee minute which was generated un-
der the influence of management. As a result management were able to achieve the risk 
and credit exposures and balance sheet leverage it desired to maximise profits. 
LB’s Board of Directors conducted eight meetings during the fiscal year 2007. “Each Director 
attended 75% or more of the aggregate of (a) the total number of meetings of the Board of 
Directors held and (b) the total number of meetings held by all Committees of the Board of 
Directors on which he or she served. Overall Director attendance as a group at Board and 
Board Committee meetings during Fiscal 2007 was 96%” (Lehman Brothers Holdings 2008i, 
p. 18). Although these statistics appear acceptable when measured in aggregate, the focus 
of the Board’s attention and relative pro-activeness of a committee can be gauged by the 
frequency each committee met. Figure 137 sets out the number of meetings for each board 




Figure 137- Number of Committee Meetings 
Board Committee Financial Year ended  
30 November 2007 
Executive Committee 16 
Audit Committee 11 
Compensation and Benefits Committee 7 
Nominating and Corporate Governance Committee Not available 
Finance and Risk Committee 2 
Source: (Lehman Brothers Holdings 2008i, pp. 9-11). 
During the 2007 fiscal year, a period when risks were escalating, and the financial markets 
were experiencing increased volatility, the finance and risk committee met only twice.  LB’s 
compensation committee instead convened seven meetings (Lehman Brothers Holdings 
2008i, pp. 9-11). The frequency of committee meetings could have reflected the relative im-
portance to LB of the area covered by each respective committee. Based on this assump-
tion, compensation arrangements were more important to LB than risk matters. As 
McDonald and Robinson (2009, p. 226) states: “King Richard had even turned Lehman’s 
Board of Directors into a kind of largely irrelevant chamber. This was yet another group to 
rubber stamp his decisions and collect generous fees”. 
Referring to the failed financial institutions during the GFC, Gross (2010, p. 1) claims that 
"These companies had Board members who either weren't paying attention or, at Lehman 
in particular, were deliberately selected because they were unqualified or out of it". 
Gillespie and Zweig (2011) also finds that directors were obliged to CEOs for their positions 
and were disengaged from the operations of the firms they were supposed to monitor. 
10.3.6 Board Compensation 
LB Board members were well compensated. Refer Figure 138 for a table of LB’s Board mem-
bers’ compensation for the full year prior to LB’s bankruptcy.  
Figure 138 - LB Board Compensation in 2007 
Non- Executive 





USD Total USD 
M. L. Ainslie 95,000 245,038 2 57,500 397,538 
J. F. Akers 115,500 245,038 0 360,538 
R. S. Berlind 107,500 245,038 0 352,538 
T. H. Cruikshank 140,000 245,038 0 385,038 
M. J. Evans 128,000 245,038 0 373,038 
C. Gent 120,500 245,038 0 365,538 










USD Total USD 
H. Kaufman 95,000 254,388 0 349,388 
J. D. Macomber 132,000 245,038 0 377,038 
Average    365,077 
1) Grundhofer is absent from the above list as he was appointed in the 2008. 
2) In relation to serving as a Director, Chairman of the Audit Committee and member of the 
Compensation and Benefits Committee in Fiscal 2007 for other LB associated corpora-
tions, Lehman Brothers Bank and FSB, Ainsle received additional cash compensation.  
Source: (Lehman Brothers Holdings 2008h). 
The above director compensation levels appear attractive when compared to the average 
non-executive director compensation for US corporations in 2006/2007. Figure 139 outlines 
the median of the non-executive director’s compensation for the Fortune 50086 list of US 
corporations in the 2006/2007 fiscal year. Compensation levels listed in Figure 139 include 
fees for participation in audit and compensation committees, which are two of the more 
common Board committees in the US. The average amount paid to LB directors of USD 
365,077 represents more than double the national average of USD 181,250. 
Figure 139 - 2006/2007 Average Compensation Non-Executive Directors of US Corporations 
Fortune 500 Non-Executive Board Director CompensationMedian for 2006/2007 
  USD 
Directors Fees* 165,000 
Audit Committee 10,000 
Compensation Committee 6,250 
Total 181,250 
Note* Directors’ fees are defined as the sum of annual retainers and Board meeting fees, 
excluding any committee fees. 
Source: (Compensation Force 2017). 




 The Fortune 500 is a list of the 500 largest US corporations ranked by total revenue. The list which is based 




Further, LB Directors’ compensation levels for 2007 ranked as the second highest of the 
peer group. This ranking is not considered extraordinary as LB was ranked second highest 
based on return on equity for 2007 (refer section 7.3 for detailed analysis of LB’s relative 
financial performance). However comparing compensation levels to returns ignores the 
other major factor in firm survivability (a responsibility of directors), which is the firm’s level 
of risk. Figure 140 compares the US investment bank peer group’s average compensation 
levels for directors to each firm’s leverage which is considered a simple and appropriate 
measure of risk for this exercise. Any statistical analysis of the variables affecting compensa-
tion is complex and is outside the scope of this thesis. Therefore the data in Figure 140 and 
related commentary is presented as observations of factors which may be considered as 
important in motivating director behaviour. Return on equity which is a measure of firm 
performance is also included in Figure 140 for comparison purposes. A firm which values 
prudent stewardship would reward effective risk management practice and attempt to ad-
just its director compensation level to account for a measure of risk.  
Goldman Sachs stands out amongst the peer group as its director compensation level is sig-
nificantly higher than all other investment banks. This is expected given its higher perfor-
mance as measured by ROE. Moreover, Goldman Sachs was able to outperform its peers 
whilst maintaining the lowest leverage. This means that it is paying its directors a significant-
ly higher multiple per unit of risk (as measured by leverage) indicating a rewarding of effec-
tive risk management.  
However this association is not clear for the other banks. A minimum level of director com-
pensation would be required to attract board candidates regardless of the risk level of a 
firm. This implies there is a ‘fixed component’ to compensation regardless of risk and return. 
LB had the second highest leverage of the peer group (behind Merrill Lynch) and yet paid 
the second highest director compensation (behind Goldman Sachs). Excluding Goldman 
Sachs, the firms’ leverage ratios are grouped within a narrow range of 32 to 37 times, 
whereas the ROE ratios vary considerably from -42.9% to 26.7%. Figure 140 shows the asso-
ciation between board compensation and return is strong, whilst the same cannot be said 
for the association between compensation and risk.    





Ratio Return on Equity 
  USD'000 Times % 
Goldman Sachs 641 24 35.2 
LB 365 36 26.7 
Morgan Stanley 343 32 8.9 
Merrill Lynch 265 37 -42.9 








Ratio Return on Equity 
        
Peer Group  
Average 368 32.8 6.7 
*Note: Leverage = Total Liabilities / (Total Equity -  Intangible Assets). 
 
Source: (Bear Stearns 2007b; Goldman Sachs Group 2008b; Lehman Brothers Holdings 
2008h; Merrill Lynch 2008b; Morgan Stanley 2008b). 
The relatively high level of compensation earned by LB directors indicates two issues which 
supports Aluchna’s (2013) concept of board structure weakness of ‘inappropriate compen-
sation structure’. Firstly, as mentioned above, the compensation structure seemingly ig-
nores risk. Secondly, the compensation levels, representing a level well above the national 
average of US corporations, and the second highest level for the peer group, creates an in-
centive for LB’s Directors to remain on the LB Board. This is borne by the relatively high lon-
gevity of tenure of the Board. An additional enticement not to resign from the board includ-
ed a compensation structure which included options exercisable over the long term: 
The options have a ten-year term, are not forfeitable, and become exercisable in one-third 
instalments on each of the first three anniversaries of the grant date or sooner upon termina-
tion of service (Lehman Brothers Holdings 2008i, p. 14). 
The above average level of compensation earned by LB’s non-executive directors empow-
ered the CEO by encouraging directors not to defect to LB’s competitors.  
10.3.7 Summary of Fuld’s Power over the Board 
Fuld was the linchpin between executive management and the Board and pursuant to sec-
tion 10.3.2 appeared to have orchestrated the composition of the Board. The combined fac-
tors of: a CEO also possessing the title of Chairman; a Board whose members occupied their 
roles for a considerable number of years sufficient to build a familiarity with management; 
ageing directors mostly retired from their previous executive roles lacking in the currency of 
modern investment banking innovations; a major lack of relevant expertise and experience 
of most board committee members necessary to make informed decisions in their area of 
responsibility; attractive board compensation arrangements which enticed board members 
to remain on the board and perpetuate their longstanding friendly relationships with the 
Chairman; and a committee meeting schedule favouring compensation over finance and risk 
matters led to a less than optimal monitoring role and level of engagement from the Board. 
In analysing this orchestration it can be seen that Fuld was able to exert his influence 
through all three of Clegg’s (1989) circuits of power. In the episodic circuit, Fuld established 




were established informally through Fuld’s intermittent interaction with each member on a 
day to day basis. The Board became Fuld’s agency in generating the outcomes he wanted. 
His influence over the Board’s frequent decision-making was realised through his orchestra-
tion of a Board with limited capacities and means. Any of the abovementioned limitations 
could have contributed to the performance of the Board. It could have included the lack of 
skill and expertise of members, or their ageing profile which potentially affected their cogni-
tive abilities. In either case, Fuld harnessed this power to achieve his desired outcomes.  
By arranging the directors’ contractual appointments and related generous compensation 
packages which encouraged a degree of acquiescence, he fixed relations with the board. 
This fixing of relations is a condition for the generation of power in Clegg’s (1989) disposi-
tional circuit. Moreover Fuld’s social relationship with the Board was formalised through his 
capacity as a formal leader of the group represented by his title of Chairman. Whether for-
malised, conveyed through various presentations or informally during Board meetings, the 
Board were made aware of Fuld’s strategy of growth (Lehman Brothers Holdings 2006). This 
type of communication reinforced Fuld’s intentions for the firm, implying that any challenge 
to his strategy would be met with resistance. See section 10.6 for a discussion on the rheto-
ric used in LB’s strategy documentation.  
Through interactions in the facilitative circuit where power is generated with knowledge and 
skill which is described by Clegg (1989) as a ‘technology of production’, the Board was found 
to be deficient. As section 10.3.4 argues, it lacked the necessary experience, skill and 
knowledge to be abreast of the latest technologies of production, that is, the financial inno-
vations occurring during the previous decade. A knowledge asymmetry existed between 
senior management who routinely operated in this complex environment and kept up to 
date with developments, and certain board members, many of whom had no recent experi-
ence in the financial markets and some of whom were retired.  
As this section illustrates, it is not only the structural elements of corporate governance that 
are important, but the qualitative aspects of a Board such as skill currency, director en-
gagement, effective independence and its resistance to strong personalities within man-
agement. The following section explores how the relationship between the CEO and the 
firm’s employees would shape the firm’s culture into one which reflected the CEO’s own set 




10.4 Relationship between the CEO and Em-
ployees 
As mentioned in section 10.3, Fuld’s overriding strategy was ‘growth’. This strategy pre-
sumed that profitability would follow growth and with an increase in profitability would 
come an improvement in bonuses and firm reputation. Fuld’s interactions with employees, 
viewed as a reflection of his management style, defined the firm’s culture. This section anal-
yses certain interactions and events which characterise his management style and its impact 
on the firm’s culture which contributed to the decisions that led to its downfall. To under-
stand the source of Fuld’s management style, it is important to explore the influences on his 
early career. 
10.4.1 Influences on Fuld’s Early Career 
As mentioned in section 5.2.1, Fuld was the protégé of Lew Glucksman, the CEO of LB be-
tween 1983 and 1984 and former head of the Trading Division where Fuld was employed for 
most of his junior career. Fuld possessed a similar management style to that of Glucksman 
whom he revered. Auletta (1985, p. 16) describes Glucksman as a “jungle fighter” and ac-
cording to an observation of a fellow Board member at the time: “Glucksman’s flaw was 
that there was an angry pig inside the man. He wasn’t after money. He was after power, 
complete control” (Auletta 1985, p. 16). As Fuld had worked under Glucksman almost his 
entire career, it is not surprising that some of Glucksman’s traits and prejudices were assimi-
lated.  
Glucksman’s ascent to power occurred whilst presiding over the Trading Division, which as 
mentioned in section 5.1.10 generated the majority of the firm’s profits in the early 1980s. 
Fuld shared this experience where generating ever increasing profits ensured the retention 
of power. An autocratic and dismissive management style which Fuld brought to his interac-
tions with internal advisors could have stemmed from his observations of Glucksman. His 
suspicion of internal power struggles and fear of being usurped in a similar manner as 
Glucksman and Petersen beforehand, prompted Fuld to value his hold over the leadership 
of the firm.  
10.4.2 Fuld’s Treatment of Employees – Abuse of Power 
Fuld’s treatment of employees was generally driven by his motivation to generate growth 
for the firm and any employee who offered obstacles or resistance to this objective would 
suffer his scorn or worse still, dismissal. To gain an understanding of how Fuld’s treatment 




Madelyn Antoncic, 55 years old in 2007, and a PhD from The Stern School of New York Uni-
versity, was an experienced risk professional who prior to joining LB had worked for several 
well-known institutions. These included: The Federal Reserve Bank of New York as an econ-
omist; Goldman Sachs where for twelve years she worked as a mortgage backed structured 
products trader and later headed the department of market risk management; and Barclays 
Capital New York Branch where, as the Treasurer for the Americas, she established the mar-
ket risk function and later became a member of the executive committee and the board of 
directors. She was also a senior figure in the Girl Scout Movement of New York. In 2005, An-
toncic was voted the ‘Risk Manager of the Year’ by Risk, an international risk journal, and 
she was also named among the US top one hundred most influential people in finance. An-
toncic joined LB in 1999 and from 2002-2007, she served as Chief Risk Officer (CRO) report-
ing directly to Fuld. (Mathiason et al. 2009; McDonald & Robinson 2009).  
It was common practice at most banks including LB to eject the originating deal team from 
the risk discussion relating to any major transaction elevated to the executive committee for 
approval. This practice was common amongst banks and investment banks in view of the 
inherent bias to influence an approval of a transaction by the deal team as more deals trans-
lated to higher potential bonuses. By late 2006, Antoncic was also ejected when risk issues 
were being discussed during executive committee meetings. This highly unusual move, initi-
ated by Fuld, coincided with her cautionary advice and recommendations of a reduction in 
risk exposures made to the executive committee based on her view that the markets, espe-
cially the property market had become overheated (Onaran 2008). In September 2007, fol-
lowing her advice of caution to the executive committee, Antoncic was demoted from her 
role as CRO, to occupy the position of Global Head of Financial Policy Relations where she 
remained until LB’s bankruptcy. Valukas (2010, p. 46) in his report found that: 
Emails written by LB risk management personnel suggest that Lehman senior management 
disregarded its risk managers, its risk policies, and its risk limits.  Press reports prior to Leh-
man’s bankruptcy stated that in 2007 Lehman had removed Madelyn Antoncic, Lehman’s 
Chief Risk Officer (CRO), and Michael Gelband, head of its Fixed Income Division (FID), be-
cause of their opposition to management’s growing accumulation of risky and illiquid in-
vestments. 
Two months after her transfer, at a risk management conference in New York, Antoncic de-
clared that it was difficult for top management to accept the hedging of LB’s mortgage posi-
tions as the hedges would curtail the firm’s profit (Mathiason et al. 2009; Onaran 2008).  In 
an interview in 2016, Antoncic revealed a glimpse of LB’s risk culture describing it as one 
that didn’t prioritise the risk management function and that transactions involving credit 
risk were facilitated with a relatively easy approval process: 
The fabric was torn away little by little. We were encouraged to take more and more risk and 




was stepped aside because I was considered old fashioned…It’s about culture…It sends a sig-
nal message to the rest of the teams and minimises authority of people in risk management. 
The head of the commitment committee wanted to approve anything that came in at the 
front door…This doesn’t make a lot of sense. Everybody was working in silos, building up risks 
that were additive (Antoncic 2016). 
Antoncic also expressed the difficulties in communicating with Fuld regarding risk matters, 
emphasising the need for a strong, confident character to overcome Fuld’s resistance to 
prudent risk considerations. Antoncic implied that LB’s risk culture should have emanated 
from the Board and risk committee level, however she herself questioned whether LB’s 
Board fully appreciated the appropriate risk tolerances for an investment bank:   
It was so important to have someone with a not shy, strong personality and confidence to be 
a risk manager to speak up…possess the right set of morals. A risk culture depends on having 
the right board and appropriate risk committee and needs to be strong to be able to chal-
lenge the chairman (Antoncic 2016). 
Antoncic’s comments confirm the findings in section 10.3 of a weak risk committee, which 
together with the board did not possess the requisite expertise in risk matters, were unable 
to establish an appropriate risk culture and were allowed to be influenced by Fuld’s strong 
character. As mentioned in section 5.2.8, Michael Gelband who headed the Fixed Income 
Division was also induced to leave in May 2007 following his resistance to taking additional 
risk (Valukas 2010, p. 149). Gelband warned Fuld of an imminent market correction in the 
property market in line with Antoncic’s advice and the CRAs’ warnings, and during a meeting 
with Fuld was told “You’re too conservative… You don’t want to take risk ” (McDonald & 
Robinson 2009, p. 235).  
Joe Gregory, COO held the same optimistic view on risk and growth as Fuld. He understood 
that to perpetuate growth in profitability, an increased level of risk was desirable. Gregory 
suited Fuld’s management style given that Gregory posed no threat to Fuld’s leadership and 
would carry out Fuld’s bidding unfailingly (McDonald & Robinson 2009). In a similar warning 
as given by Gelband, Alex Kirk, the Global Head of Convertible Trading, cautioned Gregory of 
the unacceptable risk that LB was incurring. In a discussion about risk, and in taking his lead 
from Fuld, Gregory responded by telling Kirk, “You can stay if you want, but there’s no place 
for you” (McDonald & Robinson 2009, p. 279). Soon after this conversation in February 
2008, Kirk resigned (RTT News 2008). 
10.4.3 Power through the Dispositional and Episodic Circuit 
The above examples highlight Fuld’s use of power within two of Clegg’s (1989) circuits of 
power. The CEO or through his deputy, could hire, promote, transfer or dismiss subordi-
nates, in accordance with the authority granted by the organisation’s established hierar-




tween the dispositional circuit and the episodic circuit. Fuld’s power was transmitted from 
the dispositional circuit where the power to hire or dismiss is established by formal rules 
contained in employment agreements. These agreements establish the hierarchy within the 
organisation. As CEO, Fuld was at the top of the management hierarchy and in this position 
held the ultimate power to dismiss an employee.  
However as senior advisors to Fuld and the executive committee, Antoncic, Gelband and 
Kirk possessed authority sourced from their technical knowledge, expertise and relative sen-
iority within the firm. This authority by each of the experts was formalised through their job 
design contained in their employment contracts. Both job design and technical knowledge 
are common traits which enable the generation of power in the facilitative circuit. They 
were therefore empowered to influence decision-making in the firm. As the experts pro-
jected a severe deterioration in the property market from 2007 onwards (McDonald & 
Robinson 2009), the external environment in which LB operated, posed a significant chal-
lenge to the continuing strong financial performance of LB. In fact the experts predicted sig-
nificant financial losses given LB’s over-exposure to mortgage backed derivatives. Against 
this expected change in external economic conditions, the experts’ power is reinforced with-
in the facilitative circuit, where such power can be constituted through environmental con-
tingencies. The facilitative circuit becomes a means of allowing variation in the circuits of 
power (Clegg 1989, p. 233). The expected change in economic conditions enriched the ex-
perts’ power as their advice in such adverse conditions made it even more valuable. The 
transmission of this enhanced power through the passage point of the executive committee 
meetings was usurped by Fuld’s disregard of their advice. Through the resolutions of the 
executive committee, Fuld could activate his decisions within the episodic circuit where 
such decisions would be carried out by operational staff under the passage points of routine 
instructions in the day to day activities of the firm.  
The nullification of the experts’ authority by Fuld exercising formal power obtained under 
the firm’s hierarchical structure carried unintended consequences. Fuld could have exer-
cised a consultative style of management by acceding to the learned advice and be a leader 
who respects others’ opinions and applies measured and well informed judgement. These 
leadership traits are often valued in an environment where innovation and initiative are im-
portant, such as is the case in the investment banking industry. However by admonishing 
the experts, through the exercise of formal power, Fuld ran the risk of creating a culture of 
fear, and worse still a culture potentially invisible to his organisational surveillance. Fuld’s 
capacity to be remote from employees had already been recognised by staff who thought 
that “he was in some kind of ivory tower” (McDonald & Robinson 2009, p. 97). If advice 
from the various experts differed, then the CEO could be easily justified in pursuing the par-
ticular route which offered the path of least divergence to his own biased views. However 
all three experts offered the same views on the risks posed by the mortgage and property 




and consistently strong view of the risks to the firm only heightened the danger to Fuld of 
adversely impacting the culture of the firm. Ultimately, in their challenges to Fuld’s views of 
the firm’s risk taking, Antoncic, Gelband and Kirk, experienced retribution in the form of ei-
ther a transfer from their current positon, reprimand or a persuasion to exit the firm.   
As mentioned above, the act of dismissing a subordinate from a position is viewed as an ex-
ercise of power transmitted from the dispositional circuit through to the episodic circuit. 
Clegg (1989) notes that power can be transmitted in the episodic circuit as individuals at-
tempt to address interpersonal conflicts. In the examples above, when Fuld or his deputy 
Gregory were confronted with opposing views to their own on the topic of risk, they exer-
cised power simply by the act of removing dissenters from their positions. Gregory’s (COO) 
own dismissal is another example of Fuld’s exercise of power as a means of pursuing his 
own ambition to survive the leadership of the firm. Gregory was Fuld’s trusted lieutenant of 
30 years and not immune to Fuld’s ire in this circumstance. On 12 June 2008, Gregory was 
dismissed from LB following the announcement of a loss of approximately USD 2.8 billion for 
the second quarter of the 2008 fiscal year. McDade, a younger man known for his cautious 
approach to risk-taking was installed as the replacement COO (Plumb & Wilchins 2008b). 
This act was carried out at a time when Fuld was fighting for survival and needed to convey 
a perception to the market he was addressing the firm’s risk profile. The severity of the de-
cision to dismiss such a long-standing ally and the second most senior executive in the firm 
signalled a desperate attempt by Fuld to retain control. Ironically, it was engineered to ap-
pear as a sacrifice of a senior executive who was responsible for the excessive risk taking of 
the firm yet the same attitudes to risk were shared by Fuld. The fact that Fuld remained as 
CEO attempted to signal to the market his relative lack of culpability for the firm’s financial 
difficulties.  
The period following the announcement of such a large loss marked a point in time when 
the market’s confidence in Fuld was in decline as reflected in LB’s stock price (refer Figure 
83 showing the decline in stock price during 2008). The decline in the fortunes of investors, 
the escalating risk to creditors and the increasing probability that staff would be compelled 
to forsake bonuses, led to a reduction in Fuld’s apparent power. To neutralise the appear-
ance of a loss of power, Fuld had decided to seek a scapegoat in the form of Gregory. Fuld’s 
hope was that decisive action would quell an unsettled group of investors and creditors and 
increasingly disgruntled employees. The incongruity of the decision to dismiss Gregory was 
that both Gregory and Fuld had concurred on the same agenda of pursuing growth based on 
an elevated risk profile for the firm. However Fuld appeared to take none of the responsibil-
ity. This inequitable imposition of responsibility for the loss was made possible by Fuld’s 
power not only through his position in the hierarchy – a power as discussed above, generat-
ed in the dispositional circuit - but through the dramatic change in the firm’s circumstances. 
The loss in the second quarter of fiscal 2008 was the first loss recorded by LB in many years 




an external viewpoint but also from an internal perspective. In order to retain the confi-
dence of external investors and creditors as well as employees, Fuld needed to draw on his 
formal power to act. Given the severe change in the financial markets which contributed to 
the loss, Fuld was able to generate some power constituted through the change in environ-
ment, which as mentioned above is found in the facilitative circuit. Again the impact of this 
power is seen in its transmission to the episodic circuit where the act of dismissal was seen 
as a necessary operational outcome of the functioning of the business. The problem howev-
er arises that once the change in environmental condition is well known and accepted as an 
existing condition, how would Fuld continue to generate sufficient power to overcome any 
further loss of confidence in his ability to lead the firm? 
Mathiason et al. (2009, p. 1) observed in LB a “corporate culture that saw professional, 
knowledgeable risk managers sidelined in the rush to catch a rising market and gain ground 
on Lehman's pre-eminent rival, Goldman Sachs”. This observation is consistent with Fuld’s 
ambition for continuous growth and a driver in his treatment of employees. Fuld’s man-
agement style, through his interaction with employees, was characterised by a pattern of 
squashing dissenting opinion, a very insular view of the world and the hubris to think that he 
possessed superior knowledge on risk. 
10.4.4 Culture Affecting Family 
The episodic circuit of power is useful to explain ways in which Fuld and his senior executive 
team were able to influence staff and their families on a day-to-day basis. The culture of LB 
and the values of its CEO were imposed on the families of employees. There were rules of 
behaviour that were expected of employees that also extended to spouses. An example of 
an event that characterises this feature is described below. 
According to Ward (2010) Bradley Jack’s wife Karin, recalls a a time when she was invited 
along with other LB executives and their spouses to inspect a house which Gregory, COO 
was building. Gregory sent his helicopter to pick up the party of executives. However Karin 
Jack’s son had just experienced a seizure and she declined to go, instead insisting she need-
ed to visit a doctor. Notwithstanding Karin Jack’s protests, Gregory still landed his helicopter 
near his guest’s home and waited, assuming that the Jacks were still joining the LB group. 
Karin Jack was quoted as saying: “Can you imagine the pressure? I have this really sick child, 
but I know that if I don’t get on that helicopter it’s going to hurt Brad…If you made a per-
sonal choice that hurt Lehman, it was over for you” (Ward 2010, p. 133). (Gordon 2010) rec-
ognises the dysfunctional culture at LB and the pressure for employees to dedicate a large 
portion of their lives to the firm:  
This company pretended to be united but they were ruthless, they couldn’t wait to knife each 
other in the back. What is really heinous about it is the hypocrisy. This was a place that had a 




knowing he had a child with cerebral palsy … In a welcoming ceremony with spouses present, 
he [Fuld] would thank them for all the cancelled dinners, weekends, and vacations they were 
about to experience.  
Another example involved a direct report of Fuld. As mentioned in section 5.2.3, Fuld placed 
a great deal of importance on marital harmony, given the experience of Chris Pettit who had 
an extramarital affair which defied Fuld's inferred rules on marriage (Truell 1997). Pettit’s 
error was compounded as his affair involved a LB female employee which had the potential 
to tarnish the reputation of the firm. Pettit’s dismissal was an exercise of Fuld’s power. This 
power was initially generated in the dispositional circuit by virtue of his hierarchical position 
and transmitted to the episodic circuit, through the passage point constituted by Pettit’s act 
of breaching Fuld’s own values and beliefs which were superimposed on the firm. As a sen-
ior executive, Pettit’s dismissal would have attracted the attention of the firm at large and 
would influence the firm’s culture by reinforcing the socially constructed rules of the firm 
reflecting Fuld’s own values. The dismissal sent a clear signal to all staff that extra marital 
affairs would not be tolerated and thus became a ‘rule of practice’. 
The above examples re-inforce the potency of Fuld’s influence within the firm and with 
those connected to his employees. The evident coercion to behave in a certain manner is 
symptomatic of the exercise of power of one over another. Employees clearly understood, 
through their observation or knowledge of the treatment of Jack’s wife and the dismissal of 
Pettit that certain expectations applied to their behaviour. As such events continued, em-
ployees formed expectations of their own behaviours in order to survive in their roles. The 
expectations of behaviour were tantamount to socially constructed rules that informed rela-
tions between Fuld and his employees. The fixing of these rules within the firm was the 
source of Fuld’s power in the dispositional circuit. The power would be transmitted through 
the passage points of internal communications, either in verbal or written form such as a 
notice of dismissal forwarded by a supervisor to a subordinate. This transmission of power is 
enabled by the hierarchical structure where supervisors’ and subordinates’ roles are de-
fined. Ultimately the rules reflected Fuld’s expectations of morals and values in his staff 
which he communicated clearly, whether by the welcoming speech to employees or 
through actions such as dismissals relating to behaviour inconsistent with Fuld’s view of the 
world. Fuld also manipulated the firm’s culture through an employee compensation plan. 
The following section explains how Fuld’s goal of becoming a pre-eminent US investment 
bank involved the attraction of the best talent available within the market and remunerat-




10.5 Employee Compensation 
Nash (2003, p. 6) suggests there are four fundamental variables which dictate the amount of 
an employee’s bonus: “the degree of individual power of the employee; the economic value 
that is being created; the complexity of that value; and finally, the degree of teamwork re-
quired”. This section justifies a fifth element, being the personal objectives of the CEO who 
in LB’s case used financial incentives as a means of generating loyalty in order to pursue his 
growth agenda. This element is similar to the concept of bonding costs in agency theory as 
the additional cost of incentives assumed by the agent (manager) as a result of attempts to 
align their interests with the principal (stockholders) and to assure the principal that she/he 
will not take inappropriate actions to the detriment of the principal. In this case, this con-
cept of bonding costs related to the payment of incentives to employees in order to align 
employee interests with that of the CEO. 
The first of Nash’s (2003) factors warrants discussion in this thesis due to its relevance to 
the investment banking industry. Individual power is described by Nash (2003) as the power 
an employee possesses in their compensation negotiations with the firm. The negotiating 
power results from the scarcity of relevant skills available in the market place and the value 
an employee can generate for the firm. According to Nash (2003, p. 6) “their [investment 
banks] strategy for allocating the bonus pool was to protect the ‘crown jewels’ and prevent 
them from leaving the organisation”. ‘Hold-up capital’ is a term used by Wang et al. (2009), 
which is similar to the individual power factor proposed by Nash (2003). In this instance, the 
premium over the average salary commanded by a skilful employee is referred to as hold-up 
capital which according to Nash (2003) is amplified for employees in the financial services 
industry.  
In instances where competition for an employee’s skills is industrywide, the hold-up capital 
increases further as the consequences for an employee leaving the firm are nullified by al-
ternative employment options. As discussed in section 8.2.7, the investment banking indus-
try has traditionally attracted high achieving and skilled employees who are often in high 
demand within industry generally. In such an environment relatively high hold-up capital in 
the form of salary and bonus levels are commonly observed. Figure 141 draws a comparison 
between the average salary for the US investment banking industry and the average for all 











All US Industries  
(excluding government) 
Premium over Total US 
Average 
  USD USD   
Mean Salary 84,000 42,270 99% 
Median Salary 62,250 32,390 92% 
Source: (United States Bureau of Labour Statistics 2008) 
Nash (2003) ignores the influence of the CEO as a variable which dictates the amount of an 
employee’s bonus. A CEO may have personal ambitions of positioning the firm as a market 
leader, consequently willing to offer employee compensation well above the market clear-
ing level. This desire could be driven by a range of motivations from market strategy to per-
sonal ego, however, whatever the reason, the CEO of a publicly listed corporation would 
need to exercise a high degree of influence to ensure compensation outcomes are met. 
From persuading the compensation committee to impelling the Board of Directors to follow 
the CEO’s personal preferences requires a persuasive ability that is usually associated with a 
position of power.  
Fuld understood the advantage of employing top performing staff in an industry where the 
quality of employees and the tacit skills they possess are considered a valuable resource. In 
an interview Fuld stated that one of his main strategic objectives was to surround himself 
with top performing employees. “You can’t be afraid that if the people you hire look good, 
that diminishes you … if you want to run an ‘A’ firm, ‘B’ people can’t get it done” (Wharton 
School of the University of Pennsylvania 2007). Fuld’s interest in competing for top perform-
ing staff is evidenced by his recommendation to LB’s Compensation Committee for compen-
sation levels to be awarded in the 2008 fiscal year which is captured by the Compensation 
Committee Report (CCR) (Lehman Brothers Holdings 2008f). This annually produced report 
justifies the recommended level of cash compensation (salary plus cash bonuses) to apply 
for the firm’s group of employees in total. The cash compensation level was expressed as a 
ratio of total cash compensation proposed to gross revenue achieved for the past year. This 
ratio was the basis used to determine the ensuing year’s compensation for all employees 
and separated at a divisional level. This formula was known as the Compensation Ratio 
(Comp Ratio). The key determinant of the total cash compensation proposed factor in the 
formula included the relative changes in gross revenue and earnings per share for the divi-
sional group and the relative standing of compensation per employee within the same 
group. Other subjective measures were used such as growth opportunities and general 
business conditions (Lehman Brothers Holdings 2008f, pp. 2-4). Equity based bonuses were 
granted in addition to total cash compensation (Lehman Brothers Holdings 2008f, p. 2). Re-




Figure 142 - Equity Awards Granted to Staff as Part of LB’s Incentive Scheme 
Equity Awards Granted 2006 2007 % Increase 
  Shares in Millions Shares in Millions  
Awarded during the fiscal year 11 38.8  
Adjustments:    
Earned in 2006 but reported in 2007 35 -35  
Earned in 2007 but reported in 2008  50  
Net Equity Awards Granted 46 53.8 17% 
Source: (Lehman Brothers Holdings 2008k, p. 6). 
The objective variables upon which LB’s 2008 Comp Ratios were recommended include data 
set out in Figure 143.  












% Change in Revenue 2006 to 2007 22% 10% -6% -36% -67% 
% Change in EPS 2006 to 2007 26% 70% -60% -89% -250% 
2007 Compensation per Head (USD) 661 332 343 242 248 
2006 Compensation per Head (USD) 622 334 324 320 300 
Source: (Lehman Brothers Holdings 2008f, p. 3) 
An important feature of the CCR was the relative standing of LB’s Comp Ratio with those of 
its peer group including a comparison of 2006 and 2007 Comp Ratios of all major US invest-
ment banks in order to justify a Comp Ratio that would secure top performing staff (Lehman 
Brothers Holdings 2008f, p. 3). Figure 144 outlines a comparison of the Comp Ratios con-
tained in this report.  












2007 Comp Ratio 43% 49% 59% 57% 141% 
2006 Comp Ratio 44% 49% 47% 47% 49% 
Source: (Lehman Brothers Holdings 2008f, p. 3). 
For the 2008 fiscal year Fuld recommended to the Compensation Committee a Comp Ratio 
of 52.8%, placing it at a level above the 2006 Comp Ratios of all peer group members even 
though it represented a level below those recorded by the peer group in 2007 (Lehman 
Brothers Holdings 2008f, p. 2). At the recommended level it would also result in a 5% in-
crease in compensation per employee for 2008 (2007: -1%). Fuld feared that any Comp Ra-
tio selected for 2008 which was below that of its nearest competitors’ 2006 Comp Ratio 




that of its competitors and was the second lowest of its peer group. The relatively low Comp 
Ratio in 2007 was acknowledged by Fuld as a means of maintaining discipline (Lehman 
Brothers Holdings 2008f, p. 2). However this lower Comp Ratio was offset by a 17% increase 
in long term stock awards for the same year – refer Figure 142. Only the most senior of ex-
ecutives were awarded stock incentives, therefore despite the Comp Ratio remaining rela-
tively low for 2007, senior executives, including Fuld and his direct subordinates, were able 
to achieve an increase in the combination of short term and long term incentives from the 
previous year.  
Fuld’s 2008 recommendation argued the importance of surpassing anticipated 2008 Comp 
Ratios of LB’s competitors as an opportunity to keep talented staff members and to attract 
other leading operatives in the industry. Fuld’ s objective was for:  
repricing key talent to retain at Lehman if bid away… and to take advantage of a significant 
pool of talent [which] will become available, as many of our competitors top performers be-
come disillusioned with their firms’ strategies and risk management (Lehman Brothers 
Holdings 2008f, p. 2).  
The reference to disillusionment with risk management is an inference to LB’s higher appe-
tite for risk relative to the peer group and therefore an environment where potential new 
high performing staff could increase their bonuses. The propensity to award equity based 
compensation to employees is evidenced by the growth in employee ownership of the firm 
since its incorporation. “When the firm went public, employees owned four per cent of the 
firm, worth USD 60m. By 2006, they owned around 30 per cent, equivalent to USD11billion, 
at least on paper” (Oliver & Goodwin 2010, p. 80). A lucrative employee compensation 
structure is often viewed as the most effective incentive available. Fuld remunerated top 
performers who exhibited entrepreneurial traits and those who showed inclinations for risk 
taking (McDonald & Robinson 2009). This is supported by the firm’s stated strategy originat-
ed in 1994 which encouraged an alignment of compensation with the maximisation of re-
turns: 
Lehman Brothers' human capital strategy is to attract and retain the most talented employ-
ees and to strongly align their interests with maximizing Company performance and stock-




ing a public company in 1994 and, we believe, has been instrumental in helping the Company 
achieve its goals over time (Lehman Brothers Holdings 2008i, p. 19). 
Although the concept of linking compensation to the maximisation of returns is not unusual 
from an agency perspective, there is no mention of achieving an acceptable level of risk in 
the quote above or in any other official documentation describing LB’s compensation policy. 
From the time he became CEO and Chairman in 1994 to the time LB filed for bankruptcy on 
September 15, 2008, Fuld presided over an increase of personnel expense per employee87 
of 100% - refer Figure 145 for a graph showing the escalation of expense per employee be-
tween 1994 and 2007. 
Figure 145 - Lehman Brothers Personnel Expenses per Employee 1994 - 2007 
 
Source: The data used for the graph was extracted from from Lehman Brothers Holdings 
(2008f, p. 5). 
A further analysis of the trend in personnel expenses is gauged by the proportion they con-
stituted of the firms performance indicators of net revenue and net profit after tax. Refer     























to Figure 146 for a table of the relative attribution of employee expenses to these perfor-
mance indicators.  




USD Millions USD Millions 
    
Net Revenue (after interest expense)  17,583  19,257  
% Increase from 2006 to 2007   10% 
      
Net Profit After Tax (NPAT)  3,941   4,125  
% Increase from 2006 to 2007   5% 
      
Employee Expenses (EE) 8,669  9,494  
% Increase from 2006 to 2007   10% 
EE/NPAT 220% 230% 
EE/NR 49% 49% 
Source: (Lehman Brothers Holdings 2007, p. 85). 
The increase in personnel expense per employee is consistent with the increasing propor-
tion of personnel expenses to net profit after tax, increasing from 220% in 2006 to 230% in 
2007. Personnel expenses were also able to track the significant increase in LB’s Net Reve-
nue (gross revenue less interest expense) whereby it remained at 49% of net revenue from 
2006 to 2007. 
Fuld advanced his career mostly in a trading environment where problem solving skills and 
an aggressive risk taking attitude are considered positive attributes. He therefore appreciat-
ed personnel who displayed these same attributes in a business where financial outcomes 
are transparent and easily measurable (McDonald & Robinson 2009). His preferred means 
to motivate staff was through an employee compensation structure which grants equity in 
the firm. “One of the most important elements of Fuld’s plan to develop a culture of team-
work at Lehman Bros. has been to link compensation to the overall performance of the firm 
through equity awards” (Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania 2007). Fuld also 
understood that to motivate staff to pursue higher performance they needed to think like 
stockholders. “A culture built on teamwork leads to the best business decisions for the firm 
as a whole, and paying employees in stock helped reinforce that culture, I wanted them all 
to think and act and behave like owners” (Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania 
2007).  Consistent with Jensen & Meckling’s (1976) agency theory maxim of ‘management’s 




significant portion of equity in LB. As stockholders, management were incentivised to take 
risks so long as Fuld’s optimistic view regarding the economic environment prevailed and 
the firm’s risk limits allowed. It was therefore important that if Fuld wanted to motivate 
staff, and generate the desired level of ‘bonding’, senior management were to be allowed to 
operate within flexible risk limits and possess a large amount of equity. As equity awards 
were vested on an average of 3.8 years as mentioned below, Fuld intended to hold onto 
good performers for the long term (Lehman Brothers Holdings 2008i, p. 32). 
LB operated a number of equity based incentive compensation schemes which Fuld used to 
incentivise staff and which applied to the senior executive team including Fuld. Equity incen-
tives accounted for the bulk of the senior executives’ overall compensation. “Fuld, Gregory, 
Russo, O'Meara and Lowitt received 88%, 85%, 64%, 70% and 70% respectively of their total 
annual compensation in equity. The weightings of cash and equity were determined collab-
oratively by Fuld, Gregory and the Compensation Committee” (Lehman Brothers Holdings 
2008k, p. 4). Whilst the stock price of LB climbed, these senior executives’ wealth increased 
dramatically. According to Lehman Brothers Holdings (2008k, p. 4), LB stated that “the re-
purchase program has prevented stockholder dilution, while allowing the Firm to benefit 
from the employee commitment generated by broad based employee ownership”. This pub-
lic comment seems to justify the relative high level of stock award bonuses paid to senior 
executives by assuring stockholders that their value of stock had remained unaffected by 
the bonuses, thereby abiding by the firm’s code of ethics. 
These equity based incentives are in addition to the abovementioned personnel expenses 
(Lehman Brothers Holdings 2008f). According to Lehman Brothers Holdings (2008i, pp. 25-
7), for the year ended 30 November 2007, LB expensed incentive costs of USD 1.3 billion re-
lated to these equity based incentive schemes, up from USD 1.0 billion in 2006 – represent-
ing a substantial 30% increase. Excluded from this amount was another expense of USD 514 
million which related to stock awarded to employees during the month of December 2007. 
This additional stock based compensation was accrued as compensation expense in the fi-
nancial year ending 30 November 2007 as it was argued it related to staff performance dur-
ing fiscal 2007. Therefore the total amount of stock incentives awarded during the 2007 fis-
cal year had reached USD 814 million, which was over and above the cash compensation 
allocations. Stock incentives which had not vested as at 30 November 2007, and therefore 
remained unrecognized in the financial statements totalled USD 2.0 billion. This amount, 
included in the notes to the LB 2007 annual report, was expected to be expensed over a 
weighted-average period of 3.8 years. This was in accordance with the vesting provisions 
and with the prevailing accounting treatment for stock based compensation found in ac-
counting standard Accounting for Stock Based Compensation - FAS 123, prevailing in 




A major portion of the firm’s incentive based compensation was awarded to Fuld and his 
team of senior management Lehman Brothers Holdings (2008i, pp. 25-7). Although the de-
tails of the formula used for Fuld and his direct subordinates is not disclosed, LB acknowl-
edges that it was based on a percentage of pre-tax profit. “The Fiscal 2007 incentive formula 
for each executive officer was based on percentages of Pre-tax Income, which percentages 
decline as the amount of Pre-tax Income increases up to USD 5.3 billion (beyond which the 
percentage is fixed). The incentive formula is expected to yield a bonus payment, except in 
the event of a loss” (Lehman Brothers Holdings 2008i, p. 24). The rates on the sliding scale 
are not disclosed. However the maximum percentage at the end of the sliding scale payable 
to senior executives once the target of USD 5.3 billion is reached is shown in Figure 147 . 
Figure 147 - Senior Executive Incentive Scheme Formula  
Executive Name Maximum Percentage of Pre-tax Profit 
Richard Fuld 0.75% 
Joseph Gregory 0.57% 
Tomas Russo 0.50% 
Christopher O'Meara 0.25% 
Ian Lowitt 0.25% 
Source: (Lehman Brothers Holdings 2008i, pp. 25-7). 
According to Lehman Brothers Holdings (2007, pp. F-10), LB’s pre-tax profit of USD 6.01 bil-
lion for 2007 exceeded the threshold of USD 5.3 billion, thereby enabling each senior execu-
tive to receive their maximum compensation payment at the rates depicted in Figure 147. In 
establishing the above formula, Fuld with the assistance of the Compensation Committee 
established key performance objectives for his executive team. These objectives were in-
tended to drive the team to pursue Fuld’s growth strategy and included:  
expanding the firm’s international franchise; strengthening the Company's brand; exploring 
and creating strategic opportunities; diversifying and building business units; improving em-
ployee programs; and the firm’s  budgetary goals (Lehman Brothers Holdings 2008i, p. 25). 
The compensation paid to the senior executive team for the year ended 30 November 2007 
is shown in Figure 148. 
Figure 148 - Senior Executive Compensation - 2007 
2007 LB Executive Compensation 
Executive   Salary USD Cash Bonus USD *RSUs USD Total USD 
R. S. Fuld, Jr.    750,000 4,250,000 35,000,000 40,000,000 
J. M. Gregory   450,000 4,550,000 29,000,000 34,000,000 
T. A. Russo   450,000 4,550,000 9,000,000 14,000,000 
C. O'Meara   200,000 2,650,000 6,642,857 9,492,857 




Note: *RSU’s = restricted stock unit awards 
Source: (Lehman Brothers Holdings 2008i, p. 26). 
Fuld’s own compensation was set by the Compensation Committee. Key factors taken into 
consideration in formulating his compensation included the same objectives used for the 
senior executive team mentioned above, in addition to projected and historical financial 
performance as well as the following as stated in LB’s Schedule 14A Statement lodged with 
the SEC on 5 March 2008: 
the firm’s financial performance in Fiscal 2007, his role in leading the Company through the 
challenging market environment, and orchestrating the Company's strategic direction and 
objectives including the continued diversification of the Company across businesses, regions 
and products which was important to the Company's financial performance in Fiscal 2007 
(Lehman Brothers Holdings 2008i, p. 26).  
The above shows that there is a focus in Fuld’s compensation criteria to pursue growth and 
diversification. Fuld pursued both, including his continued push for acquisitions as described 
in section 6.3.2. According to information included in SEC filings governed by the Code of 
Federal Regulations88, the top five executives at LB received substantial bonuses as part of 
their overall compensation arrangements for the period 2000 to 2008. The group of execu-
tives included in the top five changed slightly from year to year and as identified by SEC fil-
ings included: “Richard FuId, CEO from 1993 through 2008 and chairman of the Board from 
1994 through 2008; David Goldfarb, CFO from 2000 through 2004 and CAO from 2004 
through 2006; Joseph Gregory, co-COO from 2002 through 2008 and COO from 2000 
through 2002; Christopher O'Meara, CFO from 2004 through 2007 and previously in various 
management positions at the firm (since 1994); and Thomas Russo, CLO from 1993 through 
2008. FuId and Gregory were NEOs throughout the 2000-2008 period, Russo from 2003 
through 2008, Goldfarb from 2004 through 2007, and O'Meara in 2007 and 2008” (Lehman 
Brothers Holdings 2008h, pp. 14-8). In aggregate the group “earned approximately USD 1 
billion, in cash bonuses and equity sales during 2000-2008” (Bebchuk et al. 2010, p. 4).  




 The Code of Federal Regulations requires full disclosure of all components of compensation received by the 




An example of the preparedness of the Compensation Committee to reward Fuld was dur-
ing the major US financial crisis of 2001. As a result of the financial crisis, most investment 
bank CEOs including those at Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, and J. P. Morgan Chase, had 
their compensation packages reduced. At the same time, LB which outperformed the indus-
try rewarded Fuld with a compensation package valued at USD 105 million representing the 
fourth highest for a US CEO in 2001 (Reference for Business 2017). The awarding of this ex-
orbitant level of compensation is despite LB recording a significant reduction of 30% in net 
profit after tax from 2000 to 2001 as shown in Figure 149. 















Net Profit After Tax 1,161 -30% 1,667 61% 1037 
Source: (Lehman Brothers Holdings 1999, p. F2; 2002, p. F2). 
Comparing the returns of the senior executives to stockholders over the period 2000 to 
2008 reveals an incentive problem inherent in the compensation arrangements at LB. The 
problem relates to the absence of a risk adjustment mechanism within the performance-
based compensation of LB employees and senior executives. Risk adjustment could entail 
the profiling of the risk of the firm using a variety of techniques including alignment with 
balance sheet risk (as measured by leverage), credit ratings, stock beta89, or a combination 
of several measures. Further, a large portion of bonuses could have been calculated retro-
spectively. Retrospective bonus payments could allow sufficient time to ensure current 
business written did not cause subsequent losses in future periods. In these instances, bo-
nuses could be withdrawn thereby aligning compensation with sustainable business per-
formance. Whilst LB included a deferred stock component in the compensation plan for 
employees and senior executives, some of this stock could not be withdrawn except in cer-
tain employment termination cases. The deferred stock plan was intended to retain em-
ployees over the medium term rather than provide a risk adjusted incentive. Further, none 




 A stock’s beta is a measure of the stock price volatility around the mean of the whole market return. There-




of the independent directors were compensated on a risk adjusted basis (Lehman Brothers 
Holdings 2008i, pp. 14-26).  
Rational stockholders according to Modern Portfolio Theory90 undertake investments based 
on a trade-off between expected risk and return. Consistent with this theory, as LB’s per-
formance deteriorated, the value of LB’s shares decreased accordingly, ultimately resulting 
in a complete loss of value by the time of bankruptcy. However as mentioned above, during 
the final years of LB, the senior executive team were rewarded handsomely, with perfor-
mance based compensation of approximately USD 1 billion. The difference in compensation 
between stockholders and LB executives implies that “the executives' pay arrangements 
provided them with excessive risk-taking incentives” (Bebchuk et al. 2010, p. 4). Any sign of 
deterioration in net profit would have resulted in lower stock compensation therefore it 
would have been in management’s interest to avoid publishing a decline in net profit after 
tax – the key determinant of stock awards. Further as Modern Portfolio Theory suggests, 
there is an incentive for executives to increase risk if they seek higher returns. 
The disparity between stockholder and executive returns is explained by the flawed com-
pensation plan which neglected to adjust bonuses for the underlying risk carried by the rel-
evant business unit or employee. The need for a consistent approach to the linking of risk to 
compensation was acknowledged in the aftermath of the GFC. “A risk-sensitive compensa-
tion framework provides the appropriate incentives for employees, and establishes a supe-
rior link between the actions of those employees and the firm's overall risk profile” 
(Kroszner 2008). The absence of a risk-sensitive compensation framework led to risk-taking 
behaviours in an effort to maximise bonus levels. The year on year expectation of abnormal-
ly high bonuses, generated a culture of excessive risk taking in order to maximise short term 
profits. Downside risk to the employee was minimal. Employees were not required to repay 
bonuses once awarded if performance in the ensuing period erased all the gains of the peri-
od on which the bonuses were calculated (Bebchuk et al. 2010). At worst the employee 
would be terminated, however given the scarcity of skills in the investment banking industry 
during that same period, the consequences for an employee was deemed relatively immate-
rial.  




 One of the main aims of Modern Portfolio Theory is to construct an optimal portfolio by maximising returns 




As mentioned above in this section, Fuld understood the advantage of employing top per-
forming staff in an industry where the quality of employees and the tacit skills they possess 
are considered a valuable resource. As a service industry which relies heavily on the perfor-
mance of its employees, the investment banking industry generally values an effective com-
pensation framework. The effectiveness of a compensation framework in an industry which 
also deals with significant risks needs to balance the performance of the individual with the 
risks they incur for the firm. This is particularly noted within the risk management profes-
sion:  
An effective risk-sensitive compensation regime, properly embedded in a strong strategic risk 
management framework, can generate changes in behaviour so that the firm's employees 
refrain from taking on risk beyond the firm's stated risk appetite. Most importantly, such a 
compensation regime must offer the appropriate incentives to assume appropriate level of 
long term and short term risks during various economic cycles (Kroszner 2008).  
LB awarded especially attractive compensation ratios during the period between 2004 and 
2006. Refer Figure 144 showing LB as offering the second highest compensation ratios of its 
peer group. “LB’s Compensation Committee cited record net revenues, pre-tax income, net 
income, and earnings per share, as well as an increase in the firm's share price of 17% dur-
ing the fiscal year 2006, in its decision to award bonuses for fiscal year 2006” (Bebchuk et al. 
2010, p. 267). The use of only one year’s performance, in this case that of 2006, supports 
the view that the Compensation Committee was using short term performance as its prima-
ry performance indicator for the establishment of a particular year’s incentives. 
Therefore we can partly disassociate LB’s incentive scheme from the long term risk-related 
decision-making process compatible with the long term interests of stockholders. Risk-
related decisions were taken without the benefit of foresight of an impending collapse. 
However Fuld wouldn’t be paying large incentives unless there was a return to the firm or 
himself. Short term incentives can create more immediate and self-serving behaviour which 
suited Fuld in a fast paced industry which is characterised by pressure to generate good re-
sults on a quarterly basis, and a reactive share price.  
The excessive compensation arrangements also attempted to create teamwork and a con-
sensus view of the direction of the business (Nash 2003). Serwer (2006) quotes Skip McGee, 
a previous head of investment banking as saying: "Instead of trying to divide fees up and 
allocate them to different bankers and departments, for purposes of compensation calcula-
tions, we just double-count revenues". Although this practice inflated the basis of bonus cal-
culations due to the ‘double’ counting of team and individual bonus allocations, it had in-
centivised employees to help one another, supporting the group capture by Fuld of the loy-
alty of his employees and fuelled a transaction oriented investment banking operation. LB 
employees were driven by the same forces which drove Fuld’s own self-interest, thereby 




could be said that Fuld was ‘drinking out of the same trough as staff’ and his entrenched and 
shared belief system within the firm could explain the unusual loyalty he generated. In en-
riching his staff, he was able to enrich himself. 
This chapter supports the case that excessive optimism as mentioned above, combined with 
a behavioural pattern shaped by a culture highly influenced by the CEO created an elevated 
state of hubris at the core. The hubris of the CEO and the power he exerted over employees 
and the board infected the decision-making of key executives who had a genuine interest in 
the survival of the firm and the continuation of their careers. At the centre of the hubris was 
Fuld’s faith that the power of the CEO and the firm would overcome any obstacles faced. 
The following section illuminates the culture of LB by exploring the rhetoric used in certain 
communication devices used by the firm such as presentations and internal emails. The fol-
lowing section analyses these forms of communication and how they elucidate a dysfunc-
tional culture which led to irrational decision-making. By influencing culture, Fuld exercised 
power over employees with the aim of encouraging conformity of values and beliefs with his 
own. 
10.6 Communication as a Window on Corporate 
Culture 
Communication through language establishes meaning within an organisation. The language 
can be conveyed either verbally, in print, or physical expression, such as a frown. Meanings 
can affect the culture within by establishing expectations of behaviour as explained in the 
previous section. In return, culture can have an effect on meanings, as a particular use of 
language can be interpreted differently by different cultures. Cultures can be influenced es-
pecially if the language emanates from an organisation’s leadership who possess power 
over behaviour (Eccles et al. ; Westbrook 2013). Westbrook (2013, p. 57) establishes the 
nexus between communication and culture and asserts that “one cannot think of communi-
cation (one cannot speak) outside of a culture”. Therefore selecting the language and the 
environment in which it is delivered to express expected morals, values and beliefs is 
deemed an important method of shaping a culture of an organisation. This chapter finds 
that Fuld’s internal and external communication, a a key trait of his management style, also 
contributed to the intensification of a culture which began with the founders of the firm and 
perpetuated by successive leaders throughout the history of the organisation. The commu-
nication represented passage points through which Fuld was able to transmit power which 
ultimately was exercised in his day to day dealings with his staff. This section analyses cer-
tain examples of communication used at LB and covers formal visual presentations, verbal 




the language used is analysed to illuminate the direct and underlying messages conveyed to 
employees by the senior leadership of the firm. 
Fuld avoided direct contact with employees: “our battlefield commander[Fuld] was an ex-
tremely remote and watchful character surrounded by a close coterie of cronies, with al-
most no contact with anyone else” (McDonald & Robinson 2009, p. 90). This type of intro-
verted behaviour exemplified by remoteness from employees was Fuld’s preferred modus 
operandi. It was clear that Fuld made the key decisions whilst using his immediate subordi-
nates to communicate them to the general staff. “The environment had become so insular… 
Fuld OK’d decisions, but Gregory packaged material so that the choice was obvious. And the 
executive committee offered no counterweight” (Fishman 2008, p. 5). Fuld was CEO of one 
of the major US investment banks with a staff complement of 25,000, and total revenue of 
over USD 53 billion (Cook 2009). Many CEOs of large corporations prefer to circulate 
amongst employees to gauge feedback and monitor operational issues including staff mo-
rale. Avoiding direct communication with the wider staff, Fuld needed alternative channels 
to convey his messages as outlined below.  
 
10.6.1 Rhetoric in Key Strategy Document 
In 2006, one year before the deterioration in LB’s performance, Fuld and Goldfarb Chief 
Administrative Officer (CAO), delivered the firm’s global strategy at an offsite conference for 
senior executives using a slide presentation, known as the Global Strategy document 
(Lehman Brothers Holdings 2006). This is a key document as it presented LB’s strategy for 
the three years up to 2009. It can therefore be viewed as the guiding template used by 
management to execute their operational and strategic decisions immediately prior to the 
firm’s bankruptcy. It represented Fuld’s vision and objectives for the firm. Of interest, is how 
Fuld communicated his vision and objectives, which metrics and concepts are included, and 
just as importantly, which are excluded from this narrative. One of the tenets of this thesis is 
that Fuld pursued a growth strategy at all costs. The Global Strategy document reinforces 
this growth agenda in a variety of ways. An examination of the rhetoric used reveals intent 
to convey the ‘growth’ message to all senior executives in a way that strongly influences 
compliance to Fuld’s agenda.  
Rhetoric is a useful tool to influence others to the “viability, credibility and plausibility 
of…positions, beliefs, problems solutions and perspectives” (Young 2003, p. 623). The Global 
Strategy document was written in such a way as to persuade the audience consisting of sen-
ior executives to follow and understand the stated path of ‘growth’. Although some of the 
persuasive elements within the document are subtle, a rhetorical analysis reveals how they 
establish meanings, communicated in a way that could be clearly understood by the intend-




cess and according to Summa (1992, p. 138), to construct a power “to change the world, giv-
ing rhetoric both philosophical and political importance by demonstrating its connections 
with forces that shape reality”.   
The Global Strategy document comprises 38 slides. The communication style incorporates 
dot points and punchy sentences presented with colour and many statistics, figures, graphs, 
and financial terms which could only be understood by those with a professional financial 
background. This style of communication would appeal to the audience who, as senior ex-
ecutives of an investment bank, would have shared similar backgrounds. Operating in a time 
poor environment, the style suited their use of day to day communication. In this environ-
ment where efficiency is rewarded, any tool which saves time, such as clear, economical and 
concise communication would be deemed preferable. Immediately, the appeal of the mode 
of communication would have the effect of engaging the audience. 
The content of the slide presentation is divided into two parts: the first part detailing the 
historical record of achievement to date [2006], including measures dating back to incorpo-
ration in 1994 (refer below for discussion about comparatives used); and the second part 
outlining the future strategy for the ensuing three years. The introduction page of the whole 
document is set out in Figure 150. 
Figure 150 - Introduction to Global Strategy Presentation March 2006 
 
Source: (Lehman Brothers Holdings 2006, p. 2). 
The first page of the second part of the presentation dealing with forward looking strategy is 




Figure 151 - Introduction to Future Strategy Section of Global Strategy Presentation March 
2006 
 
Source: (Lehman Brothers Holdings 2006, p. 22). 
The reference to ‘$150’ applies to the stock price of LB in both the introduction to the whole 
presentation and to the introduction of the future strategy section. The stock price of USD 
150 is after the stock split on 23 October 2001 when the stock was split 2:1 and the price 
decreased from USD 125.50 to USD 62.50. The document was presented in March 2006, 
when the share price hovered around USD 141. The focus in the Global Strategy document 
was clearly on the firm’s stock price. Reference to the stock price was included in four pages 
out of the first 6 pages and continued throughout the document. Therefore the implied 
strategy was focused on the firm’s stock price above all other measures. Even though this 
measure of management performance is not unusual for a publicly listed corporation, occu-
pying such a prominent position as an objective has meaning. Not only did management 
want to maximise stockholder wealth in accordance with agency principles, the maximisa-
tion of stock price also translated to the maximisation of the bonus components of employ-
ee and senior executive compensation (refer section 10.5 for further discussion on employ-
ee compensation). This is consistent with the notion of senior executive self-interest ex-
pressed throughout this thesis. 
The other feature of the document was the reference to the word ‘growth’. This term ap-
peared in 9 slides out of the 15 slides devoted to the future strategy section. Moreover 
‘growth’ was included as part of the heading of seven out of the 15 slides in this section. The 
word ‘upside’ used in the context of ‘growth’ was used in a further two slides. The introduc-




Figure 152 - Introductory Summary Page of Global Strategy Presentation March 2006 
 
Source: (Lehman Brothers Holdings 2006, p. 23). 
The summary page of the future strategy of the firm clearly emphasises the intention for 
growth and relates this element to the drivers expected for the ensuing three years. The ex-
pectation of growth in the global capital markets and economy is a forecast and merely rep-
resents the firm’s own view on which the whole future strategy is based. There is no men-
tion throughout the document of contingencies if such growth did not occur. Therefore it 
could be surmised that the firm’s strategy was based on a singular optimistic view of the fu-
ture external environment. This is another example of the hubris exhibited by senior man-
agement where no consideration was given to an alternative scenario as evidenced by the 
document.   
The preoccupation of comparing itself to its peer group is evident in the document. Refer-
ence to a peer group comparison appears in approximately a third of the slides in the 
presentation. As mentioned in section 10.2.5, LB was subject to a normative influence which 
caused it to monitor its competitors’ performance and activities. Any significant deviation to 
the peer group’s financial performance, corporate structure, divisional activities or modus 
operandi could risk an ‘outlier’ result and attract unwanted scrutiny. Peer group compari-
sons also sought to legitimise past management decisions, particularly if the firm outper-
formed the peer group as shown in some of the slides. An example of the narrative in this 




Figure 153 - Peer Group Comparison 2003 – 2005. 
  
Source: (Lehman Brothers Holdings 2006, p. 5). 
Figure 153 depicts LB as the standout performer based on compound average growth in 
revenue and net income compared to its peer group. However two issues are important. 
Firstly the selection of the period coincides with a leading CAGR. If other periods were se-
lected, the CAGR would have not been as attractive. Secondly, there is no measure indicat-
ing this performance relative to risk. There is only one slide in the whole presentation deal-
ing with risk which is set out in Figure 154. 
Figure 154 - Risk Management Measures of LB 2003 - 2005 
 
Source: (Lehman Brothers Holdings 2006, p. 17). 
This slide dealing with the firm’s risk management is telling in that it uses only one measure 




rities and debt which included loans. VaR is only useful in measuring risk on a portfolio of 
market priced debt and equity securities and is inapplicable to illiquid loans or other credit 
exposures within the balance sheet. Many of LB’s investments were included in Special Pur-
pose Vehicles (SPV) which were standalone corporate entities outside the consolidated 
group over which LB exercised control. Shares in these SPVs were not quoted and therefore 
they represented illiquid assets which relied on management’s assessment of value for in-
clusion in any VaR calculation.  
VaR is mostly used as a measure for risk associated with a securities portfolio where the 
measure is calculated using a sample of historical market price movements. The VaR model 
is a probability based model and therefore is a statistical measure dependent on arbitrary 
selection of variables. It measures the potential for loss, not the actual loss of a firm, by as-
sessing the probability of loss (for example a 1 in 20 day occurrence) and the time frame - 
often used in one year time intervals. Therefore longer term measures are usually ignored. 
Further uncertainty surrounding this measure includes no definitive approach in selecting 
the variables in question to determine the appropriate level of risk to be tolerated. For ex-
ample, when selecting a time period for analysis of the probability of loss, the sample se-
lected may include data obtained from a period of low volatility. This would result in a more 
conservative risk measure than if the sample period covered a more volatile period.  As this 
is a means based measure of volatility, extreme events are generally ignored when assump-
tions of normal distribution probabilities are used. Also as a mark-to-market based measure 
which relies on market prices, it encounters difficulty when market prices are unavailable 
such as during a financial crisis.  
The risk management slide ignored other risk metrics applicable to LB’s balance sheet such 
as leverage, capital adequacy or a measure of credit risk using traditional credit risk metrics 
such as ratios relating to problem and past due loans, bad debts and credit risk grading with-
in the investment and loan portfolio. The use of the VaR model as opposed to any other risk 
model reinforces the trading mentality of the firm. This cultural trait can be observed as far 
back as the founding of the firm when the Lehman brothers traded a variety of goods in-




given the VaR model was a recently used measure in the financial markets91, many execu-
tives may not have been familiar with the concept.  
The slide takes into account the effect on revenue from a potential downside movement in 
market prices relevant to LB’s portfolio using a sample of historical data. This level of ex-
pected loss was quantified as USD 21.9 million in 2003 and rising to USD 31.4 million in 
2005. The other reference to VaR is its expression as a percentage of tangible equity which 
remained stable from 0.21% in 2003 to 0.20% in 2005. These latter statistics are intended to 
show that although the absolute level of VaR increased, the firm was able to contain it at a 
constant level relative to tangible equity. The effect was to allay any fears of the audience 
that the firm was unduly increasing its risk profile. Importantly, the slide does not include 
any assumptions of the variables used in the VaR calculation as mentioned above. For ex-
ample a time frame covering a period of low volatility would have produced a relatively 
lower VaR. Therefore, the one page slide devoted to risk management could be considered 
an abbreviated representation of the firm’s risk profile using a narrow measure intended to 
downplay the level of risk incurred by the firm.   
The use of particular words such as ‘Extremely Doable’ in the headings of another two slides 
involved in the setting of revenue and stock price targets, again establishes an expectation 
that the targets are entirely realistic. Refer to Figure 155 and Figure 156. There is no doubt 
in the message conveyed by the word ‘Doable’ as it relates to the audience in a colloquial 
form, and as it is separated by a colon from the first part of the heading, appears highlighted 
as a message on its own. The consequent attention to this phrase creates the perception of 
it constituting a ‘command’ rather than a ‘suggestion’. The implied message is that the tar-
gets are easily achievable and the underperformance to this target would be deemed a fail-
ure by any team or individual in carrying out their role. Fear of failure to this expectation, is 
used as a motivator at least, and a coercive pressure at worst. Therefore the communication 
of the slide during the offsite meeting is considered a passage point between the disposi-
tional circuit where the rule of practice of performing to an expected target is formed, and 
the episodic circuit where the day to day activities of staff are directed to achieving the tar-
gets.   









Figure 155 - Revenue Target for 2009 
 
Source: (Lehman Brothers Holdings 2006, p. 34). 
Figure 156 - Stock Price Target 
 
 Source: (Lehman Brothers Holdings 2006, p. 37). 
Figure 156 is important as it also shows the actual CAGR used by LB to depict an exceptional 
performance by the firm. However there appears a discrepancy between the CAGR depicted 
in the slide and the CAGR calculated using the standard formula used for calculating CAGR 














A comparison of the results between the calculation of CAGR using the above standard for-
mula and percentage shown on its slide are presented below: 








 Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 Column 5 
 1994–2006 
(current) 
*2003–2006 *1994-2006 *2006 - 2009 *1994-2009 
      
Shown by LB 31.0% 33.0% 33% 30.0% 30% 




28.7% 23.5% 28.7 27.4% 28.5% 
      
Difference 2.3% 9.5% 4.3% 2.6% 1.5% 
Note: * There is ambiguity in the slide as to whether the CAGR in these columns are calcu-
lated using 1994 as the beginning value, or 2003 and 2006 as shown in columns 2 and 4 re-
spectively. Therefore calculations for both periods have been shown to avoid doubt. 
The difference between the LB version of CAGR and that calculated by the standard formula 
varies. The differences in all circumstances represent an overstatement by LB which are in a 
range of 1.5% to 9.5% depending on the beginning periods used. This is either due to a mis-
take in LB’s calculation process, the use of data different to that provided in the slide, or 
worse still an intentional attempt to mislead the audience. Either way, the information in 
the slide is misleading with the LB version exceeding the correct calculation in every period 
used. If management’s purpose was to create a misleading perception, this unethical prac-
tice could have been driven by two different motives depending on the period covered.  
For historical data, the intention could have involved the creation of a perception that man-
agement had been very successful, thereby instilling extra confidence and loyalty in the 
firm’s leadership. The overstatement of the forecast CAGR to 2009 could have resulted from 
a rounding up to the nearest multiple of 10 so as to provide a clearly understood CAGR tar-
get that the senior executives could easily remember and act upon. A simply stated objec-
tive would assist in its achievement. If this scenario was the case, Fuld would have been 




can be interpreted as an exercise of power created in the dispositional circuit where the ex-
pectations of performance are clearly established as a rule of the firm. Consequently, the 
failure to achieve the target even one that was stretched, could attract negative outcomes 
for the staff member. As mentioned above, the communication of this slide represents a 
passage point from which the power generated in the dispositional circuit was transmitted 
to the episodic circuit for the effective implementation of the necessary tactics to achieve 
the targets. 
Fuld’s attempt to extend the ‘growth’ culture throughout the firm can be observed in Figure 
159. The title of this slide refers the intention to sustain the high growth rates of market 
share for the firm. Highlighted as a key to achieving this growth is the phrase “Aggressively 
grow and diversify our franchise and strengthen our capabilities” (Lehman Brothers Holdings 
2006, p. 31). The key word ‘aggressively’, apart from describing the growth target for ‘new 
initiative’ investments, is not quantified with reference to the other items earmarked for 
growth. Resources for balance sheet, capital and risk appetite, have not been identified ei-
ther. Importantly growth intended for ‘risk appetite’ has not been quantified, leaving it an 
open target for management to determine dynamically and opportunistically. The discretion 
to impose a risk appetite on the firm at a level and at a time preferred by management rep-
resents a manifestation of power also generated in the dispositional circuit. In effect the 
ability to change the risk appetite of the firm is like changing the rules relating to risk man-
agement. Barring unforeseen events, an elevation of risk normally translates to an increase 
in returns. Therefore by socially integrating the rules relating to risk amongst staff, man-
agement was empowered to elevate the returns of the firm. This power is transmitted via a 
passage point represented by risk limits within which traders and deal makers are required 
to maintain risk exposures. The power is subsequently exercised in the episodic circuit 
where the routine transactions that reflect the revised risk levels are executed.  
Figure 159 also encourages Fuld’s vision of the firm’s culture by stating the goal to “continue 
to strengthen the culture” and instil this strong cultural push to the entire team with 
phrases such as ‘one team’ and ‘one firm mindset’. The incentive to collaborate with this 
push for a singular culture is neatly linked to the objective of applying “significant equity 
compensation – 30% employee ownership…All employees acting like owners” (Lehman 
Brothers Holdings 2006, p. 31). As clearly outlined in the slide, senior management are also 
considered substantial owners of the firm, and therefore participate on both sides of the 







Figure 159 - Summary of Strategy – March 2006. 
 Source: (Lehman Brothers Holdings 2006, p. 31). 
The messages and meanings directed to the audience of senior executives by the Global 
Strategy document is clarified through the analysis of rhetoric contained therein. The above 
analysis elucidates Fuld’s mission of achieving outperformance to its peer group, with a be-
nign attitude to risk, supported by conformity to a unified ‘aggressive culture’.  As discussed 
above, Fuld made use of power often generated in the dispositional circuit and exercised in 
the episodic circuit to achieve these ends. Further evidence of the firm’s culture can be 
gauged by communication modes such as internal and external conversations and emails. 
The following section examines some examples of these modes of communication to further 
illustrate the culture Fuld attempted to engender. 
10.6.2 Internal Emails as a Window to Firm Culture 
As mentioned throughout section 10.6, the power Fuld possessed in influencing the culture 
within the firm is established through various types of communication. Adhering to the 
analysis of rhetoric used in the Global Strategy document in section 10.6.1, the following 




tion. The analysis will use metaphors and analogies to extract meanings in senior manage-
ment’s attempts to “persuade others about the correctness of [a] particular view of reality” 
(Young 2003, p. 623). The reality being constructed continues to consist of a view of the firm 
as an unfailing organisation that will survive at all cost using whatever means necessary. The 
analysis reveals the hubris relating to both management’s abilities and their flawed view of 
the economic circumstances that prevailed until the final days of LB.  
Fishman (2008, p. 4) describes Fuld’s siege mentality and instincts by quoting excerpts from 
some of his conversations:  
Sometimes, that instinct meant that Lehman would ‘decide that we should be doing the ex-
act opposite of what the analysis said’, as one analyst put it. At the top of the organization, 
Fuld instilled his pugilistic, paranoid view of the world: It’s us against them. ‘Every day is a 
battle’, he told his managing directors. ‘You’ve got to kill the enemy. They tried to kill us’. 
Lehman, as he saw it, was always in danger, never getting respect even as it became the 
country’s fourth largest investment bank. ‘We’re going to keep showing people not to under-
estimate us’, he said. And the troops, as Fuld called them, bought in.  
As shown above, Fuld’s communication style was at times direct and poignant. Phrases such 
as ‘You’ve got to kill the enemy’, exhibit a raw and emotional attitude towards business and 
a mentality of winning at all costs. This attitude, coming from the top, likely permeated 
throughout the organisation, engendering a highly competitive and aggressive spirit with 
the firm. Internal emails of LB can offer a view on the culture operating within the firm. The 
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, 2010 set out excerpts of certain key LB 




Figure 160 - Excerpt, Hearing before Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 
 




The above commentary on LB’s emails, clearly demonstrate Fuld’s disdain of a plan to forgo 
bonuses by ‘top management’ (including himself) and his natural inclination to distrust 
those Neuberger Berman executives who would suggest such a tactic. The objective of the 
Neuberger Berman executives was to generate savings for the firm and send a clear mes-
sage to investors of the intended conservative stewardship of the firm. Further, Fuld’s au-
dacity of recommending extra compensation to some top management four days before LB 
filed for bankruptcy clearly demonstrates the greed and self-interested attitudes pervading 
the senior ranks of the hierarchy. Alternatively, Fuld could have been attempting to signal to 
the market LB’s confidence in a turnaround by increasing its compensation expenses. Both 
of the above incidents reported by the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 
provide a window into the ‘greed-centric’ culture Fuld was supporting. This culture is further 
exemplified by a series of other LB internal emails sourced by the bankruptcy examiner. An 
analysis of these emails follows. 
10.6.3 Emails Regarding Escalating Risks 
A March 2007 email forwarded by Michael Gelband, LB’s Head of Capital Markets to Fuld 
refers to advice provided by respected investment managers, Stanley F. Druckenmiller of 
Duquesne Capital Management LLC and Paul Tudor Jones of Tudor Investment Corp con-
firming Gelband’s previously mentioned concerns regarding the risks of the firm and that 
consideration should be given to the balance of risk versus return:  
This is not the B-team, Gelband wrote. I heard your view at the risk meeting that odds are in 
your favour but risk/reward is not good here so I’m trying to get out of as much illiquid risk as 
possible (Valukas 2010, p. 46). 
Further examples of emails from risk managers to senior management warning of the inap-
propriateness of the firm’s risk limits and risk policies, are presented below: 
Email from Kentaro Umezaki, Lehman, to Herbert H. (Bart) McDade III, Lehman, et al. (Sept. 
10, 2008) (noting history of end arounds on risk decisions, risk management’s lack of authori-
ty and lack of authority over balance sheet and inability to enforce risk limits); Email from 
Vincent DiMassimo, Lehman, to Christopher M. O’Meara, Lehman (Sept. 1, 2008) (whatever 
risk governance process we had in place was ultimately not effective in protecting the firm. 
Risk Appetite measures were not effective in establishing clear enough warning signals that 
the Firm was taking on too much risk relative to capital. The [Risk Management] function 
lacked sufficient authority within the Firm. Decision‐making was dominated by the busines); 
Email from Satu Parikh, Lehman, to Michael Gelband, Lehman, Sept. 15, 2008 (I am shocked 
at the poor risk management at the highest levels, and I don’t think it started with 
Archstone. It is all unbelievable and I think there needs to be an investigation into the broad-
er issue of malfeasance. Management gambled recklessly with thousands of jobs and share-




An email dated 18 April, 2007 to O’Meara amongst others from Kentaro Umezaki, Head of 
Fixed Income Strategy for LB confirmed the confusion of the Fixed Income Division following 
a verbal presentation by Fuld the night before. In his presentation, Fuld urged an increase in 
risk. In describing his team’s reaction to Fuld’s speech, Umezaki wrote:  
…the majority of the trading businesses focus is on revenues, with balance sheet, risk limit, 
capital or cost implications being a secondary concern. The fact that they [the traders] ha-
ven’t heard that those items matter [in] public forums from senior management recently re-
inforces this revenue oriented behaviour implicitly… Example which we’ve debated for years: 
was even a topic in [the Turnberry meeting in] FLA: Do we or don’t we have a limit on how 
much HY LBO related lending/commitment exposure we can have at any given time?  There 
has been no real ‘one firm’ outcome to date in my opinion.  I’m not the only one who has this 
view in FID (Valukas 2010, p. 100). 
The above email confirms three important points: firstly that consideration of risks was sec-
ondary to the priority given for the generation of revenues; secondly, senior management 
had avoided communicating the ‘revenue over risk’ priority to the financial markets; and 
thirdly there was no clear communication of risk limits relating to high yield leverage buy-
outs92 (HY LBO) to staff in the trading department. The ambiguity over the communication 
to both external and internal stakeholders created an environment which encouraged the 
treatment of risk limits as a ‘soft’ constraint and capable of being easily adjusted. The under-
lying message conveyed was that an increase in risk levels was plausible. Fuld’s obvious in-
tention was to perpetuate an elevated ‘risk culture’ of the firm as a means of increasing its 
returns.  
The creation of the abovementioned ambiguity regarding risk limits is an expression of 
power emanating from what is ‘not communicated’ and found in the dispositional circuit. 
Risk limits are a common feature used in investment and commercial banks. They constitute 
restrictions on traders’ behaviours, limiting their ability to exceed the firm’s pre-determined 
risk appetite. However in LB’s case these limits were unclear, which is extraordinary for a 
firm whose major portion of revenue was generated from the Trading Division. Therefore 




 High yield leverage buyouts are transactions involving the purchase of high yielding risky bonds usually rated 
sub-investment grade. Although these bonds attract high returns, they are often referred to as ‘junk bonds’ 




traders were required to interpret their own acceptable risk limits through their establish-
ment of a socially constructed meaning created from their communication with senior man-
agement. As no communication was evident or at best ambiguous, traders were left to es-
tablish their own rules. Fuld’s power in this circumstance was exercised in his decision to 
remain silent on the topic of risk limits. In doing so, he enabled traders to trade up to their 
own discretionally imposed limits. The temptation naturally would be for a trader to incur as 
much risk as possible under these circumstances, as higher risk limits translated to more or 
riskier trades thereby increasing the potential for greater bonuses. Fuld understood this 
driver, being a former trader, and created the setting for this behaviour through his silence 
on the matter which in itself represented the passage point where power was transmitted 
to the episodic circuit.  
In expressing the power exerted by Japanese management as a cultural practice Clegg and 
Bailey (2007, p. 732) observed the influence on a team of management silence: 
…management owes very little to formal rules. Rather the power to guide practice… is medi-
ated-informally-by close knit relationships by insiders who come to know each other well. The 
slightest nuance of body language or the significance of what is not said can convey im-
portant information to a fellow insider.  
The trades executed by the traders within their own ‘set of rules’ were carried out in their 
routine activities, which they considered normal and acceptable within the risk manage-
ment framework of the firm.  
10.6.4 Emails Regarding Raising Extra Capital 
During the second half of 2007, as certain assets such as CDOs held by many investment 
banks were devaluing, there was a search for additional capital to counter the associated 
losses and increased risk levels. Three similarly financially distressed financial institutions 
including Citigroup, Bear Stearns and LB, had approached the Citic Group, a leading Chinese 
investment bank in their quest to seek a strategic stockholder for their corporations in order 
to provide the much needed capital (Valukas 2010).  
Although a potential investor the size of Citic Group presented as an ideal ‘White Knight’, 
given their access to capital, an email exchange between Fuld and Goldfarb revealed little 
interest in Citic Group and a degree of arrogance and hubris. The following initial email from 
Goldfarb to Fuld signalled a view that LB did not need assistance:  
This will signal a major sign (which obviously isn’t true and will feed into rumours, etc.) and 





Fuld’s response reveals crudeness in the use of language such as ‘NFI’ (abbreviation for ‘no 
fucking idea’):  
Sounds to me like another non-starter. If it’s just about price [and] who is the right partner 
then tell them NFI (Fuld 2007).  
Goldfarb replied:  
Agreed 1000 percent … How do you spell stupidity in Chinese!!! (Goldfarb 2007). 
The above email exchange exemplifies a degree of arrogance and misguided faith that the 
firm didn’t need assistance in the form of a White Knight. Young (2003, p. 624) acknowledg-
es that text such at the above email exchange can be the result of calculated thoughts by 
managers who purport to have a superior understanding of a situation. The absoluteness of 
the expression used to signify full confidence: ‘1000 percent’ indicated that Fuld and Gold-
farb knew what they were doing, even though the search for a ‘White Knight’ had become 
an urgent matter. The exchange continued displaying a high degree of macho condescen-
sion with an email by Fuld indicating a trace of racism:  
What happened, … u didn’t like my sumdum spelling? (Fuld 2007).  
Goldfarb responded in an arrogant vernacular:  
I love it, better said than I could have. I think Mizuho is the best option for strategic partner. 
Any potential investor that would consider BS Bear Stearns in the same breath as LB should 
go fungoo themselves!!! (Goldfarb 2007). 
Fuld replied, again with a degree of unprofessional overconfidence, this time expressed in a 
hood93 like expression with a indolent use of grammar:  
I agree we need some help but the Bros always wins!! (Fuld 2007).  
Goldfarb agreed, responding with the following:  
Absolutely, will and skill always win, and that be us!!!! (Goldfarb 2007).  
Fuld concluded:  








Got it so do u (Fuld 2007). 
The style of communication reveals two of the most senior executives in the firm as self-
congratulatory, arrogant and misguided. It also exposes the executives’ lack of seriousness 
and urgency in confronting the problems of the firm. The rhetoric used reveals a similarity in 
the crude and assertive culture that existed at LB. The texts also exhibit a common under-
standing amongst two of the most senior executives at LB, who use a similar vernacular 
tending to confirm each-others’ beliefs that LB can afford to be selective in selecting a 
‘White Knight’. The reciprocal encouragement to pursue a course of action reinforces a con-
fidence in their conviction. Young (2003, p. 624) notes the power of texts to modify or rein-
force convictions:  
Texts perform actions as they encourage certain beliefs and behaviours. The various argu-
ments within texts are intended to modify the convictions or disposition of specific audiences 
through persuasive discourse rather than through an overt imposition of will or through con-
straint.  
Had Fuld and Goldfarb not persuaded each other to dismiss the alternative ‘White Knights’, 
the path to bankruptcy could have been avoided. In January 2008 when LB perceived an op-
portunity to again raise capital, this time from the Kuwait Investment Authority, Goldfarb, 
CFO, wrote to Fuld:  
Only issue would be that if they bought newly issued equity we would join the bad company 
of the many who had to raise equity. Perception issue (Goldfarb 2008).  
As mentioned in section 6.3, at a time when a capital-raising was desperately needed by LB, 
and there was a dearth of institutions willing to invest, Fuld exhibited a degree of hubris by 
suggesting charging the Kuwait Investment Authority a premium for LB’s stock and re-
sponded to Goldfarb as follows:  
Not if it were at a premium (Fuld 2008). 
Consequently the intended capital raising failed. This is not surprising given the probable 
unwillingness of the potential investor to pay a premium in such a tight capital market. 
Fuld’s hubris prevented a much needed capital-raising as confirmed by Paulson’s opinion 
that Fuld’s perceptions of the firm’s problems were unrealistic - discussed in section 6.6.2. 
Fuld and Goldfarb believed LB would survive, by advising the Board in January 2008 that: 
During the last downturn [2001-02]… the firm outperformed its competitors and established 
a platform for further growth… The firm pursued a counter-cyclical strategy, investing in tal-





The above statement indicated that LB could repeat the turnaround strategy in 2008 that it 
employed during the economic downturn of 2001/2002. At the Board meeting in January, 
2008, Fuld was able to influence the Board in agreeing to pursue growth as a counter-
cyclical strategy which was contrary to the strategy employed by the rest of the major US 
investment banks. Other investment banks pursued a strategy which involved raising capital 
in anticipation of future losses. Fuld justified his growth strategy by explaining that:  
… while other Wall Street firms were raising significant capital in the past three months, for 
Lehman aggressive capital raising is not necessary because the firm remains strongly capital-
ized thanks to capital generated by earnings (Lehman Brothers Holdings 2008a, p. 16). 
The retained earnings on which Fuld relied for extra capital were never realised. In fact a 
massive loss was about to be recorded in the ensuing quarter ending May 2008 (Lehman 
Brothers Holdings 2008c). Fuld’s refusal to follow the other investment banks which under-
took capital raisings in anticipation of losses further signifies Fuld’s conviction that he knew 
better. The other investment banks imitated each other as a survival tactic intended to also 
comfort their investors and creditors. The common view of impending danger was not 
shared by Fuld who was blinded by hubris and a disregard of his own firm’s stockholders to 
whom he owed a responsibility under agency principles.     
LB’s cultural problems indicated by its internal communications were compounded by a 
question over its ethical practices. Despite the external appearance of an ethical best prac-
tice, the following section discusses certain shortcomings. It is argued that the questionable 
ethical practices emanated from the abovementioned cultural atmosphere.  
10.7 Code of Ethics – Was it practiced at LB? 
LB disclosed in its 2007 Form 10-K report submitted to the SEC that it possessed a Code of 
Ethics with which it complied. The report specifically mentions that:  
‘We [LB] recognize that maintaining our reputation among clients, investors, regulators and 
the general public is critical. Maintaining our reputation depends on a large number of fac-
tors, including the selection of our clients and the conduct of our business activities. We seek 
to maintain our reputation by screening potential clients and by conducting our business ac-
tivities in accordance with high ethical standards’ (Lehman Brothers Holdings 2007, p. 76). 
Further the report states that LB acknowledges its ‘other’ risks as follows: 
We are exposed to other risks having an ability to adversely impact our business. Such risks 
include legal, geopolitical, tax and regulatory risks that may come to bear due to changes in 




such risks, we monitor and review regulatory, statutory or legal proposals that could impact 
our businesses (Lehman Brothers Holdings 2007, p. 76).  
As argued in section 10.3, despite maintaining a formally documented modern day corpo-
rate governance policy, an organisation may not actually adopt best practice. Lehman 
Brothers Holdings (2007, p. 76) described LB’s ethical standards as ‘high’. However, this the-
sis argues that LB’s ethical standards were far from high. Examples cited in this chapter 
which indicate an ethical standard less than optimal include: the firm’s ‘window dressing’ of 
financial statements, (refer CHAPTER 9 for a discussion of this practice); the treatment of 
employees and their families; and the firm’s internal emails discussing potential investors. It 
is expected that a firm’s ethical practices would have an impact on the culture within an or-
ganisation. Yet LB managed to contravene some key ethical considerations.  
Greenfield (2009) asserts that LB’s aggressive culture allowed it to avert a financial disaster 
during past economic downturns such as in 2001/2002. Most of the incumbent manage-
ment team in 2008, occupied senior management positions during 2001/220, including Fuld 
who occupied the CEO and Chairman positions. The same aggressive culture said to exist in 
2001/2002 also existed up to 2008. Management’s aggressive culture supported by Fuld’s 
hubris described above, blinded senior management from the risks posed by the firm’s ex-
cessive leverage which was incurred during the pre-GFC period.  
As described in section 10.4.2, Fuld ignored critical advice from expert staff in some key de-
cision-making. Apart from ignoring expert advice, LB’s dysfunctional management style dis-
regarded the firm’s code of ethics. “The code of ethics became an artefact; something ex-
ternal to the culture and existed because companies like LB needed a code for public rela-
tions purposes and to protect themselves from conduct against the firm” (Stevens 2008, p. 
53). 
A legalistic approach to the adoption of a code of ethics by US firms was found to be a 
common finding by (Pelfrey & Peacock 1991, p. 17). Farrell and Cobbin (1996) analysed the 
content of codes adopted by Australian, US and UK enterprises and found that for many or-
ganisations, the codes were a “reiteration of the legal obligations of staff” (Farrell & Cobbin 
1996, p. 55). This indicates a perfunctory approach to the adoption of a code of ethics as 
opposed to an independent and holistic approach with a purpose to instil appropriate val-
ues. Further, Farrell and Cobbin (1996, p. 55) found that 83 per cent of the codes of ethics 
examined addressed the behaviours of employees and ignored standards for directors. This 
study also concluded that the codes examined did not directly promote the adoption or 
support ethical cultures. It is not surprising therefore that LB treated its code of ethics as a 
necessary document to fulfil the expectations of regulators and investors rather than to 




Stevens and Buechler (2013) used two different methodologies to ascertain whether LB’s 
code was instrumental in management decision-making. They used the ‘Competing Values 
Framework’94 developed by Quinn et al. (1991) in conjunction with the ‘Ethisphere bench-
mark’95 created by Erwin (2011). They argue that LB’s code was similar to codes found in 
similar documents of other US public corporations. The code “addresses the basic issues 
found in most corporate codes such as conflict of interest, retaliation, stealing and use of 
proprietary information, non-retaliation, compliance with laws, EEO issues and fairness” 
(Stevens & Buechler 2013, p. 51). According to Stevens and Buechler (2013), LB’s code ap-
peared standardised and authored by lawyers as opposed to being specifically prepared for 
LB.    
Although appearing as a standardised document, the code of ethics provided a clue to LB’s 
aggressive culture. LB’s relentless pursuit of growth is reflected in a phrase used in its code 
of ethics: "to compete aggressively in furthering the interests of the firm" (Stevens & 
Buechler 2013, p. 51). The choice of the word ‘aggressively’, in this section of the code of 
ethics clearly establishes a guiding principle that aggressive behaviour in furthering the in-
terests of the firm was acceptable. Similar references alluding to an ‘aggressive pursuit of 
business’ are also found in the documented code of ethics of another failed US investment 
bank, Bear Stearns (Greenfield 2009). However Greenfield (2009, p. 53) observes that it is 
“absent from one of the two surviving firms’ codes - Goldman Sachs’ Code of Conduct and 
Business Principles”. Stevens and Buechler (2013) state that although LB’s code dictates that 
the firm should ‘compete aggressively’, it neglects to mention how an employee can com-
pete aggressively in an ethical context and fails to articulate the boundaries of such aggres-
sive behaviour. Therefore how could an employee clearly ascertain the boundaries of their 
expected ethical behaviour in pursuing their day to day activities? 
Evidence suggesting unethical practices by LB is contained in a letter dated 18 May 2008, 
authored by Matthew Lee, then senior Vice President, Financial Control and in charge of the 
firm's global balance sheet and accounting, addressed to Erin Callan CFO, and Christopher 




 The Competing Values Framework is a grading framework which analyses exchanges of discourse by reveal-
ing the use of rhetoric in communication. 
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 The Ethisphere benchmark assigns grades on a code of ethics based on eight ideal dimensions of a code es-




O'Meara Chief Risk Officer at LB. The letter stated that Lee had become aware of unethical 
practices at LB: 
I have become aware of certain practices….that require me as a Firm employee to bring to 
the attention of management conduct and actions on the part of the Firm that I consider to 
possibly constitute unethical and unlawful conduct (Lee 2008, p. 1). 
Lee’s complaint targeted a misstatement of assets published in the previous quarters’ finan-
cial statements leading up to May 2008. In his opinion the value of assets published in the 
financial statements misled the public as they had been devalued due to market corrections. 
“I believe the manner in which the firm is reporting [certain] assets is potentially misleading 
to the public and various governmental agencies” (Lee 2008, p. 2). He claimed that a signifi-
cant level of assets may have been overstated as they should be classified as either ‘non-
performing’ or ‘bad’. The quantum of the overstatement was considered significant: “Tens 
of billions of dollars of unsubstantiated balances, which may or may not be 'bad' or non-
performing assets” (Lee 2008, p. 1). This criticism by an employee of 14 years was ignored 
by senior management who retrenched Lee a few days after the date of his letter (Corkery 
2010). 
This section argues that the culture of LB largely emanated from the values and beliefs of 
the leadership team and not a published code of ethics reflecting best practice. The values 
of the CEO and other senior executives were embedded in the firm. The code of ethics, like 
the corporate governance structure, as discussed in section 10.2, was a mere construct. Fuld 
relegated the practice of the published code of ethics, through his refixing of the meanings 
of appropriate behaviour, as Clegg (1989) explained, by fixing relations of meanings in the 
dispositional circuit. The divergence of meanings from the published code to Fuld’s socially 
constructed code was carried out through his various forms of communication, which, as 
passage points, transmitted power to the episodic circuit where the associated behaviours 
were expressed in daily work routines as explained in section 10.6. And in the process he 
restricted the effect and influence of the code of ethics effectively ‘disempowering’ the 
document and its meaning.    
10.8 Summary 
This chapter examined the management style of Fuld and his senior executive team and its 
impact on the important management decisions which led to LB’s bankruptcy. The man-
agement style is found to contribute to the ‘greed centric’ culture of the organisation which 
was encouraged by institutional influences and the exertion of power by Fuld. These influ-




tice were manifest in Fuld’s relationship with the Board of Directors and the institutional 
forces which shaped board structure; Fuld’s influence over employee behaviour; the various 
forms of communication used by Fuld and his senior executives; an ethical practice at odds 
with the firm’s formal code of ethics; and an employee compensation structure which en-
couraged risky behaviour and a general compliance with Fuld’s values and beliefs.  
Fuld is shown to have had an influential role in the appointment of a submissive and com-
pliant Board. Structuring the Board with members whose ages,, longevity of tenure, limited 
financial expertise in financial markets and above average compensation, contributed to a 
relative disengagement in the risk affairs of the firm and created a subservient attitude to-
wards Fuld’s strategic intentions. In addition, the mimetic and normative institutional influ-
ences to which LB was subjected concealed a corporate governance framework, including 
board structure, which, although complied with the regulatory framework, did not engender 
professional and ethical practice. 
Fuld was able to engender loyalty from his staff, principally by ensuring they were remuner-
ated at the top end of the industry’s pay scale, including a generous incentive compensation 
plan. This loyalty produced mostly compliant subordinates who largely adopted Fuld’s strat-
egy of ‘growth at all costs’. Fuld’s behavioural traits can be traced to his earlier career where 
he learned the value of loyalty and the dangers associated with strong personalities with 
potential to challenge the authority that comes with leadership. Those who challenged 
Fuld’s values or views, especially in relation to the firm’s direction and its associated risks, 
were punished. The resultant culture empowered Fuld to pursue his growth objective with 
the aim of perpetuating generous bonuses for his key staff and himself.  
The chapter also provided an insight to the firm’s culture aided by a rhetorical analysis of 
the manner and style of communication adopted by Fuld and his close associates. It is 
shown to offer a deeper understanding of how communication devices and the use of lan-
guage and discourse can impact meaning to foster certain behaviours and influence values 
consistent with those of the author. The resultant culture was coloured by a hubris associ-
ated with a denial of LB’s escalating risk profile and the worsening financial difficulties. 
Finally, the chapter questions the firm’s ethical values as exposed by its application of the 
firm’s publicly stated code of ethics, which although presented as an example of best prac-
tice, was found to be somewhat ignored at the firm. The treatment of employees and their 
families, the style and content of the firm’s communications, and the attitudes expressed in 
communications towards creditors and potential investors attest to the firm’s relative disre-
gard of ethical practice. This disregard is also reflected in LB’s unethical accounting of repur-
chase agreements used as a temporary financing tool in an effort overcome the firm’s reli-




  CONCLUSION CHAPTER 11
This chapter summarises the thesis and presents the findings in response to the research 
question posed in section 1.1. It also presents the contribution of the research and its rele-
vance to current investment banking and regulatory practice. Finally the chapter outlines 
the limitations of the thesis and offers recommendations for future research. 
11.1 Thesis Summary 
This research provides a rich insight into the culture and behavioural practices of LB and the 
participants in the investment banking industry. This issue is important as culture and be-
havioural practices have been found to influence management decision-making crucial to 
the viability of businesses in the lead up to the GFC. Furthermore, it demands attention 
from legislators and regulators who routinely deal with individual firm and systemic risk 
which could impact the wider economy. This thesis shows an example where legislators and 
regulators have failed to manage these qualitative factors amongst other prudential super-
visory responsibilities and therefore have failed to protect the public interest. It is therefore 
of particular relevance in the current environment where an increasingly lenient regulatory 
setting is being discussed in the US. As regulatory strictures and economic policies continue 
to be subjected to various influences and swing from loose to tight settings, this thesis will 
continue to have relevance. Additionally as unchecked concentration of power and deficient 
corporate governance systems continue to exist in large organisations the danger of other 
catastrophic bankruptcies will persist.  
The thesis is organised by initially presenting a background to the economic, regulatory and 
political environment over the time period up to the GFC. The review and discussion of the 
theoretical framework of DiMaggio & Powell’s  (1983) New Institutional Theory, augmented 
by Clegg’s (1989) Theory of Power, is presented in CHAPTER 3. This chapter links the theo-
retical framework to a critical analysis methodology involving a case study approach using 
LB as its subject. The case study approach emphasises the importance of acknowledging the 
social, political and economic contexts within which the investment banking industry can be 
analysed to explain the various influences acting upon it and its use of influence in generat-





Two historical chapters follow which offer an understanding of the evolving culture and 
practices of the investment banking industry. CHAPTER 4 presents an historical overview of 
the US investment banking industry, highlighting the roles and behaviours of a sample of 
personalities who were influential in shaping the culture found in modern day investment 
banking. Certain historical events such as economic crises and the pressures on investment 
banks to modify their business models are also discussed in this chapter. CHAPTER 5 follows 
with a history of LB, which tracks the development of the firm’s culture through an account 
of the key individuals within the firm from its founding by the three Lehman brothers in 
1850 until the firm’s demise in 2008 whilst it was headed by its CEO, Richard Fuld. The chap-
ter is divided between periods covering the pre-Fuld era and the post-Fuld era, in order to 
compare and contrast the specific cultural traits impacting the firm between these two pe-
riods which shows the post-Fuld era as one characterised by dysfunctional senior manage-
ment decision-making.  
The last days of LB warranted a dedicated discussion in CHAPTER 6 given the important de-
cisions made by senior management which directly led to the firm’s downfall. An explana-
tion of some of the important innovations and practices of the industry, such as the devel-
opment of large scale securitisation warehouses, complex derivative products such as CDOs 
and MBS, and the outsourcing of origination activities to commission driven agents, com-
bined with the lack of transparency exhibited by LB, sheds light on some of the immediate 
causes of the GFC. The business models and financial structures of the major investment 
banks are discussed in CHAPTER 7. They were found to be similar and influenced by an insti-
tutional isomorphism, therefore subjecting them to the same consequences from severe 
economic and financial market shocks. Further, this chapter discussed the profitability bene-
fits of the leverage effect which were well understood and exploited by the investment 
banks. 
The value of connections developed by the investment banking community within the ‘fi-
nancial network’ consisting of the investment banking industry; other financial institutions; 
the regulators; the government; CRAs; and, lobby groups representing the investment bank-
ing industry is analysed in CHAPTER 8. The influence over accounting standard setters was 
exemplified by the generation of an ambiguous accounting standard covering Repo 105 
transactions - FAS 140. CHAPTER 9 further explains Repo 105 in detail and analyses the 
power exerted by LB’s senior management in ensuring the manipulative use of accounting 
for this financial instrument achieved the desired effect of concealing significant levels of 
debt.   
CHAPTER 10 concludes with an analysis of Fuld’s management style and the firm culture. 
The chapter suggests that Fuld was driven by self-interest. His exercise of power involved an 
influence over the firm’s corporate governance, employees, their families and the firm’s ac-




tative, dispositional and episodic circuits of power, resulting in a culture which prioritised 
the objective of ‘growth at all costs’. The consequential culture is highlighted by an exami-
nation of a sample of communications between senior executives of the firm and between 
internal executives and outsiders. Finally, an assessment of the firm’s documented com-
mitment to ethical values is shown to be divergent from the firm’s actual practice. The fol-
lowing section outlines the findings of this study in more detail. 
11.2 Findings from the Study 
This thesis addresses the following research question: 
To what extent did the cultural and behavioural influences through the context of an 
institutional framework and interplays of power within the investment banking in-
dustry contribute to the failure of LB?  
This analysis reveals the historical and cultural factors relevant in answering how and why 
LB failed. Three recurring themes were revealed in the historical chapters. The first recurring 
theme deals with the empowerment of investment bankers through their knowledge, ex-
pertise and innovation. The second recurring theme involves the value of close relationships 
which enabled investment banks to grow their business and solve complex problems for 
their customers. Thirdly, the chapters reveal the effect of externalities, such as economic 
cycles, and political/regulatory developments on the fluctuations of power between regula-
tors and industry.These themes contributed to certain behaviours and organisational cul-
ture found in modern day investment banking. The benefit of highlighting these themes is to 
draw a comparison between them to those factors which impacted on LB. It was found that 
LB senior management, in particular its CEO had coveted power to satisfy motives of self-
interest, which when combined with institutional influences from a variety of external agen-
cies, influenced a dysfunctional organisational culture which led to the collapse of the firm.  
The case study approach focusing on LB is set within an historical context and offers an in-
sight into the US investment banking industry prior to 2008. The case study provided an 
analysis of practice within the industry and permitted an evaluation of the two theoretical 
frameworks. The theories were applied over  the evolution of the US banking industry since 
its beginnings - a period of over 230 years. They were found useful in explaining the cultural 
and behavioural influences on the investment banking industry which contributed to the 
failure of LB. 
The selection of LB as a representative of the US investment banking industry is considered 
appropriate given the peer group’s largely similar business models and financial structures. 




sponsored rescue, or merger with a stronger financial institution. LB however was the only 
member which entered official bankruptcy and was effectively allowed to fail by the author-
ities. This unique position allows for a deeper insight into the motivations of various stake-
holders including authorities and provides a window into the world of investment banking in 
the pre-GFC period. The critical analysis is conducted using two theoretical frameworks. 
Clegg’s (1989) Theory of Power is used to augment DiMaggio & Powell’s (1983) New Institu-
tional Theory to explain the abovementioned dynamic influences. This chapter presents the 
findings over three sections: Section 11.2.1  explains the development of the investment 
banking culture from an historical context; section 11.2.2 presents the various institutional 
influences on the investment banking industry and in turn its influence on other organisa-
tions; and section 11.2.3 finds that the use of power within LB was instrumental in shaping 
the key decision-making which led to the deterioration of LB’s financial performance. Each 
section supports the conclusion that the use of institutional influence and power was an im-
portant contribution to the downfall of LB. 
11.2.1 Development of the Investment Banking Culture 
The historical context in which this story is told is important as it offers an understanding of 
the origins of the behaviours and culture found in modern day investment banks. The histor-
ical chapters comprising CHAPTER 4 and CHAPTER 5 reveal the organisational evolution of 
LB in parallel to the development of the investment banking industry which had its founda-
tions in the American War of Independence of 1775. The latter period covered by this study 
is characterised by a period governed by a neo-liberal political environment, a burgeoning 
economy and a ‘light touch’ to investment banking regulation. The three overarching 
themes developed in the historical chapters are discussed below.  
Traditionally, investment bankers have been able to add value in arranging funding for cus-
tomers or providing advisory services. These activities could be sustained as long as they 
offered specialised knowledge, expertise and innovation which otherwise was largely una-
vailable within industry generally. The attributes of knowledge, expertise and innovation 
commonly found amongst all members of the peer group supports the argument that vari-
ous institutional influences contributed to the culture, practices and behaviours found 
throughout the investment banking industry. The effective use of novel funding techniques 
such as the first bond issues, the adoption of effective distribution networks in selling finan-
cial instruments, the development of risk transfer instruments such as credit derivatives, 
and the methods of assessing credit risk of borrowers were able to set participants apart 
within the industry. The application of the two theories mentioned above is useful in ex-
plaining how knowhow emerged as a force in investment banking and why it was keenly 
sought to gain financial advantage. Clegg’s (1989) facilitative circuit is where power is gen-
erated by techniques of production which is translated as the knowhow of arranging diffi-




mimetic pressures, allowed the abovementioned innovative practices to survive until the 
modern era as they were accepted as a safe and legitimate practice by which to operate and 
succeed. By excelling in these practices, firms and individuals within the industry could de-
velop a competitive advantage.  
The thesis used the influential roles played by key individuals such as Haym Salomon, Robert 
Morris, Albert Gallatin, David Parish, John Jacob Astor, Stephen Girard, Nicholas Biddle, 
Clarke Dodge, James Gore King, Anthony Joseph Drexel, and the well-known John Pierpont 
Morgan to show that power sourced from the application of knowledge, expertise and inno-
vation enabled beneficial outcomes. These selected individuals are highlighted since they 
represent a sample of prominent US investment bankers operating during the formative 
years of the industry. They were therefore the early leaders who were able to shape the cul-
ture and practices within the industry.  
Since the industry’s inception, investment bankers have realised the importance of business 
and government relationships for the development of their enterprise. The thesis finds the 
strategy of pursuing relationships with important individuals within larger organisations and 
especially government was mimicked for three reasons. Firstly, it was hoped such clients 
would provide a continued stream of large and lucrative transactions. Secondly, given the 
high social and commercial status of the individuals involved, these relationships would help 
with the firm’s image and reputation, and expand the networks useful for potential future 
business. Lastly, networks were also useful as an instrument in pushing a point of view with 
government and regulators. The exploitation of relationships also worked in reverse where-
by government officials used investment bankers to meet their needs, for example, Albert 
Gallatin, US Secretary of Treasury who used Stephen Girard, John Jacob Astor and David Par-
ish to assist with the financing of the War of 1812. 
The thesis finds that externalities such as economic cycles, and political/regulatory devel-
opments had an effect on the fluctuations of power between regulators and industry 
throughout the history of the US investment banking industry. Attitudes towards regulatory 
strictures tended to vary according to economic conditions. Following a financial crisis for 
example, public outcry would prompt politicians who, sensitive to public opinion, were 
prone to tighten financial markets regulation or censure influential personalities within in-
dustry. Examples of these trends include: the panic of 1907 which was followed by the Pujo 
Commission and which brought into scrutiny JP Morgan’s business activities; and the Great 
Depression which was followed by the Percora hearings and prompted a swathe of regula-
tions between 1933 and 1940. Conversely, the ‘light touch’ approach to regulation coincided 
with prosperous economic conditions such as those which prevailed prior to the 1929 stock 
market collapse and the period prior to the GFC. The hubris which is generated by a period 




In summary, the historical chapters find that during prosperous periods of economic expan-
sion, there is a danger that politicians and regulators are prone to adopt a ‘laissez faire’ ap-
proach and succumb to institutional pressure to apply a ‘light touch’ to regulation. Concur-
rently, there is a potential risk that policy setters prolong accommodative monetary condi-
tions which tend to stimulate financial markets, at times creating asset bubbles which often 
precede a financial crisis.  
11.2.2 Application of Institutional Influence 
 
A finding of this thesis is that institutions including the members of the ‘financial network’ 
are subject to and/or conveyors of DiMaggio & Powell’s (1983) various forms of institutional 
influence. This exertion of influence, if unchecked can contribute to dire consequences such 
as the GFC. Specifically, the thesis finds institutional influence was meaningfully applied in 
four areas: the business models and financial structures of the major US investment banks; 
the legislative process and regulatory framework; the CRAs and the accounting standard 
setting process.  
 
When business models of major participants in the investment banking industry converge 
and their financial structures similarly take advantage of loose regulatory settings such as 
the inadequate Net Capital Rule which existed prior to the GFC, the resultant systemic risk 
adds to the probability of industry failure.  
The business model of investment banks up until the immediate post WW2 period largely 
comprised the partnership business structure, with its disadvantage of a partner’s restricted 
capacity to contribute capital to the firm. Due to the increasing need for capital to sustain 
business expansion, firms sought to incorporate. Unlike a partnership, this structure with its 
limited liability protection meant that CEOs could take abnormal risks with the expectation 
of generating abnormal profits without placing themselves at personal financial risk, as 
would a partner in a firm. As executive compensation structures were aligned with perfor-
mance generally, executives were incentivised to push the boundaries of acceptable organi-
sational risk levels. CEOs at the helm of the firm could also monopolise potential bonus 
pools in contrast to the typical profit sharing model of a partnership. These factors led to 
the concentration of power to the CEO and allowed for an elevation in the firms risk profile. 
Further as investment banks operate in a competitive and ambiguous environment, where 
economic cycles, evolving technology and innovation are constant features and challenges, 
mimetic pressure led divisional units of the peer group to undertake similar lines of busi-
ness, thereby exposing each firm to similar business risks. Additionally, all the major US in-
vestment banks exploited the temporary benefits of the ‘leverage effect’ which placed un-




their financial distress and as a combined group added to systemic risk within the financial 
markets. 
A common theme found in this thesis was that regulators were subject to a ‘regulatory cap-
ture’ by the investment banking industry. Prior to the GFC, DiMaggio & Powell’s (1983) co-
ercive pressure was exerted by the industry directly and indirectly through political contri-
butions, the lobbying process and exploitation of knowledge asymmetry in order to influ-
ence the regulatory process. The ultimate purpose of the industry’s significant expenditure 
of resources to these processes was to engineer a regulatory environment conducive to op-
timising financial success. The research also reveals the limitation of regulations to control 
behaviour. The major restrictions on investment banks constituted: the capital regulations, 
which were found to be lenient and were effectively subject to voluntary compliance; 
NYSE’s corporate governance rules and guidelines; and, SOX, all of which failed to prevent 
the failure of the largest US investment banks. Influence either through the exercise of 
power or institutional pressure is an immeasurable phenomenon and therefore is difficult to 
control. 
 
The role played by the CRAs in publishing excessively positive and later found to be, flawed 
credit ratings on issuers was one of the many factors which contributed to the GFC. The key 
finding is that it was in the best interests of the investment banking industry to exert its in-
fluence coercively over the CRAs. This influence was exerted through their commercial sup-
port and providing persuasive feedback to CRAs on the complex ratings models employed as 
many of the rated issuers were either customers or securitisation vehicles sponsored by in-
vestment banks themselves. Ultimately the investment banks were able to achieve their de-
sired outcomes of influencing the production of over-inflated ratings for their customers 
and more importantly their own securitisations of MBS and CDOs. As a result they were able 
to achieve superior securities prices and timely issues to ensure the highest possible 
throughput of transactions. Further, if an investment bank is routinely perceived as achiev-
ing a higher rating for its client than was expected, this skill would enhance its reputation in 
the market and therefore potentially attract a greater number of clients seeking to minimise 





Institutional pressure was also applied in the form of regulatory requirements for credit rat-
ings. There was a natural and skewed demand for higher rated issues - at least equal to or 
higher than the minimum ‘investment grade’ band of ‘BBB’ which is the lowest rating for 
many of the relevant regulations governing an investable universe96 for certain government 
and semi-government authorities. Further, for an underwritten securities issue to be suc-
cessfully placed, the underwriting investment bank’s job is made easier if the credit rating of 
its issuer meets the minimum investment grade level. This scenario provided a potential 
arena for investment banks to exert coercive pressure on the CRAs to rate an issue such that 
it met the minimum threshold. The CRAs’ business model which employed an issuer pays 
system within a competitive environment influenced CRAs to placate the investment banks 
so as to sustain an increasing volume of ratings and thereby support their own survival. 
 
Three findings relating to the influence on accounting standard setters are revealed in this 
thesis. Firstly, a normative influence was exerted on the FASB by industry in general; sec-
ondly the FASB was subject to subtle coercive pressure; and, thirdly a reverse legitimisation 
was sought by the FASB. All three forms of influence combined, resulted in the production 
of an accounting standard which favoured investment banks by potentially allowing them to 
conceal debts in their financial statements. The example used in the thesis was the process 
used to establish FAS 140, and its predecessor FAS 125 relating to the accounting of repur-
chase agreements. The process involved a consultation phase through which the investment 
banking industry’s influence was applied, principally through their comment letters. The re-
sultant accounting standard allowed flexibility to account for these instruments as either 
sales or on balance sheet liabilities. By choosing the former treatment, investment banks 
could remove potential liabilities from their balance sheets and disguise their actual finan-
cial position from stakeholders. This practice was employed by LB which resulted in excess 
of USD 50 billion of debt omitted from its balance sheet and an understating of its leverage 
ratio. 
 
The normative influence stemmed from a mutual reliance between the standard setter and 
the industry participants which incubates a culture of similarity and supports the contention 
of a common world view within a profession. This common view construes professionalism 








by members collectively and defines the appropriate ways in which to behave and act. 
FASB’s treatment of the submission letters was aligned to the persuasive arguments of the 
industry. Since the standard setters and the practitioners are members of the same profes-
sional community, they are able to collectively determine a set of practices and cognitive 
frameworks in which organisational routines are shaped. This type of normative pressure is 
heightened particularly if a large volume of submissions are conveying the same recom-
mendation. 
The second concept of a subtle coercive pressure is demonstrated through the enthusiasm 
of the financial institutions to appear in front of the FASB during direct hearings over the 
exposure draft to FAS125, the predecessor to accounting standard FAS140 and which car-
ried the key contentious clauses, to declare their views and recommendations. According to 
Financial Accounting Standards Board (1996b), there were 60 respondents who spoke at 
public hearings in 1996. As discussed in section 3.1.3, coercive pressures may take various 
forms and be disguised or restrained. Although it “may be felt as force or persuasion, and 
are generally associated with explicit and direct impositions, coercive pressures may also be 
more subtle” (Devin & Bartlett 2011, p. 5). The subtle coercive pressure over the FASB to 
follow the wishes of the financial markets industry in their opposition to the 90-day Bright-
line test can be interpreted as political influence. The influence was derived from the over-
whelming number of participants who in addition to forwarding documentary submissions, 
contributed in the direct hearings that followed.  
The third concept which allows the conveyance of influence is that of reverse legitimisation. 
As discussed in section 3.1.3, Riaz (2009) contends that if organisations such as investment 
banks are successful, the institutions such as the FASB from which organisations and practi-
tioners sought legitimacy, are endorsed as the responsible entities which supported those 
successful organisations and practitioners under their authority. 
For reverse legitimisation to exist, industry participants would be expected to support the 
FASB as long as its standards are valuable to those participants. This is consistent with the 
concept that the involvement of industry participants in the consultation process through 
the writing of comment letters is a vital measure of the legitimacy of the standard setting 
process and in turn the supervisors of this process – the FASB (Durocher et al. 2007; Fogarty 
1992; Larson 2002; Olusegun Wallace 1990). The following section presents findings related 
to the exertion of power. The section focuses on the nocuous exercise of power by LB’s CEO 
resulting which contributed to the development of a dysfunctional culture characterised by 
incompetent decision-making ultimately leading to the failure of the firm. 
11.2.3 Exertion of Power  
This thesis finds that LB’s organisational culture was influenced by its CEO and Chairman 




culture could lead to suboptimal management decisions, potentially leading to financial dis-
tress. As shown by CHAPTER 4 and CHAPTER 5, firm culture is influenced by a firm’s history. 
Fuld persisted with the firm’s long standing historical objectives of growing the firm. How-
ever Fuld’s strategy tended to push the risk boundaries even further than his predecessors 
in the areas of leverage, product innovation and most significantly asset positions such as an 
ill-informed overexposure to the property market during the formation of a housing bubble. 
This objective of attempting to generate ever increasing profits was also self-serving as a 
large portion of Fuld’s compensation consisted of bonuses aligned with firm performance. 
The thesis finds that Fuld’s management style in attempting to achieve his personal goals 
such as maximising personal compensation, reputation and position longevity involved the 
exertion of power. Fuld’s power, which flowed from Clegg’s (1989) episodic, dispositional 
and facilitative circuits, was exerted over the firm’s corporate governance system and his 
employees and their families.  
 
Fuld’s influence over the firm’s corporate governance involved his decision to influence the 
appointment of board members who mostly lacked the background and experience to carry 
out their responsibilities effectively in a complex financial institution. Additionally Fuld con-
structed an attractive board compensation structure which enticed board members to re-
main on the board and perpetuate their longstanding relationships with the Chairman and 
senior management and a committee meeting schedule favouring compensation over fi-
nance and risk matters. This combination of board characteristics and processes led to a less 
than optimal monitoring performance and level of engagement from the Board.  
Another insight to Fuld’s use of power is reflected in his relationship with employees, where 
power was routinely exercised to ensure the pursuit of his strategy of generating ‘growth at 
all costs’. The first step in his journey for control as CEO was achieved by appointing like-
minded, compliant staff who shared his values to crucial positions. These appointments al-
most exclusively originated from the trading side of the business, an area in which Fuld de-
voted much of his career and where he understood the trader mentality typified by a pen-
chant for risky transactions. Moreover these appointments created an inner circle with 
whom Fuld could feel comfortable and avert conflict. 
The resultant corporate culture can be examined in certain communications between senior 
executives of the firm. Internal communications showed Fuld routinely resisted advice from 
other senior executives, most importantly the Chief Risk Officer relating to the firm’s exces-
sive business risks. His disregard of consistent warnings is an example of Fuld’s misplaced 
self-assuredness of possessing superior knowledge regarding the market environment. 
These qualities are also exemplified by his management style which was tainted by arrogant 
and overconfident behaviour especially during the firm’s financial crisis at the time of seek-
ing a white knight’. As employees observed Fuld’s self-perceived superiority, a CEO with a 




employees, they succumbed to his growth agenda. This power which is often exercised in-
termittently, involves power over another, in this case Fuld’s power over LB’s employees. 
Interestingly the thesis finds that the firm culture influenced by Fuld’s power, resulted in an 
organisation’s value set at odds with the firm’s documented code of ethics. Fuld’s initial de-
nial of his own accountability to the firm’s difficulties reflects his mantra of ‘surviving at all 
costs’ and is shown in itself, as an exercise of power. As the firm’s performance deteriorat-
ed, Fuld’s credibility and power diminished, shifting towards creditors and regulators, who 
had an increasing say in the firm’s future. Ultimately, the shift in power was too great and 
they decided to allow LB to fail. The following section sets out the contribution of the re-
search and finds relevance to modern day dilemmas faced by the industry, policy makers as 
well as to the regulatory framework. 
11.3 Contribution and Relevance of Research 
11.3.1 Contribution 
This thesis is motivated by a desire to better understand the causes of the GFC by examining 
the largest corporate failure in US history up to that time. Rather than limiting the analysis 
to economic or technical factors, the thesis peels back the layers of the causes of LB’s failure 
to reveal a story involving human and organisational interactions within a socially construct-
ed environment. There is a relative dearth of qualitative research on the investment banking 
industry which this thesis addresses.  
 
The primary contribution of this thesis is its use of two theoretical frameworks in explaining 
the downfall of LB and providing a rich insight into the investment banking industry and the 
role of the financial network in the lead up to the GFC. The application of the two theoreti-
cal frameweworks is unique and was necessary as the use of a single theory would have 
been insufficient to explain both internal and external influences on LB’s failure. The case 
study provided an analysis of practice within the industry and permitted an evaluation of 
the two theoretical frameworks used. This use of the two theories combined with an histor-
ical approach and case study method is unique in explaining the cause of LB’s failure and 
offering insight into the GFC.  
New Institutional Theory was valuable in elucidating the isomorphic influences on the finan-
cial network, for example from the mimicking of financial structures and models between 
investment banks, to the influences applied to accounting standard setters. However this 
theory is not sufficient to explain all the undercurrents at play in the major decision-making 
by members of the financial network. To help explain the behaviours and culture prevalent 




strumental in guiding LB down a path of self-destruction. The effective use of power over 
others within the organisation was the principal tool used by its CEO for his self-interest 
purposes. In the process he was able to affect the culture in a way that imbued the firm with 
his own view of the world and to support his objective of growth and later, ‘survival at all 
costs’. Ironically, the power that facilitated the realisation of Fuld’s ambitions eventually 
backfired in line with the firm’s diminishing fortunes. Instrumentally, shareholders, creditors 
and regulators, who were earlier subjected to Fuld’s influence, had gained the ascendancy 
and ultimately triggered his downfall.  
 
This study therefore constitutes an alternative means of understanding the GFC and failure 
of one of the largest investment banks in the US. The qualitative factors revealed by this re-
search offer an understanding of the influences on the evolution of the regulatory field and 
the challenges and potential weaknesses confronting the investment banking industry, 
which in turn can enlighten the industry’s modus operandi. The relevance to the current en-
vironment is topical as shown by the following section. 
11.3.2 Relevance of Research 
The investment banking industry has been linked to repeated financial crises. Although dis-
cussion on financial and economic factors contributing to financial crises have been well 
covered, this research is intended to inform governments and regulators to better frame 
and implement policies, legislation and regulations and warn investment banks of the pit-
falls of a dysfunctional organisational culture in order to mitigate a repeat catastrophe of 
the GFC and failure of large non-bank financial institutions. 
 
It is reassuring that since the GFC, the US government and regulators have implemented 
many improvements to the regulatory framework. Significant progress was made in 
strengthening financial market regulation with the enactment of the Dodd–Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (The Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act  2010). However at the time of writing this thesis, The US Govern-
ment under the Trump Administration announced more than 100 changes to regulations 
intended to loosen restrictions on financial institutions, importantly including those applying 
to ‘bad behaviour’: 
 
Changes proposed by the Treasury Department include easing up on restrictions big banks 
now face in their trading operations, lightening the annual stress tests they must undergo, 
and reducing the powers of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), which has 






This development runs contrary to the recommendations of this thesis and is of particular 
concern as the proposed changes apply mainly to those investment banks which survived 
the GFC, either as separate entities or divisions of larger banks. 
  
The industry has long sought many of the proposed changes, which would mostly benefit 
banks like JPMorgan Chase & Co, Bank of America Corp, Citigroup Inc, Wells Fargo & Co, 
Goldman Sachs Group Inc and Morgan Stanley (Schroeder & Lambert 2017). 
 
Therefore, it is hoped that the findings of this thesis are noted by policy makers and regula-
tors. Carefully consideration should be given to pitching supervisory tools available such as 
capital adequacy, liquidity and other relevant prudential rules and guidelines at an appro-
priate level to manage the systemic and firm specific risk within the investment banking in-
dustry. Specifically, more attention, not less, should be applied on matters of organisational 
culture within investment banks and a system of disincentives for breaches of good corpo-
rate conduct should be implemented. Given the fast-paced economic and technological de-
velopments, combined with an industry that readily adopts innovation, these strictures 
need to be regularly monitored and amended if necessary. A narrowing of the knowledge 
asymmetry between investment bankers and regulators, whereby investment banking pro-
fessionals are able to influence regulators through their more intimate knowledge of certain 
financial products and risks would assist in addressing the monitoring role by regulators. A 
regulatory review of compensation structures at all senior levels within the industry could 
assist in narrowing compensation inconsistencies between industry and government agency 
employees. This would in turn mitigate some of the general flow of highly talented individu-
als to industry instead of regulatory agencies. The above recommendations would contrib-
ute to the government’s and regulators’ responsibilities towards the public interest. 
 
This thesis emphasised the importance of independence for accounting standard setters. 
Better systems of identifying otherwise unintended consequences from new or amended 
accounting standards is encouraged. On 12 June 2014, the FASB introduced Accounting 
Standards Update No. 2014-11, Transfers and Servicing (Topic 860): Repurchase-to-Maturity 
Transactions, Repurchase Financings, and Disclosures (Financial Accounting Standards Board 
2014). This standard removes any ambiguity relating to the accounting for repurchase 
agreements by eliminating the option to account for repurchase agreements as sales, and 
confirms that they should be accounted for as secured borrowings:  
First, the amendments in this Update change the accounting for repurchase-to-maturity 
transactions to secured borrowing accounting. Second, for repurchase financing arrange-
ments, the amendments require separate accounting for a transfer of a financial asset exe-
cuted contemporaneously with a repurchase agreement with the same counterparty, which 
will result in secured borrowing accounting for the repurchase agreement (Financial 




Although addressing the problem, FASB’s clarification for the accounting treatment of re-
purchase agreements has come six years following LB’s bankruptcy and the acknowledge-
ment of the firms unethical application of FAS 140. 
The other financial network participants found to be deficient in their responsibilities were 
the CRAs which also contributed to the GFC. It is encouraging that The Dodd–Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 2010) addressed many shortcomings of the 
CRAs. However much still needs to be done. The regulations which require government 
sanctioned organisations to invest within prescribed rating bands have not been changed at 
the time of writing. Further the thesis found the CRAs issuer pays business model created 
conflicts of interest and despite considerable discussion between the SEC, the CRAs and in-
dustry, no changes have been made as yet. Considerable time has elapsed since the GFC and 
developments relating to the above proposed amendments to regulations have yet to be 
implemented, reflecting a lack of urgency from the regulatory sphere. The SEC annually re-
views progress on the evolution of the regulatory framework relating to CRAs and in its lat-
est report of findings in 2016 did not find any current deficiencies. In relation to its investi-
gations, the SEC is keeping its process open, therefore confirming its lack of urgency, ac-
knowledging that it “has not determined whether any finding discussed in this Report con-
stitutes a material regulatory deficiency, but may do so in the future” (Securities and 
Exchange Commission 2016, p. 12). 
Finally this thesis warns of the adverse consequences that a concentration and misuse of 
power poses to investment banks. Effective corporate governance assists in promoting re-
sponsible management decision-making. The board of directors represent the ultimate 
group responsible for corporate governance. Therefore their appointment should be inde-
pendent from the influence of management they are responsible for overseeing. Moreover 
a meticulous process should be employed in ensuring the appointment of skilled, experi-
enced and engaged directors.  Corporate governance should include formal and informal 
ethical guidelines which imbue appropriate values within the firm as opposed to a mere tick 
a box approach. Values can also be influenced by compensation structures offered to em-
ployees, senior management and the CEO, thereby implying that a balance needs to be 
reached between encouraging strong performance on the one hand and encouraging re-
sponsible practice within a firm on the other. A degree of independence is also encouraged 
for those responsible for safeguarding the business risks of a firm at the operational level. 
This is usually the CRO who possesses a deep knowledge of a firm’s risks and who should be 
insulated from undue influence from senior management. Ultimately it is recommended 





11.4 Limitations and Recommendations for Fu-
ture Research in the Area 
The time period selected, which ends at the time of LB’s bankruptcy in 2008, is limiting with 
respect to the regulatory, commercial, social and political responses post-GFC. Similarly this 
study is conducted using the US as its subject field and a detailed discussion of the effective 
failure of other international investment banks is beyond the scope of this study and is rec-
ommended for future research. Similar studies covering other jurisdictions would be in-
formative on the impacts on the investment banking industry from diverse cultures and on 
whether investment bankers in these other countries exhibit similar characteristics and be-
haviours. This study also uses secondary data from third parties such as journalists, books 
authored by ex-employees who may have accounts of industry participants. The use of pri-
mary sources to delve into the cultural and behavioural traits found within the industry, 
such as personal interviews with surviving individuals directly involved in the story would 
provide a deeper insight.  
Consistent with the views of Sinclair (2010), the importance of a transparent and distinct 
separation between investment banking industry participants and their regulators is rela-
tively under researched and further study of the relationships between the regulator and 
the regulated is considered worthwhile. The evolution of regulation and a comparison with 
other jurisdictions can inform future attempts to improve the regulatory framework. There-
fore a detailed study of the history of capital regulation is recommended for the US and 
other countries’ investment banking industries. Of particular interest would be the disparity 
and disproportionality of regulations between the investment banking and banking indus-
tries. This disproportionality in addition to the decision to establish the Consolidated Super-
vising Entity program for the investment banking industry in 2004, which was found to be 
deficient, warrants further research.  
In conclusion, the GFC represented a massive failure of institutional practice and the human 
condition. Quantitative analysis cannot account for the forces which impacted on the im-
portant decisions made by participants in the financial network. The choice of theoretical 
perspectives of Clegg’s (1989) Theory of Power and DiMaggio & Powell’s (1983) New Institu-
tional Theory represent a way to understand these forces. If the human condition and insti-
tutional practices are unchangeable, then the world is destined to repeat the failures of the 
past and guarantee future financial crises. It is up to bodies mandated by the wider public to 
mitigate as best they can the repeat of the GFC in view of the many casualties, both corpo-
rate and public. This implies an appropriate legislative response and a reflection on our hu-
man frailties which cause us to disproportionately prioritise self-interest over the public 




famously stated that ‘greed is good’. The movie explored the question as to whether greed 
benefits the self-interested individual at the expense of corporate shareholders. Applying 
the same concept in the context of this thesis, the phrase could be restated as ‘power and 
influence are good’. However this thesis has shown this to be a flawed belief in the invest-
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 Appendix A - Deregulation Timeline for Investment Banking Industry 
 
Year Event / Act Description 
1978 Marquette vs. First of Omaha Supreme Court allows banks to export the usury 
laws of their home state nationwide and sets off a 
competitive wave of deregulation, resulting in the 
complete elimination of usury rate ceilings in 
South Dakota and Delaware among others. 
   
1980 Depository Institutions Deregu-
lation and Monetary Control Act 
Legislation increases deposit insurance from USD 
40,000 to USD 100,000, authorizes new authority 
to thrift institutions, and calls for the complete 
phase-out of interest rate ceilings on deposit ac-
counts. 
   
1982 Garn-St. Germain Depository 
Institutions Act 
Bill deregulates thrifts almost entirely, allowing 
commercial lending and providing for a new ac-
count to compete with money market mutual 
funds. This was a Reagan administration initiative 
that passed with strong bi-partisan support. 
   
1987 Federal Savings and Loan Insur-
ance Corporation (FSLIC) Insol-
vency 
U.S. Government Accountability Office declares 
the deposit insurance fund of the savings and loan 
industry to be insolvent as a result of mounting 
institutional failures. 
   
1989 Financial Institutions Reform 
and Recovery Act 
Act abolishes the Federal Home Loan Bank Board 
and FSLIC, transferring them to OTS and the FDIC, 
respectively. The plan also creates the Resolution 
Trust Corporation to resolve failed thrifts. 
   
1994 Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking 
and Branching Efficiency Act 
This bill eliminated previous restrictions on inter-
state banking and branching. It passed with broad 
bipartisan support. 
   
1996 Fed Reinterprets Glass-Steagall Federal Reserve reinterprets the Glass-Steagall Act 
several times, eventually allowing bank holding 
companies to earn up to 25 percent of their reve-
nues in investment banking. 
   
1998 Citicorp-Travelers Merger Citigroup, Inc. merges a commercial bank with an 
insurance company that owns an investment bank 





Year Event / Act Description 
   
1999 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act With support from Fed Chairman Greenspan, 
Treasury Secretary Rubin and his successor Law-
rence Summers, the bill repeals the Glass-Steagall 
Act completely. 
   
2000 Commodity Futures Moderniza-
tion Act 
Passed with support from the Clinton Administra-
tion, including Treasury Secretary Lawrence Sum-
mers, and bi-partisan support in Congress. The bill 
prevented the Commodity Futures Trading Com-
mission from regulating most over-the-counter 
derivative contracts, including credit default 
swaps. 
   
2004 Voluntary Regulation The SEC proposes a system of voluntary regulation 
under the Consolidated Supervised Entities pro-
gram, allowing investment banks to hold less capi-
tal in reserve and increase leverage. 
   
2007 Subprime Mortgage Crisis Defaults on subprime loans send shockwaves 
throughout the secondary mortgage market and 
the entire financial system. 
   
2007 Term Auction Facility Special liquidity facility of the Federal Reserve 
lends to depository institutions. Unlike lending 
through the discount window, there is no public 
disclosure on loans made through this facility. 
   
2008 Bear Stearns Collapse The investment bank is sold to JP Morgan Chase 
with assistance from the Federal Reserve. 
   
2008 Primary Dealer Facilities Special lending facilities open the discount win-
dow to investment banks, accepting a broad range 
of asset-backed securities as collateral. 
   
2008 Housing and Economic Recov-
ery Act 
Provides guarantees on new 
mortgages to subprime borrowers and authorizes 
a new federal agency, the Federal Housing Finance 
Agency, which eventually places Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac into conservatorship. 
   
2008 LB Collapse Investment bank files for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy. 




Abraham Lehmann, born Abraham Löw, cattle merchant in Rimpar, 
Bavaria[1] 
Emanuel Lehman (1827–1907), born Mendel Lehmann, 




married to Carrie 
Lauer (–1937) 
Pauline Lehman, married 




Philip Henry Isles 
(1912–1989) 
Philip Henry Isles II, 
married to Alexandra 
Moltke (1947–) 
Adam Isles (1969–) 






Henry Lehman (1822–1855), born Hayum Lehmann, 
founder of H. Lehman, which became Lehman 
Brothers 
Mayer Lehman (1830–1897), co-founder of Lehman Brothers, 








1948), married to Philip 
Goodhart 
Helen Goodhart (1887–













Arthur Altschul, Jr. (1965–) 
Emily Helen Altschul (1966–) 
Serena Altschul (1970-), broadcast journalist 
and MTV host 
Arthur Lehman (1873–1936), married to 
Adele Lewisohn, daughter of Adolph 
Lewisohn (1849–1938), mining magnate 
Helen Lehman (1905–1989),[5] lawyer, married to 
Benjamin Buttenwieser (1900–1991), banker at Kuhn, 
Loeb & Co. 
Lawrence B. Buttenwieser, lawyer at 
Katten Muchin Rosenman, married 
to Ann Lubin 
Peter L. Buttenwieser, philanthropist 
Paul A. Buttenwieser, psychiatrist 
Frances Lehman (1906–1996), married 
to John Langeloth Loeb, Sr. 
John Langeloth 
Loeb, Jr. (1930–), 
businessman 
Nicholas M. Loeb (1976–) 
Ann Loeb (1932–2011), married 
to Edgar Bronfman, Sr. (1929–
2013) 
Irving Lehman (1876–1945), 
U.S. lawyer and politician, 
married to Sissie Straus 
Herbert H. Lehman (1878–
1963), 45th Governor of 
New York 




Appendix C - List of Transactions undertaken by LB 1971 – 1986 
Year and Transaction       
1973       
1. Alison Mortgage Investment Trust (1 deal during the year)  
2. Automatic Data Processing, Inc. (4 deals during the year)  
3. Avis, Inc. (2 deals during the year)    
4. C.I.T. Financial Corp. (10 deals during the year)   
5. Chase Manhattan Mortgage and Realty Trust (3 deals during the year) 
6. City of Clinton, IA / Standard Brands, Inc. (1 deal during the year)   
7. Connecticut Light and Power Co. (1 deal during the year)  
8. County of Ashland, Ohio (1 deal during the year)    
9. Digital Equipment Corporation (9 deals during the year)  
10. European Investment Bank (4 deals during the year)  
11. Federative Republic of Brazil (1 deal during the year)    
12. FibreBoard Corporation (3 deals during the year)  
13. Gardinier, Inc. (1 deal during the year)   
14. Marriott Corporation (2 deals during the year)   
15. Massey-Ferguson Credit Corporation (1 deal during the year) 
16. Met-Mex Penoles, S.A. (2 deals during the year)  
17. Parker Drilling Company (1 deal during the year)  
18. Peabody Galion Corporation (1 deal during the year)    
19. The Medical Clinic Board of the City of Birmingham-South (Alabama) (1 deal during the 
year) 
20. The Mortgage Bank and Financial Administration Agency of the Kingdom of Denmark (1 
deal during the year) 
       
1974       
1. Abbott Laboratories (1 deal during the year)   
2. Amsterdam-Rotterdam Bank N.V. (1 deal during the year)  
3. Bankers Trust New York Corp. (3 deals during the year)  
4. Bendix Corp. (1 deal during the year)     
5. C.I.T. Financial Corp. (10 deals during the year)   
6. California Pollution Control Financing Authority (1 deal during the year) 
7. Caterpillar Tractor Co. (2 deals during the year)   
8. Caterpillar Tractor Co. (2 deals during the year)   
9. Chase Manhattan Corp. (2 deals during the year)  
10. Chemical New York Corp. (4 deals during the year)  
11. Clark Equipment Co. (1 deal during the year)   
12. Clark Equipment Credit Corp. (5 deals during the year)  
13. Continental Can Co., Inc. (5 deals during the year)  
14. County of Monroe, Michigan (2 deals during the year)    




Year and Transaction       
16. Diamond Shamrock Corporation (4 deals during the year)  
17. European Coal and Steel Community (7 deals during the year) 
18. General American Transportation Corporation (9 deals during the year)  
19. General American Transportation Corporation (9 deals during the year)  
20. General Foods Corporation (3 deals during the year)  
21. Hercules Incorporated (2 deals during the year)  
22. Inland Steel Company (3 deals during the year)   
23. J. Lyons & Company Limited (1 deal during the year)  
24. Macy Credit Corp. (4 deals during the year)   
25. National Rural Utilities Cooperative Finance Corporation (4 deals during the year) 
26. Ocean Highway and Port Authority (1 deal during the year)   
27. Orange and Rockland Utilities, Inc. (1 deal during the year) 
28. Philip Morris Incorporated (3 deals during the year)    
29. The Detroit Edison Company (13 deals during the year)  
30. Thermo Electron Corporation (2 deals during the year)  
31. W. W. Grainger, Inc. (3 deals during the year)   
       
1975       
1. Asian Development Bank (2 deals during the year)  
2. Associated Dry Goods Credit Corp. (1 deal during the year)  
3. Bankers Trust New York Corp. (3 deals during the year)  
4. Bethlehem Steel Corp. (5 deals during the year)   
5. C.I.T. Financial Corp. (10 deals during the year)   
6. Clark Equipment Credit Corp. (5 deals during the year)  
7. County of Monroe, Michigan (2 deals during the year)    
8. Crocker National Corporation (3 deals during the year)  
9. Crown Zellerbach Corp. (1 deal during the year)   
10. Department of Community Affairs and Economic Development of the State of Dela-
ware (1 deal during the year) 
11. Diamond Shamrock Corporation (4 deals during the year)  
12. Digital Equipment Corporation (9 deals during the year)  
13. European Coal and Steel Community (7 deals during the year) 
14. European Coal and Steel Community (7 deals during the year) 
15. European Investment Bank (4 deals during the year)  
16. Flexi-Van Corporation (1 deal during the year)   
17. FMC Corporation (3 deals during the year)   
18. FMC Finance Corporation (1 deal during the year)  
19. General Signal Corporation (1 deal during the year)  
20. Hercules Incorporated (2 deals during the year)  
21. Industrial Development Board of the City of Copperhill, Tennessee / Cities Service Com-
pany (1 dea during the year l) 




Year and Transaction       
deal during the year) 
23. Inland Steel Company (3 deals during the year)   
24. International Minerals & Chemical Corporation (1 deal during the year) 
25. International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation (9 deals during the year)  
26. International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation (9 deals during the year)  
27. ITT Financial Corporation (4 deals during the year)  
28. Kerr Glass Manufacturing Corporation (1 deal during the year) 
29. Kingdom of Norway (3 deals during the year)    
30. Kingdom of Norway (3 deals during the year)    
31. Koch Industries, Inc. (1 deal during the year)   
32. Macy Credit Corp. (4 deals during the year)   
33. Marriott Overseas Corporation N.V. (1 deal during the year)   
34. Massey-Ferguson Nederland N.V. (2 deals during the year) 
35. Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company (1 deal during the year) 
36. Montgomery Ward Credit Corporation (3 deals during the year)   
37. Montgomery Ward Credit Corporation (3 deals during the year)   
38. Morrison-Knudsen Company, Inc. (1 deal during the year)  
39. N L Industries, Inc. (1 deal during the year)     
40. National Rural Utilities Cooperative Finance Corporation (4 deals during the year) 
41. National Rural Utilities Cooperative Finance Corporation (4 deals during the year) 
42. New York State Electric & Gas Corporation (4 deals during the year) 
43. Pennzoil Company (2 deals during the year)   
44. Philip Morris Incorporated (3 deals during the year)    
45. Revlon, Inc. (6 deals during the year)   
46. Revlon, Inc. (6 deals during the year)   
47. Sybron Corporation (2 deals during the year)    
48. Tektronix, Inc. (3 deals during the year)   
49. Tektronix, Inc. (3 deals during the year)   
50. Textron Inc. (1 deal during the year)     
51. The Detroit Edison Company (13 deals during the year)  
52. The Miller-Wohl Company, Inc. (1 deal during the year)    
53. The Signal Companies, Inc. (1 deal during the year)    
54. The Williams Companies (2 deals during the year)  
55. USLIFE Corporation (1 deal during the year)   
56. W. W. Grainger, Inc. (3 deals during the year)   
57. Zapata Off-Shore Company (1 deal during the year)  
       
1976       
1. AMFAC, Inc. (1 deal during the year)    
2. Eveleth Expansion Company (1 deal during the year)  
       




Year and Transaction       
1. Chemical New York Corp. (4 deals during the year)  
2. Fuqua Industries, Inc. (1 deal during the year)   
3. General American Transportation Corporation (9 deals during the year)  
4. ITT Financial Corporation (4 deals during the year)  
5. Lehman Brothers (2 deals during the year)     
       
1978       
1. American General Insurance Company (1 deal during the year) 
2. General American Transportation Corporation (9 deals)  
3. GenRad, Inc. (5 deals during the year)   
4. ITT Financial Corporation (4 deals during the year)  
5. Memorex Corporation (1 deal during the year)    
       
1979       
1. Beckman Instruments, Inc. (4 deals during the year)  
2. European Coal and Steel Community (7 deals during the year) 
3. ITT Financial Corporation (4 deals during the year)  
       
1980       
1. GenRad, Inc. (5 deals during the year)   
2. Geosource Inc. (1 deal during the year)   
3. Tektronix, Inc. (3 deals during the year)   
       
1981       
1. The LTV Corporation (2 deals during the year)   
       
1982       
1. GenRad, Inc. (5 deals during the year)   
       
1983       
1. BGS Systems, Inc. (1 deal during the year)   
2. GenRad, Inc. (5 deals during the year)   
       




Appendix D - Fed Funds Rate Changes 
Year Month Fed Funds Rate Comments 
Federal Reserve Board Chairman -  Alan Greenspan (August 1987 - January 2006) 
1987 
  
  1987: GDP = 3.5%, Unemployment = 5.7%, Inflation = 
4.4%   
  Sep 7.25%   
  Nov 6.75%   
1988 
  
  1988: GDP = 4.2%, Unemployment = 5.3%, Inflation = 
4.4% 
  Feb 6.50%   
  Dec 9.75%   
1989 
  
  1989: GDP = 3.7%, Unemployment = 5.4%, Inflation = 
4.6% 
  Dec 8.25% H.W. Bush took office. Fed lowered rates. 
1990 
  
  1990: GDP = 1.9%, Unemployment = 6.3%, Inflation = 
6.1% 
  Dec 7.00%   
1991 
  
  1991: GDP = -0.1%, Unemployment = 7.3%, Inflation = 
3.1% 
  Dec 4.00%   
1992 
  
  1992: GDP = 3.6%, Unemployment = 7.4%, Inflation = 
2.9% 
  Apr 3.75%   
  Jul 3.25%   
  Sep 3.00%   
1993     Clinton took office in 1993. Fed made no changes. 
1994 
  
  1994: GDP = 4.0%, Unemployment = 5.5%, Inflation = 
2.7% 
  Feb 3.25%   
  Mar 3.50%   
  Apr 3.75%   
  May 4.25%   
  Aug 4.75%   
  Nov 5.50%   
1995 
  
  1995: GDP = 2.7%, Unemployment = 5.6%, Inflation = 
2.5% 
  Feb 6.00%   




Year Month Fed Funds Rate Comments 
  Dec 5.50%   
1996 
  
  1996: GDP = 3.8%, Unemployment = 5.4%, Inflation 
= 3.3%  
  Jan 5.25%   
1997 
  
  1997: GDP = 4.5%, Unemployment = 4.7%, Inflation = 
1.7%  
  Mar 5.50%   
1998 
  
  1998: GDP = 4.5%, Unemployment = 6%, Inflation = 
1.6% 
  Sep 5.25%   
  Oct 5.00%   
  Nov 4.75%   
1999 
  
  1999: GDP = 4.7%, Unemployment = 6%, Inflation = 
2.7% 
  Jun 5.00%   
  Aug 5.25%   
  Nov 5.50%   
2000 
  
  2000: GDP = 4.1%, Unemployment = 6%, Inflation = 
3.4% 
  Feb 5.75%   
  Mar 6.00%   
  May 6.50%   
2001 
  
  2001: GDP = 1.0%, Unemployment = 6%, Inflation = 
1.6%. George W. Bush took office. 
  Jan 6.00% Jan-03 
  Jan 5.50% Jan-31 
  Mar 5.00%   
  Apr 4.50%   
  May 4.00%   
  Jun 3.75%   
  Aug 3.50%   
  Sep 3.00%   
  Oct 2.50%   
  Nov 2.00%   
  Dec 1.75%   
2002 
  
  2002: GDP = 1.8%, Unemployment = 6%, Inflation = 
2.4% 
  Nov 1.25%   
2003 
  
  2003: GDP = 2.8%, Unemployment = 6%, Inflation = 
1.9% 
  Jun 1.00%   
2004 
  





Year Month Fed Funds Rate Comments 
  Jun 1.25%   
  Aug 1.50%   
  Sep 1.75%   
  Nov 2.00%   
  Dec 2.25%   
2005 
  
  2005: GDP = 3.3%, Unemployment = 6%, Inflation = 
3.4% 
  Feb 2.50%   
  Mar 2.75%   
  May 3.00%   
  Jun 3.25%   
  Aug 3.50%   
  Sep 3.75%   
  Nov 4.00%   
  Dec 4.25%   
Federal Reserve Board Chairman -  Ben Bernanke (February 2006 - January 2014) 
2006 
  
  2006: GDP = 2.7%, Unemployment = 6%, Inflation = 
2.5%.         
  Jan 4.50%   
  Mar 4.75%   
  May 5.00%   
  Jun 5.25%   
2007 
  
  2007: GDP = 1.8%, Unemployment = 6%, Inflation = 
4.1% 
  Sep 4.75%   
  Oct 4.50%   
  Dec 4.25%   
2008 
  
  2008: GDP = -0.3%, Unemployment = 6%, Inflation = 
0.1% 
  Jan 3.50% Jan-22 
  Jan 3.00% Jan-30 
  Mar 2.25%   
  Apr 2.00%   
  Oct 1.50%   
  Oct 1.00%   
  Dec 0%   






Appendix E - Main Types of Structured Finance Instruments  
Asset-Backed Securities (ABS).  
ABS is the general term for bonds or notes backed by pools of assets rather than a single 
corporation or government. Common types of collateral for ABS are auto loan receivables, 
and student loan receivables.  
Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS).  
MBS are ABS whose cash flows are backed by the principal and interest payments of a set of 
mortgage loans. MBS can be divided into RMBS and commercial-mortgage-backed securities 
(CMBS), depending on the type of property underlying the mortgages. 
Home Equity Loan Securities (HELS).  
HELS are RMBS whose cash flows are backed by a pool of HELs. 
Collateralised Debt Obligations (CDOs).  
CDOs are structured finance securities that are pooled and tranched. CDOs are backed by a 
pool of assets, like other structured finance securities, but they issue classes of securities 
with some investors having priority over others. 
Collateralised Bond Obligations (CBOs).  
CBOs are CDOs backed primarily by high yield corporate bonds. 
Collateralised Loan Obligations (CLOs).  
CLOs are CDOs backed primarily by leveraged high-yield bank loans. 
Collateralised Mortgage Obligations (CMOs).  











Appendix F - Political Contributions by the Investment Banking Industry in 2007 
Contributor USD Donated  
Over USD 500,000 
Securities Industry & Financial Mkt Assn 5,680,000 
Investment Co Institute 5,630,841 
Blackstone Group 4,746,250 
Merrill Lynch 4,420,000 
Cerberus Capital Management 3,000,000 
KKR & Co 2,820,000 
Goldman Sachs 2,720,000 
Private Equity Council 2,460,000 
FMR Corp 2,395,000 
Morgan Stanley 2,360,000 
Credit Suisse Group 1,920,000 
Managed Funds Assn 1,900,000 
Principal Financial Group 1,883,047 
CME Group 1,695,000 
Charles Schwab Corp 1,652,000 
TIAA-CREF 1,490,000 
National Venture Capital Assn 1,445,739 
NYSE Euronext 1,220,000 
Federated Investors Inc 1,180,000 
NASDAQ OMX Group 1,139,754 
TPG Capital 920,000 
Intellectual Ventures LLC 902,000 
International Swaps & Derivatives Assn 900,000 
JPMorgan Chase & Co 900,000 
Trafigura Ltd 900,000 
State Street Corp 880,340 
Ameriprise Financial 848,677 
Vanguard Group 800,000 
Citadel Investment Group 790,000 
Chicago Board Options Exchange 770,000 
Bain Capital 720,000 
Lehman Brothers 720,000 
UBS AG 720,000 
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority 680,000 
American International Group 680,000 
Alliance for Investment Transparency 680,000 
Carlyle Group 680,000 
Deutsche Bank AG 650,000 
Options Clearing Corp 638,441 




Contributor USD Donated  
Over USD 500,000 
Group MENATEP 560,000 
Stanford Financial Group 540,000 
E*TRADE Group 520,000 
Oaktree Capital Management 510,000 






Appendix G - Regulatory Uses of Credit Ratings in the US 









1931 Required banks to mark-
to-market lower rated 
bonds 




1936 Prohibited banks from 
purchasing ‘speculative 
securities’ 
BBB OCC, FDIC and Fed-
eral Reserve joint 
statements  
Prudence 
1951 Imposed higher capital 
requirement on insurers’ 
lower rated bonds 






1975 Imposed higher capital 
haircuts on broker dealers’ 
below investment grade 
bonds 
BBB SEC amendment to 
rule 15c3-1, the uni-





1982 Eased disclosure require-
ments for investment 
grade bonds 






1984 Eased issuance of non-
agency mortgage backed 
securities 
AA Congressional 
promulgation of the 
secondary Mortgage 
Market Enhance-




1987 Permitted margin lending 
against MBS and (later) 
foreign bonds 
AA Federal Reserve 
regulation T 
Prudence 
1989 Allowed pension funds to 
invest in high rated ABS 
A Department of La-





1989 Prohibited S&Ls from in-
vesting in below invest-
ment grade bonds 
BBB Congressional 
promulgation of the 
Financial Institutions 
Recovery and Re-




1991 Required money market 
mutual funds to limit hold-
ing of low rated paper 
A1* SEC amendment to 
rule 2a-7 under the 
investment company 




1992 Exempted issues of certain 
ABS from registration as a 
BBB SEC adoption of Rule 















mutual fund vestment Company 
Act of 1940 
Access 
1994 Imposes varying capital 
charges on banks and 





OCC, FDIC, OTS Pro-
posed Rule on Re-






1998 Department of Transpor-
tation can only extend 
credit assistance to pro-
jects with an investment 
grade rating 
BBB Transport Infrastruc-
ture Finance and 
Innovation Act 1998 
Prudence 
1999 Restricts the ability of na-
tional banks to establish 
financial subsidiaries 
A Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Act of 1999 
Prudence 
2000 Loan by non-profit corpo-
ration eligible for guaran-
tee under the Act provid-
ed that such corporation 
has one or more issues of 
outstanding long-term 
debt that is rated within 
the highestthreerating 
categories of an NRSRO 
(District of Columbia – 
Appropriations Legisla-
tion) 
A Public Law 106-553 Prudence 
Source: (Langohr & Langohr 2008) pp.432-433 
